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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1 . The Problem of the Dissertation 
A decade ago , someone characterized the major factors 
determining American foreign policy as follows: 
The country has gone to the dogs. What F . D.R . 
started, little Truman and that Red Acheson are 
finishing. Everything that's happening to the 
country fits into a master plan of Stalin's . 
He is conniving with the International Jews, 
Frankfurter is one of the worst . Truman is 
a yes-man for Frankfurter, as Marshall was a 
front for Anna Rosenberg . The State Depart-
ment is a bunch of Reds . Hiss made our policy 
and helped concoct the U. N. , another dodge to 
cripple our nation . The U. N. is being run for 
Stalin's convenience, as a sounding board for 
spreading Communist propaganda over the entire 
world . The Jewish Gestapo runs everything . l 
In a 1937 encyclical, Pope Pius XI maintained that the 
Vatican had "called attention to the perils of communism 
more frequently and more effectively than any public 
authority on earth . 112 In 1952 Methodists declared that 
1 . Quoted in Arnold Forster and Benjamin Epstein, The 
Trouble-Makers (Garden City, N. Y. : Doubleday and 
Company , 19S2), p . 106 . 
2. 11 Divini Redemptoris , " in Joseph Husslein (ed . ) , Social 
Wellsprings, (2 vols ., Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing 
Company , 1949) , II , 343. 
1 
"the Church in a unique way holds in its keeping the moral 
and spiritual forces for a peaceful world."l 
Such are three estimates of the role of religion in 
international affairs. Their common theme is that religion 
is the more or less decisive factor . But in a textbook on 
international organization , a much different assessment is 
ventured: "Religion is hardly strong enough, and certainly 
not sufficiently united, in this day and age to produce a 
world society . Indeed, such cosmopolitanism as exists is 
somewhat cynical and skeptical of the religion which is too 
often tribal and nationalistic in its origin and employment . 11 2 
These contrasting and emotionally-charged judgments help 
to set the stage for the arena of action to which this disser-
tation is addressed . The perception of religious influence 
in world affairs is peculiarly subject to distortion . Empir-
ical study of religion is itself a singularly hazardous 
enterprise . When the passions of the political arena are 
joined to religious sentiments, the mixture makes objectivity 
even more difficult . And when the focus of concern is the 
behavior of the political system in the realm of foreign 
policy, the dangers of distortion are compounded to the 
1 . The Methodist Church , Doctrines and Disci lines of The 
Methodist Church , 1952 New York and Nashville : The 
Methodist Publishing House, 1952), p . 644. 
2 . Pitman B. Potter, An Introduction to the Study of Inter-
national Organization, Fifth Edition (New York: Appleton-
Century-Crofts, Inc. , 1948) , p . 43 . 
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highest degree. There is a "triangle of troubles" at the 
outset, inherently requiring powers of detachment in religion, 
politics, and foreign policy . 
The twentieth century American setting of this study has 
been characterized by the most elaborate interpenetration of 
these phenomena. Not surprisingly, there has been an unpar-
alleled emotionalism in American attitudes on world affairs. 
The war "to make the world safe for democracy," isolationism, 
pacifism, "unconditional surrender," "one worlders," "the 
betrayal at Yalta," Zionism, "massive retaliation," 11 real-
ism11--just to mention such labels and slogans is to reveal 
the intense ~motional investment Americans have made in their 
attraction or aversion to various policies. The theologian, 
the political scientist, and the diplomat have all been 
a c t ors in the same setting; detached observation is a neces-
sary goal for each, but it is a simple possibility for none. 
It is the primary problem of the dissertation to develop 
a schematic and comprehensive approach to the empirical study 
of the relationships between Protestantism and American 
foreign policy since 1898. There is a secondary and normative 
concern: to define these relationships in such a way as to 
guide the most fruitful research and the most responsible 
religious action. 
Whatever the defaults of political science and interna-
tional relations may be in this regard, it is the lack of 
3 
comprehensive, critical self-study by the disciplines of re-
ligion which has prompted the selection of the problem. To 
the extent that contemporary discussion and action proceed 
from ignorance of the actual historical relationships between 
these two realms, they neglect perhaps the most important 
sources of insight available . It has been commonly observed 
that religion's unique forms of power have been employed for 
the most opposite of purposes in the world . It is pertinent 
to inquire whether religious leadership elites have possessed 
the perspective of this observation when their own influence 
has been brought to bear upon major political decisions . 
Contemporary "realists" charge that religious leadership pos-
sesses an addiction to "religion- in-general." It must be 
asked whether churchmen are marked by discriminating judgment 
and the capacity to recognize empirically the differential 
influences of religion at multiple levels of causation . From 
within organized religion, does religious influence tend to 
be viewed only in general and pervasive terms? 
A contrasting view is often provided by the external 
critics of religion in world affairs who may be more percep-
tive of religion as a "factor" and more sensitive to its 
"intrusion" than religionists themselves . But these critics 
have yet to provide an adequately organized body of data . 
The "religious factor" in politics or international relations, 
when it is singled out, is likely to be identified with only 
one aspect of the problem, such as "the Jewish vote," or 
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religious conflict (the India-Pakistan dispute), or church-
state controversy (diplomatic relations with the Vatican). 
At the outset, it is important to recognize this con-
trast between the charge of sentimentality against religious 
leadership and the apparent skepticism of so many of the 
practitioners and the students of the diplomatic arts. The 
modern writing of diplomatic history breathes a skeptical 
air with regard to all things religious, "moralistic," and 
''idealistic." To the extent that religion has been faithful 
to all of its own imperatives in the life of the nations, it 
can afford to regard such an air as the price it must pay for 
faithfulness to transcendent obligations in the often hostile 
arenas of the world--although it must not cease to share in 
the hope and the work for better understanding through vital 
communication with policy-makers and political scientists as 
persons. But, to the extent that the skepticism of diplo-
matic historians is justified by religion's own ignorance and 
irresponsible action, religion will have to earn a new re-
spect through more critical self-study and more intelligent 
and responsible action . 
The selection of this problem has also been prompted by 
the suspicion that the ethical vigor of Protestantism in in-
ternational affairs has been seriously dissipated in mutual 
hostility between pacifists and nonpacifists. Have both 
groups focused more energy upon the issues between them than 
upon the constructive functions which they might perform 
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together? Is it not possible that both groups have failed 
to develop an adequate empirical understanding of the dis-
tinctively religious functions in political systems? If so, 
such an understanding may contribute to a more useful dialogue 
between them. 
2 . Definitions 
"Religion" may be defined in metaphysical terms (the 
supernatural) or in ethical terms (the "Christian" thing to 
do) . Or its definition may derive from more worldly phenom-
ena: institutional (the churches) , affiliational (Methodist), 
intellectual (beliefs) , psychological (sentiments), or legal 
(civil liberties). It is in these latter "functional" cate-
gories that a definition of religion for empirical study must 
be articulated. 
This study is primarily oriented to the "worldly phenom-
ena" of religion. It does not pretend to answer the ultimate 
question as to how any superhuman power may affect political 
processes, forei gn policy, or military action. (Some, if not 
most, Americans have confidently maintained that our national 
history, including our diplomatic and military history, has 
been a unique manifestation of Divine Providence.) Nor shall 
this study deal directly with the normative problem of what 
a "more Christian foreign policy" might be . However, it is to 
be hoped that the consideration of the functional relation-
ships between religion and foreign policy will help to clarify 
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some of the dilemmas with which men of conscience and concern 
must wrestle as they attempt to translate values into action. 
But if ultimate questions of power and of purpose cannot 
be answered by the employment of a method which is basically 
empirical and behavioral, the fact of the orientation of the 
adherents of religion to these questions must come within the 
scope of study. This orientation is clearly set forth in a 
definition of religion advanced by J. Milton Yinger which 
is accepted as relevant, adequate, and peculiarly appropriate 
to the examination of religion and world politics. Yinger 
defines religion as "a system of beliefs and practices by 
means of which a group struggles with [ the] ultimate problems 
of human life." Among these problems, he lists death, frus-
tration, hostility, and egocentricity--all touching "deep-
seated emotional needs, springing from the very nature of man 
as an individual and as a member of society."1 It is of the 
very nature of world politics to thrust these same ultimate 
problems into bold relief: death, frustration, hostility, and 
egocentricity (or ethnocentricity). 
"World politics" is, by definition, the largest arena of 
action in which the political structures and processes of the 
nations function. It is a term which has gained currency in 
recent years in the field of international relations because 
1. Religion, Society, and the Individual {New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1957), p. 9. 
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it suggests a dynamic and behavioral approach which makes 
realistic contact with other disciplines in the social 
sciences. 1 As will be noted more fully below, the adequate 
study of the complex relationships between religion and 
world politics must draw together data from a wide variety 
of scattered disciplines . 
As research and reflection on these relationships have 
proceeded, the conviction has deepened that it is only in 
this context of two ultimate concerns--universal problems 
and universal action--that a satisfactory theory of religion 
and politics (or, more traditionally, nchurch and state") 
can be developed. World politics provides the ultimate and 
most fateful setting for the very ultimate problems with 
which religion itself is preoccupi>ed . It is perhaps only 
in the international theater, with its dramatizing of supreme 
human triumphs and tragedies , that an adequate empirical theory 
of religion can be established. 
The terms of the dissertation's sub-title describe the 
theoretical framework of the study which will be elaborated 
in the second chapter: "A typological approach to the 
functions of religion in the decision-making processes of 
American foreign policy. " 
1. A. i. K. Organski, World Politics (New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 1958), pp . 7~8. 
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3. Limitations 
Notwithstanding the growth of international organization 
and of other patterns of interdependence among modern nations, 
the nation-state remains the primary unit of political action. 
This stubborn historical fact suggests that a realistic and 
manageable approach to the functions of religion in world pol-
itics would begin with the study of religious influence upon 
the foreign policy of a single nation. Accordingly, the dis-
sertation is limited primarily to the influences of American 
religious groups upon United States foreign policy. The focus 
is upon Protestant religious behavior, although it is occa-
sionally ext ended to Catholic and Jewish groups for compara-
tive purposes . The theoretical framework may be less appro-
priate to Hindus and Moslems in the East, but the structure 
of the theory in its barest outline is proposed as possibly 
applicable to other national and other religious systems and 
to be tested by further research in alternative settings. 
The period of American foreign policy under study is 
1898-1960 . Walter Lippmann has asserted that "from the pro-
mulgation of the Monroe Doctrine to the end of the war with 
Spain, there was no need for the American people to form a 
foreign policy. In that long period the very nature of for-
eign policy, of what it consists and how it is formed, was 
forgotten . "1 This long forgetfulness during the nineteenth 
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century was made possible not by our own strength but by our 
dependence upon British sea power . l The new interest in for-
eign affairs was, naturally enough, matched by an increasing 
international concern in American churches after 1898 , al-
though it was not until World War I that this concern was 
widely and directly related to the problems of policy . 
Secularization of social life in the West had, to the 
dawn of the twentieth century, removed many important func-
tions from the control of organized religion . While this 
process of secularization has continued, there have emerged 
important new forms of voluntary responsibility within Amer-
ican religious life which have expanded its functions in 
scope , if not always in power . Among these are the revitali-
zation of the missionary movement, the development of social 
Christianity, and the ecumenical movement . 
It is important for purposes of this study to observe 
that these religious developments have occurred during pre-
cisely that same period in which America was becoming a world 
power and was having to formulate foreign policies of increas-
ingly comprehensive scope . At the very time that organized 
religion was newly seeking to relate itself to all areas of 
national and international life , foreign policy was increas-
ingly requiring a "total diplomacy . n There has been a paral-
lel expansion to ultimate boundaries . 
1. Ibid . , p • 3 0 • 
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These two parallel processes, whatever their causal 
relations or correlations, have practically accomplished 
what has always been theoretically possible in both realms: 
they have imposed claims of total obligation. Thus two 
distinctly modern forms of ancient loyalties, church and 
state, have been established: "total religion" and "total 
diplomacy . " There is all too much evidence that many Ameri-
cans do not feel the pressure of either of these competing 
loyalty-systems in its extremity, much less the seriousness 
of the tensions between the two. Some are very 11religious 11 
without exhibiting any consistent concern for world affairs . 
Some who have such a world- concern have become increasingly 
indifferent to religious i mperatives . Some get along tolera-
bly without feeling strongly about either religious or politi-
cal matters . But it is of no less importance to take account 
of the fact that each realm has establish ed its claim, and 
that this fact has important consequences for the functioning 
of each loyalty- system vis-a-vis the other. An adequate 
empirical approach to t hese relationships must stretch to the 
widest boundaries of both systems, although hopefully accu-
mulating concepts of increasing clarity and scientific 
validity . 
If these considerations do not misrepresent the problem 
of study in this area, it is evident that the most pervasive 
and complex rela tionships have developed between religion and 
foreign policy in America during the twentieth century . This 
11 
is not to suggest a priori that religion has become a more 
powerful component of policy-making: it is to suggest that 
it is a more complex component of policy-making than it has 
ever been before. The field which this study seeks to define 
must embrace both systems in the full range of their dialecti-
cal and multiple interaction. 
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While the national and the historical limits of the dis-
sertation have thus been established, the scope remains broad 
and the data vast. It is not proposed that all previous study 
bearing upon American religion and foreign policy in these 
sixty years be surveyed and tested, but rather that, from a 
wide sampling of representative and relevant literature, a 
framework be developed which is adequate to define the field. 
4. Previous Research in the Field 
The indebtedness of the dissertation to previous research 
is heavy. In a sense, the entire dissertation serves as a 
summary of work by other scholars. It borrows prodigally from 
men in a dozen disciplines, all of whom shed some light on the 
relationships between religion and foreign policy. But the 
most conspicuous problem is not the lack of attention to these 
relationships: it is the lack of integration in the effort to 
understand them. The dissertation seeks to perform an integ-
rative function for previous studies. 
Max Weber employed the "ideal-typical" method for heur-
istic and expository purposes in the construction of social 
theory. Sociologists of religion have been much indebted to 
his method and have made particular use of his 11 church 11 and 
"sect" types, generally providing elaborations of them as 
the principal features of their own systems. Weber con-
sidered the "ideal-type" as "an attempt to analyze histori-
cally unique configurations or their individual components 
by means of genetic concepts. 111 It was neither a descrip-
tion of reality nor an average: 
An ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentu-
ation of one or more points of view and by the 
synthesis of a great many diffuse , discrete, more 
or less present and occasionally absent concrete 
individual phenomena , which are arranged according 
to those one - sidedly emphasized viewpoints into 
a single analytical construct (Gedankenbild) . In 
its conceptual purity, this mental construct (Ge-
dankenbild) cannot be found empirically anywhere 
in reality . It is a utopia . Historical research 
faces the task of determining in each individual 
case , the extent to which this ideal-construct 
approximates to or diverges from reality . 2 
The fruitfulness of ideal - typical method in the sociol-
ogy of relig~on suggests its appropriateness in the develop-
ment of a conceptual scheme for religion and world politics. 
However, the data of the dissertation introduce new typolog-
ical problems which existing schemes cannot embrace . Previous 
typologies have assumed an analytical model in which religion 
is defined in relationship to a single social or poli:tical 
system. "Church" and "sect" derive their characteristics 
1 . Max Weber , The Methodology of the Social Sciences, Trans-
lated and Edited by Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch 
(Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1949), p. 93. 
2 . Ibid., p . 90 . 
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primarily from their differential socio-economic foundations 
within a society or nation (Troeltsch, Pope, Yinger1 ). 
1. Ernst Troeltsch, The Social Teachin of the Christian 
Churches, trans. Olive Wyon 2 vols., London: George 
Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1931); Liston Pope, Millhands 
and Preachers: A Stud of Gastonia (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 19 2 ; J. Milton Yinger, Religion 
in the Stru le for Power: A Stud in the Sociolo of 
Religion Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 19 
and Religion, Society, and the Individual: An Intro-
duction to the Sociolog! of Religion (New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1957 • Yinger's studies do con-
sider national and international problems as they are 
confronted by the claims of universalist religions, but 
his typology remains an elaboration of the "church-sect" 
classification within a single social system: "The de-
velopment of this instrument of analysis inevitably 
gives emphasis to the differences between church and 
sect, minimizing the similarities that all of the reli-
gious organizations within a particular socio-cultural 
system share in common." Religion, Society, and the 
Individual, p. 143. A similar interest in universalist 
religions pervades the work of Joachim Wach, Sociologff4 
of Religion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 19 ), 
which also employs a typological method. Wach's tr.pology 
remains within the more traditional categories of 'church 
and state," however, and does not recognize conflict 
among states as a problem to be accounted for by his ty-
pology. It is not contended here that all previous ty-
pologies should be supplanted by the one proposed in the 
dissertation. Weber's method was essentially heuristic. 
The 11 church ... sect 11 typology remains an enduring contri-
bution to the explanation of the dynamics of religious 
behavior within a social system. It is contended, how-
ever, that the relation of religion to world politics 
intrinsically constitutes another class of phenomena for 
which a new typology is required. Dietrich Bonhoeffer 
went so far as to reject the Weber-Troeltsch typology 
for its "genetic'' basis, preferring an "ontological" 
theory for the empirical understanding of the church 
(see pp. 64-5n. below). Bonhoeffer 1 s method and politi-
cal interests are helpful to this dissertation. However, 
there would appear to be not only room but necessity for 
both genetic and ontological elements in an adequate em-
pirical theory of religion. The former suggests dynamic 
analysis, the latter static analysis. 
14 
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"Christ and culture" (H. Richard Niebuhr) 1 and "church 
and state" (whether expressed as a theolo gical or a consti-
tutional doctrine) provide dialectical model s which tend to 
assume the unity or solidary character of the "world" to 
which the church addresses itself . 
Historic reasons may be advanced for these preoccupa-
tions. The sociologists of religion, paralleling the dominant 
interests of social Christianity and social ethics as they 
developed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
have directed their energies to the explanation of the impact 
of industrialization and the class struggle upon religious 
phenomena . Their typologies have established the dialectical 
character of religion in its institutional forms, but t his 
dialectic is "domesticated" within "the social order." 
"Church and state" theories in the period of modern na-
tionalism have been fashioned within the framework of assump-
tions based upon the doctrine of absolute national sovereignty. 
They have tended to neglect the "provisional" character of the 
state as required by radical monotheism and to be unaware of 
the historic attrition of sovereignty through the growing 
interdependence of nations and national insecurity in an age 
1. Christ and Culture (New 
1951) . An earlier work 
the Troeltsch typology . 
inationalism (New York: 
York: The Macmillan Company, 
by Niebuhr explicitly accepted 
The Social Sources of Denom-
Henry Holt and Company, 1929). 
threatened with universal disaster. Perhaps the foundations 
upon which a more adequate body of church-state theory (apart 
from the purely negative principle of their formal "separa-
tion") must rest are those afforded by a theoretical under-
standing of both religion and politics in their inevitably 
transnational aspects. 
Multiple systems comprise the very stuff of inter-
national life. The term "world politics" bears witness t0 
the fact that conflict is an enduring characteristic of 
the world, and that, not simply between the church and the 
world, but among worldly centers of loyalty as well. It 
is therefore proposed that an adequate empirical theory of 
religion must possess a "triangularity" as well as a 
"dialectic." Such a theory inherently demands the relating 
of religious behavior both to the nation-state and to the 
society of nation-states, in their interdependence and 
conflicts. While sociologists of religion have not neglected 
international problems entirely, their analytical models have 
manifested a built-in "nationalist bias" which has heretofore 
precluded the possibility of an adequate understanding of the 
relationships between religious and political systems in 
their international setting. 
In the background of American sociology of religion is 
American sociology itself which has tended to perpetuate 
this same "nationalist bias 11 --not so much a bias of interests 
as a bias of theoretical structure. While the increasing 
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place given to the concept of "culture" reflects a determi-
nation to avoid ethnocentrism, it must be asked whether this 
determination has yielded positive gains in the construction 
of systematic international theory. Dahrendorf and others 
have claimed that the sovereignty of the "structural-func-
tional" approach of Talcott Parsons in American sociology 
has delayed a behavioral understanding of international prob-
lems. It is their judgment that preoccupation with the 
internal phenomena of a single social system has provided an 
"integration theory," but that American sociology has lacked 
a radical theory of conflict between systems as a continuing 
functional/dysfunctional aspect of their relationships.l 
The need is for inter-system theory. 
To these passing judgments concerning sociology must be 
added the observation that political science has been taught 
to a long generation of its students with national govern-
ment as its base--and with international relations as only 
a functional category of national government responsibility 
instead of as the basic arena of political behavior to which 
all the functions of modern governments have become more or 
less oriented.2 
1. Ralf Dahrendorf, "Toward a Theory of Social Conflict," 
Conflict Resolution, 2 (June, 1958), pp. 170-83. 
2. This observation was sustained in an interview with Waldo 
Chamberlin, August 29, 1960. Dr. Chamberlin, Professor 
of Government and Administrator of the Graduate Program 
of Study on the United Nations at New York University, 
has had a special interest in decision-making and foreign 
policy, as both political scientist and churchman. 
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In several disciplines, it has thus been observed that 
the fundamental analytical models for religion or society 
or culture or government have, in the intrinsic preoccupa-
tions of their structures, tended to be those of a single 
system. The theoretical requirements of the field of world 
politics are more than interdisciplinary: there must be a 
transcending of the "domestication of disciplines" in all 
related fields. It is not just method which is at stake: 
it is the very definition of the problem to be studied. 
The most acute social realities of our time are those which 
express the unifying and conflicting processes at work 
between American and other political systems. Both religion-
ists and social scientists are certainly aware of interna-
tional conflict but have been slow to develop a coherent 
theory for the interpretation of that conflict. In conse-
quence, the need for a "typological breakthrough" is as-
serted by the dissertation in the definition of the problem 
of Protestantism and American foreign policy. 
5. The Methodology of the Dissertation 
The sustained methodological goal of the dissertation 
is to provide instruments for the sharpening of perception 
in a complex realm of behavior in which perception is so 
easily susceptible to distortion. While the actual progress 
of such research is marked by the groping for the shape of a 
18 
field of study, it is possible to reconstruct by a process 
of rationalization the "logic" of the method. The steps 
include: 
1. A survey of relevant and representative literature 
from a wide variety of existing fields of specialization which 
are assumed to have some contribution to make toward the 
definition of a field of religion and world politics. These 
specialties are: diplomatic history, international relations, 
the policy sciences, political sociology, sociology of con-
flict, sociology of religion, ecumenics, world religions, 
political ethics, church-state relations. Of these, the 
bulk of the empirical data is derived from diplomatic 
history, international relations, political sociology, and 
church and state. Theoretical concepts are supplied, for 
the most part, by sociology of religion, sociology of con-
flict, and the policy sciences. Explicitly normative and 
dogmatic sources, in addition to the Old and New Testaments, 
include ecumenics, world religions, political ethics, and 
church and state. 
2. The development of an "inventory" of the functions 
of religion in world politics as produced by the survey and 
reduced to simple statements of an empirical character. 
This element in the method was suggested by the employment 
of "propositional inventories" in foreign policy research by 
Richard c. Snyder and others. For some of the language and 
much of the spirit of the "functional" approach to the study 
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of religion, without which such an inventory could not be 
developed, the dissertation is indebted to J. Milton Yinger's 
sociology of religion. 
3. The classification of inventory items by the typo-
logical method evolved by Max Weber, Ernst Troeltsch, Yinger, 
and others. The six-fold typology finally elaborated is 
assumed to be original and is offered tentatively as an ex-
haustive framework for both study and action in religion and 
world politics. 
4. The application of international conflict theory 
and decision-making models to the typology for illumination 
and theoretical integrity. 1 The dangers of eclecticism have 
threatened the integrity of the dissertation at every point, 
but the fundamental task of integration has not been know-
ingly abandoned at any point. 
1. See Chapter II, sections 4 and 5, for t he exposition of 
these steps in the method. 
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CHAPTER II 
A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
1. Prerequisites of an Adequate Theory 
of Religion in World Politics 
The dynamic and behavioral approach afforded by recent 
trends in the field of world politics opens up the possibil-
ities of an interdisciplinary synthesis appropriate to the 
requirements of the dissertation. It does not, however, af-
ford a ready-made system of theory which can simply be ap-
plied to the problem under study in its inherent triangular-
ity. An analysis of the theoretical problem as it relates 
to foreign policy yields three structural elements which ap-
pear to require elaboration and incorporation into the most 
logical and plausible relationships: 
1. A theory of religion which can sustain empirical 
investigation of the relationships of religion to a multi-
plicity of other social systems, particularly nation-states 
which are involved in patterns of mutual interdependence and 
conflict--without determining a priori what those relation-
ships ought to be. 
2. A theory of the field of phenomena constituted by 
the actors and systems of international politics. 
3. A theory of the more-or-less rational attempts of 
nation-states to advance their interests in the international 
arena in which they find themselves the inescapable actors. 
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The total theoretical framework thus seeks to combine 
a functional theory of religion with a behavioral approach 
to international conflict-systems and a dynamic model of 
decision-making in foreign policy. Within the last several 
years, there have been important theoretical developments in 
all three of these structural elements of the problem, and 
this study attempts to bring them together in productive and 
coherent interaction . 
It must be acknowledged that there are formidable 
difficulties in the attempt to reconcile these divergent 
theoretical sources . There is the danger of inadequate 
understanding of phenomena in several fields or of theories 
too recently developed to be exploited with confidence. 
There is the hazard of incongruity--that the elements may 
not be sufficiently integrated into a more general theory 
adequate for the interpretation of such varied phenomena . 
It may be charged that the scope of the problem itself is 
too ambitious and that a case study or some other more 
modest project would make a more substantial and reliable 
contribution to the understanding of the role of religion 
in foreign policy. 
The anticipation of these criticisms, however, has been 
a spur to further research and reflection which have tended 
to sustain the conviction that the study must not neglect 
the problem of "ultimate boundaries" inherent in it . It is 
part of the concern of the dissertation to demonstrate that 
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the very lack of a conceptual scheme on a broadly interdis-
ciplinary basis is largely responsible for the failure of 
historical understanding of the relationship of man's two 
fundamental loyalties: his religion and his nation . More 
positively, the provi s ion of such a scheme , if valid , can be 
the productive source of new insights whi ch perhaps cannot 
be perceived without this apprehension of ultimate relation-
ships . The wholeness of theoretical integrity is more than 
a series of fragmentary approaches t o isolated facts . Prac-
tically , responsible religious leadership in years of con-
tinuing international hostilities depends upon a comprehen-
sive and critical grasp of these ultimate relationships . 
2 . An Inventory of the Functions of 
American Protestantism in World Politics 
It is the purpose of an "inventory" to summarize avail-
able research data and hypotheses in brief propositional or 
functional statements so that the relationships and distinc-
tions among them may be more readily observed. The inventory 
thus becomes a theoretical tool facilitating the categoriza-
tion of evidence . Its usefulness is heightened when the 
sources of evidence are scattered across a variety of dis -
ciplines --precisely the problem confronted by a dynamic and 
behavioral approach to international relations . l 
1 . The use of such an inventory is demonstrated in Raymond 
W. Mack and Richard c. Snyder , "The Analysis of Social 
Conflict : Toward an Overview and Synthesis , '' Conflict 
Resolution , 1 (June, 1957) , pp . 212- 48 . 
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It has been reported above that a variety of disciplines 
have yielded quantities of data which are relevant to this 
inquiry . The richness of this yield, when collected in 
simple functional statements, will be apparent . There fol-
lows a list of sixty functions of American religion in world 
politics , as demonstrated or proposed by previous research . 
The l i st is suggestive , not exhaustive . Overlapping and 
arbitrariness at a number of points are acknowledged . The 
scheme of preliminary classification is static rather than 
dynamic ; the theoretical structure of the dissertation will 
proceed from this list to construct a dynamic typology which 
describes religious action and not simply principles of 
grouping within religious and political systems . 
I . International influences 
A. Relationships among religious groups 
1. Source of supranational loyalties 
2 . Source of group loyalties cooperating with 
other world religions 
3. Source of group loyalties conflicting with 
other world religions 
4. System of international communications 
5. Agency for education and information 
concerning international affairs 
6 . Relief from the suffering occasioned by 
participation in international conflict 
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7. Sanction for non-participation by religion in 
world politics 
B. Relationships among nation-states 
8 . Source of international law 
9 . Intensifier of national hostility to other 
peoples 
10 . Reducer of national hostility to other peoples 
11 . Component of emerging ideologies among foreign 
peoples 
12 . Rejection of emerging ideologies among foreign 
peoples 
13 . Source of division in the body politic in 
other nations with which the United States 
must deal 
14. Agency of the nation- state in the formulation 
or execution of policy 
15. Specific object of foreign policy 
16 . Action supplementing official policy goals 
17 . Ac tion antagonistic to official policy goals 
18 . Source of moral substitutes for national 
policy 
19 . Source of functional alternatives to war 
20 . Sanction for non-participation by the nation 
in world politics 
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II. Intranational influences affecting international 
relationships 
A. Relationships within religious groups 
21 . Public opinion audience for a professional 
leadership elite 
22 . Source of motives for political action 
23 . Moralizer of the psychological appeals and 
the social functions of war 
24 . Moralizer of the tensions and guilt inherent 
in participation in international conflict 
25 . Source of intrapersonal conflict 
26 . Consolation for the personal costs of conflict 
27 . Source of group loyalties and activities com-
pensating for inferior status feelings 
B. Relationships among political groups 
28 . Sanction for non- religious pressure groups 
29 . Sanction for party loyalties which divide the 
body politic 
30 . Determinant of voting behavior 
31 . Source of divided and ambiguous national 
loyalties 
32 . Propaganda weapon in intergroup conflict 
33 . Source of ins tability in mass opinion 
34. Projection of non-rational values into the 
political arena 
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35. Projection of dogmatic issues into the 
political arena 
36. Projection of non-dogmatic or technical 
issues into the political arena 
c. Relationships between religion and decision-makers 
37 . Determinant of the character-structure of 
decision-makers 
38 . Criterion in the selection and assignment 
of decision-makers 
39 . Personal ministry to decision-makers 
40 . Source of public support and prestige for 
decision-makers 
41. Pressure group seeking to exert direct in-
fluence on decision-makers 
42. Source of norms for the formulation of policy 
43 . Source of norms for the criticism of policy 
44. Source of norms for the personal conduct of 
decision-makers 
45 . Source of norms for the criticism of the 
personal conduct of decision-makers 
46. Source of hostility to decision-makers 
47. Source of indifference to decision-makers 
48. Source of alienation of decision-makers from 
religion 
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49. Distracting influence from the responsi-
bilities of decision-makers 
5o. Source of intrapersonal conflicts and ten-
sions for decision-makers 
51. Training of personnel for the responsibili-
ties of decision-making 
D. Relationships between religion and the nation-
state 
52. Component of national character 
53. Component of national ideology 
54. Source of constitutional government and 
national law 
55. Legitimization of authority for the claims 
of the state 
56. Sanction for the symbols of national 
loyalty 
57. Rejection of the claims of the state in the 
name of universal values 
58. Source of symbols of conflict with national 
loyalty 
59. Source of norms for the criticism of the 
structures and processes of decision-making 
within the government 
60. Sustainer of military morale 
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This inventory may serve not only as a catalogue of 
functions to be demonstrated by further research but also as 
a catalogue of the consequences of religious action for reli-
gious leadership . Such an inventory may help religious leaders 
acquire a more self- conscious awareness of the richness and 
variety of the dynamic influences of religion upon national 
policy . In so doing , it may serve to indicate the parallel 
problems which religious leadership shares with political 
leadership . Elder reports that there are currently 86 
methods of implementing foreign policy in any given country 
and that the policy-makers in the State Department are obliged 
to select the most appropriate and efficient 11mix 11 of these 
methods for a particular policy to be responsible and ef-
fective . 1 Religious leaders, as an elite group of decision-
influencers in national life , are similarly obliged to take 
stock of the appropriateness and the "mix" of methods which 
are uniquely at their disposal . 
If religion has peculiar points of access in the process 
of shaping and implementing American policy, its own percep-
tion of these points of access, with all of their possibili-
ties of good and evil, is a primary obligation . A responsi-
ble political order imposes responsibilities, not alone upon 
those who hold public authority or economic power, but 
1 . Robert Elder, The Polio Machine: The De artment of State 
and American Foreign Policy Syracuse: Syracuse University 
Press, 1960), p. 9 . 
especially upon those who proclaim the ultimate norms of 
accountability: the religious leaders . Decision-making is 
not simply the application of moral norms to situations of 
which one may be already aware: it requires the enlargement 
of the boundaries of awareness before norms are applied. 
When this requirement of awareness has not been met by 
religious leaders with regard to religion's own consequences 
for foreign policy problems, policy-makers tend to become 
resentful and skeptical . 
Classifi cation of items in the inventory proceeds from 
an inspection to determine what dynamic qualities are held 
in common by two or more functions . These sixty items 
readily disclose two opposite and ubiquitous properties of 
religion commonly recognized by social scientists : its 
cohesiveness and its divisiveness . Religious behavior 
generates both loyalty and conflict among persons and groups . 
It performs a dual social role : it may provide either "a 
focus of consensus, solidarity , and integration," or a source 
of "societal cleavage and implacable opposition."1 
These two basic categories of loyalty and conflict are 
appropriate to the study of both religion and the nation-
state . They provide important clues to the establishment 
of an adequate theoretical framework . The typological 
1 . Robin M. Williams , Jr . , nReligion, Value-Orientations , and 
Intergroup Conflict," The Journal of Social Issues, 12 
( 19 56), p . 13 . 
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structure developed by the dissertation assumes that any 
meaningful design for a field of religion and world politics 
must take account of the fundamental nature of these cate-
gories. 
"Think over the great dramas of all times," Maciver 
once proposed, "and you will find that they concentrate on 
the issue of clashing loyalties." From Antigone to Hamlet 
this concentration is apparent.l Both of these tragedies, 
it is to be noted, focus sharply on conflicts between per-
sonal and political loyalties when sovereign power is at 
stake. The political arena dramatizes the themes inherent 
in a prophetic or dialectical ethic, for it is perhaps in 
that arena that conflicting loyalties are most vividly por-
trayed. 
3. A Typology for the Comparative 
Study af Functions 
The categories of loyalty and conflict, pervading the 
inventory of functions, were advanced as clues to the estab-
lishment of a conceptual framework for religion and world 
politics. This duality may also be stated as the capacity 
of religion to exercise a power of identification with pol-
itics and a power of transcendence above politics. Yet 
another expression of this dual role is suggested by the 
1. Robert M. Maciver {ed.), Conflict of Loyalties (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1952), p. 1. 
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distinction between the words "sanction" and "sanctuary." 
Webster defines 11 sanction" as "any consideration, principle, 
or influence which impels to moral action . " Its Latin root 
is the verb sanctio: to render sacred or inviolable . Reli-
gion is peculiarly equipped to sanction or legitimize action 
in political systems . A "sanctuary , " on the other band, is 
"a consecrated place , " a "sacred and inviolable asylum; 
a place of refuge . Immunity from law by entering such a 
place . " With re gard to conflict , it is apparent that reli-
gion may both impel participation therein and refuge there-
from . Finally, both Judaism and Christianity profess and 
practice the obligation to reconcile conflict through ulti-
mate and universal values . 
When the dual role of religion is thus seen operative 
in the triangular relationships which Christianity encounters 
in world politics , it a~pears arithmetically appropriate that 
a six- fold typology should be elaborated : 
1 . Religion as a source of loyalty 
2 . Religion as a sanction for loyalty 
3. Religion as a sanction for conflict 
4. Religion as a source of conflict 
5. Religion as a sanctuary from conflict 
6. Religion as a reconciler of conflict 
These six types are presented as the logical categories for 
the analysis of the functions of Christianity in world poli-
tics. They are "utopian," in Weber's sense of that term, 
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in that no religious group actually can present itself ex-
clusively as a 11pure" example of any one of the six. 
(Strictly speaking, this is not a typology for the classifi-
cation of groups: it is a typology for the classification of 
functions.) In fact, in the same sense in which Troeltsch 
and those after him have held that creative religion depended 
upon maintaining the tension between "church" and "sect" 
tendencies in Christianityl, the dissertation will suggest 
that a creative tension must be maintained among all six 
of these functions if Christianity is to remain true to its 
own genius in the world . The most relevant expression of 
Christianity's ultimate loyalty in its fullness depends 
upon the degree to which it recognizes, performs, and bal-
ances all of the functions inherent in its dialectical re-
lationship with political communities. Political ethics, 
1. Troeltsch, II, 1009-13. "More and more the central life 
of the Church-type is being permeated with the vital 
energies of the sect and of mysticism; the whole history 
of Protestantism reveals this very clearly •••• In 
the mutual interpenetration of the three chief socio-
logical categories, which must be united with a structure 
which will reconcile them all, lie its future tasks, tasks 
of a sociological and organizing kind, which are more 
pressing than all doctrinal questions. • • • And when 
they have been created and expressed, they will meet the 
fate which always awaits every fresh creation of religious 
and ethical thought: they will render indispensable serv-
ices and they will develop profound energies, but they 
will never fully realize their actual ideal intention 
within the sphere of our earthly struggle and conflict •• 
Thus the Christian ethic of the present day and of the 
future will ••• only be an adjustment to the world-sit-
uation, and it will only desire to achieve that which is 
practically possible. This is the cause of that cease-
less tension which drives man onward yet gives him the 
sense that he can never realize his ethical ideal." 
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• • 
in its Christian expression, must proceed from the appre-
hension of these irreducible categories and must maintain 
all of them in fruitful interaction. 1 
The typology may accordingly be supplemented with these 
affirmations: Christianity possesses an inherent recognition 
1. that its own is the only ultimate loyalty; 
2. that its ultimate loyalty requires a political 
loyalty; 
3. that political loyalty involves it in inevi-
table conflict among political loyalties; 
4. that its ultimate loyalty involves it in inevi-
table conflict with political loyalty; 
5. that its ultimate loyalty requires a capacity 
to transcend political conflicts; 
6. that all political conflicts are qualified by 
forces making for common loyalties. 
To speak of "an inherent recognition" in religion is to touch 
upon what is essentially and inevitably dogmatic. The spe-
cifically Christian assumptions of the writer cannot escape 
confession. The six affirmations listed above point to a 
meeting-ground where the ultimacy of faith is reconciled 
with the relevance of function. Political ethics requires 
the making of decisions which are at once faithful and 
1. Will Durant declared that "co-ordinated energy is the last 
word in ethics and politics, and perhaps in logic and 
metaphysics, too." Th~ Stor of Philoso h : The Lives 
and 0 inions of the Greater Philoso hers New York: Simon 
and chuster, Inc., 192 , p. 1. 
relevant. The Christian is finally obliged to see that 
between his dogmas and his deeds there is an organic cord 
which must not be broken. But he is also finally promised 
that his 11 ideal 11 life is to be accounted "realistic" by the 
only standards of measurement which are eternally fixed and 
absolutely dependable. Both the obligation and the promise 
have been sundered from political ethics as many Christians 
of the twentieth century have tried to interpret and prac-
tice the claims of their faith, whether calling themselves 
"idealists" or "realists." 
4. Propositions for a Theory of 
International Conflict 
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The capacities of religious loyalties to generate corres-
ponding conflicts are matched by the parallel capacities of 
political loyalties. Foreign policy is formulated and imple-
mented with reference to the enduring fact of conflict among 
nations. Herbert Butterfield describes this quality: 
It is characteristic of diplomacy ••• that it 
functions in cases where wills are in conflict 
and power is involved--cases where, if there were 
no such method of negotiation, the parties con-
cerned would be making a direct appeal to force. 
And even where the struggle is a purely diplo-
matic one, the force of the respective states 
is not annulled, but is rather transmuted and 
transformed.l 
Social Christianity in America was slow to recognize the 
theological and ethical aspects of international conflict. 
1. Christianity, Di)lomacls and War {New York: Abingdon-Cokes-
bury Press, n . d . , p. • 
Preoccupied with domestic social and economic problems in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, its concerns 
reinforced the tendency of the churches to ignore or minimize 
the dilemmas of foreign policy . As the United States was 
being drawn into war in April , 1917, Walter Rauschenbusch de-
livered his Taylor Lectures at Yale, calling the attention of 
t he churches to the need for both a more adequate theology 
and an awakening to international responsibilities . "We 
have a Social Gospel," he said. "We need a systematic theol-
ogy large enough to match it and vital enough to back it . "l 
Until the war, social Christianity's recognition of conflict 
had been limited to the class struggle: now the international 
conflict must be faced.2 This two-fold plea was an antici-
pation , if not a primary cause, of the parallel developments 
of a theological revival and a radical political ethic in 
the post-war generation . 
Rauschenbusch 1 s premature death the following year pre-
eluded the possibility of the churches' benefiting from the 
application of his theological and historical insights to 
international affairs. Fifteen years later, after the 
ascendancy of pacifism and isolationism in the churches and 
in the American public generally , Reinhold Niebuhr--in 
many ways the spiritual heir of Rauschenbusch--announced his 
1 . A Theology for the Social Gospel (New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1917), p . 1 . 
2 . Ibid., p . 4. 
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judgment in Moral Man and Immoral Society that i n ternational 
conflict was inevitable . "Conflict between the national 
units remains as a permanent rather than a passing charac-
ter of their relations to each othe r . "l Furthermore, 
external conflict was essential to the maintenance of patri-
otism, which he regarded as an "altruism" which is "si:rnply 
another form of selfishness."2 A decade later, in the midst 
of a new war, Niebuhr provided his most comprehensive and 
theological statement of the problem of confl ict . He ap-
pealed to an Augustinian "realism" in which the best possi-
bility of world pe ace must be understood as an uneasy armi-
stice "based on strife . "3 It was beyond both religion and 
politics to banish the recurrence of confl ict from the 
circumstances of history . "There is no possibility of 
making history completely safe against either occasional 
conflicts of vital interests (war) or against the misuse of 
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power which is intended to prevent such confl ict of inter-
ests (tyranny) . 114 
Niebuhr ' s dogmatic approach to conflict, deeply rooted 
in a neo-conservative "realism" in theology, has now for a 
generation exerted a profound influence in religious, 
1 . Moral Man and Immoral Society (New York: Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 1932), p . 3 . 
2 . Ibid., p . 48. 
3. The Nature and Destin of Man: A Christian Inter retation 
2 vols . , New York : Charles Scribner's Sons, 19 3 , II , 273. 
4. Ibid . , p . 284. 
political, and ecumenical circles. However, his polemic 
attacks upon the social sciences, along with the latt er's 
neglect of the theoretical problems attending international 
conflict, have conspired to delay the emergence of a system-
atic framework for the empirical study of religion in world 
politics. The lack of such a framework tends to leave un-
focused the more constructive possibilities of recognizing 
and reconciling conflict among nations. Kenneth Thompson, 
one of Niebuhr's most sympathetic interpreters to students 
of world politics and to social scientists generally, has 
judged that Niebuhr's "abstract ideological terms" have 
prevented him from dealing creatively with the whole prob-
lem of international negotiation. "Realism," according to 
Thompson, must go on to assert that 11 at some stage in the 
political struggle interests must be identified, adjusted, 
and accommodated or, failing this, statesmen must go on to 
redefine their nation's hierarchy of interests in order that 
mutually antagonis t ic interests may, if possible, be made 
more compatible. Because Niebuhr is disposed ultimately to 
treat with politics in at least proximate moral terms, he 
confuses, ignores, or underestimates the elements of this 
process and t hus misunderstands the demands of realism."l 
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1. Kenneth Thompson, "The Political Philosophy of Reinhold 
Niebuhr," in Charles W. Kegley and Robert W. Bretall (eds.), 
Reinhold Niebuhr: His Religious, Social, and Political 
Thought {New York: The Macmillan Company, 1956), p. 174. 
A more recent work by Thompson provides a systematic ex-
position of the emerging consensus among such "realists" 
Whatever the inadequacies of the theologians' approach 
to the theoretical problems posed by international conflict, 
the social scientists themselves have been slow to attack the 
same problems. International relations, as a discipline, has 
until very recent years maintained primary orientations to 
history, international organization, and international law in 
such a way that systematic theory has not developed very far. 
Dean Acheson has complained that "we Americans in our study 
and writing on international relations have tended to shun 
theory and logical philosophic analysis of historical ma-
terial--certainly in this century--in favor of narrative ex-
position and absorption in the problems of international 
organization." The most urgent need is for "an applicable 
body of theory. 111 
In March , 1957, the first issue of a new journal, Con-
flict Resolution, appeared. Its editorial called for an 
interdisciplinaris internationalis which would approach the 
problem of world conflict on a broad empirical and behavioral 
basis: "If intellectual progress is to be made in this area, 
the study of international relations must be made an inter-
disciplinary enterprise, drawing its discourse from all the 
as scholars Reinhold Niebuhr, Hans J. Morgenthau, and the 
late Nicholas Spykman ; policy-planners George F . Kennan, 
Paul H. Nitze, Louis Halle , C. B. Marshall, and Dorothy 
Fosdick; and columnists Walter Lippmann and James Reston . 
See Political Realism and the Crisis of World Politics: 
An American A roach to Forei n Polic (Princeton, N. J.: 
Princeton University Press , 19 0 • 
1. Quoted in Louis Halle, Civilization and Foreign Policy 
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955), p. xvi . 
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social sciences, and even further . "l It was also affirmed 
that conflict "is perhaps the key concept in international 
relations." While it is an aspect of all human relation-
ships, its other forms are less urgent: "Personality con-
flict, domestic conflict, and industrial conflict threaten 
us with inconvenience, with distresses , with losses . War 
threatens us with irretrievable disaster . " But conflict 
must be seen in more than its negative qualities: it may be 
fruitful as well as destructive . Some conflict processes 
lead to "resolution and integration," some lead to "disin-
tegration and disaster . "2 
The typological approach developed in this dissertation, 
with its fundamental categories of loyalty and conflict, is 
substantially indebted to propositions advanced in this first 
and subsequent issues of Conflict Resolution. 
Mack and Snyder, in the next issue, called into question 
the tendency to dichotomize between conflict and cooperation: 
the "persistent tendency to regard all conflict as bad, as 
susceptible to complete elimination, given 'good will,' 'un-
derstanding,' and so on, and as basically different from 1 co-
operation . 1113 Among positive functions of conflict, they 
1 . "An Editorial," Conflict Resolution: A Quarterl~ for 
Research Related to War and Peace, 1 (March, 19 7), p . 1 . 
2 . Ibid . , p • 2 . 
3 . Raymond W. Mack and Richard C. Snyder, "The Analysis of 
Social Conflict: Toward An Overview and Synthesis," Con-
flict Resolution, 1 (June, 1957), p . 212. ----
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list: (1) the setting of group boundaries by strengthening 
group cohesiveness and separateness; (2) the reduction of 
tension and the maintenance of social interaction under 
stress; (3) the clarification of group objectives; (4) the 
establishment of group norms; and (5) accommodation through 
agreement rather than superordination-subordination. 1 In all 
of these, it is apparent that the existence of a conflict is 
the precondition of social change . 
There is no disposition on the part of Mack and Snyder 
to deny the normative aspects of the functional approach to 
international conflict . They acknowledge that one of their 
most difficult problems is the establishment of criteria for 
t he identificat i on of positive or constructive functions as 
against negative functions or 11 dysfunctions."2 Several typo-
logical schemes are set forth to clarify this problem of 
identification: (a) realistic-nonrealistic, the former refer-
ring to an actual scarcity or incompatibility of values, the 
latter to such sources as deflected hostility, tradition, ig-
norance, and error;3 (b) institutionalized-noninstitutional-
ized, as indices of the degree to which explicit rules, con-
tinuity, and predictability are provided;4 (c) nonviolent-
violent; and (d) specificity-diffuseness, criteria for the 
1. Ibid., p. 228. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., p. 219. 
4. Ibid., p. 220. 
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degree of central ized control over forces in conflict . l 
Quincy Wright cautions against seizing upon one aspect of the 
norms of conflict and erecting absolute goals which themselves 
may become new sources of unnecessary conflict. The solution 
is one of "balance rather than of establishing and maintaining 
a hierarchy of means and ends . 11 2 This concern for balancing 
the norms of conflict and conflict resolution matches the 
concern of the dissertation to maintain a balance among the 
six inherent functions of religion in international conflict. 
While the focus of the dissertation is more empirical 
than normative, both the typological scheme and use of conflict 
theory suggest that the two cannot be separated--that the 
functions of religion within and among political systems 
are rooted (a) in the inherently normative nature of reli-
gion itself , and (b) in the inherently normative aspects of 
the problem of conflict and conflict resolution . 
Mack and Snyder also propose that the criteria of con-
flict resolution can be objectively determined, to some ex-
tent : "Social strategies designed to keep conflict functional 
and to prevent violent or aggressive conflict ought to be 
based in part on deliberate attempts to capitalize on natural 
limits . " There are two categories of "na tural limits": "in-
trasystem" and "extrasystem. " The "intrasystem limitations" 
upon conflict include: 
1. Ibid . , p . 240. 
2 . Quincy Wright, "The Value for Conflict Resolution of a 
General Discipline of International Relations , " Conflict 
Resolution, 1 (March, 1957), p . 6. 
1. Functional interdependence between parties 
2 . Regulation through institutionalized norms 
and procedures 
3. The need for continued communication between 
parties 
4 . The cost of conflict to the system 
5. Availability and feasibility of certain modes 
of resolution 
6 . Inertia and organizational inefficiency of 
parties 
7. Ignorance or misunderstanding 
8. Avoidance - of-conflict taboosl 
Among the 11 extrasystem limitations" upon conflict are: 
1 . Shared cultural and social values which neutral-
ize or dominate conflicting values 
2 . Sanctions against certain kinds of power rela-
tions and modes of resolution 
3. Third parties interested in control or resolution 
4 . Crisscrossing of other conflict systems which 
prevents enlargement or bipolarization around 
any single system 
5. Cross-pressures which create ambivalences within 
parties2 
1. Mack and Snyder, p . 246 . 
2 • Ibid • , p • 24 7 • 
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A number of these natural limits upon conflict are actual 
or potential elements in religion's strategy as a reconciler 
of conflict and will be incorporated in appropriate dis-
cussion below. 
While social scientists enlisted in the effort to de-
velop a coherent theory of international conflict do not ne-
cessarily agree among themselves in all particular respects, 
there are a number of elements of consensus. These common 
elements may be listed in propositional form and are assumed 
by the dissertation as valid and relevant statements charac-
terizing the field of phenomena called world politics: 
1. Conflict is an inevitable and ubiquitous aspect of rela-
tions among peoples and nation-states. 
2. Conflict is a necessary and functional aspect of world 
politics not to be judged inherently "good" or nbad." 
3. Conflict is an aspect of power relationships both within 
and among nation-states. 
4. Conflict is never total or absolute, but is always quali-
fied by natural limits and processes of cooperation. 
5. The resolution of conflict does not require and cannot 
achieve its abolition; resolution does require efforts to 
institutionalize conflict and to make it productive. 
6. International conflict in the nuclear age is the most 
comprehensive and most dangerous form of conflict because 
it uniquely threatens the survival of both human beings 
and human values. 
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The possibilities and limitations of such a conception 
of conflict are suggested in more colorful language by 
Frederick L. Schuman, a political scientist sensitive to 
human symbols and values: 
If the Temple of Man can slowly be reared on 
foundations of swords beaten into plowshares, 
the result will not be paradise, even if the 
structure is finally completed. Men will not 
thereby become saints nor be magically liber-
ated from unreason. They will struggle with 
themselves and with one another for goals ig-
noble and noble, and find many of t heir con-
flicts difficult of resolution . But the re-
sult , we may reasonably believe, will be an 
escape from an I nferno wherein men like devils 
torture one another to death in a vain quest 
for salvation . And without such escape, none 
can sensibly hope for betterment of our common 
lot or for a chance for human self-realization . l 
5. A Model of the Decision-Making Process 
in Foreign Policy 
Thomas Bailey's writings in the field of diplomatic 
history have been marked by attention to popular influences 
upon American foreign policy . In The Man in the Street, he 
observes: "If religion is important to us, and if foreign 
policy is also important to us, each is bound to have some 
influence on the other, for the two cannot be compartmented 
in our thinking.n2 
1. The Commonwealth of Man: An In uir into Power Politics 
and World Government New York : Alfred A. Knopf, 19 2 , 
p . 493. 
2. The Man in the Street: The Impact of American Public 
Opinion on Foreign Policy (New York: The Macmillan Com-
pany, 1948), p. 199 . 
The study of Protestant influence upon the foreign 
policy of the United States in the modern period must take 
account of parallel developments in both fields. Organized 
religion has sought increasingly to relate itself to all 
aspects of national and international life: the revitali-
zation of the missionary movement, the development of social 
Christianity, and the ecumenical movement are perhaps the 
most distinctive expressions of "total religion" in the 
twentieth century. At the same time, foreign policy has 
become increasingly related to all other kinds of policy. 
That Americans should have developed both an "activistic 
religion" and a "total diplomacy" in the modern period makes 
it inevitable that the relationships between the two should 
be multiple and complex, some tenuous, others subtle, still 
others more obvious and of perhaps decisive importance. 
The empirical study of these relationships assumes: 
(1) that religion is a dynamic and ubiquitous phenomenon 
which cannot be isolated from the structures and processes 
which shape and implement foreign policy; and (2) that it 
is possible to study patterns of religion's involvement in 
these structures and processes without necessarily prede-
termining what that involvement ought to be. While it has 
been judged that religious leadership has often lacked an 
empirical sensitivity with regard to these relationships, it 
is nevertheless true that religious leaders have occasion-
ally recognized the pervasive quality of the relationships. 
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The International Missionary Council, meeting at Whitby, 
Ontario, in 1947 declared: "Although the Church has a life 
of its own, it touches at every point the life of the world 
and cannot dissociate itself from it, even if it would. "l 
Within the broad categories of functions elaborated 
in the dissertation's typology and illumined by an interna-
tional conflict theory (the first two structural elements 
in the theoretical framework) , systematic study would appear 
to require an identification of those points of access which 
the church has in the world of nations and which make it 
possible for religious influence to affect policy . The 
third element in the theoretical structure is therefore a 
model of the more-or-less rational attempts of nation- states 
to advance their interests in the international arena--a 
model of decision- making in foreign policy. According to 
Butterfield, 11 The methodical study of international affairs 
is concerned ••• with the background out of which the 
great acts of decision emerge . tt2 The participation of reli-
gion in the background (and occasionally in the foreground} 
of decision-making in foreign policy provides the substance 
of the dissertation. 
1 . Quoted in John w. Turnbull (ed.), Ecumenical Documents 
on Church and Societ (1925- 53) (Geneva, Switzerland: 
World Council of Churches, 19 ), p . 112 . 
2 . Herbert Butterfield, International Conflict in the Twen-
tieth Centuri: A Christian View (New York: Harper and 
Brothers, 19 0), p . 55 . 
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i . Rational structure of the model 
The process of decision-making has become a major focus 
of t he concern for "realism" which has animated political 
scientists of this generation . With assistance from other 
social sciences and from philosophy, there have been many 
efforts to provide an adequate model for the analysis of 
decision-making in various operations of government. Such 
an analysis requires the consideration of such components as: 
(a) the character and interests of decision-makers; (b) the 
environment within which decisions are made; and (c) the 
rational criteria for the making of decisions, such as goals 
and consequences, ends and means . 
The dynamics of the process of decisi.on-making, ration-
ally conceived, may be set forth in a simple listing of steps 
required to complete the process. Members of the faculty of 
Ohio Wesleyan University list four such steps: (a) identifi-
cation of the objective; (b) organization of relevant knowl-
edge; (c) consideration of proposed policies; and (d) evalu-
ation of policies and objective . 1 A similar scheme is 
advanced by Rothwell: (a) clarification of goals; (b) an 
exhaustive evaluation of the situation to be met; (c) se-
lection of appropriate action by weighing the probable 
1. Russell Bayliff et al . , Values and Policy in American 
Society (Dubuque, Iowa : William c. Brown Company, 1954), 
pp . 31-41 . 
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consequences of various alternatives; and (d} determination of 
the optimum means for carrying out the action decided upon.l 
It will readily be observed that there is a mixture of 
normative and technical elements in the process: questions of 
value and of efficiency, of ends and means, emerge side-by-
side in each step. To the extent that either the dogmatic or 
ethical aspects of religion enter into the normative criteria 
by which policy decisions are formulated and implemented, an 
area of religious influence upon policy may thus be identi-
fied. While identification of these points of access to 
decision-making can only pose the problem of measurement, it 
is important to include these points of access in the total 
theoretical structure for purposes of perception. Decisions 
are made by persons and groups who bear within themselves the 
influences of all that they have acquired from their cultural 
heritage and their interaction with one another, including 
their religion. This very identification of the points of 
access for religious influence in decision-making may thus 
assist empirical analysis by reminding the investigator that 
persons finally make decisions, whether singly or in concert, 
and not organizations, which are only abstractions without 
their personal constituents. Choice and accountability are 
1. Charles Eaton Rothwell in Foreword to Daniel Lerner and 
Harold D. Lasswell (eds.), The Polic Sciences: Recent 
Developments in Scope and Method Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press, 19Sl), p. ix. 
not mechanical categories: they are radically personal. 
Thus both religion and decision-making are irreducibly 
personal phenomena.l 
The dynamic interaction of government, particularly 
that of government by consent, with the public which it 
serves indicates that the decision-making process in public 
policy requires further elaboration than is provided by the 
four-step models set forth above. The international impli-
cations of decision-making in the field of foreign policy 
also deserve some recognition in any model adequate for 
this study. Employing suggestions from Lasswell2 and 
1. Robert Gessert lists the following contributions of 
theology to decision-making in democratic institutions: 
(a) motivation; (b) critical insight for overcoming 
self-righteousness and seeing limitations which must 
be imposed in determining alternatives; (c) construc-
tive insight regarding the deepest meaning of concepts; 
(d) awareness that the social and policy sciences pro-
vide tools for understanding; and (e) justification 
for creative pluralism (or secularism) in democratic 
institutions. "Decision-making in institutions with 
large and diversified membership and responsibility is 
done by an elite few. A theology which can inform and 
help them provides a total frame of reference for un-
derstanding man and society--not merely a set of ab-
stract ethical standards." "Contribution of Theology 
to Decision-Making," Week of Work 1954, The National 
Council on Religion in Higher Education (New Haven: 
The National Council, September, 1954), pp. 15-16. 
2. Harold D. Lasswell, The Decision Process: Seven Cate-
gories of Functional Analysis (College Park, Maryland: 
Bureau of Governmental Research, University of Maryland, 
1956), summarized in Paul Wasserman and Fred s. Silander, 
Decision-Making: An Annotated Bibliography (Ithaca, New 
York: Graduate School of Business and Public Administra-
tion, Cornell University, 1958), p. 10. Lasswell's seven 
categories: intelligence, recommendation, prescription, 
invocation, application, appraisal, and termination. 
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Lerche,l an eight-step rational structure of decision-making 
in foreign policy is proposed: 
1. Valuation: the determination of goals ("the 
national interest") to be secured by policy 
2. Intelligence: the recognition and analysis of 
a problem tending to threaten goals 
3. Recommendation: proposal(s) for a decision 
4. Prescription: the decision to act 
5. Promulgation: publication of the decision 
(the "public" to whom the decision is an-
nounced may be restricted for reasons of 
"national security") 
6. Approval: response of coordinate decision-
makers and the public 
7 • . Application: enforcement of the decision 
8. Appraisal: measurement of the adequacy of 
policy in securing the determined goals 
While explicit reference to the terms of this model will not 
be made at every point throughout the dissertation, it will 
become apparent that religious influence is actual or poten-
tial in each of the eight steps. 
1. Charles o. Lerche, Jr., Foreign Policy of the American 
PeoBle (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 
195 ), p. 5. Lerche's eight steps: (1) establishment 
of criteria; (2) determination of relevant variables in 
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the situation; (3) measurement of variables; (4) selection 
of a goal; (5) elaboration of strategy to reach the goal; 
(6) decision to act; (7) action; (8) evaluation of results. 
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ii. Application of the model to American foreign policy 
The empirical investigation of the behavior of decision-
makers and of the environment within which decisions are made 
is fraught with problems of method and of scope which defy 
adequacy and accuracy. George Kennan has remarked that 
action in the field of foreign policy is by nature cumulative: 
it "merges with a swelling stream of other human happenings; 
and we cannot trace its effects with any exactness once it 
has entered the fluid substance of history."1 The investiga-
tion of religious influence, while it may seem to be singu-
larly hazardous, shares difficulties of analysis with all of 
the other historic influences upon foreign policy. A deci-
sion-making model within the theoretical structure is, at 
best, another heuristic device for a method which aims pri-
marily at identification of problems for a new field of study. 
It is, like the inventory, the typology, and the conflict 
propositions, a tool for the sharpening of perception. 
To the cumulative nature of foreign policy historically 
must be added the problem of institutional complexity within 
which policy has come to be formulated and executed. The Con-
stitution itself, with its separation of powers and system of 
checks and balances, provided for a combination of executive 
and legislative decision-making: Presidential appointments and 
executive agreements, Senatorial consent to appointments and 
1. American Di~lomacy, 1900-1950 (New York: The New American 
Library, 19 2), p. 53. 
treaties, and Congressional action on appropriations, the 
maintenance of armed forces, the declaration of war, and the 
regulation of international commerce. 
The Department of State, with its Policy Planning Staff, 
bureaus, offices, desks, diplomatic hierarchy, and consular 
services, is perhaps the most obvious agency of policy sub-
ordinate to the President. But a long list of other execu-
tive agencies must be added, including: the Department of De-
fense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the United States Informa-
tion Agency, the International Cooperation Administration, 
the Export-Import Bank, the Development Loan Fund, the Treas-
ury Department, the Bureau of the Budget, the departments of 
Commerce, Labor, and Agriculture, the Council on Foreign 
Economic Policy, the National Advisory Council on Interna-
tional Monetary and Financial Problems, and the Interagency 
Committee on Agricultural Surplus Disposal. Perhaps more im-
portant than any of these in recent years have been three co-
ordinating mechanisms: the National Security Council and the 
Central Intelligence Agency (created in 1947} and the Opera-
tions Coordinating Board (created in 1954).1 
Similarly, the coordinate role of Congress is not con-
fined to its most obvious committees, the Senate Foreign Re-
lations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee. 
The Finance and ays and Means committees concern themselves 
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1. Elder's thorough study of the Eisenhower-Herter "policy 
machine" in 1960 is already in need of revision. President 
Kennedy abolished the Operations Coordinating Board and an-
nounced a determination to participate directly in the im-
plementation of policy decisions. 
with tariff policies. Appropriations committees are involved 
in all policy matters. Committees on Armed Services, Agri-
culture, Commerce, Labor, and Merchant Marine and Fisheries 
have natural international interests and responsibilities. 
The Judiciary and Un-American Activities committees are pre-
occupied with internal security, Government Operations with 
the entire policy apparatus, Banking and Currency with inter-
national finance, Interior and Insular Affairs with Pacific 
trust territories, and Public Works with the St. Lawrence 
Seaway. The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy parallels the 
"independent" Atomic Energy Commission. The Joint Committee 
on the Economic Report takes stock of American commitments, 
resources, and growth.l 
Mack and Snyder propose a continuum for analyzing de-
cision-making systems according to their degree of "diffuse-
ness or specificity" which implies the distinction between 
"a system characterized by a broad range ·of effective bases 
of influence and ambiguity of control over decisions, as 
against a system embodying a narrow range of effective bases 
of influence and definite prescriptions for control over de-
cisions."2 The high degree of diffuseness in the apparatus 
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of American foreign policy, even though the President has for-
midable powers as "chief diplomat, 11 is manifest in the listing 
1. The role of Congress in United States foreign policy is 
the theme of Robert A. Dahl, Congress and Foreign Policy 
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 19SO). 
2. Mack and Snyder, p. 242. 
of executive organs and legislative committees sharing respon-
sibility. Consequently, the problem of investigation of the 
patterns of influence upon policy is enormous, whether the in-
vestigation is conducted by scholar, reporter, or government 
itself . Practically, the problem of accountability is serious 
in its elusiveness . 
No doubt a completely adequate study of the influence of 
religion upon modern foreign policy would require the exami-
nation of every part of the policy apparatus with more success 
than research specialists have yet attained--and with the dy-
namics of religion adding perhaps the most impenetrable mys-
teries of all. The magnitude of these difficulties is por-
trayed in an interim report on a study-in-progress by the 
Washington Center of Foreign Polley Research at Johns Hopkins 
University . This study finds that decision-making is not 
necessarily the formal, logical , discrete process which the 
rational models suggest . Empirically, policy is often the 
sum of vaguely related actions, expressing an uneasy, incon-
slstent compromise . Frequently, policy is formulated, but 
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fails of implementation because it is blocked or changed some-
where down the line. 1 Polley in some areas may be continuously 
1 . Franklin D. Roosevelt , famed as he was for expanding the 
powers of the modern Presidency, once complained to Mar-
riner Eccles of the bureaucratic obstacles to the imple-
mentation of executive policies: "The Treasury is so large 
and far - flung that I find it almost impossible to get the 
action and results I want--even with Henry [Morgenthau] 
there. But the Treasury is not to be compared with the 
State Department. You should go through the experience 
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debated without ever being resolved. It is difficult to iden-
tify the decision-makers in specific instances: whether they 
are high or low in the hierarchy, or whether the initiative 
has come from persons in Congress or in the Executive branch. 
Few decision-makers perceive themselves to be in positions of 
power formidable enough to be held accountable for policy. 
Even the broad goals of policy do not invite simple agreement 
and accountability: the actual result may be more a "mix of 
values" {some of which may be inconsistent) held together in 
order to achieve a viable consensus. The Washington Center 
study discovers that "areas of policy" tend to be generated 
from three different centers: (a) "crisis policy" in matters 
of East- est relations (Korea, Lebanon, Quemoy and Matsu) 
tends to be primarily an executive affair; (b) "program 
policy" in such concerns as foreign aid appears to flow from 
Congressional action and pressure groups; and (c) "anticipatory 
policy'' in terms of military strategy is likely to be a crea-
tion of the press, the academic world, and men of affairs. 1 
of trying to get any changes in the thinking, policy and 
action of the career diplomats and then you'd know what 
a real problem was. But the Treasury and the State De-
partment put together are nothing compared with the 
Na-a-vy. The Admirals are really something to cope with--
I should know. To change anything in the Na-a-vy is like 
punching a feather bed. You punch it with your right and 
you punch it with your left until you are finally ex-
hausted, and then you find the damn bed just as it was 
before you started punching." See Hans Morgenthau, 
"Alone with Himself and History, 11 The New York Times 
Magazine {November 13, 1960), p. 116. 
1. Roger Hilsman, "The Foreign Policy Consensus: An Interim 
Research Report," Conflict Resolution, 3 (December, 1959), 
pp. 361-82. 
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Such studies and observations reinforce the judgment 
that foreign policy has acquired peculiarly ultimate and 
pervasive qualities in the modern period . All of the basic 
organs of national government share decision-making responsi -
bilities affecting international relations . Every area of 
basic national policy , including 11 domestic 11 policy, has be-
come a problem for foreign policy . Policy is thus cumulative 
vertically (historically) and horizontally (institutionally) . 
The cumulative nature of religion's own penetration of culture 
thus doubles the demand for comprehensive understanding . It 
is necessary, however, to bring these relationships and their 
corresponding claims into the clearest possible focus if re -
search is to make progress and action to become more responsi-
ble . 
The normative or valuative dimensions of decision-making 
have been included within the model . Whatever the moral and 
ideological pretensions of nations may be, some conception of 
"national interest" tends to exert sovereign influence over 
the formulation and execution of policy. National interest 
is the prime criterion in terms of which a state judges situa-
tional factors, determines relative priorities, and establishes 
and evaluates courses of action . 1 The conception of the na-
tional interest may be said to be derived from two sources: 
a "myth" of the national purpose and the decision-makers who 
1. Lerche, p . 6 . 
are themselves partakers in that umyth." The "myth" is an 
expression of "those mass-shared values in foreign policy 
whose maximization by government is demanded by a broad con-
sensus."1 The conflicts both above and below the consensus, 
and the dynamics of religion within both conflict and consen-
sus, remain to be explored below. It can be observed here, 
however, that the myth of the national mission imposes mass 
restraints upon the process of decision-making in foreign 
policy. 
The mass may be manipulated, tricked , cajoled, 
temporar ily evaded, or even tyrannized, but it 
cannot permanently be ignored. To the extent 
to which the mass tradition of international 
mission is clearly formulated and based on genu-
ine value consensus, it is an absolutely con-
trolling determinant of national interest. 
Statesmen must develop their own formulations 
within such freedom of action as it permits 
them.2 
The myth of national mission involves broad value generaliza-
tions, however, which do permit some flexibility in official 
interpretation and in application to specific situations. It 
is also expressed in slogans subject to manipulation by 
skilled leadership.3 These characteristics reveal the basic 
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irrationality and instability of mass attitudes underlying 
foreign policy: "Popular attitudes may seize upon an objective, 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid., p. 11. 
3. Ibid. 
a technique, or a condition, and sanctify it as an integral 
part of basic national interest . Against such a move the 
statesman is helpless . 111 Religion is naturally endowed with 
peculiar powers of sanctification which it can impart to the 
59 
various aspects of policy, thereby influencing mass responses. 
The capacity of religion to sanctify or reject public 
policy tends to be exercised through its leaders . Whatever 
religion's role may be among the "decision-makers," it has 
a definite and recognizable place among the 11 decision-in-
fluencers." Almond identifies four groups related to the 
process of policy-making in international affairs: the 
"general public," the ''attentive public," the "opinion elites , " 
and the "policy leaders . " It is in the interaction between 
an "opinion elite" and an "attentive public" that Almond per-
ceives the strategic significance of religious leadership: 
"Perhaps the most effective opinion leaders are the vast num-
ber of vocational, community, and institutional 'notables , ' 
known and trusted men and women- -clergymen and influential 
lay churchmen , club and fraternal order leaders, teachers and 
the like--with personal followings . "2 The instability of mass 
moods underlying foreign policy places enormous power in the 
hands of "opinion elites. 11 3 The s anctifying of particular 
l . Ibid . , p. 12. 
2 . Gabriel Almond, The American Peo le and 
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 
3. Ibid., Chapter IV . 
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policies requires the attachment, in the mass mind, of the 
national mission to those policies; symbols and rituals are 
primary aids to this process of attachment, and religious 
and educational elites are among those most able to create 
and manipulate symbols and rituals. They can trigger the 
most opposite and contradictory responses by their own claims 
of sanctification--although they, too, must generally operate 
within the limits established by the myth of national mission. 
One of the requirements of the dissertation, therefore, 
appears to be a t he ory of religious leadership: in empirical 
terms for research purposes, and in normative terms for action 
purposes. For the most part , religious leadership is exer-
cised by 11 decision-influencers" rather than 11 decision-
makers11--the exceptions will be clear--and this study will 
come to focus more on the private pressures external to 
decision-making in foreign policy than upon pressures internal 
to it. But the understanding, or lack of understanding, by 
religious leaders of the internal structure of decision-making 
and the human burdens and dilemmas, ethical and spiritual as 
well as technical, to be borne by the decision-makers is 
itself a factor of high significance. Elder 's description 
of "the policy machine" takes account of these inner, personal 
realities of decision-making in American foreign policy: 
In a sense, the policy machine is nothing more 
than man writ large, with both his limitations 
and his potentialities, carrying within itself 
the frustrations, the interests, and the emotions 
of contemporary society. For man and the men who 
make policies are no t machines, nor would we 
have them become mere automatons . Indeed, 
the ultimate goal of American foreign policy 
is to preserve and develop the opportunities 
of mankind to remain human, yet to encourage 
man to find in himself new humanity . l 
1 . Elder, p . 3. 
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CHAPTER III 
RELIGION AS A SOUR0E OF LOYALTY 
1 . The Type 
The first function of religion in world politics is to 
unite its adherents with an ultimate source of loyalty . 
Members of a religious community are oriented to the 
radical center of their ultimate values . From this radical 
center an orientation to the nature and claims of all lesser 
centers of loyalty is provided . Inherent in the nature of 
religion itself is "identification by persons of themselves 
as members of a specific religious 'communion' which consti-
tutes a supreme center of loyalties . 111 
The absolute qualities of this identification are given 
frequent expression in Hebrew and Christian scriptures . Loy-
alty, obedience , and faithfulness to God are the primary re-
quirements of both faith and ethics . The Commandments an-
nounce these requirements: "You shall have no other gods be-
fore me •• • for I the Lord your God am a jealous God . 112 
The category of loyalty was given heightened emphasis by the 
Revised Standard Version which translated the Hebrew chesed 
(or hesedh) as "loyalty" or "steadfast love" instead of 
1. Robin M. illiams, Jr ., p . 14. 
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2 . Ex . 20:3 , 5b . All Biblical quotations are from the Revised 
Standard Version, except where otherwise noted. 
"mercy," which had been the most common rendering in the 
King James Version. 1 Thus, the Psalms 11 sing of loyalty and 
of justice ,"2 and the Proverbs proclaim that "loyalty and 
faithfulness preserve the king."3 These religio-political 
expressions of the word for "loyalty" proceed from the dis-
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tinctive qualities of Old Testament religion . Snaith suggests 
that the full meaning of chesed is "covenant-love," thus 
re l ating it to the central doctrine of both "covenants" or 
"testaments . " This love is expressed in mutual obligation 
between God and 11 the people of God . " "The original use of 
the Hebrew chesed is to denote that attitude of loyalty and 
faithfulness which both parties to a covenant should observe 
towards each other."4 
1 . The Inter;reter 1 s Bible (12 vols . , New York: Abingdon 
Press , 19 5) , IV , 798 . 
2 . Ps . 101:1 . 
3. Prov . 20:28 . 
4 . Norman H. Snaith, The Distinctive Ideas of the Old Testa-
ment (London: The Epworth Press , 1944), p . 49 . Doctrinal 
and empirical qualities of the community of the covenant 
are combined in a discussion by Pedersen who characterizes 
it as a "psychic community free from deep-rooted conflicts," 
or blessed with shalom, that special kind of love or peace 
which is a harmony of the whole faithful community. "The 
commandment to love is thus not a dogmatic invention, but 
a direct expression of the character of the soul and the 
organism of family and people . It means that the individual 
acts for the whole, and the whole for the individual, and 
this is not an abstract or an unnatural claim, but only 
the substance of normal life . " Johannes Pedersen, Israel: 
Its Life and Culture (Copenhagen: Branner og Korch, 1926), 
I, 285, 310 . 
Christian obedience in the New Testament combines both 
ultimate ("We must obey God rather than men"l) and insti-
tutional {"Obey your leaders and submit to them112 ) qualities . 
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In its pure type, religious loyalty is absolute and unqualified . 
The religious community is committed to divine commandments 
which control both its internal life and its relationship to 
the world . Paul Lehmann finds "the foundation and pattern 
of Christian behavior" in the koinonia, the community of the 
New Covenant, which manifests the operation of divine provi-
dence in human history: 
The koinonia is the outpost of God's judgment 
upon every pattern and structure which seeks to 
preserve and to justify itself by the idolatry 
of the status quo. And the koinonia is the out-
post of God's renewal , establishing new patterns 
and structures, commensurate with God's new 
possibilities of living on the other side of 
those which are played out . The ethical reality 
of the Christian life is being, in fact and in 
anticipation, ready for God's next move . 3 
It is the very nature of the religious community, thus de-
fined , to regard all other communities in a relative and pro-
visional way . 
1 . Acts 5: 29 . 
2 . Heb . 13 : 17 . 
3. "The Foundation and Pattern of Christian Behavior , " in 
John A. Hutchison (ed . ), Christian Faith and Social Ac-
tion (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953), p . 110 . 
Lehmann here acknowledges his indebtedness to Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer, the martyred German theologian, whose friend 
and fellow- student he was at Union Theological Seminary 
in 1930-31 . For Bonhoeffer, the will of God is always 
to be known concretely within "the empirical reality of 
the Church , " or the koinonia, the "laboratory of the 
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Religious loyalty is not only extensive: it is intensive . 
Loyalty is more than a symbol of reference: it is profoundly 
sentimental in expressing the fullness of emotional identifi-
cation . The symbols of loyalty are "affectively toned . " To 
be identified with a symbol personally is "to include it with 
the symbol of the primary ego as part of the self."1 The re-
ligious community employs such means as ritual and creed to 
reinforce the emotional power of its symbols of loyalty . 
living word . " Bonhoeffer 1 s dissertation at the University 
of Berlin was entitled Sanctorum Communio: Eine do atische 
Untersuchung zur Soziologie der Kirche Sanctorum Communio: 
A Dogmatic Investigation of the Sociology of the Church) . 
His investigation of "the fellowship of saints" combined 
sociology's (especially Ferdinand Tennies') interest in the 
structure of empirical communities with theology's dogmatic 
interest in the concept of the church (a combination of in-
terests acknowledged in this dissertation) . Bonhoeffer 
recognized the dimension of conflict in both the church 
and the world. This dogmatic-functional description of 
the church as a "community of love" in which the Holy 
Spirit is objectified established three basic sociological 
relationships: Geistvielheit (Spirit-multiplicity), 
Geistgemeinschaft (Spirit - fellowship), and Geisteinheit 
{Spirit-unity). This formulation explicitly rejected the 
Weber- Troeltsch "church- sect" typology as being "genetic" 
instead of "ontological . " The sanctorum communio is a 
fellowship bound only to the word of God revealed in Jesus 
Christ . For a fuller discussion, in English, of Bonhoeffer's 
dissertation, see John D. Godsey, The Theology of Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer (Philadelphia : The Westminster Press, 1960), 
pp . 27-55. The categories of multiplicity, fellowship, and 
unity in Bonhoeffer's description of the church may perhaps 
be understood as rough parallels to the categories of con-
flict, reconciliation, and loyalty employed in this disser-
tation . Further parallels with the structure of 
Bonhoeffer 1 s t hought will be acknowledged in the presenta-
tion of succeeding types . 
1. Harold D. Lasswell, "World Loyalty," in Quincy Wright (ed . ), 
The World Community (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1948), p . 200 . 
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The dominant religious communities of the United States--
Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish--have all been marked by a 
growing self-assertion in the face of what they have regarded 
as the "relativism" of a secular ago. Fundamentalism and neo-
Reformationism, nee-Medieval Catholicism, Zionism and a re-
newed attention to the heritage of Judaism all reflect a 
tendency to reinstate the absolute and transcendent loyal-
ties of religion. Salo Baron, in his discussion of the rela-
tionship between modern nationalism and religion, has observed 
that "even liberal Protestantism and Reform Judaism have tend-
ed in recent years to search for more absolute values and de-
mand more rigid observance •••• There has been a universal 
quest for religious absolutes to satisfy the cravings for 
spiritual security of a generation which had come to cherish 
security almost above everything else."l Assertive national-
ism in the twentieth century, with quasi-religious qualities 
of its own, is thus confronted with a new absolutism of faith. 
Americans of this generation are subject to both the asser-
tiveness of religion and the assertiveness of nationalism. 
This quest for absolutes may be characterized, within 
the typology of this study, as the attempt to reclaim reli-
gion's first function as a radical source of loyalty for its 
community of believers. The political consequences of this 
function of transcendent loyalty as it may be given purest 
1. Salo Baron, Modern Nationalism and Religion (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1947), p. 253. 
expression by the Christian in international affairs are de-
scribed by Butterfield: 
Precisely because he can hold fast to spiritual 
truths--not turning any mundane programme or 
temporal ideal into the absolute of absolutes--
the Christian has it in his power to be more 
flexible in respect of all subordinate matters, 
and to ally himself with whatever may be the 
best for the world at a given moment •••• The 
Christian is particularly called to carry his 
thinking outside that framework which a nation 
or a political party or a social system or an 
accepted regime or a mundane theology provides. 
Even the preservation of what we may love as 
the existing order of things--even Anglo-Saxon 
ideals and western values--are not the absolute 
values for the Christian.l 
Political ethics for the loyal Christian is not, as both his 
friends and his critics have caricatured it, the barren and 
unyielding abstraction of an individualistic moralism or 
legalism somehow to be watered down to the organic require-
ments and the ambiguous thickets of collective life. It pro-
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ceeds, rather, from a radically corporate ethic nourished and 
sustained in the vitality of an historic community. It ac-
knowledges at the outset that personal life must seek its 
fulfillment in the profoundest possible connections among 
persons and groups. The Christian ethic is "corporate" in 
two fundamental senses: ultimacy and intimacy. Vertically, 
it is the continuing manifestation by a community of the 
Covenant of that Ultimate Being whose life was made visible 
in the Incarnation--it is the Body of Christ. Horizontally, 
it is this community's living expression of its ultimate 
1. Christianity, Diplomacy, and War, pp. 3-4. 
loyalty in practicing its Covenant-obligations among its own 
members and with the world.l 
1. The act of identification with a community of the Covenant 
suggests, from the religious side, the irreducibly dog-
matic or val uative element in decision-making . The emer-
gence of the vital concept of "decision-making" in the 
policy sciences in the same generation in which the need 
for "decision" has been so vigorously asserted by theo-
logians and ethicists presents a new and not yet fully 
exploited possibility of substantial progress in construc-
tive political ethics. Such progress would appear to de-
pend, in large measure, upon increasing communication 
between ethicists and policy scientists and upon empirical 
research of a quality acceptable to both. The religious 
component of decision-making, beginning with t his first 
function of religion as a radical center of loyalty, has 
been indicated by H. Ric hard Niebuhr's discussion of "the 
center of value" in all moral action. "Dogma," he writes, 
"there must be, since the analysis even of value cannot 
begin in the void but must start with an act of decision 
for some being as value-center." The monotheistic faith 
of Christian and Jewish theology involves, 11first, a cen-
tral value-theory and then the recognition of an infinite 
number of possible, relative value-s ystems. Its starting 
point, its dogmatic beginning, is with the transcendent 
One for whom alone t here is an ultimate good and f or whom, 
as the source and end of all things, whatever is is good • 
• • • With this beginning the value-theory of monotheistic 
theology is enabled to proceed on the con struction of many 
relative value systems, each of them tenta tive, experi-
mental, objective, as it considers the interaction of 
beings on beings, now from the point of view of man, now 
from the point of view of society, now from the point of 
view of life." H. Richard Niebuhr, nThe Center of Value," 
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in Ruth Nanda Anshen (ed.), Moral Principles of Action: Man's 
Ethical Imperative (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 
1952), pp. 173-4. Thus, in monotheistic theology, ultimate 
value resides neither with the individual nor with the com-
munity, but with Him who is ultimate. He is not to be appre-
hended exclus~vely in either the isolated person or in the 
collective life, but only in that proper relation of person 
to community in which each is relative to the Absolute pre-
cisely because each is a manifestation of the Absolute. It 
is upon such foundations that a new generation of political 
ethicists will be "enabled to proceed on the construction of 
many value systems, each of them tentative, exp erimental, ob-
jective." Niebuhr has recently provided an elaboration of 
this perspective in Radical Monotheism and Western Culture 
(New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1960). 
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2. The Institutionalization of Loyalty 
It is beyond the scope of this study to determine which 
foreign policies in the modern period most adequately express 
absolute religious loyalty . Such an inquiry would shift the 
focus of study from the empirical qualities of religious in-
fluence to the ethical issues involved in policy discussion, 
addressing itself in such terms as "a Christian foreign pol-
icy. " While that alternative inquiry is a valid and necessary 
one , the dissertation has proceeded from the judgment that it 
is the preoccupation of theologians and ethicists (both "real-
ists" and "idealists") with that discussion which has tended 
to obscure the need for critical self-study. It is to be dem-
onstrated that the empirical significance of religious loyalty 
in international affairs can only be perceived when that loy-
alty is seen to enter into its dialectical relationship with 
each of the other categories of the typology. 
It is possible, and perhaps necessary, however, to de-
scribe the institutionalization of loyalty within the reli-
gious community as it is maintained by religious leadership 
and related to the attempts of the religious community to 
influence foreign policy. 
Religious leadership tends to recognize an inherent 
conflict between religious and other loyalties . While seek-
ing to control other loyalties by the ultimate one, it is 
acknowledged in many ways that members of the religious 
community will be subject to alienation from itself by the 
pull of those other loyalties. Formally, if not practically, 
such alienation may be regarded as idolatry. 1 An internal 
system of sanctions will be employed, in addition to ritual 
and creed. Such sanctions may be positive and rewarding 
(e.g., the promise of divine favor), or negative and punitive 
(e.g., the threat of excommunication). 
While religious values are expected to control political 
values among loyal members of the religious community, they 
cannot be immediately translated into political values. 
There must be "interpretations" expressed in "pronouncements" 
by religious leaders concerning the meaning of faith for 
policy matters. In a free society, religious leadership can-
not depend primarily upon its most extreme sanctions to en-
force loyalty to official "pronouncements," but must depend 
essentially upon education and moral persuasion. 
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There is apparently an inevitable gap between these 
"pronouncements" on policy issues and the sentiments actually 
prevailing among the total constituency of the religious 
community. This gap is a measure of the lack of loyalty to 
(or degree of conflict with) religious leadership, although 
not necessarily a lack of loyalty to the ultimate values 
whose communication has been entrusted to that leadership, 
because "pronouncements" may themselves conflict with the 
1. It is not to be assumed that religious leadership consis-
tently recognizes a conflict between religious and national 
loyalties. In fact, as Chapters 4 and 5 below will make 
apparent, the conflict may be resolved by simply reducing 
religious loyalty to an apology for national loyalty. 
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ultimate values of the faith. Those members of the religious 
community not supporting the "pronouncements" {if, indeed, 
they are aware of the "pronouncements") may appeal either to 
their own understanding of their faith or to more secular 
sources of judgment. 
Political decision-makers often perceive the gap, or 
lack of consensus, in the religious community on policy is-
sues. Such a failure to achieve consensus may subject the 
decision-makers to conflicting pressures from reli gion, but 
those very conflicts tend to mitigate the decisive influence 
of religious leadership and to allow the decision-makers to 
be more responsive to secular than to religious pressures. 
Religious leadership may then develop patterns of partici-
pation and communication within the religious community to 
reduce the opinion gap and, at the same time, to keep the 
gap from becoming a dysfunctional cause of conflict within 
the fold. 
Before referring to several studies which attempt to 
measure the "opinion gap" on foreign policy questions, some 
of the institutional factors determining the size of the 
gap may tentatively be identified: (1) inconsistency and 
conflict within the leadership; {2) rigidities of organiza-
tion; (3) class characteristics of membership; and (4) tri-
vialization of membership. 
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(1) Inconsistency and conflict within the leadership 
In an analysis of public moods which have alternated 
between isolationism and internationalism, Fensterwald distin-
guishes between the intent and the effect of religious in-
fluence with regard to international affairs. While most 
American churches appear from their pronouncements to be 
"staunchly and outspokenly 'internationalist,'" their own 
"policies, principles, and teachings may well influence their 
members in the adoption of ultra-nationalistic attitudes."l 
Fensterwald does not elaborate the contention, but the force 
of it will be demonstrated in succeeding chapters in this 
study. The "latent" functions of religion in the influencing 
of foreign policy may operate at cross-purposes with the 
"manifest" functions, even to the degree that the former 
supersede the latter. 
The patterns of organization and authority which bind 
religious leaders together may, therefore, significantly 
minimize or maximize their influence upon public policy. 
Central control is maximized within or among denominations 
to the extent to which corporate commitments govern the degree 
of coordination; it is minimized to the extent to which indi-
viduals meet as "'representatives' or 'ambassadors' from a 
1. Bernard Fensterwald, Jr., uThe Anatomy of American 
Isolationism and Expansionism: Part I," Conflict 
Resolution, 2 (June, 1958), p. 136. 
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constituency to which they feel responsible."1 Glock reports 
his 11 impressionn t hat the leadership of the Catholic Church 
is a more significant referent for the American Catholic 
than Protestant leadership is for the American Protestant. 
"The strength of the Catholic Church in conflict situations 
derives, in part, from the tightness of its organizational 
structure, the unity of its ideology, and its concomitant 
ability to present a relatively unified point of view on 
most issues. 11 2 Without minimizing the political diff erences 
within American Catholic leadership, it is important to rec-
ognize the degree to which public policy issues are central 
to hierarchical responsibilities, while occupying a more 
marginal or peripheral status for Protestant leaders. Fi-
nally, it must be recognized that some sources of internal 
conflict among reli gious elites in foreign policy discussion 
are not to be reduced simply to institutional causes, al-
though their institutional effects may be significant. 
There are enduring controversies of a theological and ethic-
al nature, such as pacifism-nonpacifism, which prevent the 
absolute identification of religi ous loyalty with most 
pronouncements concerning foreign policy. 
To this suggestion of inconsistency in the behavior of 
religious leadership must be added the probability t hat 
1. Robin M. Williams, Jr., p. 19. 
2. Charles Y. Glock, "Issues that Divide: A Postscript," 
The Journal of Social I s sues, 12 (1956), p. 42. 
Protestant religious leaders most exercised about foreign 
policy are somewhat marginal to the constituencies which 
they are supposed to represent. Other leaders, perhaps a 
majority on most foreign policy issues, may respond with in-
difference or opposition to the churches' own official spokes-
men on those issues. Yinger observes: "Extensive concern 
with 'social questions' has continued to characterize the 
work of only a minority of churchmen; and these have been 
more largely represented in seminaries, religious publica-
tions, 'institutional' downtown churches with predominantly 
lower-class congregations ••• , and various boards and 
agencies that are somewhat separated, as national organiza-
tions, from continuous contact with most laymen, than they 
have been found in local pulpits where any deviations from 
'respectable' religious views would be readily apparent to 
the middle and upper class congregations. 11 1 International 
viewpoints may not be as directly responsive to class differ-
ences as are domestic social and economic issues; the marginal 
status of Protestant leadership in the area of international 
concern remains a problem affecting its influence on national 
policy. 
(2) Rigidities of organization 
Loyalty to religious leadership and pronouncements in 
foreign policy matters is further qualified by the same 
1. Yinger, p. 226. 
obstacles of bureaucratic block and change which the policy-
makers themselves confront within the government. Bilheimer 
illuminates these problems in the field of ecumenical action 
by complaining that "the official representatives of the 
churches in the ecumenical movement may be so tempted to 
interpret ecumenical insight and judgment in terms congenial 
to their own constituencies as to rob those insights and 
judgments of their power . "l Ecumenical action is described 
as a two-way process combining a "movement upward" and a 
"movement downward . " The movement upward is the formation 
of a "common mindn from denominations through national 
councils to world conferences and the preparation for those 
conferences . It is Bilheimer's judgment that the ecumenical 
movement has been more successful in forming a common mind 
than in "throwing its agreements and concerns back upon its 
constituency . "2 In the movement downward, where no coercion 
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but only moral persuasion is possible, policies confront such 
"institutional rigidities'' as: (a) the natural inflexibility 
of institutions which are sanctioned by doctrine; (b) vested 
interests in property, program, work, and viewpoint; (c) the 
self - generation of pride; and (d) the tendency of institutions 
to be self-perpetuating . 3 
1 . Robert s . Bilheimer , "Problems in Ecumenical Action," 
Ecumenical Review, 4 (July , 1952), p . 364. 
2. Ibid . , p . 365 . 
3. Ibid ., pp . 360-3 . 
Thus, to the institutional pressures upon loyalty char-
acteristic of all formal organization, including government, 
the religious community adds the peculiar frustrations im-
posed by voluntary status, fragmented constituencies, and 
dogmatic sanctions. The "movement downward" in religious or-
ganization, denominational or ecumenical, is seldom if ever 
one of unobstructed progress in an unvarying direction. In 
foreign policy matters, pronouncements frequently do not move 
down to the local constituencies at all. 
(3) Class characteristics of membership 
Yinger's observation that only a minority of religious 
leaders exhibit an extensive concern on public issues and 
that the pastors among them serve predominantly lower-class 
congregations should not be taken as evidence of superior 
social attitudes on the part of those congregations. The 
congregations of the middle and upper classes actually tend 
to be more internationalist on foreign policy questions than 
those of the lower classes. 1 What clergymen at higher class 
levels seem to confront is a more formidable constituency in 
terms of education, articulate concern, critical response, 
and community influence in discussions of public policy. 
Among lower class constituencies, with correspondingly 
lower educational attainments, the intensity of religious 
loyalty may be just as strong if not stronger. The quality 
of that loyalty, however, appears to be less critical and 
1. See George Horsley Smith's distinction between "economic" 
and "non-economic liberalism," p. 206 below. 
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discriminating on matters of public policy to which rel i -
gious leadership may address itself . Almond characterizes 
lower class publics as a "stratum of the population which 
tends to be inert and apathetic , a group which is most readily 
manipulated by organizational bureaucracies such as church 
and trade -union leaderships . "l He calls for special atten-
tion to the problems of leadership training for low-income , 
low-education groups in order that they may bear a more 
responsible influence upon public opinion in foreign policy 
matters . Present efforts are directed primarily to the 
middle and upper classes . 2 
(4) Trivialization of membership 
In modern, multigroup American society , most members of 
religious communities also belong to a number of other con-
stituencies in which secular values and norms are dominant . 
The intensity of secular group loyalties may tend to diminish 
the intensity of religious loyalties . Religious aff iliation 
for many persons becomes more nominal and less decisive: it 
is ureligion at a low temperature . " Such a "trivialization 
of religious allegiance" re sults in the "extreme attenuation 
of commitment to specifi cally religious values . "3 
1 . Almond , p . 127 . 
2 . Ibid ., p . 239 . 
3 . Robin M. Williams, Jr . , p . 15 . 
78 
With this shift in the intensity of loyalties and the 
focus of values, religious pronouncements on foreign policy 
matters may be less influential for many church members than 
the viewpoints of business organizations, service clubs, labor 
unions, professional associations, veterans' groups, and civic 
leagues. Even where religious loyalties remain strong in in-
tensity, the pull of secular values in policy matters may be 
decisive by default if the internal patterns of religious 
leadership and organization combine to block effective com-
munication with the constituency. Thus, it is possible to 
have "religion at a high temperature" and decisive secular 
values at the same time among the same people. If the mem-
bers of the religious community are not exposed to the spe-
cific sources of insight in their own heritage as they relate 
to the life of nations, there is no conflict with nonreli-
gious groups in foreign policy attitudes: the nonreligious 
groups win by forfeit. In fact, substantial elements within 
both religious and secular group elites believe in just such 
a forfeit and resist the staging of a conflict in foreign 
policy discussion. 1 Membership in the religious community 
may be more emotionally intense and uncritical among those 
for whom religion's only function in public affairs is to 
sanction whatever the nation decides, in concert or conflict 
with other nations. In such a process, the fact of religious 
1. The resistance to open conflict in foreign policy discus-
sion is made effective by the manipulation of the aversion 
to political controversy which characterizes many Protes-
tants and is discussed in Chapters VII and VIII below . 
membership has become trivialized as a radical source of 
loyalty controlling other loyalties. 
3. The Measurement of Loyalty 
Several studies of the 11 opinion gap 11 between pronounce -
ments and popular attitudes in the churches have helped to 
document the problems of loyalty to religious leadership in 
foreign policy matters . Glock and Ringer, in a larger survey 
of the attitudes of Episcopalian ministers and parishioners 
on social issues, assembled data on the degree of support of 
denominational positions on international issues. Their in-
vestigation took place in 1951~2 and compared clergy and lay 
attitudes with the official pronouncements adopted by the 
Protestant Episcopal Church in its triennial meetings , at 
which all American dioceses and overseas missions are repre-
sented. Glock and Ringer distinguished between the "unequi-
vocal" pronouncements of a primarily ideological and non-
economic character and the "equivocal" pronouncements where 
social and economic power tend to be involved. The unequivo-
cal pronouncements cited included a strong stand for the sup-
port and strengthening of the United Nations, a liberal im-
migration policy, and the rights of conscientious objectors. 
Pronouncements concerning labor, on the other hand , were mod-
erate and balanced and seemed to evidence a "desire to keep 
from alienating parishioners ." Economic differences appeared 
to prevent any major pronouncements on issues corresponding 
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to government control of the economy . There was a somewhat 
equivocal pronouncement on war which, while condemning it 
as evil , accepted it as legitimate . 1 
Glock and Ringer found that parishioners were in essen-
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tial agreement with the stand officially taken by their denom-
ination on only one issue: support for the United Nations. 
This was interpreted partly in terms of the traditional ties 
between the Episcopal Church and Great Britain and the fact 
that "internationalism" in the twentieth century has required 
an American- British alliance . A wide divergency of senti-
ment among parishioners on other issues of an ideological 
and moral character such as immigration and conscientious 
objection did not prevent unequivocal pronouncements, how-
ever . The church did not find it necessary to temper its 
stand precisely because there were no solidified collective 
interests and wills involved . Thus , while l eadership may be 
more clearly exercised on the ideological and moral issues, 
its influence cannot command solidary support from its own 
constituency . 2 I ndeed , its exercise may depend upon lack of 
mass interest and response . 
Within the denominational organization, the parish min-
ister was identified as nthe crucial link in communicating 
church policy to the church's membership" and as uthe 
1 . Charles Y. Glock and Benjamin B. Ringer, "Church Policy and 
the Attitudes of Hinisters and Parishioners on Social Issues," 
American Sociological Review, 21 (April, 1956) , pp. 148-53 . 
2 . Ibid . , p . 155. 
individual most subject to cross pressures where conflict 
arises between church policy on an issue and how his parish-
ioners feel on this issue." Where church policy is strong 
and unequivocal (with the exception of support for the U.N.), 
ministers and parishioners tend to disagree. Where church 
policy is moderate and equivocal, ministers and parishioners 
are more likely to agree. In both types of policy, however, 
ministers tend to identify with church policy despite the 
opposition of many parishioners. Among themselves, ministers 
are most li~ely to agree when church policy is strong and 
unequivocal. 1 
The findings of such a study should not be taken to 
obscure the conflict which arises between pronouncements and 
parish sentiments when the minister may not perform his func-
tion as "the crucial link of communication." The same 
"desire to keep from alienating parishioners" which leads to 
equivocal pronouncements on foreign policy and other issues 
may also lead to the avoidance of communication of pronounce-
ments at the parish level. Thus, even when ecumenical, de-
nominational, and district obstacles to communication have 
been overcome, the local obstacles may be the most formidable 
and critical, preventing parishioners from being directly in-
fluenced by the corporate judgments of religious leadership. 
The importance of the attitudes of the local parish in 
international relations is boldly stated by a Catholic 
1. Ibid., pp. 155-6. 
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sociologist: "Catholicism will succeed or fail in the im-
perative job of reconstructing and reintegrating modern so-
ciety mainly on the basis of its individual parishes •• • • 
The sociological roots of Catholicism are in the parish . "1 
But when Fichter conducted an opinion survey of "the Catho-
lic mind" of a Southern parish , he found that even "ideal 
types" (those who had shown the "most Catholic" behavior in 
fulfilling religious obligations) varied significantly from 
official teachings of the Church on social matters . Three 
conceptual levels were distinguished : (a) the "complete 
Christian ideology" as taught by the Church; {b) the "prac-
tical ideology" or actual value - system of parishioners; and 
(c) the "actual behavior" of parishioners . While (c) can be 
determined only through accurate observation, the practical 
ideology can be indicated through opinion studies . In 
Fichter's study, interviews of 11 ideal types" in the parish 
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were conducted by priests, suggesting that the most likely 
bias would be toward support of official teachings . On birth 
control and labor unions, the percentages of support were only 
51% and 53%, respectively . Of more direct relevance to the 
dissertation are the findings with regard to group loyalties 
and conflicts. Only 38% supported the official teaching that 
atomic bombs should not be dropped on civilians in a future 
war (presumably, Russian civilians); only 35% woul d agree to 
1. Joseph H. Fichter, S . J . , Southern Parish (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 19Sl), pp. 7-8. 
the instruction not to marry non-Catholics; and just 26% 
accepted the principle of desegregated schools. On all 
issues, domestic and foreign, the average of support was 
Fichter's survey must, accordingly, balance the obser-
vation of Glock reported above that Catholic leadership is 
relatively unified and tightly organized, when compared with 
other religious groups.2 While that judgment may be true, 
it seems evident that religious leadership in all groups 
fails to command anything approaching solidary support in 
the attitudes of members on foreign policy questions.3 
The ideological conflict of both religion and democracy 
with Russian Communism has introduced new elements into mass 
attitudes on foreign policy. In a comprehensive and cele-
brated study of "the American mind" as it focused on the 
problems of Communism and threats to civil liberties in the 
summer of 1954, Stouffer reported that there was little 
1. Ibid., Chapter 20. 
2. See p. 73 above. 
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3. Reinhold Niebuhr, in giving a high estimation of the quali-
ties of papal teachings, remarked (with twinkled eye) to a 
panel at the 1960 Annual Meeting of the American Political 
Science Association: 11 The real issue in the 1960 campaign 
is not 'How much Vatican control of American government 
will result if Senator Kennedy is elected?' but 'How can 
we help the Vatican to have more influence over the Ameri-
can hierarchy in world politics?'" The suggestion was 
that even Catholic leadership is much less solidary than 
is supposed by many Protestants, when it comes to the is-
sues of national policy. 
statistical evidence for a "national anxiety neurosis" over 
these issues at the level of local leadership. 1 However, 
among those most worried about Communist infiltration, the 
antireligious aspects of Communists' beliefs were most fre-
quently mentioned.2 Moreover, church-attenders of both sexes 
were found to be less tolerant in the maintenance of consti-
tutional liberties than were the non-church-attenders.3 This 
local picture contrasts with conspicuous efforts of national 
leadership in the denominations and in the ecumenical move-
ment at that time to protect civil liberties and to prevent 
anti-Communist hysteria. Perhaps most conspicuous was the 
1953 appearance of Methodist Bishop G. Bromley Oxnam, a 
President of the World Council of Churches, before the House 
Un-American Activities Committee, and his subsequent criti-
cisms of the investigating practices of the Committee.4 It 
84 
may well be, therefore, that sermons preached against the 
evils of "atheistic Communism" in local churches in 1953 and 
1954 tended to offset the national pronouncements and actions 
concerning Communism, the dangers of conformity, and the 
threats to civil liberties. 
1. Samuel A. Stouffer, Communism, Conformity, and Civil Lib-
erties (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1955), Chapter 3. 
2. Ibid., Chapter 7. 
3. Ibid., Chapter 6. 
4. G. Bromley Oxnam, I Protest (New York: Harper and Brothers 
Publishers, 1954). For a more general discussion see 
Ralph Lord Roy, Communism and the Churches (New York: Har-
court, Brace . and Company, 1960). 
When religious loyalty is institutionalized, it is ap-
parent that wide deviations from the "pure type" of loyalty 
will result. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RELIGION AS A SANCTION FOR LOYALTY 
1 . The Type 
The second function of religion in world politics is to 
provide legitimizing sanctions for the secular communities to 
which its adherents belong . 
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The religious community recognizes the existence of 
secular communities, including the nation . It also recognizes 
the legitimate claims of those communities and attempts to 
comprehend them within the hierarchy of loyalties ultimately 
controlled by the fundamenta l religious l oyalty . There is an 
inherent recognition in religion that ultimate loyalty requires 
a political loyalty . 
Both the Old and New Testaments chronicle t h e history of 
nations and empires and proclaim God ' s will regarding them . 
The Psalmist sang: "Blessed is the nation whose God is the 
Lord, the people whom he has chosen as his heritage! 111 The 
prophets announced the activity of God even through the life 
of those nations which did not acknowledge God as the Lord . 
Jesus instructed the Pharisees: "Render t herefore to Caesar 
the things that are Caesar's , and to God the things that are 
God's . "2 Paul wrote to the church at Rome: "Let every person 
1 . Ps . 33:12 . 
2 . Mt . 22:21 . 
be subject to the governing authorities. For there is no 
authority except from God, and those that exist have been 
instituted by God."l 
The absolute qualities of the Christian's religious loy-
alty require him to acknowledge his political loyalties with 
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relative and limited sanctions . His understanding of history 
teaches him that there is an eternal realm beyond all tempo-
ral realms . In Cullmann 1 s words, there is a "chronological 
dualism" in the New Testament. In Christ, the end of history 
is already fulfilled, yet its consummation remains in the fu-
ture . "Because the Gospel presents itself as the 'politeuma,' 
the community of the coming age, it must accordingly see as 
its most intrinsic concern its disposition toward the present 
' polis,' the secular state . 112 And so the state cannot be re-
garded as something final and definitive: it is accepted for 
its necessary but temporal and "provisional" character . 3 
This intrinsic concern of the koinonia (the community in 
anticipation of the politeuma) with the polis is a distinctive 
characteristic of the New Testament . The New Testament marks 
a fundamental fracture between the religious community and the 
political community which had been unknown in the Israel of 
the Old Covenant . The "people of God" had held their reli-
gious and political loyalties in a common and undivided 
1 • Rom . 13 : 1 . 
2 . Oscar Cullmann, The State in the New Testament (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1956), p . 4. 
3 . Ibid. , p . 5. 
allegiance. Now "church" and "state" became separate cate-
gories, each at t empting to establish its autonomy, but each 
seeking sanction by the other and each at times asserting 
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its claims over the other. Augustine, Aquinas, the Reformers, 
and many others were to provide their special interpretations 
of the two realms of the eternal and the temporal. The state 
would be variously legitimized as an order of creation, an 
order of nature, or a consequence of corrupted nature--but 
always the dominant traditions of the faith would sanction 
the state as a necessary institution entitled to the Chris-
tians steadfast, if "provisional , " loyalty . 
While the medieval Catholic Church and the theocracy of 
Calvin's Geneva attempted to reunite ecclesiastical and polit-
ical loyalties (thereby turning to Old Testament sources), 
they were only temporarily successful . The historical devel-
opment of the church as a dogmatically exclusive community of 
the New Covenant made it impossible to reestablish the Israel 
of the Old Covenant . The radical separation of the koinonia 
from the polis was such as to prevent their organic reunion 
in history; only in the new age would they become reconciled 
in the politeuma . The community of the New Covenant actually 
prepared the way for the emergence of the modern secular 
state . The state, unable to take the identity of religious 
and political loyalties for granted, established a new cove-
nant of its own : a social contract , formally expressed in a 
constitution . The community of the New Covenant with its 
obligations now had to come to terms with the community of 
the social contract with its obligations: the former would 
still be ready to sanction the latter, but the latter would 
now be ready to compel loyalty on its own terms. 
The social contract, as a secular covenant within a so-
ciety whose values had been largely shaped by the community 
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of the New Covenant, would retain the claims of the political 
community to divine favor, but would not and could not re-
claim an absolute identity of religious loyalty and political 
loyalty. Henceforth, two autonomous communities would be 
marked by a mutual interpenetration of values: not only would 
the religious values of the community of the New Covenant con-
tinue to penetrate the national community, but the political 
values of the community of the social contract would react 
upon the religious community. Religious sanctions would be 
established for the democratic state as they had for the mon-
archies and the empires of the past; democratic sanctions would 
tend to reshape the structure of the religious community as 
monarchical and imperial sanctions had done for the church of 
the past. 
For religious sanctions to become effective with regard 
to the modern nation-state, they must be expressed in the 
dynamic context of the structures and processes within the 
state, including the process of decision-making. Religion 
tends to penetrate the national state at such levels as estab-
lishing national goals and shaping the constitutional structures 
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of decision-making and the character of decision-makers . 
The degree of penetration will vary with the status of reli-
gion in the national hierarchy of loyalties and values . To 
the extent that it claims increasing success for its influence 
within the nation, religion will tend to assert growing sanc-
tions for the decisions and actions of the state . Its sanc-
tions depend only in part upon religion's formal recognition 
by the state . A secular or even formally hostile state may 
win religious sanction if religion is free to develop and 
maintain its own institutions . 
Where religion has been most successful in influencing 
the state and most fully accepted by the state, it is most 
likely to interpret political loyalty as a religious obligation . 
Political functions will be surrounded by the rites of reli -
gion: executives will perform priestly chores, courts will 
swear oaths , legislatures and armies will employ chaplains . 
The policies of the state will be announced with pious and 
moral principles. Decision-makers who are themselves perceived 
to be "religious" will become the subjects of prayer and the 
objects of popular support and prestige . The leaders recog-
nize the importance of religion as a cohesive and integrating 
force making for national unity . They seek the cooperation of 
religious leadership in appealing for patriotism. 
Political loyalty, as well as religious loyalty, requires 
symbolism to sustain its sentimental foundations . Political 
loyalty, too, will combine forms of ritual and creed to make 
its symbolism meaningful . The secular state tends to be 
marked by a poverty of symbolism of its own; religious sym-
bols, cast out of the front door, come around to enter by 
the back. Religious language will become embodied in the 
creeds , the mottoes, and the anthems which express patriotic 
sentiment . In Christian sanctuaries , the flag of the Cross 
and the flag of the nation will be unfurled side-by-side . 
The history and/or destiny of the nation will be interpreted 
by both religious and political leaders as a unique manifes -
tation of divine providence . 
91 
The fullest expression of religious sanctions for 
national loyalty will tend to result in a "homogenizing of 
symbolisms" and the mutual acceptance of religious and polit-
ical leaders . The "provisional" character of the state will 
be acknowledged at times by both religious and political 
leaders, if only to spur the people on to even greater efforts 
to merit continuing divine favor . The sentiments inherent 
in religious and in patriotic types of loyalty will tend to 
merge . Political loyalty is a religious duty . 
2 . Religion and the American Character 
While the dissertation ' s concern for particular events 
and policies is limited to the period beginning in 1898, it 
is important to recognize that the modern period inherited 
a framework of decision- making from nearly three centuries of 
American history, as well as from European life and ancient 
times . Accordingly, a relevant inquiry is to investigate the 
patterns of religious influence in the shaping of American 
political institutions responsible for the conduct of foreign 
policy, the myths upon which these institutions rest, and the 
symbols to which they appeal. 
In 1889, on the eve of the decade in which the United 
States was to emerge as a world power, Lord Bryce published 
his American Commonwealth as an Englishman's picture of the 
political life of the land.l His account was not narrowly 
political: the very title suggests his background concern for 
"intellectual and social phenomena" and the role which he as-
signed to the Puritan ideal of "commonwealth" in creating the 
institutions of American government. Bryce noted these dis~ 
tinctive characteristics of public life in the United States: 
(a) Christianity was, in fact if not in name, the national 
religion; (b) the worldview of average Americans was shaped 
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by the Bible and Christian theology; (c) Americans attributed 
progress and prosperity to Divine favor; (d) political thought 
was deeply influenced by such Puritan emphases as the doctrine 
of original sin; (e) American constitutional government was 
peculiarly legalistic; (f) American religion was marked by 
emotional fervor; and (g) the social activities of American 
religion were singularly developed. 
1. James Bryce, The American Commonwealth (2 vols., London: 
Macmillan and Company, 1889). 
These observations, scattered throughout both volumes 
of The American Commonwealth, may thus be brought together 
in Bryce's own words: 
Christianity is in fact understood to be, though 
not the legally established religion, yet the 
national religion . So far from thinking their 
commonwealth godless ••• they deem the general 
acceptance of Christianity to be one of the main 
sources of their national prosperity, and their 
nation a special object of the Divine favour . 
A perusal of the literature which the ordinary 
Ameri can of the educated farming and working class 
reads , and a study of the kind of literature which 
those Americans who are least coloured by European 
influences produce , lead me to think that the 
Bible and Christian theology altogether do more in 
the way of forming the imaginative background to 
an average American view of the world of man and 
nature than they do in modern Pr otestant Europe . 2 
Some one has said that the American Government and 
Constitution are based on the theology of Calvin 
and the philosophy of Hobbes . This at least is 
true, that there is a hearty Puritanism in the view 
of human nature which pervades the instrument of 
1787 . It is the work of men who believed in ori-
ginal sin , and were resolved to leave open for 
transgressors no door which they could possibly 
shut . 3 
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The spirit of the American Revolution was not like the "enthu-
siastic optimism" of the French Revolution: 
With the spirit of Puritanism there is blent 
a double portion of the spirit of legalism. 
Not only is there no reliance on ethical 
forces to help the government to work: there 
is an elaborate machinery of law to preserve 
the equilibrium of each of its organs.~ 
1. II, 560- 1 . 
3 . I, 299. 
2. II, 581 . 
4. I, 300 . 
Emotionalism and social activity characterized American re-
ligion in the late nineteenth century: 
A still more peculiar feature of the American 
churches is the propensity to what may be 
called Revivalism which some of them, and 
especially the Methodist churches, show •••• 
All denominations are more prone to emotion-
alism in religion, and have less reserve in 
displaying it, than in England or Scotland.l 
The social side of church life is more fully 
developed than in Protestant Europe. A con-
gregation, particularly among the Methodists, 
Baptists, and Congregationalists, is the cen-
tre of a group of societies, literary and 
recreative as well as religious and philan-
thropic.2 
In describing the influence upon political institutions of 
a religion which was supremely confident yet preoccupied with 
evil, legalistic, activistic, and emotional, Bryce provided 
more than seventy years ago a striking anticipation of recent 
discussion of "the American character" as it affects politics 
and foreign policy. The "national character" of a people may 
be defined as the traits held more or less in common by the 
average citizens of a nation in their personal and collective 
behavior.3 While such a definition lacks precision and 
1. II, 577. 
2. Ibid. 
3. There has long been a European interest in "national char-
acter" as the key to literary criticism and historical 
studies. Lord Bryce and his French predecessor, Alexis 
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de Tocqueville, most conspicuously manifested this interest 
with regard to the American scene in the nineteenth cen-
tury; Denis W. Brogan is their heir in the twentieth. 
While the writing of intellectual and social histories has 
flourished in America in recent decades, the scientific 
95 
presents severe methodological problems for the social scien-
tist , an adequate theory of world politics must allow for the 
differential historical and cultural conditioning of the ac-
tors and the systems within the conflicting nations of the 
world . 
Religion ' s sanctions for national loyalty cannot be ap -
prehended only in the moments when they are announced: they 
must be seen as the expression of an historic component in 
the national character . While it is frequently observed that 
"the nation has replaced religion as the group to which prime 
study of "national character 11 was not developed until World 
War II when anthropological and psychological methods were 
applied to both the allies and the enemies of the United 
States as aids in the resolving of policy problems . Mar-
garet Mead discusses this development in 11 The Study of 
National Character" in Lerner and Lasswell, pp . 70-85 . 
There is a lack of clarity as to the meaning of the con-
cept . It may be variously defined as: (a) the frequency 
of appearance of personality characteristics within a 
nation (Ralph Linton); (b) the basic personality structure 
developed from the socio-cultural matrix of a nation 
(Abram Kardiner); or (c) the 11 requiredness 11 of the social 
organization of a nation manifested in a "social charac-
ter (Erich Fromm) . Primarily and most usefully , it re -
fers to common traits in the adult psychology of a people, 
although it demands a study of child development and must 
allow for "sub- cultural variations . " See the International 
Sociological Association, The Nature of Conflict : Studies 
in the Sociolo ical As ects of International Tensions 
Paris: UNESCO, 19 7 , p . l 3. Organski is one student of 
world politics who dismisses the concept of "national 
character 11 as being of little usefulness because of its 
"questionable stereotypes" and its static assumptions . 
However, he resorts to such related concepts as "national 
culture" and "common history . " See World Politics, pp . 26, 
30, 79-83 . 
devotion is now given,"l the quasi - religious qualities of 
modern nationalism te s tify to the interpenetration of polit-
ical and religious values . The German historian, Leopold 
von Ranke , asserted that, "in most periods of world history 
nations were held together by religious ties alone . "2 There 
has been an historic interplay between nationalism and reli-
gion: "Positively or negatively , religions served as the 
most powerful vehicle of both nationalization and denation-
alization, while receiving in turn enormous stimuli from the 
patriotic , ethnic and cultural loyalties of their adherents." 
The nnationality-forming and nationality-preserving features 
of religion" have been well understood and succ essfully used 
by the political leaders of nations and empires . 3 
This interpenetration of religious and political loyal-
ties is of fundamental importance to the nature of foreign 
policy. Two writers not at all disposed to view religious 
influence sentimentally have declared that "nothing fixes the 
quality of a nation's foreign policy more than the character 
of the body politic from whence it springs . " How a nation's 
people "look upon religion, ethics , the individual person, 
and the state must assert itself in the entire political life 
1 . Fensterwald, loc . cit . 
2 . Abhandlungen und Versuche (Leipzig, 1872), p. 38 . Quoted 
in Baron, p . 20 . 
3. Baron, p . 7 . 
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of the nation, whether domestic or foreign; it sets the goals 
of policy and marks out the avenues of approach to them."l 
In the American character, this complex of loyalties and 
values has been given a distinctive shape in such a way that 
religion has exerted a more pervasive influence upon both the 
structures of decision-making and the policies which have 
been promulgated by them than upon those of any other modern 
Wes tern nation. This is not to say that such influence imme-
diately or directly intervenes in all policy-making but 
rather that it is an expression of continuities of national 
character, some deposited long before the modern period began, 
to which both political and religious leaders must now respond. 
Brogan echoes Bryce: "The connection between morals, the law, 
and politics is old and not exclusively American. But, in 
America, the connection has been made closer by the religious 
inheritance of the American people, and by the American be-
lief in the necessity and desirability of legislation to put 
down manifest evils."2 
It was in America, the one major Western nation for whom 
the social contract of seventeenth and eighteenth century phi-
losophers did not remain simply a myth of origin, that the 
purposeful and recorded acts of nationalization took place. 
It was in America that this contract was to be most responsive 
1. Norman Hill and Doniver A. Lund, If the Churches Want World 
Peace (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1958), p . 90. 
2. Denis W. Brogan, Politics in America (New York: Harper and 
Brothers, 1954), p. 174. 
to the religious influences of the ancient covenant between 
a community and its Sovereign Lord . While every nation has 
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some version of essianism in its national character, America 
was to regard itself as "the darling of divine providence . "1 
Both Puritans and Jeffersonian rationalists attributed Ameri -
can success to the hand of God: here was born a "new Israel," 
a new "Promised Land," a new "chosen people . " The community 
of the Covenant had become the American Commonwealth . Reli -
gious loyalty and political loyalty were reunited . 
Christopher Dawson, a Catholic chronicling the power of 
Protestant thought upon Western politics, has perceived this 
affinity between ecclesiastical covenant and political action: 
It is seen most clearly in America where the Con-
gregationalist Calvinism of New England, which was 
a parallel development to the independent Puritan-
ism of Old England , leads on directly to the as-
sertion of the Rights of Man in the Constitution 
of the North American states and to the rise of 
political democracy •••• The modern Western 
beliefs in progress , in the rights of man, and 
the duty of conforming political action to moral 
ideals , whatever they may owe to other influ-
ences, derive ultimately from the moral ideals 
of Puritanism and its faith in the possibility 
of the realization of the Holy Community on earth 
by the efforts of the elect . 2 
1 . Reinhold Niebuhr, The Irony of American History (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 19$2) , p . 70 . 
2 . Christopher Dawson , "Religious Origins of European Dis-
unity," Dublin Review (October , 1940), p . 1.53 . Cited in 
James H. Nichols, Democracy and the Churches {Philadelphia: 
The Westminster Press , 19$1), p . 30 . Troeltsch described 
the political qualities of later Calvinism in similar terms: 
"a Christian intensification of the ideas of democracy and 
liberalism, and it produces the virtues of independence, 
love of liberty, love of humanity, and of Christian social 
reform." See Social Teachings, II, 689 . 
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The influence of Calvinism upon American character and 
Constitution is not simply to be witnessed in t he positive 
impulses of l iberty, humanitarianism, and reform, however . 
Its negative qualities of restraint have also pervaded the 
framework of government and the generations of official be-
havior . In the doctrine of original sin was grounded a 
theory of political power which was to combine with 
Montesquieu ' s doctrine of separation of powers to produce 
the traditions of limited government under a constitution . 
Locke , the philosopher of the Puritan Commonwealth in Eng-
land , and the Puritans of the New England Commonwealth who 
actually flourished before Locke insisted upon the restraint 
of power , wi thin and outside of the government . John Cotton , 
the Puritan theologian who came from Old to New England, 
warned against 
the danger of allowing to any mortal man an in-
ordinate measure of power to speak great things • 
• • • Whatever power he hath received, he hath 
a corrupt nature that will improve it in one 
thing or other •••• It is therefore most 
wholesome for magistrates and officers in church 
and commonwealth never to affect more liberty 
and authority than will do them good: for what-
ever transcendent power is given wil l certainly 
overrun those that give i t and those that re-
ceive it •••• It is necessary therefore that 
all power that fs on earth be limited, church-
power or other . 
While Calvinism in Geneva and Boston has been as s ociated with 
theocracy, the separation of church and sta te, as well as the 
1 . "Limitation of Government," in Perry Mill er (ed . ), The 
American Puritans: Their Prose and Poetry (Garden City , 
New York : Doubleday and Company, Inc ., 1956), pp . 85- 6. 
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separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, 
could eventually be grounded in Puritan dogma . Puritan Prot-
estantism provided a collective unity of religious and ethical 
attitudes which has profoundly penetrated the American charac-
ter . Its 11 common ethos" is to be discovered in "that family 
of Anglo-American denominations whose best - known representa-
tives are the Congregationalists , Baptists , Presbyterians , 
Perhaps the most thorough discussion of the doctrine of the 
Covenant in New England Puritanism is to be found in 
Miller , The New En land Mind : The Seventeenth Centur 
(New York : The Macmillan Company, 1939 • The immense 
historical importance" of Puritanism is that it was "the 
most coherent and most powerful single factor in the early 
history of America" (p . viii) . The doctrine of the Cov-
enant of Grace represented a seventeenth century "scholas-
tic" systematization of Calvinism: it was "the one tenet 
upon which all other theories were made to hang" (p . 396) . 
"With this doctrine ready to hand well before the colonies 
were settled, the leaders were prepared to organize their 
commonwealths and furthermore to acknowledge by force of 
logic several of the deductions which were later to fur-
nish the wisdom of a Locke or a Jefferson . That magistrates 
were limited by compact , that government should be by laws 
and not by men , that the covenant was annulled by any serious 
violation of the terms, and that the people had a right to 
resist all such infringements - -these principles were de-
clared no less emphatically i n Puritan theory than in the 
Declaration of Independence" {p . 409) . While the deliberate 
aims of Puritan leaders were authoritarian and intolerant, 
they contributed inadvertently and accidentally to liberal 
government (p . 418). "The Puritan state was seen by Puri-
tans as the incarnation of their collective will; it was 
driven by an energy they had acquired in their conversion, 
it was the embodied image of their power, of their resolu-
tion, of their idea • ••• New England political theory 
made the state almost a kind of second incarnation, a Mes-
siah fathered by God and born of the people. Mortal men, 
being visited by God in the Covenant of Grace, conceive a 
will to moral obedience; when they covenant among themselves, 
when they combine their several regenerate wil l s into one all-
inclusive will, the state becomes another savior, the child 
of God and man, l eading men to righteousness and preparing 
them f or the final reckoning" (pp . 418-9). 
Methodists, Unitarians, Quakers, Disciples, Salvation Army, 
and the evangelical party within the Anglican communion."1 
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Perhaps the most forceful recent statement of the influ-
ence of the corporate doctrines of the Old and New Testaments, 
via Puritanism, upon political structures and processes in 
the United Sta tes has been made by A. Mervyn Davies . To 
Davies, the Calvinist concept of commonwea lth under divine 
sovereignty was "the foundation of American freedom": 
Where we see efforts being made to transform so-
ciety into the likeness of a holy community, 
a Christian commonwealth, and where the chief 
means employed to that end is a church of con-
vinced believers which shall be free from magis-
terial interference and democratically consti-
tuted--there we see Calvinism at work. What did 
it achieve? By defeating the rising tide of ab-
solutism when it threatened to engulf all Europe, 
it made possible the emergence of a commonwealth 
of man under the sovereignty of God. Thus i~ was 
that it laid the foundations of our freedom. 
Brauer, in recognizing the historic interpenetration of re-
ligious and political behavior in America, characterizes this 
generation as neo-Puritans reasserting the ideal that "the 
saints should rule." 
In America the preachers act like politicians and 
the politicians talk like preachers •••• The 
American public is so concerned, at t his particular 
time in history, to appear as a godly people and 
nation •••• It so quickly responds to the re-
ligious motif in political life •••• Americans 
are convinced that they are a chosen people. Prov-
idence has selected them for a special task. 
1. Nichols, p. 10. 
2. Foundation of American Freedom (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 
1955)' p. 8. 
Because the American people have been essentially 
a good people they have become a powerful and rich 
people.l 
Whatever may be the subjective affinities between mid-twen-
tieth century Americans and their ancestors in colonial reli-
gion and constitutional convention, it is important to recog-
nize that the basic structures of decision-making in American 
government are still those established by an eighteenth cen-
tury Constitution. To the extent that religion influenced 
such fundamental decisions as the separation of powers and 
checks and balances in 1787, it contributed to the balance 
and the tension between executive and legislative action in 
foreign policy which have been so manifest in the late 1940's 
and the 1950's. While the recent pronouncements of ecumen-
ical and denominational bodies have generally sought to 
strengthen presidential power in treaty-making, arms control, 
and foreign aid , they have confronted many Senators and Rep-
resentatives appealing to Congressional prerogatives as a 
sacred trust assigned by the Constitution and protesting 
against the evils of unlimited executive power in the most 
Puritanical of terms. Religion 's own sanctions were also 
forceful in prohibiting the establishment of any particular 
religion in 1789; the government remains subject to the 
sanctions of all religious groups today. 
1. Jerald c. Brauer, "The Rule of the Saints in American 
Politics ," Church History, 27 (September, 1958), p . 240. 
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It must n~t be supposed, however, that there has been 
an uninterrupted coincidence of religious and political loyal-
ties for all Americans since 1787 . Not all Puritans were the 
friends of political liberty . Not al l politicians in 1787, 
or in the years since, were the friends of religion . Not all 
Americans have been politically responsible and religiously 
faithful; many have been neither . Within the national char-
acter, these loyalties have competed with each other and 
with other preoccupations, establishing peculiarly American 
combinations of ethical orientation. Some of these com-
binations can only be characterized in terms of paradox, as 
Reinhold Niebuhr regularly suggests: Americans in the twenti-
eth century are 
at once the most religious and the most secular 
of Western nations •• • • We are 'religious' in 
the sense that religious communities enjoy the 
devotion and engage the active loyalty of more 
laymen than in any nation of the Western world. 
We are 1 secular 1 in the sense that we pursue 
the immediate goals of life , without asking too 
many ultimate questions about the meaning of 
life and without being too distur£ed by the 
tragedies and antimonies of life . 
But Niebuhr's portrait of the American character in these 
dualistic strokes is neither original nor recent. A scant 
half-century after the framing of the Constitution, 
Tocqueville observed that "there is no country in the world 
where the Christian religion retains a greater influence over 
1 . Pious and Secular America (New York: Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 1958), pp. 1-2 . 
the souls of men than in America ••• • Christianity reigns 
without obstacle, by universal consent; the consequence is 
that every principle of the moral world is fixed and deter-
minate . 111 While religion was given no formal status or 
establishment in America, it "must be regarded as the first 
2 
of their political institutions . " The connections between 
religious and political loyalties are vital: "The Americans 
combine the notions of Christianity and of liberty so in-
timately in their minds that it is i mpossible to make them 
conceive the one without the other •••• Religious zeal is 
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perpetually warmed in the United States by the fires of patri-
3 
otism. " But Tocqueville i dentified a dualism in the American 
character: Americans were alternately a people of intense 
spiritualism and intense materialism. Leaders and sects were 
continually arising "full of a fanatical and almost wild spirit-
ualism, which hardly exists in Europe . " Religious insanity 
is common . "Although the desire of acquiring the good things 
of this world is the prevailing passion of the Ameri can people, 
certain momentary outbreaks occur when t heir souls seem 
1 . Democracy in America (2 vols . , New York: Vintage Books, 
1956), I , 314-15 . 
2 . Ibid ., 316 . 
3. Ibid . , 317 . 
suddenly to burst the bonds of matter by which t hey are re-
strained and to soar impetuously toward heaven . "1 To 
Tocqueville, it seemed that the very intensity of American 
materialism reacted upon religion and morals to i mpart to 
them a peculiar emotional fervor. 
If their social condition , their present circum-
stances, and their laws did not confine the minds 
of the Americans so closely to the pursuit of 
worldly welfare, it is possible that they would 
display more reserve and more experience whenever 
their attention is turned to things immaterial, 
and t hat t hey would check themselves without dif-
ficulty . But they feel imprisoned within bounds , 
which they will apparently never be allowed to 
pass . As soon as they have passed these bounds, 
their minds do not know where to fix themselves 
and they often r~sh unrestrained beyond the range 
of comraon sense . 
The instability of public moods and the unpredictability 
of moral enthusiasm, as traits of American character, have 
engaged the attention of many contemporary writers in the 
field of foreign policy , notably Gabriel Almond, Hans Morgen-
thau, and George Kennan . It would be a serious oversimplifi-
cation to claim that twentieth century religious leadership 
has been responsible for the shape of American foreign policy 
for these six decades . Indeed , the direct efforts of reli -
gious leaders to influence foreign policy have typically met 
frustration and skepticism. Both religious and political 
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leaders are subject to the continuing conditioning of national 
1 , II , 142. 
2 . II, 143. 
institutions and values shaped long before the modern per-
iod . Traits of national character become increasingly in-
dependent of their sources . Religious leaders in twentieth 
century America do not simply create and control religious 
loyalties and values: their constituencies are already 
"religious . " The moral ethos of Puritanism survives more 
through acculturation than through indoctrination . Mac 
Dougall ' s study of public opinion underscores the pervasive 
influence of Puritanism across all religious boundaries and 
in spite of resistance by leadership : 
No matter what their national origin, race , or 
religion, late- comers to these shores have been 
affected by the entire American tradition, in-
cluding Protestantism, for whatever importance 
it has •••• The extent to which standardization 
of customs and ideologies has occurred in this 
country is astounding . l 
In this mixing of religious and political symbolisms and 
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sentiments , a natural consequence has been the religiosity of 
politicians and the political pretensions of the clergy. "Sec-
ular and religious viewpoints tend to merge into a kind of 
vague and sometimes sentimental religion of democracy, with 
no strong anti-religious or anti-secular fanaticisms . n2 
Thus , for three centuries before 1898, the inexhaustible 
energies of Calvinism, which had been fueling the economic 
1. Curtis D. Mac Dougall , Understandin Public 0 inion: A 
Guide for Newspapermen and Newspaper Readers New York: 
The Macmillan Company , 1952) , p . 156 . 
2 . Niebuhr , Pious and Secular America , p . 16 . 
revolution of capitalism, were also storing up a religio-
political force in the depths of the American character which 
was to be unleashed upon the world when the nation suddenly 
discovered the need for a foreign policy. All of the charac-
teristically American responses to the modern world--in its 
brief imperialism, in its wars , in isolationism, pacifism, 
internationalism, and anticommunism--have been uttered with 
a Puritan accent . It is not that other nations have passed 
through these years without parallel responses; but American 
foreign policy has taken each of these modes and given a 
peculiarly religious zeal to it . The contradictions among 
them should not obscure their common source of energy in the 
American character as it had been molded by religion . 
In the course of the nineteenth century, according to 
Ralph H. Gabriel, " the American democratic faith" had devel-
oped into a "romantic , secular national religion . 11 In part , 
this was to compensate for a sense of cultural inferiority to 
Europe . Among the doctrines of this ''national religion" were 
those of "the Fundamental Law," "the Free Individual , " and 
"the Mission of America . "1 It was this third doctrine which 
most influenced American foreign policy at the turn of the 
century. Exemplars of 11 the Mission of America" were : (a) 
Josiah Strong, whose book Our Country was an apology for 
1. Ralph Henry Gabriel , The Course of American Democratic 
Thou ht : An Intellectual Histor Since 1815 (New York: 
Ronald Press , 19 0 , chapter 3. 
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Anglo-Saxon superiority in political and missionary imp eri-
alism; (b) Alfred Thayer Mahan, naval historian and pro-
ponent of sea power, and nationalist diplomat and advocate 
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of arbitrat ion; (c) Theodore Roosevelt, who be l ieved in fi ght-
ing for the right and in the moral duties of civilized people 
to those who were not so; and (d) David Starr Jordan, pacifist 
president of Stanford University who preached that war was 
1 
contrary to both evolution and democracy. 
The variety of persons and viewpoints thus conditioned 
by a national religion suggests that it is misleading to think 
of twentieth century foreign policy as a dialogue between 
"moralists" and "realists," representing religious and secular 
groups, respectively. The American character has brought it 
about that moralism is not just a quality of religious groups--
business and military groups may be just as moralistic as the 
churches. Generals, corporation presidents, and Senators can 
quote the Scriptures as piously as the clergy--and they may do 
so precisely at the same time that the clergy are pretending 
to expertise on the secular and technical aspects of national 
issues. The problem of responsible public leadership may thus 
be not so much that of balancing the moralism of religious 
and educational elites with the cynicism of other, more secu-
lar elites: it may be that of attempting to manage a balance 
among clamoring and competing moralists, all professing the 
1. Ibid., chapter 26. 
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national religion and all claiming competence in world affairs. 
This problem is implied in Brogan's portrait of the American 
character: 
Americans like slogans, like words. They like 
absolutes in ethics. They believe that good 
is good, even if they quarrel over what, in 
the circumstances, is good . l 
3. Religion, Ideology , and Policy-Consensus 
The national character combines with the distinctive 
political requirements of each nation to produce a national 
ideology. Because public opinion, the ultimate pressure upon 
democratic foreign policy, must define issues for itself ac-
cording to some meaningful terms, there is a tendency for such 
terms to accumulate and acquire a collective unity. This uni-
ty of meaningful terms, highly symbolic in nature, is an in-
dispensable requirement of all organized society and all polit-
ical action . It may be called an "ideology. " In a nation 
whose character has been significantly shaped by religious in-
fluences, the essence of ideology will tend to be penetrated 
by the symbols of religion. In both loyalty to the nation 
and relationships with other nations, religious influence will 
be pervasive and important . "What the fundamental beliefs and 
assumptions of an individual are to his character and conduct, 
2 ideology is to the character and conduct of a nation." 
1. The American Character (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1944),. 
pp . 131-2. 
2 . Hill and Lund, loc. cit. 
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F . s . c. Northrop has contributed to the discussion of 
ideology in international relations by introducing the methods 
of the sociology of law , particularly those of the Austro-
Hungarian , Eugen Ehrlich . Ehrlich assumed that each society 
has a "normative inner order" of ideological principles which 
he termed its "living law . " Law , politics , and economics 
within a society are only effective insofar as they corres-
pond to this inner order . The "living law" of each society 
may be objectively studied and described . Northrop not only 
recognizes the values of the sociology of law for internation-
al relations: he virtually identifies the two fields . He 
proposes that international relations be redefined as ''that 
subject which specifies the normative inner order of each 
nation and the relation between these national normative in-
ner orders . "l The behavior of a nation cannot be apprehended 
in its fullest significance without this specification of its 
ideology. 
A nation is a society responding as a unit . What 
is it that gives a society this national unity? 
The answer is common norms . Except as the people 
of a society agree upon at least some common norms 
that society cannot respond as a national unit . 
The key , therefore, to the understanding of any 
nation and to the specification of those proper-
ties which will determine its international reac-
tions is to be found when the major common norms 
1 . F . S . C. Northrop , The Tamin of the Nations: A Stud of 
the Cultural Bases of International Policy New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1952) , pp . 4-5 . 
of its people are determined . For unless the 
people of a nation have a dominant fdeology there 
is no consistent dominant response . 
While not all students of international relations have 
shared Northrop's confidence in the objectivity of the soci-
ology of law, most participants in recent discussions have 
shared his recognition of the importance of ideology in 
shaping foreign policy . Kurt London believes that ideology 
is basic to foreign policy differences in the twentieth cen-
tury and that it has replaced economic arrangements as the 
primary factor in international relations. Contrasting tra-
111 
ditions of law make the status of international law precarious 
d b • 2 an am 1guous . Ideology has become more important in the 
modern period because of the mass orientation of modern na-
tionalism. The standardization and unification of Western 
nations have developed through mass industrialization, mass 
urbanization, mass communications , mass education, and mass 
politicization . By contrast, the nineteenth century had 
provided a period of bourgeois nationalism in which the middle 
classes had been most identified with the policies of the na-
tion and in which property had been the key to political pow-
er.3 
1 . Ibid ., pp . 3-4. 
2 . Kurt London, How Foreign Policy is Made (New York: D. Van 
Nostrand Company, Inc ., 1949) , chapter 1 . 
3. Organski, pp. 42-47. 
The political requirements peculiar to the twentieth 
century have been the capacity to retain or create symbols 
of loyalty and myths of authority and, through them, the 
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power to manipulate mass moods . In an age which religious 
leaders have too gl ibly characterized as "secular" or "materi-
alistic," religion's own unique forms of power have acquired 
a new relevance to the tasks of political leadership . The 
symbol-sustaining and myth-making functions of religion have 
been employed by nationalist leaders in both East and West . 
In the very preconditions of effective political leadership 
in modern nations, religious influence has found new access 
to government, The creation and manipulation of a national 
ideology provide that precondition and that new access. 
"There must be a fund of common symbols in terms of which the 
loves, hates, and fears of men , as they find public expression, 
are evoked, mobilized, and discharged in similar ways . With-
out such a shared 'ideology' or 'belief-system,' no govern-
ment is possible."1 
It is not proposed here that religious leadership exer-
cises the most decisive influence upon foreign policy. It is 
contended that religious symbols and myths are uniquely quali-
fied to provide "systems of evaluation that seek to explain 
our experiences" in understandable terms and thus to stimulate 
2 
and precede political action . Roucek characterizes ideology 
1 . Schumann, p . 118. 
2 . Josephs . Roucek et a1., Social Control (New York: D. Van 
Nostrand Company, Inc . , 1947), p . 186. 
as a basic instrument of social control, defining it as a 
"theory of social life which approaches social realities and 
interprets them consciously or unconsciously from the point 
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of view of ideals to prove the correc t ness of the analysis 
1 
and to justify these ideals . " Religious sanctions for nation-
al policy perform precisely those functions. The components 
of a successful ideology are : 
its completeness and internal coherence , 
its gorgeous vision of the future , 
its ability to hold men's imaginations, 
its pretense to provide a universal frame of 
reference of good and evil , 
its consistency , 
its convincing criticism of the present and 
picture of the future , 2 
and its ability to circumvent counter- criticisms . 
An effective ideology "becomes a tie which binds personal am-
bitions into group values so that the selfish character of in-
dividual and group demands ge~lost, ideologically, in devo-
tion to the cause which seems to rise above the group interest 
by pretending its loyalty to a universal value . 
• • • Every 
ideology pretends that its primary loyalty is to a universal 
value , thus sanctifying its partial and particular inter ests . "3 
The modern American nation , confronted with a succession 
of internati onal adventures and unparalleled commitments to 
its own and other peoples , has had compelling reasons for 
1 . Ibid ., p . 187 . 
2 . Ibid . , p . 188 . 
3. Ibid . , p . 193 . 
invoking the sanctions of its national religion . From the 
depths of its own character, it has summoned the doctrine of 
"the mission of America" and "the community of the elect" to 
sanctify national loyalty . Patriotism has become a moral 
114 
and spiritual demand upon the people . The two elites most 
oriented to moral and spiritual responsibilities (even though 
they are among the most potentially critical groups in the 
nation), clergy and teachers , must perform their priestly 
duties on behalf of the national religion . Piety and patriot-
ism both thrive upon a "homogenizing o.f symbolisms" in which 
it is dif.ficult to disentangle religious from political be-
havior . 
In calling patriotism a moral virtue we are re-
ferring to its spirit of dedication and self-
sacrifice in the service of one ' s country. The 
canon it prescribes is ' Thou shalt serve th~ 
people . ' The patriot's will is altruistic . ~ His 
natural egoism has been overcome to the extent 
that in certain matters he sees he must subor-
dinate his immediate private interest to the 
general welfare . 
The words "dedication" and "self-sacrifice" come most .frequent-
ly from the lips of religious and political leaders . Through 
the efforts of both, the American ideology has come to identi -
.fy national loyalty with universal values . 
Some observers have reported that the intensity of the 
American ideology varies significantly with its class founda -
tions . Daniel Bell and Peter Viereck see a moralistic 
1. Joseph P. Morray , Pride of State: A Stud of Patriotism and 
American National Morality Boston: Beacon Press, 19 9), p . 15. 
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ideology exerting an increasing influence in American poli-
tics and relate it to Richard Hofstadter 1 s concept of "status 
politics": it is the peculiar product of an anxious middle 
class insisting on conformity. The anxiety has increased with 
the dissolution of the line between middle classes and masses 
in twentieth century America. With the exhaustion of liberal 
ideology, which was satisfied by the New Deal , patriotic ideol-
1 
ogical issues have filled the vacuum. Ideological intolerance 
increased in the 1950's, partially supplanting ethnic intoler-
ance, and has been notably manifested in "the new American 
Right " associated with McCarthyism and its intellectual de-
fenders--a movement which disclaims bigotry, but is nonethe-
less neo-isolationist. 2 Catholics, reports Viereck, are par-
ticularly vulnerable to the radical right, just as Jews were 
vulnerable to the radical left in the 1930 1 s. 3 However, the 
essence of moralism, according to Bell, is to be found in the 
middle class, Protestant America. It is largely a product of 
Puritan ethics and of Methodist and Baptist evangelical fervor. 
For middle class Protestants, traditional moral standards are 
1. Daniel A. Bell (ed.), The New American Right (New York : 
Criterion Books, 1955), p. lS. 
2. Since the death of Senator McCarthy , Senator Barry Goldwater 
has emerged as the most conspicuous spokesman for the Right 
in domestic affairs and foreign policy. His strong support 
from Southern conservatives in 1960 is an indication that 
racial attitudes may reinforce ideological intensity on 
other issues. 
3. The New American Right, p. 98. 
relaxing, but moralism in politics is intensifying--perhaps 
1 
the latter is functioning as an alternative to the former . 
Thus, the middle classes were the historic vehicle for Puri-
tan energies in the commercial and industrial revolutions and 
have become the special vehicle for Puritan energies in poli-
tics and world affairs . 
This discussion of the intensification of patriotism 
according to c lass and status lines is an indication of the 
negative as well as the positive functions of a national ide-
ology within the dynamics of public opinion. It has commonly 
been observed that American public opinion dominates foreign 
policy in the long run but that it tends to operate primarily 
in general, negative, and ex post facto terms . Foreign poli-
cy debates typically focus more on past events than upon 
future possibilities . In these public debates, the ideology 
tends to set the borders of argument: it automatically pro-
vides "the limits beyond which debate may not go . Arguments 
are permitted only within the framework of the ideology, and 
any attack on the ideology becomes a punishable heresy, since 
the faithful ones will tolerate no skepticism or criticism 
of the fundamentals. 112 
These negative qualities of mass opinion, expressed with 
Puritan intensity, have engaged the continuing attention of 
1. Ibid ., pp . 18-20. 
2. Roucek, p . 189. 
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Walter Lippmann in his writings in f oreign policy . Review-
ing the history of American foreign policy in 1943, he re -
garded "the national ideology" as a source of confusion and 
a cause of international disaster . "Idealistic objections to 
preparedness , to strategic precautions, and to alliances came 
to dominate American thinking in the hundred years which fol-
lowed Monroe's declaration . We came t o think that our privi -
leged position was a natural right, and then to believe that 
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our unearned security was the r eward of our moral superiority . 111 
In his discussion of "the public philosophy11 in 1956, Lippmann 
maintained that "the only words that a great mass qua mass 
can speak" are "yes 11 and 11no . n Si nce 1917 , with regard to 
foreign policy , the mass has usually said "no . n 
For everything connected with war has become danger-
ous, painful , disagreeable and exhausting to very 
nearly everyone . The rule to which there are few 
exceptions - -the acceptance of the arshall Plan is 
one of them--is that at the critical junctures , 
when the stakes are high , the prevailing mass opin-
ion will impose what amounts to a veto upon changing 
the course on which the government is at the time 
proceeding . Prepare for war in time of peace? No . 
It is bad to raise taxes, to unbalance the budget , 
to take men away from their schools or their jobs, 
to provoke the enemy . Intervene in a developing 
conflict? No . Avoid the risk of war . Withdraw 
from the area of conflict? No . The adversary must 
not be appeased . Reduce your claims on the area? 
No . Righteousness cannot be compromised . Negotiate 
a compromise peace as soon as the opportunity pre-
sents itself? No . The aggressor must be punished . 
Remain armed to enfor~e the dictated settlement? 
No. The war is over . 
1 . Lippmann , p . 49 . 
2. Essays in the Public Philosophy (New York: The New American 
Library , 1956), p . 23 . 
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A more detailed analysis of mass moods and their responses 
to a moralistic ideology has been advanced by Gabriel Almond 
who , following Tocqueville , emphasized their instability in 
America . The American people have alternated between the in-
difference justified by a confidence in Providence and a cru-
sading zeal which is the special property of Puritanism in 
politics . There has been a pattern of mood-simplification: 
now withdrawal , now intervention--now optimism, now pessimi sm- -
now idealism, now cynicism--now superiority, now inferiority . 
Americans tend to over- react to the problems of foreign poli-
cy . They are peculiarly capable of both overestimation and 
underestimation . They can shift from a broad tolerance to 
a narrow intolerance . While "the autonomous conscience of 
Puritanismn has yielded in the direction of a practical flexi -
bility, there is a "substratum of ideological fundamentalism 
which f requently breaks through the surface and has an im-
portant impact on foreign policy. 111 
There is impressive agreement among both the sharpest 
critics of the American ideology and its most enthusiastic 
defenders that the commonwealth ideal , the product of Purl-
tan Calvinism, has been the most distinctive note sounded by 
American foreign policy . If anything , the critics ("realists") 
have paid more t r ibute to this influence than have the de -
fenders . c. B. Marshall speaks for the critics: "Americans 
1. Almond , pp . 59- 60 . 
have traditionally wanted perfection to be par for the 
course, and a foreign policy conceived in terms of good 
principles destined for inevitable triumph over evil has 
seemed to have more appeal to them than a forei gn policy ex-
pressed in terms of interests susceptible of compromise with 
the interests of others. 111 Marshall's complaint echoes that 
of George Kennan: 11 I sea the most serious fault of our past 
policy formulation to lie in something that I might call the 
legalistic-moralistic approach to international problems." 
The elements of this app roach have included the arbitration 
treaties, Hague conferences, disarmament schemes, ambitious 
international law, the Kellogg Pact, and the hope of world 
government. All reflect "the belief that it should be pos-
sible to suppress the chaotic and dangerous aspirations of 
governments in the international field by the acceptance of 
some system of legal rules and restraints. 112 
The literature of the "realists" is significant at this 
point, not because of merit or fault on the issues of policy, 
but because it perceives the historic influence of religion 
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in the national character and ideology as they have shaped 
policy. Much of the criticism directed a gainst the "realists" 
has been misplaced. An example is provided by Harvey Seifert: 
1. Charles Burton Marshall, The Limits of Foreign Policy 
(New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1954), p. 54. 
2. Kennan, pp. 93-94. 
Political realists, aware of the problem of power, 
have often overlooked the power of ideals. The 
common acceptance of high ideals within a nation 
nurtures a more ardent devotion both from citizens 
and from other like-minded nations whose aid we 
desire. Deterioration of the moral fiber of a na-
tion is a greater disaster than armed attack.l 
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The elements of truth in the second and third sentences above 
are acknowledged by "realists" and "idealists" alike. The 
irony is that the "realists" have recognized the political 
power of Puritanism in the American character and ideology 
more than have the "idealists" in recent discussion. It is 
the "realists"--Niebuhr, Morgenthau , Kennan, Marshall, Lipp-
mann--who have done the most to focus attention upon the in-
fluence of religion and moral idealism on American foreign 
policy in the twentieth century. A more tenable complaint 
is that the "realists" have been too preoccupied with the 
negative or "dysfunctional" influence of religion and have 
done little to indicate the positive and constructive responsi-
bilities of decision-makers with regard to the resources la-
tent in the American character and the necessity for an au-
thentic national ideology. In the attack upon the destructive 
excesses to which idealism is always prone, the attackers have 
perhaps done too much to destroy the creative possibilities 
of idealism and to discourage the continuing task of inter-
preting the ethical resources which are the peculiar proper-
ty of Christianity and other world religions. 
1. "A Christian Reappraisal of Realism in Foreign Policy," 
Religion in Life,29 (Winter 1959-60), p. 80 . 
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The American ideology thus serves two basic functions 
in foreign policy discussion: one positive or prescriptive, 
the other negative or proscriptive . These are quasi-legal 
functions: to legitimize certain policies and to deny legit-
imacy to alternative policies . The Puritan ethos is especial-
ly equipped to perform both prescriptive and proscriptive 
functions . Its moralistic and legalistic attachment of divine 
favor and will to the particulars of public behavior has been 
among its most characteristic features . The ideal of Common-
wealth has commonly been enj oined to sanction the ends of 
acceptable policy; the doctrine of the corruption of power 
has commonly been enjoined to repudiate the means of unac-
ceptable policy. 
The area of legitimized foreign policy discussion is 
termed "the foreign policy consensus," without which policy 
could not become both formulated and executed. The category 
of "consensus," however , is heir to all of the methodological 
and ethical problems which afflict the categories of "nation-
al character" and "national ideology . 11 Imprecision, deviation, 
and change mark all three . The description of each proceeds 
impressionistically and typologically. But the three are 
not simple abstractions : they are constructs desi gned to 
interpret the realities of collective behavior. Their em-
pirical reference is primarily to public opinion and its i m-
pact upon national policy . The affinity among such constructs 
is not always recognized in foreign policy discussion . It 
is possible for some "realists" to speak with absolute and 
almost mystical confidence in what the "consensus" dictates 
ethically--and then to disparage such empirical methods of 
investigation as those employed by the sociology of law as 
being unwarranted or unavailing . 
The foreign policy consensus since World War II has 
been frequently described as combining two basic proposi-
tions: (a) the development of an international order which 
serves the national interest in peace , justice , and prosper-
ity ; and (b) opposition to the expansion of Communism, by 
force if necessary . Business , labor , agriculture, veterans, 
women ' s groups , ethnic groups , and the churches have all been 
generally included within this consensus, although Almond 
contends that a "pacifist bias" in the churches at times 
threatens to remove them from the consensus . This 11 bias 11 is 
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not to be identified solely with the small number of committed 
pacifists but with a more general orientation away from prob-
lems of force and conflict . 1 Within the consensus, the claims 
of the participating groups must be adjusted and compromised . 
"Deviant groups" are, by definition , those who do not share 
the basic propositions of the consensus and who insist on 
adhering to absolute and universal claims . Among the "deviant 
groups" Almond lists radical appeasers , the reactionary 
1 . Almond, chapter 8. 
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nationalists, the pacifists, and t hose extreme international-
ists working directly for world government . 1 
The difficultie s in such arbitrary descriptions of a 
public opinion consensus are indicated by Kennan: "What pur-
ports to be public opinion in most countries that consider 
themselves to have popular government is often not really 
the consensus of the feelings of the mass of the people at 
all but rather the expression of the interests of special 
highly vocal minorities- - politicians, commentators, and pub-
licity- seekers of all sorts [he might have mentioned theo-
logians !) : people who live by their ability to draw attention 
to themselves and die , like fish out of water, if they are 
compelled to remain silent . " The so- called "consensus" is 
likely to consist of those who are especially fond of "pat 
and chauvinistic slogans . 112 Theories of consensus , like 
theories of ideology and of the national character, can only 
with great difficulty explain the facts of political change 
within and among nations and they must always be supplemented 
by theories of leadership if they are to avoid conservative 
biases , collective fallacies , and deterministic conclusions . 
An historic art in political leadership is the ability to 
change the prevailing consensus through a patriotic appeal 
1 . Ibid ., chapter 9 . 
2 . Kennan , American Diplomacy, pp . 62-3 . 
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to make progress with a vigorous reassertion of tradition-
al myths and symbols . The energies of patriotic loyalty are 
summoned not only for the maintenance of the status quo: they 
are marshalled for new departures in national policy . Histo-
rians recognize this paradoxical combination in the "strong 
presidents" of American history : those who reinvigorate the 
doctrine of the mission of America and apply it to the meet -
ing of new national crises . Thus , to state that the Puritan 
ethos has dominated the foreign policy consensus is not to 
assert that it cannot be employed to alter the consensus . 
Nor can it be overlooked that "deviant groups" may invoke the 
same sanctions as "consensus groups . " In fact, the history 
of much of American policy is that the program of one gener-
ation's 11 deviants" becomes the program of the next generation's 
"consensus . " Calvinism has always been able to justify either 
reaction or reform with incomparable zeal . 
Father Canavan has defined "politically relevant con-
sensus" as "the agreement that underlies disagreement and which 
1 furnishes the common premises of the disagreeing parties." 
Such a definition reinforces the role of ideology in providing 
the preconditions of national action . It also suggests that 
1 . Francis Canavan, S . J., "The Levels of Consensus . " Paper 
prepared for delivery at the 1960 Annual Meeting of the 
American Political Science Association, New York, Septem-
ber 10, 1960, p . 3. 
ideology mus t reconcile ethical and political conflict with-
in the nation and that it is the very nature of ideology at 
the national level to be restricted to vague and general 
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propositions which are related more symbolically than ration-
ally. Canavan identifies four 11 levels 11 of consensus: (a) 
existence: the common agreement to abide by a constitution; 
(b) action: agreement on the main lines of government policy 
and procedure; (c) sentiment: the sharing of common loves 
and common fears; and (d) belief: the common worldview de-
riving from theological and metaphysical assumptions. 1 
It is a principal historical argument of the disserta-
tion, underlying the more general theoretical purpose, that 
the common ethos of Puritanism has dominated the worldview 
of most Americans as they have brought public opinion to bear 
upon foreign policy in the twentieth century. That world-
view has been employed to decide whom Americans shall love 
and whom they shall hate and fear . The policy decisions have 
been made within a constitutional framework which Puritanism 
helped to fashion nearly two centuries ago. Notwithstanding 
the variety of religious traditions and the pull of secular 
loyalties, the legacy of the Puritan faith to modern foreign 
policy has been to provide its distinctive shape if not its 
substance. This is not to claim a logical consistency for 
that policy: in fact , particular attention is called to the 
extremes of inconsistency which have been sanctioned by a 
1. Ibid., pp. 4-14. 
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national religion which is so largely the heritage of Puri -
tanism. Puritan influence has provided more of a psycholog-
ical than a logical consistency. If the "realists" have 
perceived this heritage more than have most others, they have 
tended to focus too exclusively upon a doctrine of man and 
have described the heritage too simply in terms of 11 individ-
ualism" and "moralism. " It is in corporate ethical doctrines 
concerning the religious community (the church) and the polit-
ical community (the sta te) that the full range of religious 
influence upon United States foreign policy must be embraced . 
Moreover , it is not only in the content of the doctrines 
of the national religion that the effectiveness of that in-
fluence is to be perceived: it is i n the objective points of 
access which those mass doctrines have in the structures and 
processes of decision-making in uniquely American institutions . 
That those institutions , in turn , were partly shaped by the 
nation ' s religious heritage is a fact of more than historic 
interest . In no other great power of the twentieth century 
has there b een as large a degree of popular control over for -
eign policy as t here has been in the United States, and "for 
this reason our idealistic impulses have been allowed freer 
1 
rein . 11 
1 . Bailey , A Diplomatic History, p . 187 . 
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4. Religion and the Policy-Maker 
The corporate doctrines of the community of the Covenant, 
especially the New Covenant, are not collectivist in the 
sense that the worth of the individual person is denied. At 
the Last Supper, when the most corporate symbolism of the 
Christian faith was expressed in the Body of Christ, it was 
the individualism of Jeremiah which was honored: "This cup 
which is poured out for you is the new covenant in my blood. 111 
Jeremiah brought Old Testament prophecy to its highest point 
and to its most immediate connection with the New Testament. 
With him, religion became inner experience and a matter of 
personal piety . The old covenant had to be supplanted with 
a new covenant , a covenant of the heart . 
This is the covenant which I will make with the 
house of Israel after those days, says the Lord; 
I will put my law within them, and I will write 
it upon their hearts; and I ~ill be their God, 
and they shall be my people . 
It was Jeremiah who 11 first made the soul of the individual 
the true seat of religion . " In so doing , he was not present-
ing just ano ther ·idea: it was "a new spiritual force, backed 
up and made vital by a great personality . "3 Israel thus 
continues as the chosen people, but personal loyalty is ex-
alted above external and collective law . In the climactic 
1 . Lk. 22 : 20 
2 . Jer. 31:33 . 
3. Albert C. Knudson , The Beacon Lights of Frophec~ {New 
York: The Methodist Book Concern , 1914) , pp . 16 -7 . 
insights of both Testaments, there is a paradoxical intensi-
fication of the symbolism of both the person and the com-
munity . 1 
The empirical investigation of the influence of a reli-
gion which claims a vital "new spiritual force'' in personal 
pie t y cannot stop with the description of mass opinion . The 
national character, ideology , and foreign- policy consensus 
are collective categories which must always come to a f ocus 
in the behavior of individual decision-makers and decision-
influencers. An adequate theory of religion in world poli-
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tics must provide an interpretation of the role of leadership 
in both religious and political elites . While a doctrine of 
"contingency" in history has been prominent in the writings 
of some "realists" who have discussed international problems , 
l . It is of more than passing interest to recall at this 
point that no Biblical personality expressed more intense 
concern about the relationship of religious loyalty to 
national loyalty than did Jeremiah . "No one in Scripture 
can do more than Jeremiah to help us to a clear idea of 
what true patriotism is and to show us what worlds away 
it is from the noisYt ' blustering jingoism which so often 
is mistaken for it . 1 See William Meiklejohn" The Prophet 
of Hope (The Church of Scotland, 1949) , p . 5b . "No man 
ever loved his nation or his people more than Jeremiah 
loved his •••• If by a patriot i s meant one who places 
the immediate national interest above every other inter-
est , Jeremiah was not a true patriot. If by a patriot, 
however , one means a man who loves his country so much 
that nothing will satisfy him short of having his country 
become the custodian of high moral ideals; who judges 
his country according to its fidelity to these ideals , 
then Jeremiah's patriotism ' makes men's common patriotism 
seem a trivial and tawdry thing . '" See Raymond Calkins, 
Jeremiah the Prophet (New York : The ~acmillan Co ., 1930) , 
pp . 311- 12 . 
a theory of leadership has been lacking--although the evi-
dence of decline in the power-position of the United States 
in recent years have brought a demand for "leadership" from 
Lippmann and other "realists . " 
The relationship of individual to collective f orces i s 
a continuing issue among historians (and other social scien-
tists) and presents a problem which cannot be ignored by the 
theorists of international relations . The theorists of each 
generation tend to swing the pendulum away from the direc-
tions charted by the theorists of the previous generation . 
This tendency is conspicuous in the discussion of individual 
vs. collective influence . In his discussion of international 
conflict , Herbert Butterfield, the Cambridge historian , has 
written: 
The present generation is perhaps in danger of 
underestimating the subtlety and the complexity 
of the historical process , and particularly the 
play of personality and the role of contingency 
in human events . Every moment in history pre-
sents unique combinations of circumstances , and 
some small and apparently irrelevant occurrence 
may assume unexpected importance because it hap-
pens to be pivotal . Because great things may turn 
on a tiny pivot , the resolution of an individual 
human being sometimes acquires a magnified im-
portance in the world . The process of history 
may even give extraordinary leverage at a certain 
moment to the decisions or the initiative of some 
single person . l 
Diplomatic historians are obligated to inquire into the life 
and character of significant policy- makers and to ascertain 
1 . International Conflict in the Twentieth Century, p . 45. 
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personal foundations of decision-making. This is essentially 
the craft of the biographer which is no less subject to meth-
odological and ethical dilemmas than are the collective inqui-
ries previously considered . To what extent has the Puritan 
ethos--or any other religious influence- - become decisively em-
bodied in the life and character of significant policy- makers 
in the twentieth century? 
The appropriateness of such a question is underscored in 
a thesis set forth by Levinson , the effect of which is to add 
a "sociopsychological approach" to the study of social forces 
in international relations : "Every foreign- policy orientation , 
whatever its degree of rationality and constructiveness, has, 
to an appreciable extent , a psychological foundation in the 
personalities of its adherents . "1 Levinson constructed a con-
tinuum scale for the measure of "internationalism- nationalism" 
in the attitudes of Harvard students . This scale was corre~ 
lated with a "traditional family ideology" scale. "Interna-
tionalism" was significantly associated with equalitarian and 
permissive family ideology , whi l e "nationalism" tended to be 
associated with authoritarian , moralistic , and conventional 
family ideology . "Nationalism" was also associated with 
"certain patterns of religious ideology , " emphasizing God as 
a power- figure who rewards the virtuous and punishes the 
1 . Daniel J . Levinson , "Au.thori tarian Personality and Foreign 
Policy," Conflict Resolution , 1 (March , 1957), p . 37 . 
sinful. Ritual and authority tend to be important in such 
f '1' 1 arn1 1es. 
131 
Both the possibilities and the l~mitations of such an "in-
ternationalist-nationalist scale" are apparent in the differ-
ential results according to religious affiliation. The "na-
tionalist" scores were as foll ows: Roman Catholics-38.7; 
Protestants-32.8; Jews-30 . 1; no affiliation-21.2. Those who 
attended church weekly averaged 36.2; occasionally-30.9; never-
2.5.3.2 The fact that Catholics were significantly more "na-
tionalist" than Protestants requires explanation if the dis-
sertation's argument concerning the dominance of the Puritan 
ethos is to be substantiated. It has already been acknowledged 
that the influence of Puritanism has spread across religious 
boundaries so that Catholics have come to share its distinctive 
traits.3 It will be seen below that Catholic nationalism in 
recent decades, particularly with regard to the threat of Com-
munism, has functioned partly as a means of compensating for 
inferior status feelings associated with late immigration and 
low social class . 4 
The most serious limitation of Levinson's scale, however, 
is in its assumption that "internationalism" and "nationalism" 
in Americans have been simple polar opposites. The covenant 
1 . Ibid., p. 39 . 2 . ill£., p. 44. 
3. See p . 106 above. 4 . See pp. 198-9 below. 
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idea, whether considered in ancient Israel, the Protestant 
Reformation, or "the mission of America," has always brought 
together in paradoxical combination an intense nationalism and 
an intense universalism. This is the logical and psychological 
result for any "chosen people" professing absolute loyalty to 
a God of radical monotheism. To be "chosen" by such a God is 
to have the most ultimate sanction for one's nationality- -but 
also to be "chosen" for a universal mission. Thus, "inter-
nationalism- nationalism" is not a statement of polarit;y for 
the Puritan ethos but a statement of identit;y . When either 
side of this identity has been relaxed in the modern period, 
public opinion has shifted in a radically different direction, 
The national ideology has been highly variable during the 
twentieth century , now sanctioning isolationism, now inter-
ventionism. The instability of mass moods is partly to be 
attributed to this internal identity , yet inevitable tension 
between the nationalist and the universalist components of the 
Puritan ethos . Held together, these components most faithfully 
continue the covenant tradition of the Scriptures . Allowed to 
separate , they may be expressed in the most unmitigated nation-
alism or the most utopian universalism . 
Individual policy-makers in the United States have exhib-
ited both the internal conflict and the possibilities of un-
restricted excess in the Puritan ethos . 
Whenever American statesmen and leaders have set 
forth their creeds and formulated the aims and 
goals of national policy, it has been these 
commonwealth principles they have enunciated. 
The resolve that 'this nation under God shall 
have a new birth of freedom and that govern-
ment of the people by the people and for the 
people shall not perish from the earth' was a 
resolve to preserve and perfect the American 
Commonwealth. I 
It was one of Lincoln's secretaries, John Hay, who announced 
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at the time of the Spanish- American War, as the new Secretary 
of State, that American foreign policy was based on the Golden 
Rule. 2 At the same time, Senator Beveridge of Indiana pro-
vided an impassioned justification for imperialism: 
God has not been preparing the English-speaking 
and Teutonic peoples for a thousand years for 
nothing but vain and idle self-contemplation and 
self-admiration. He has made us the master 
organizers of the world to establish system where 
chaos rei gns •••• He has made us adept in gov-
ernment that we may administer government among 
savage and senile peoples •••• And of all our 
race he has marked the American people as his 
chosen nation to finally lead in the regeneration 
of the world .3 
William Jennings Bryan , thrice candidate for the Presidency 
and eventually Secretary of State under Wilson, was just as 
zealous in his opposition to imperialism, believing that "the 
United States should seek to exercise only a moral influence 
in international affairs.n Bryan was an eager advocate of 
treaties of arbitration in the early 1900's. "Throughout 
this period, there was no one more anti-imperialist, 
1. Davies, p. 246. 
2. Norman Hill , International Relations: Documents and Read-
ings (New York: Oxford University Press, 1950) , p . 482. 
3. Quoted by Reinhold Niebuhr , The Irony of American History , 
p. 71. 
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anti-big-Navy and anti-foreign involvement than the silver-
tongued orator who preached to a thousand Chautauqua audi-
ences on ' The Prince of Peace.•"1 With Josiah Strong, Alfred 
Thayer Mahan, Theodore Roosevelt , and David Starr Jordan, all 
of these men believed in "the mission of America"--although 
t hey could not agree as to just what that mission should be 
or how it should be carried out. 
To inquire into the sincerity of such utterances is to 
embark upon an empirically difficult and ethically dubious 
task. The point to be made is that major matters of policy, 
in a country which acts "under God," must establish ideolo-
gical justification before public opinion in ''spiritual" and 
"moral" terms. In America , there is a "religious angle" to 
all fundamental policies. Religious symbolism has cohesive 
power, and presidents, secretaries of state, and other public 
figures continually play upon religious themes to create a 
focus for popular loyalties . Schuman's version of this prac -
tice is that 
statesmen use moral and legal abstractions to influ-
ence public attitudes--since no public is able to 
admit that international politics is a competition 
for power . But states act out of interest. To con-
fuse one's interests with the verbiage of ethics and 
law is to act blindly, rashly, and fatuously. To 
see one's interests plainly, to serve them boldly, 
and to clothe the result in the language of legalism 
and moralism is to act adroitly and effectively. The 
lofty expectations of the naive may ev~n appear, in 
the latter situation, to be fulfilled. 
2. Schuman, pp. 358-9. 
I· 
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This characterization of political leadership is perhaps 
extravagant in its amorality, but it clearly points to the 
manipulative features of mass -oriented ideologies in the twen-
tieth century. Religious influence is not simply to be con-
trolled by religious leaders themselves: it is subject to 
manipulation by anyone having access to mass opinion, wheth-
er politicians , advertisers, journalists, artists , or edu-
cators. In an age when the status of religion is on the rise 
and the vaunted power of secularism under sustained attack, 
the public becomes especially vulnerable to everything with 
a "religious" label and wary about anything labeled "atheistic." 
The renewed status of religion in America is evident in 
the well-publicized notion that religion is a form 
of social and psychological therapy; that it is 
a bulwark against Communism, juYenile delinquency, 
family instability, and the hydrogen bomb; that it 
should be the basis for foreign policy and national 
legislative goals . It is possible that these sen-
timents stem from genuine concern about pressing 
problems or from an interest in achieving a wider 
recognition for the religious orientat ion; but 
their cumulative effect can be divisive and, under 
crisis conditions, they may foster the acceptance 
of illusory solutions to grave problems. Popular 
religion lends itself to ideological manipulation 
and, thus, religion is often invoked in the effort 
to obtain non-religious ends, that i!, as an instru-
ment of political and public policy. 
Modern education and mass media of communications may them-
selves receive special sanction as blessings to democracy or 
religion, but they also increase the possibilities of mass 
1. Don J. Hager, "Religious Conflict," The Journal of Social 
Issues, 12 (1956), p . 8. 
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indoctrination . "Modern psychology and sociol ogy have pro-
duced a class of intellectuals conscious of ideologies and 
of their nature, and able to wage the warfare of ideas with 
l 
an awareness and a level never matched before." 
These developments naturally distract attention from the 
inspection of the authentic moral qualities of individual po-
litical leaders . They tend to reduce the functions of the 
Puritan ethos in America to acquiescence in propaganda which 
seems to confer the honors of recognition upon religion while 
it drains religion of its prophetic witness and ethical vital-
ity . A decade ago , in an essentially pre-television a ge and 
as professional political leadership was just beginning to 
tap the resources of public relations firms, Norman Hill wrote 
of this effect of propaganda upon morality in the area of for-
eign policy discussion: 
Whether it is pretense or not, the point is that, 
in their diplomacy , appeals by governments to 
moral principles show that they prefer to be 
looked upon as doing the right thing and being 
fair and square. They want their own people to 
be convinced of the propriety of their conduct 
even more than they are concerned with the reac -
tion of other nations , for their people have votes 
that count, at least in democracies . Here, however, 
is where propaganda enters to detract even more 
from the reality of moral standards, for by radio 
campaigns, moving pictures , clever speeches, and 
censored news, the people may be led to believe in 
the moral justification of their government's poli-
cy; whereas, if left alone, they would be severely 
critical . Propaganda enables a government to play 
power politics with popular support, as moral issues 
are twisted to promote rather than hinder what is done . 2 
1. Roucek, p . 197 . 2. Hill, p . 482 . 
It is perhaps more than accidental that the two American 
statesmen of the twentieth century who may be regarded as the 
purest political products of Puritanism--Woodrow Wilson and 
John Foster Dulles--were preoccupied with the power of mass 
opinion. Before them, Theodore Roosevelt had mixed the image 
137 
of Calvin with that of the cowboy, giving the Presidency the 
moral force of both: 11 the breathless drama of a Western movie, 
and he never left the audience in doubt that he was the ' good 
guy' and the other fellows--Democrats, Senators, monopolists , 
Socialists, diplomats, nature fakers, muckrakers--the 'bad 
guys.'" It is Rossiter's judgment that Roosevelt ''was a bril-
liant molder and interpreter of public opinion, who confessed 
happily that the White House was a 'bully pulpit.' 111 
It was left to Woodrow Wilson , however, to exploit the 
moral power of the Presidency to the full. One of the most 
unintended and ironic consequences of the American Constitution, 
in its reaction to monarchy and its separation of powers , was 
to prepare the way for a modern presidency which would over-
shadow both the monarchs and the prime ministers of the twen-
tieth century. The moral power of the office in an age of 
ideology and mass nationalism was enhanced by the very combina-
tion of the symbolic functions of chief of state with the 
political authority of the chief executive. Moreover, while 
the removal of the chief executive from membership in the 
1. Clinton Rossiter, The American Presidency (New York: The 
New American Library, 1956) , pp. 74-5. 
138 
parliamentary body was intended to reduce his power over that 
body, it had the potential effect of providing the President 
with a privileged sanctuary in the White House whose "bully 
pulpit" did not require a daily defense before Congress . And , 
finally , the popular voting for the Presidency was to afford 
the holder of that office an opportunity to claim a mandate 
for national action which prime ministers must always be pre -
pared to win anew with parliamentary votes of confidence . In 
combining the majesty of a king with the power of a prime min-
ister, the Constitution made it possible for an American Presi-
dent to feel that "all his powers are invigorated, indeed are 
given a new dimension of authority, because he is the symbol 
of our sovereignty, continuity , and grandeur . 111 
With this historic development and Wilson's accurate per-
C6ption of it long before he became its embodiment, it is 
possible to estimate just how astute a political leader he 
was -- and how false it is to dismiss Wilson as an "idealist" 
or "moralist" out of touch with political realities. In 1908, 
he had written of the symbolic power of the President: 
The nation as a whole has chosen him, and is con-
scious that it has no other political spokesman. 
His is the only national voice in affairs. Let 
him once win the admiration and confidence of the 
country , and no other single force can withstand 
him, no combination of forces will easily over-
power him . His position takes the imagination of 
the country . He is the representative of no con-
stituency, but of the whole people . When he 
1 . Ibid ., p . 12 . 
speaks in his true character, he speaks for no 
special interest . If he rightly interpret the 
national thought and boldly insist upon it, he 
is irresistible, and the country never feels 
the zest of action so much as when its president 
is of such insight and caliber. Its instinct is 1 for unified action, and it craves a single leader . 
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Wilson's appeal for "open diplomacy" and his rousing response 
from mass opinion in both Europe and America were striking an-
ticipations of the more recent years of ideological warfare 
and of the United Nations as a propaganda forum "for the mo-
bilization of shame . " A student of public opinion has said 
of Wilson: "His general knowledge of the character and thought 
of the people and their historical tendencies coupled with an 
almost uncanny ability to sense the aspirations of the people 
seems to have accounted for his ability to crystallize public 
opinion and express the common feeling in clear and striking 
fashion . "2 
The "zest for action" which ilson brought to the Presi-
dency and which the masses were made to feel through him is 
commonly attributed by both Wilson ' s critics and his defenders 
to his Calvinistic background . The son of a Presbyterian min-
ister who married the daughter of another Presbyterian minister, 
Wilson followed a daily discipline of Bible- reading and prayer . 
"Inheritance and indoctrination made Wilson a Presbyterian; 
1 . Constitutional Government in the United States {New York: 
Harper and Brothers Publishers , 1908) , p . 68. 
2 . Charles W. Smith, Public Opinion in a Democracy {New York: 
Prentice - Hall, 1939), p . 196 . 
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temperament made him an especially devout one--a 'Presbyteri-
an priest' in the words of one Roman Catholic politician who 
had reason to know."l Wilson's moral interests--in covenant 
style--were articulated with a combination of exalted nation-
alism and missionary internationalism to which the American 
public typically responded with enthusiasm: 
We have an object lesson to give to the rest of 
the world.2 
The idea of America is to serve humanity .3 
We are the mediating nation.4 
The force of America is the force of moral prin-
ciple.5 
He regarded the Covenant of the League of Nations as the uni-
versal fulfillment of the American covenant, its Constitution. 
Wilson 's critics have claimed that his Calvinistic back-
ground made him an uncompromising idealist who was largely 
responsible for the failure of the United States to subscribe 
to the Covenant of his League. If he had only been willing to 
compromise with Henry Cabot Lodge's reservations, it is said, 
American acceptance of the Covenant would have been made polit-
ically possible. Blum contends that "the politics of morality" 
1. John Morton Blum, Woodrow Wils on and the Politics of Morality 
(Boston : Little, Brown and Company, 1956), p . 7. 
2. Ray Stannard Baker and W. E. Dodd (eds.), The Public Papers 
of Woodrow Wilson (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers , 
1925-27), I, 367. 
3. Ibid., I, 412. 
5. Ibid., III, 332. 
4. Ibid ., III , 304. 
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practiced by Wilson offended the leaders of other nations and 
alienated potential support at home. 11A fervid legalism, then, 
a missionary constitutionalism tinged with racialism, a senti-
mental pacifism shaped Wilson's foreign policy."1 
Wilson's defenders recognize the power of the same reli-
gious influences upon his leadership and profess to see in 
him the manifestation of the "true American character" and 
its mission in the world. Norman Cousins rejects the patron-
izing skepticism with which it became "fashionable 11 in the 
twenties and thirties to view Wilson's idealism: 
Wilson was perhaps the most practical man of his 
time, for he had addressed himself to the basic 
needs of America and the world. • • • He was rep-
resenting the strength of America as he understood 
it and as history had confirmed it. We do not 
honor his memory unless we also honor his convic-
tions. At the heart of those convictions was the 
belief that vision--vision with spaciousness and 
moral grandeur--is not only the solvent of poten-
tial danger but the natural setting for a human 
community at peace.2 
Notwithstanding the failure of the League, Wilson had pro-
vided the most radical redefinition of American foreign policy 
since the Monroe Doctrine and had charted the main directions 
of the American response to international conflict for a half-
century: the quest for a peaceful international order and col-
lective defense against aggression. His influence upon scores 
1. Blum, p. 85. 
2. Norman Cousins, Who S~eaks for ~an? (New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1953), pp. 2 2-3. 
of policy-makers is not difficult to demonstrate. Herbert 
Hoover, his relief administrator in Europe, consciously was 
guided by his "force of moral principle" and has recently 
authored a laudatory volume concerning his leadership. 1 
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Just a few days after his first election, Franklin Roosevelt , 
who had served Wilson as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 
remarked: 
The Presidency is not merely an administrative 
office. That is the least of it. It is pre-emi-
nently a place of moral leadership. All of our 
great Presidents were leaders of thought at times 
when certain historic ideas in the life of the 
nation had to be clarified •••• Theodore Roose-
velt and Woodrow Wils on were both moral leaders, 
each in his own way and for his ~wn time, who 
used the Presidency as a pulpit. 
Dwight Eisenhower, an Army lieutenant during Wilson's war 
years, proclaimed the Wils on Centennial in 1956 with a tribute 
characteristic of his own policy declarations: the twenty-
eighth President "gave to this Nation and to the world a con-
cept of peace based on justice and freedom and supported by 
the brotherhood of man; and ••• led the United States sue-
cessfully through the ordeal of a devastating war, which was 
fought to preserve those high principles which this nation 
cherishes."3 
1. The Ordeal of Woodrow Wilson (New York: l'-1cGraw-Hill Book 
Company, 1958). While Calvin Coolidge was not noted for 
any "zest for action" or for other Wilsonian qualities 
William Allen White's biography of Coolidge was entitl~d 
A Puritan in Babylon (New York: The Macmillan Company 
1938) . , 
2 . Quoted by Rossiter, p . 112 . 
3. The Woodrow Wilson Centennial Celebration Commission Hand-
book of Information and Suggestions (Washington, 195b):-IT. 
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The purest diplomatic heir to President Wilson was Secre-
tary of State John Foster Dulles. Dulles, too, was the son ·of 
a Presbyterian clergyman. One grandfather was a missionary, 
the other a Secretary of State . Dulles attended Princeton 
during Wilson's university presidency. Originally inclined 
to the ministry, he decided for law and diplomacy, first at-
taining national recognition as one of Wils on's principal ad-
visers at Versailles. However, his most conspicuous platform 
for foreign policy views prior to becoming Dewey's adviser 
and Eisenhower's secretary of state was afforded by the churches. 
Dulles was a delegate to the Oxford Conference on Church, State, 
and Community in 1937. In 1940, he was appointed chairman of 
the Federal Council of Churches' Commission on a Just and Dur-
able Peace which, during the war, he used to win mass support 
for the United Nations--believing finally that this campaign 
had made the difference between 1919 (the campaign which Wil -
son was unable to finish) and 1945 in public support for inter-
national organization. In 1946, at Cambridge, he was instru-
mental in the creation of the Commission of the Churches on 
International Affairs (CCIA), jointly sponsored by the Inter-
national Missionary Council and the World Council of Churches. 
At the Amsterdam Assembly of the World Council in 1948 , Dulles 
declared: 
What seems urgent--and possible-- is to revive in men 
a sense of moving peacefully toward a state of greater 
perfection •••• The need is for more effective po-
litical use of moral power •••• The Christian 
churches [are] especially qualified to help men 
form moral judgments which are discerning and to 
focus them at the time and place where they can 
be effective. The need is for full use of the 
present great possibilities of the United Nations . 
It was Christians most of all who wanted a world 
organisation which would depend primarily on moral 
rather than physical power . They have it. Now 
it is up to the churches to generate the mora± 
power required to make the organisation work. 
The fact that Dulles continued, after 1948, to be a spokesman 
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for bipartisan internationalism in American foreign policy did 
not for him preclude the assertion of a vigorous nationalism. 
He drafted the foreign policy plank of the Republican platform 
in 1952: 
The present administration, in seven years, has 
squandered the unprecedented power and prestige 
which were ours at the close of World War II. In 
that time, more than 5oo,ooo,ooo non-Russian people 
of 15 different countries have been absorbed into 
the power sphere of Communist Russia, which pro-
ceeds confidently with its plan for world conquest. 
We charge that the leaders of the administration in 
power lost the peace so dearly earned by World War 
II.2 
Just as the Wilson administration had been obsessed with loy-
alty investigations in its late months , the Dulles tenure at 
the State Department began in the full tide of Senator McCar-
thy's loyalty investigations, to which Dulles was responsive. 
The first press release of the new Secretary, t h e day after 
1. "The Christian Citizen in a Changing World," in The Church 
and the International Disorder: An Ecumenical Study Prepared 
Under the Aus ices of the World Council of Churches (New 
York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 19 , pp . 111, 113 . 
2. Quoted by John Robinson Beal, John Foster Dulles: A Biog-
raphy (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers , 1957), 
p. 131. 
President Eisenhower's inauguration, sternly insisted upon 
the virtue of loyalty: 
We are front-line defenders of the vital interests 
of the United States which are being attacked by 
a political warfare which is as hostile in its 
purpose and as dangerous in its capabilities as 
any open war •••• The peril is of a kind which 
places a special responsibility on each and every 
member of the Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. It requires of us competence, discipline, 
and positive loyalty to the policies that our 
President and the Congress may prescribe. Less 
than that is not tolerable at this time •••• 
I know, and our fellow citizens know, that those 
who comprise the Department of State and Foreign 
Service are, as a whole, a group of loyal America~s 
dedicated to the preservation of American ideals. 
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This proclamation of the Puritan ideals of "competence , disci-
pline, and positive loyalty" had political overtones which 
were demoralizing to career men in the Department and in the 
Foreign Service, a number of whom resigned or were 11 retired. 112 
But, whatever its consequences for the administration of 
American foreign policy, it reflected Dulles' pronounced sensi-
tivity to the symbols of the American ideology and to mass 
opinion. While statements by a Secretary of State have ordinar-
ily taken account of 11 home consumption" aspects, the greater 
care has normally been given to the conveying of American poli-
cy to other governments; domestic impact has been a secondary 
consideration. Dulles reversed this emphasis . It was his 
theory that "foreign policy , no matter how wise and sound, 
l. Ibid., pp. 7-8. 
2. Ibid., pp . 138-52. 
could not succeed in a democratic republic unless the mass 
of people understood it and supported it . " It was his con-
viction that his first job as Secretary in 1953 was "to re-
store the American public's confidence in the State Depart -
ment . 111 
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Woodrow Wilson and John Foster Dulles--two devout resby-
terians - -brought to the foreign policy of five decades a re -
newed projection, in bold relief , of the Puritan ethos . All 
of the adjectives associated with the name 11Puritan11 --moral -
istic , idealistic, legalistic , activistic, imperialistic- -
have been applied to them by either friends or critics . One 
important clue to their public behavior is that each incar-
nated the internal tension inherent in the doctrine of the 
covenant: a "chosen people" is at once zealously nationalistic 
and zealously universalistic . Each generated a missionary 
internationalism in his time ; each invoked the most earnest 
sanctions upon national loyalty . Each was a preacher as well 
as a policy-maker , seeking to win mass support for his convic -
tions . 
In their political leadership, Wilson and Dulles exhib-
ited both the cohesive and divisive properties of religion 
itself . Because each was perceived by the public to be a 
special embodiment of the national religion, he won a vast , 
enthusiastic , uncritical following for a time . But, when 
1 . Ibid . , p . 13 . 
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either the nationalistic or the universalistic component of 
the covenant seemed to preclude the other , however . temporari-
ly , substantial elements of the public were alienated from 
them and from their policies . 
In the days of their sovereign hold on public opinion, 
the American people found in Wilson and Dulles (to use Weber's 
term) an "elective affinity" between their intensely held doc -
trine of "the mission of America" and the political require-
ments of foreign policy . Tawney has written of the Puritan 
Revolution in England: 
There is a magic mirror in which each order 
and organ of society, as the consciousness of 
its character and destiny dawns upon it, looks 
for a moment , before the dust of conflict or 
the glamour of success obscures its vision ••.• 
For the middle classes of the early seventeenth 
century , rising but not yet triumphant , that 
enchanted mirror was Puritanism. l 
Three centuries later, when an i ncreasingly middle-class Am-
erica was called upon for its first responsible foreign policy 
in generations of revolutionary conflict; when the very nature 
of conflict lifted ideology above economics; when the depths 
of the nation's character and destiny were to be portrayed 
before a world arena , the "magic mirror" was much the same . 
Diluted and manipulated by secular influences it may have 
become--but the Puritan ethos has given Americans their most 
distinctive vision of their role in international affairs . 
Unstable and inconsistent may be the part played--the very 
1. Richard Henry Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism 
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1926), p . 175 . 
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instabilities and inconsistencies dramatize Puritan action . 
Both the feats and the failures of United States foreign poli-
cy must be seen in that mirror . 
CHAPTER V 
RELIGION AS A SANCTION FOR CONFLICT 
1. The Type 
The third function of religion in world politics is to 
provide legitimizing sanctions for conflicts among secular 
communities. 
The religious community recognizes the fact of conflict 
among both individuals and groups. This recognition extends 
to religion's own involvement in the processes of conflict. 
Its very sanctions of loyalty to the political community re-
quire the members of the religious community to continue 
their identification with the political community when inter-
community conflict develops. Political loyalty involves re-
ligious persons in an inevitable conflict among practical 
loyalties. 
Those engaged in the conflicting "causes" of the cen-
turies--military, political, economic, social--have been able 
to appeal to the Scriptures for sanction. The Psalms of 
David sing of God's help in time of conflict: 
He trains my hands for war, 
so that my arms can bend a bow of bronze •••• 
For thou didst gird me with strength for the battle; 
thou didst make my assailants sink under me. 
Thou didst make my enemies turn theil backs to me, 
and those who hated me I destroyed. 
1. Ps. 18:34, 39-40. 
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The prophets heard the judgments of God proclaimed in inter-
national conflict, whether as vindication or as punishment 
for the people of the Covenant. Jesus warned: "Do not think 
that I have come to bring peace on earth: I have not come to 
bring peace, but a sword."l His vision of the future was 
that of "wars and rumors of wars •• • • For nation will rise 
against nation, and kingdom against kingdom." 2 Jesus found 
more faith in a Roman centurion than he found among his own 
people.3 He told the multitudes that the cost of disciple-
ship had to be counted with the same calculating wisdom with 
which a king prepared to wage war.4 
If these texts cannot dictate a simple ethical answer 
to the problems of war and peace, they do belong to a vast 
body of Scriptural teaching which accepts the fact of per-
sonal and social conflict and announces the will of God as 
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active in conflict. Scriptural symbols have been conspicuous 
in the conflicts of political loyalties: 
1. Mt. 
2. Mt. 
3. Lk. 
4. Lk. 
For the past sixteen hundred years, the cross and 
the sword have been symbolic of Christendom. Ever 
since Constantine discovered military value in the 
unifying ideal of loyalty to the cross, and made 
it a sign under which his legions fought, the 
Church has been a participant in war. Battle 
flags have been displayed in cathedrals, Popes 
have called the faithful to crusades against the 
infidel with sword and lance and crossbow, bishops 
10:34. 
24:6, 7. 
7:8-9. 
14:31. 
have blessed the hosts of imperialism and have 
sent forth troops and navies to f i ght against 
primitive peoples for purposes of enslavement, 
with pious benedictions . It has been the aim 
of national governments to secure the full co-
operation of the Church in time of war, and with 
few exceptions that co - operation has been ob-
tained . l 
Many of the most compelling symbols of modern nationalism 
have been created out of the very fact of conflict . Flags 
are designed for a revolution or to commemorate martial 
glory . National anthems sing of "rockets ' red glare" and 
"bombs bursting in air . " The personal symbols of loyalty 
and patriotism are typically the military heroes and the 
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wartime executives . To the extent that religion and patriot-
ism have shared a "homogenizing of symbolisms," it is not to 
be expected that religious and political sentiments will be 
separated in time of war . 
In terms similar to those employed by Almond in his 
distinction between "opinion elites" and "attentive publics , " 
Waller characterizes the church (along with the press and the 
school) as an ''attention- getting agency . " It is the nature 
of such an agency to strive for attention and approval , es -
pecially in times of national cri s is . 
As a crisis gains momentum, more conservative 
agencies, such as the school and the church, 
must fall in line . Since all these agencies 
strive for approval the stand taken must be 
patriotic . The competitive nature of these 
agencies of opinion brings it about that if 
l . Hugh c. Stunt z, The United Nations Challen e to the Church 
(New York: Abingdon- Cokesbury Press , 19 72- 3. 
any leader of opinion fails to ac t in the 
manner describedi he will shortly be replaced 
by someone else . 
These agencies are inevitably caught up in "the milling pro-
cess" which leads to war . "Incidents 11 and public opinion 
play upon each other; atrocity stories, myths, and stereo-
types multiply and provide a focus for generating war fever . 
Of all the agencies controlling public opinion , the church 
and the school may be the last to declare their open support 
of actual warfare . "Sooner or later , however, the ministers 
and the teachers discover that this war is different; this 
is a holy war . "2 While Waller 's assumption of inevitability 
and his neglect of exceptions must be challenged3 , his anal-
ysis does indicate that the effectiveness of religious sane -
tions in the field of foreign policy must be measured in the 
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dynamics of public opinion and decision-making , and not simply 
as logical deductions from moral principle . 
The deeper psychic functions of religion in sanctioning 
war are suggested in studies by J . C. Flugel of the "psycho-
logical appeals of war . " Among these appeals are: (1) ad-
venture: the zest for the unknown , the demand on bodily and 
1 . Willard Waller, "War in the Twentieth Century,n in John 
Eric Nordskog and others (eds.), Analyzing Social Problems 
(New York: The Dryden Press, 1950), p . 67 • 
2 . Ibid., p . 679 . 
3. There was a qualitative difference in the response of Prot -
estant churches to World War II . See Chapter VI below. 
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mental powers; the fascination of risk and danger, the need 
to "sacrifice" (or to 11 punish 11 the self); (2) social unity: 
the experience of common emotions and purposes as the idea 
of the nation becomes vivid and powerful; co-operation, the 
lifting of the ego to the super-ego, the "need to be needed"; 
(3) freedom from individual worries and restrictions: sub-
merging of the individual to the common danger, reduction of 
economic worry through employment security, reduction of 
class and status distinctions, relaxing of moral inhibitions; 
and (4) aggression: the availability of an enemy as a'~cape-
goat for projection and the reduction of intra-nation ag-
gression •• As a me ans of doing evil and of feeling good 
while doing it, war is without a parallel . "1 Perhaps no 
agency is better equipped to moralize or justify these psych-
ological appeals of war than the church. Its own preaching 
of sacrifice, co-operation, peace of mind, and moral indigna-
tion seems to afford the church a special appropriateness in 
times of national crisis, including war. 
Yet Christianity's inherent doctrine of the "provision-
al" nature of the state will tend to assert itself in the 
midst of the conflict and to qualify the sanctions. War's 
very requirement for nan unconditionally devoted and sacrifi-
cial community" implies the "autonomous dignity of the polity 
resting on force." To this autonomy, Christianity can never 
1 . 
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completely consent, according to Weber, because of its inter-
pretation of the ultimate meaning of death. The "consecrated 
meaning of death which is characteristic only of death in 
war" comes into radical conflict with the "theodicy of death 
in a religion of brotherliness . 111 The transcendent and 
reconciling functions of the faith can never be completely 
extinguished, particularly when confronted with the most ul-
timate problems for which, by definition, the religion exists. 
The psychic qualities of the community of the Covenant 
are thus perhaps most fully to be apprehended in the midst 
of international conflict. Religion's identification with 
forces in conflict can never become absolute without incur-
ring the guilt of having violated its own transcendent loyalty 
and having abandoned its own will to resolution. The more 
absolute the identification, the deeper the guilt is likely 
to be, and the more it will be accompanied by a consequent 
hostility which imparts an intensification to the conflict 
not wholly functional to the political aspects of the conflict 
and complicating the resolution of the conflict. If the reli-
gious community makes no identification with the conflict 
(whether or not it actively participates in the more violent 
aspects of the conflict is not prejudged by the term "identi -
fication''), it incurs the guilt of having violated its 
1. From Max eber, edited by Hans H. Gerth and c. Wright Mills 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1948), pp . 335-6. 
inherent acknowledgement of involvement in all forms of con-
flict and it generates hostility between itself and the 
political community which blocks religion ' s inherent capac-
ities for resolving the conflict . 
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Religious sanctions for loyalty to the national political 
community are not abolished in time of international conflict, 
b~t the "provisional" nature of political loyalty will tend 
to impart a "provisional'' qualification to the sane tions for 
the conflict . 
2 . International Conflict 
i . Sanctions for Ideological Conflict 
The interpenetration of religious and national values in 
the modern period has not been simply an intranational phenom-
enon . Nationalism has been both t he cause and consequence of 
international conflict in which religion has played a dynamic 
role . Notwithstanding the message of love and reconciliation 
and peace proclaimed by the church and the more or less persis -
tent thread of pacifism throughout Christian history, Christian 
sanctions for conflict among nations have been granted in most 
occasions of such conflict . In the 1870's , the British hist-
orian, W. E . H. Lecky , came to the "melancholy conclusion that 
not only has ecclesiastical influence had no appreciable effect 
in diminishing the number of wars , but that it has actually 
and very s eriously increased it . We may look in vain for any 
period since Constantine, in which the clergy as a body 
exerted themselves to repress the military spirit or to pre-
vent or abridge a particular war . "1 
With the declining power of the church in the face of 
modern nationalism, the church's role with regard to war was 
bound to undergo significant changes . Toynbee has set apart 
the eighteenth century as a period of ''civilized warfare" 
156 
marked by the decline of religion prior to the full emergence 
of nationalism. "The fundamental reason why war was less 
atrocious in the eighteenth century than either before or 
since was that it had ceased to be a weapon of religious fan-
aticism and had not yet become a weapon of nationalist fan-
aticism. 112 That nationalist fanaticism has not been a purely 
secular phenomenon , unaided by religion, is a common observa-
tion of recent discussion in international relations . A 
third British historian, Butterfield, has emphasized the paral-
lels between twentieth century conflict and the Wars of Reli -
gion in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: 
Europe , during the last few centuries, has had 
considerable experience of creeds, ideologies, 
and regimes whose claims were absolute . It has 
already seen bitter conflicts between systems 
which purported to be universal , and which were 
mutually exclusive . The Wars of Religion for 
a number of generations after Luther's break 
with Rome provide perhaps the closest analogy 
to the conflicts of the twentieth century.3 
1 . History of European Morals (New York: D. Appleton and Com-
pany , 1872) , II , 269 . Quoted in Stuntz , p. 74 . 
2 . Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History . Abridgement of Volumes 
I-VI by D. C. Somervell (New York: Oxford University Press , 
1951) , p . 284 . 
3 . International Conflict , p . 63 . 
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The absolute dimensions of the earlier wars were manifested 
in the claims of Roman Catholics that Protestantism was a 
"monstrous blasphemy" and in the claims of Protestantism that 
the Pope was the ttAntichrist . 11 11Above all, it was unthinkable 
that two forms of the Christian religion could coexist with-
in a given country • • •• For a hundred and fifty years Eur-
ope was ravaged by civil wars and international conflicts 
which owed their cruelty and intensity to religious fanati-
cism. nl 
The ideological character of mass nationalism in the 
twentieth century suggests that religious and quasi-religious 
qualities have been i mparted to international conflicts since 
1898. Religious sanctions for conflict have tended to bolster 
the absolute claims of international riva~ in decades of total 
war and total diplomacy . There is a totalitarian character 
of intellectual conflict more or less associated with nation-
al power-systems . In the struggle of ideas for mass support , 
religious zeal has been courted by policy-makers, and reli-
gious leaders have, in large numbers, responded . The par-
ticular requirement of mass opinion is that it be aroused to 
moral indignation against the enemies of the nation: "The 
raising of moral indignation against a foreign people is the 
essential factor in the fuelling of a totalitarian war . " In 
this respect, Protestant churches are especially vulnerable 
1 . Ibid . , pp . 64-5 . 
because of the ready propaganda platform which they offer . 
"No national government could ever secure a more powerful 
organ of propaganda than a church quickening moral indigna-
tion against the enemy of the moment, and doing it on infor-
mati on which , as the crisis deepens , is more definitely 
controlled , more carefully filtered out to the country , by 
the agencies of the home government itself . 111 The techni-
cians of twentieth century politics have increasingly come 
to believe that democratic nations "can only be keyed up 
to modern war- - only brought t o the necessary degree of fer -
vour--provided they are whipped into moral indignation and 
heated to fanaticism by the thought that they are engaged 
in a 'war of righteousness .' ••• Here is the clue to the 
deadliest features of modern war-- the hatred, the vicious-
ness , the refusal to compromise . " 2 
Historians of American foreign policy in the twentieth 
century testify to the manner in which the Puritan ethos has 
provided the moral indignation of the nation's wars . George 
Kennan's discussion of policy in the first half of the cen-
tury repeatedly calls attention to the characteristics of 
"moralism" and "legalism" and their peculiar qualities of 
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intensity and inconsistency with regard to international con-
flict . 
1 . Ibid., p . 18 . 
2 . Butterfield, Christianity , Diplomacy, and War, p . 26 . 
Whoever says there is a law must of course be 
indignant against the lawbreaker and feel a 
moral superiority to him. And when such indig-
nation spills over into military conflict, it 
knows no bounds short of the reduction of the 
lawbreaker to the point of complete submissive-
ness--namely , unconditional surrender . It is 
a curious thing •••• that the legalistic ap-
proach to world affairs , rooted as it unquestion-
ably is in a desire to do away with war and 
violence, makes violence more enduring , more 
terrible, and more destructive to political sta-
bility than did the older motives of national in-
terest . A war fought in the name of high moral 
principle finds no e~rly end short of some form 
of total domination . 
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The same moral drives can lend themselves to the most oppos ite 
of policies . American democracy has been like a prehistoric 
monster in the primeval mud: slow to wrath, it may not defend 
its own vital interests at first --but when aroused, it tends 
not onl y to destroy its adversary but also largely wrecks its 
own habitat . 
It is surely a curious characteristic of democracy; 
this amazing ability to shift gears overnight in 
one's ideological attitudes , depending on whether 
one considers one's self at war or at peace . Day 
before yesterday , let us say, the issues at stake 
between ourselves and another power were not worth 
the life of a single American boy . Today, nothing 
else counts at all ; our cause is holy; the cost is 
no consideration; violence must know no limitations 
short of unconditional surrender . 2 
Kennan also emphasizes the fact that historic circumstances 
have lent themselves to moralistic fervor on the part of 
Americans a s they have launched their wars : "The real source 
1 . Kennan, American Diplomacy , pp . 98-9 . 
2 . Ibid ., p . 66 . 
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of the emotional fervor which we Americans are able to put 
into a war lies less in any objective understanding of the 
wider issues involved than in a profound irritation over 
the fact that other people have finally provoked us to the 
point where we had no alternative but to take up arms . This 
lends to the democratic war effort a basically punitive note . "1 
Such a punitive response followed the sinking of the Maine in 
1898, the submarine attacks of 1917, and the bombing of Pearl 
Harbor in 1941. But moral sanctions have thus tended to fol-
low the advent of a national emergency and not to propel Amer-
ican intervention for nmoral 11 reasons before the emergency 
became America's own . (The Korean War is the one significant 
exception to this tendency in the twentieth century, in that 
American intervention was not based so much upon "the nation-
al interesttt as upon ncollective security . ") Reinhold Niebuhr 
has succinctly indicated this after- the-fact characteristic of 
moral sanctions for war : "Every nation is caught in the moral 
paradox of refusing to go to war unless it can be proved that 
the national interest is imperiled , and in continuing the war 
only by proving that something more than the national interest 
is at stake . 112 
A religion which tends to attach absolute distinctions of 
right and wrong to particular policies--and this has been 
1. Ibid ., p . 83 . 
2 . The Irony of American History, p . 36 . 
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characteristic of Puritan Protestantism--provides ideological 
and symbolic resources for the winning of mass support in 
times of national crisis. When war is imminent, policy-makers 
are under pressure to simplify issues and suspend critical 
judgment . Governments "communicate symbols to the home popu-
lation, to neutrals, and to enemies, each government seeking 
to convince all that its ideals, goals, and values are right 
and the enemy's wrong and that in any case it is going to win 
and the enemy is going to lose . On the legal front, each gov-
ernment argues in the court of world opinion the ri ghtness and 
justice of its cause and conduct, and the violations of inter-
national law by the enemy . 111 Public opinion, at home and 
abroad, is never more vulnerable to manipulation than when it 
fears the outbreak of violent conflict . 
It is one of the weaknesses of public oplnlon • • • 
that sides can quickly be taken in a quarrel on 
the strength of an apparently unanswerable thesis 
which covers a convenient selection from the facts 
of the case . The public shuns the baffling com-
plexities which emerge when one tries to see all 
around a given problem, and to bring all the various 
types of consideration into one's survey. Rene~ 
the colossal opportunities which governments possess 
for imposing upon their peoples2all the psychology of the 'war for ri ghteousness .' 
Whatever the religious component may be in America's response 
to the wars of the twentieth century, the religion of this 
''most religious nation" has not been able to prevent the 
1. Quincy Wright, p . 4. 
2. Butterfield, p. 37. 
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occurrence of those wars. Whether by choice or by exploit-
ation, religious symbols have been readily employed in the 
prosecution of those conflicts and have , for the duration, 
predominated over the symbols of restraint and brotherhood. 
Kennan suggests the difficulties in reversing this pattern: 
"The counsels of impatience and hatred can always be supported 
by the crudest and cheapest symbols; for the counsels of mod-
eration, the reasons are often intricate, rather than emotion-
al, and difficult to explain •••• And until peoples learn to 
spot the fanning of mass emotions and the sowing of bitterness, 
suspicion, and intolerance as crimes in themselves--as perhaps 
the greatest disservice that can be done to the cause of pop-
ular government--this sort of thing will continue to occur."1 
To the extent to which the moral resources of Protestant -
ism have lent themselves to the intensification of conflict 
through the manipu~ation of fear, they have undermined their 
own integrity and their capacity for genuinely free moral re-
sponse. Protestantism has more readily identified with the 
ideological conflicts of the twentieth century than it has 
transcended them. It has been the very nature of those con-
flicts t o compel national loyalty under threat and to mitigate 
its more positive qualities. 
What makes this ideological conflict so dangerous 
is not so much the love of one's own doctrines as 
fear of the other man 's. A nation state may fear 
another as such, but there are remedies for such 
fears--adequate armaments, alliances with others, 
bargains with the potential enemy himself. No 
1. Kennan, American Diplomacy, p. 63. 
such remedy , it seems , can be relied upon against 
the ideological enemy . No fortifications can keep 
him out , no alliances deter him, no pacts with him 
can be entirely trusted . A constant cause of fear 
is constantly an object of hate . l 
This is not to claim evidence for the ethical rejection of 
war as an instrument of national policy : it is to require an 
adequate political ethic to take account of the consequences 
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to morality itself when it has permitted itself to identify un-
critically with one side of an international conflict . For , as 
Butterfield has observed, "one of the troubles of war is that 
it acquires its own momentum and p l ants i ts own ideals on our 
shoulders, so that we are carried far away from the purposes 
which which we began--carried indeed sometimes to greater acts 
of spoliation than the ones which had provoked our original 
entry into the war . 112 
The exploitation of mass fear and the intensification of 
mass hostility in a nation dominated by the Puritan ethos have 
tended to develop a vicious circle of moral fervor and acute 
guilt . The very intensity of participation by religious per -
sons in conflict is "a functi on of guilt and insecurity feel-
ings over having taken such positions . "3 When the moral in-
hibitions against violent conflict are relaxed so that the 
full power of moral indignation may be released, the 
l . "Intolerance, Enemy of Peace , " The Round Table, No . 147 
(June , 1947), p . 213 . 
2 . Butterfield, p . 28 . 
3 . Mack and Snyder, p . 216 . 
resolution of the conflict becomes more difficult to effect . 
"Ideological conflict is more intense and the parties there -
to are more intransigent because of the objectification of 
issues and lack of inhibitions on personal attacks . 111 The 
reaction of guilt after the cessation of conflict has been 
apparent in the post - war disillusionment of Americans . 
Niebuhr was a liberal pacifist prior to the First World War . 
As a German- American , he suddenly became "more than ordina-
rily patriotic" and resented the critical attitudes main-
tained by some other German- Americans . In time , the senti-
mentality of his patriotic passions waned as he perceived the 
fanaticism of religious leaders in supporting the war effort , 
leaving him critical of "emotionalism, all kinds, the reli -
gious variet;i.es included." The total impact of the war was 
to shatter all his previous thinking: 
It made me a child of the a ge of disillusionment . 
When the war started I was a young man trying to 
be an optimist without falling into sentimentality . 
When it ended and the full tragedy of the fratri-
cides had been revealed , I had become a realist 
trying to save myself from cynicism. • • • The 
universe ••• had been rather suddenly revealed 
to me as a depers onalized process •• ~ • I had 
been sunk into a sea of relativities . 
Later , Niebuhr was to claim that 11 it is the highest function 
of religion to create a sense of guilt, to make man conscious 
1 . Ibid. , p . 225 . 
2 . "What the War Did to My Mind , " The Christian. Century, 45 
{September 27, 1928) , pp . 1161- 2 . 
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of the fact that his inadequacie s are more than excusable 
limitations ; that they are treas on against his better self . 111 
For a people marked by the religious fervor of the Puritan 
ethos , the function of guilt is particularly heightened in 
the ultimate circumstances of international conflict . Both 
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the quality and the r esults of the conflict are shaped in part 
by the vicious circle of moral enthusiasm and war guilt . 
It is thus in the circums t ances of international conflic t , 
with their moralistic qualities in a century of ideological in-
tensity , that American Protestants have come close t o violating 
the "provisional" character of the state which the Christian 
ethic requires . As a religious public approaches absolute 
identification of ultimate with national purposes in war , it 
tends to substitute the latter for the former as the sovereign 
source of ethics . 
The cause of ethics in international affairs has • 
been retarded by popular attitudes toward the na-
tion state , providing a loyalty that easily takes 
precedence over issues of right and wrong . When 
their collectiv~ welfare or security is at stake , 
a people incline to relegate moral principles into 
the background . The end appears to justify the 
means, and if the future of the state is at stake 
it is felt that there is nothing more important 
than self- preservation . 2 
. . 
1 . "Barth: Apostle of the Absolute , " The Christian Centur;r , 45 
(December 13, 1928) , p . 1524. 
2 . Hill , p . 482 . 
ii . Sanctions for Wars 
After the sinking of the u.s . battleship aine in Havana 
harbor on February 15, 1898 , Protestant clergy became espe -
cially vociferous in demanding a war policy . For two months, 
along with a sensation-seeking press and Navy imperialists 
such as Mahan, Roosevelt , Lodge , and Beveridge, the churches 
helped to inflame public opinion against the reluctance of 
President McKinley to go to war . The Reverend Thomas Dixon, 
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a Baptist , preached a sermon against "hesitation, delay , dip-
lomacy , and idle talk . 111 The special enthusiasm of Protestant -
ism for going to battle derived from propaganda about Spanish 
11 atrocities 112 and from the new opportunities for missionary 
1 . Hill and Lund , p. 82 . 
2 . The vulnerability of Protestant clergy to "yellow journal-
ism11 in stimulating public resentment against Spanish "atroc-
ities , " many of which were fabrications or exaggerations , 
is discussed incidentally in Marcus M. Wilkerson, Public 
0 inion and the S anish- Ameri can War: A Stud in War Pro a -
ganda Baton Rouge : Louisiana State University Press, 1932) . 
See especially pp . 57 , 88, 96 , 103 , 110 . Wilkerson's study 
focuses particularly upon the rivalry for circulation between 
William Randolph Hearst of the New York Journal and Joseph 
Pulitzer of the New York World . His conclusion : "The 
sensational press had finally triumphed . Led by the World 
and the Journal, partisan newspapers, after carefully 
arranging the stage for the final act in the drama of war 
propaganda, 'played up' the Maine explosion without restraint 
and left the American public reeling from a bombardment of 
half- truths , mis - statement of facts, rumors, and faked 
dispatches . Sensing the popular tide, a hesitant adminis-
tration, egged on by a 'jingo ' Congress , proposed war with 
a nation already on the verge of collapse from internal 
strife and rebellion . " Seep . 132 . Bailey's description 
of the role of the clergy in 1898 compares that period with 
1914 and after; in both instances , the disposition of Protes-
tant preachers 11 to accept on faith what cannot be seen" led 
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activity in the Orient. Financial and business interests, 
ordinarily alleged to be the instigators of imperial ventures, 
were generally opposed to American involvement in a war with 
Spain. For her part, Spain indicated a willingness to nego-
tiate and make concessions, but the McKinley administration, 
in late April, "to the accompaniment of great congressional 
and popular acclaim, inaugurated hostilities against another 
country in a situation of which it can only be said that the 
possibilities of settlement by measures short of war had by 
no means been exhausted . 111 There has never been proof of 
Spanish responsibility for the sinking of the Maine, but the 
churches helped to preach the slogan, "Remember the I'<laine t 11 
One Methodist minister declared that he felt it 11 in his 
bones" that the explosion was the deliberate act of Spain. 
With the Spanish-American War under way, the editor of The 
Methodist Review declared: "We shall be much disappointed if 
the final outcome of the war does not show that it was one 
of God's most efficient agencies f or the advancement of true 
them to an uncritical dissemination of morally outraged 
propaganda concerning "atrocities." The "bellicosity of 
preachers,n especially of the "evangelical type,u derives 
from their public role as "professional emotionalists." 
In the critical days on the brink of violent conflict, 
when the public needs "calmness and stability, some pulpit-
eers unfortunately give us hysteria and gullibility," 
falling "prey to propaganda and [crying) out for a right-
eous war." The Man in the Street, p. 202. 
1. Kennan, p. 17. 
Christian civilization and the ushering in of brighter times 
for the human race . "1 
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Thus began what Fensterwald has called "the First Cr u-
sade" of the United States in world politics . The "apostles" 
of this new policy "coated their doctrines with a thick sheen 
of ideology . " Most Americans at the time believed that na-
tional motives were "anti-imperialist," whereas, in fact, 
those who "maneuvered" the nation into the war had "exactly 
the opposite in mind . "2 In time , the anti-imperialists and 
pacifists were "revolted by its imperialistic usage and driven 
deeper into their 'isolationism' and pacifism.") 
1. Paul A. Varg , Missionaries , Chinese , and Diplo-
American Protestant Missionar Movement in China , 
Princeton , N. J .: Princ e ton University Press, 
1958) , p . 82 . The pronounced enthusiasm of Methodists for 
war in 1898 may help to explain the final decision of 
McKinley, a Me thodist, to ask for a declaration of war . 
The President, before making up his mind, told Methodist 
leaders that he often went down on his knees "and prayed 
Almi ghty God for light and guidance . " The missionary argu-
ment appears to have weighed heavily with him, partly be-
because of the zealous concern of his invalid wife about 
"the heathen of the Philippines . " After the decision was 
made , McKinley announced that there was no alternative 
but "to take them all, and educate the Filipinos, and up-
lift and civilize and Christianize them, and by God's 
grace to do the very best we could for them, as our fel-
low men for whom Christ also died . 11 See Bailey, pp . 201-2 . 
2. Fensterwald, p. 118 . 
3 . Ibid . , p. 119 . 
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In the summer of 1900 , a second imperialistic policy was 
proclaimed with a high-minded and idealistic ring: the "Open 
Door" for China to "guarantee the territorial and administra-
tive integrity" of that country against 1tJ'estern dismemberment . 
The policy , in Kennan ' s words , "wa s obviously in the interests 
of American trade . " Secretary of State Hay wrung 11 the grudg-
ing , embarrassed , and evasive replies which might have been 
expected . " While regarded by the American public as a diplo-
matic victory, the 11 0pen Door 11 lacked any significant prac -
tical result , the United States was unwilling to back its own 
commitment in any forceful way , and Hay himself became disil -
lusioned by it . Still , it remains "the established opinion 
of the American public that here , in this episode of the Open 
Door notes , a tremendous blow had been struck for the triumph 
of American principles in international society--an American 
blow for an American idea . 111 
The "Open Door" was vigor ously supported by American 
church leaders and missionary interests . Public opinion was 
persuaded that a rig~ous covenant had been contracted with 
the "imperialists"--a practice which was to be frequently re-
peated in succeeding decades . 
The tendency to achieve our foreign policy objec -
tives by inducing other governments to sign up to 
professions of high moral and legal principle ap-
pears to have a great and enduring vitality in our 
diplomatic practice •••• It was as sumed by American 
statesmen that whatever was uttered or urged in the 
1 . Kennan, American Diplomacy , pp . 40-1 . 
name of moral or legal principle bore with it no 
specific responsibility on the part of him who 
urged it, even though the principle might be of 
questionable applicability to the situation at 
hand and the practical effects of adherence to 
it drastic and far-reaching. We were at liberty 
to exhort, to plead, to hamper, to embarrass. 
If others failed to heed us, we would cause them 
to appear in ungraceful posture before the eyes 
of world opinion. If, on the other hand, they 
gave heed to our urgings, they would do so at 
their own risk; we would not feel bound to help 
them with fhe resulting problems--they were on 
their own. 
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An exhortatory policy may thus win public support among the 
American people, especially if supported by religious leaders, 
at the same time that it alienates intended allies and fails 
to safeguard the interests of those people for whom the na-
tion has expressed moral concern. 
Time after time we would call upon other powers 
to make public confession of these principles. 
Time after time we would receive from them re-
luctant, evasive, or qualified replies, putting 
us on notice that no one would deny the princi-
ples but that it all depended on how they were 
interpreted. Time after time we would present 
these replies to our own people, despite their 
qualified nature, as diplomatic achievements: as 
acknowledgments of the justice of our view, ex-
pressions of contrition, willingness to reform.2 
The coexistence of moralism and imperialism in the doctrine 
of "manifest destiny" depends not so much upon the general 
premise of policy but upon the specific conclusion which 
leaders may draw from the premise. Religious or political 
1. Ibid., pp. 49-50. 
2. Ibid., p. 42. 
leaders may not perceive the inconsistency between a high-
sounding moral premise and an imperialistic conclusion. 
Mirabile dictu, the altruism of international mor-
ality leads to an aggrandizement which usually 
requires the contraction of some other party. 
The inverted character of international morality 
is most striking in the ideology supporting terri-
torial expansion •••• Moral ideology as directive1 is altruistic in premise and selfish in conclusion. 
In the years leading up to World War I, the Protestant 
churches launched a variety of "movements" with unparalleled 
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moral and spiritual enthusiasm. Among these were the Men and 
Religion Forward Movement, Prohibition , the Laymen's Mission-
ary Campaign, the World Student Christian Federation, the Stu-
dent Volunteer Movement , the official Social Gospel, the 
Federal Council of Churches, and the Church Peace Union .2 
These movements helped to prepare the psychic responses with 
which the American public were to respond to the war. After 
1914, Britain and France addressed umoral 11 appeals to Ameri-
cans, encouraging their enlistment in a "crusade" against the 
"immoral" Germans whose "sins" had included the invasion of 
Belgium, the use of submarines, and the building up of mili -
tary power.3 Woodrov-1 Wilson 's policy of neutrality was at 
first supported by the churches, but the uskillful propaganda" 
of the Allies combined with the zeal of the Security League, 
1. Albert K. Weinberg , Manifest Destiny (Baltimore: Johns Hop-
kins Press, 1935), p. 6. Quoted in Schuman , p . 102. 
2. William Warren Sweet, The Story of Religion in America (New 
York : Harper and Brothers Publishers , 1950), p. 391. 
3. Gabriel, Chapter 27. 
supported by Theodore Roosevelt , William Allen White, Lyman 
Abbott and other church leaders, to arouse American opinion . 
The "spiritualization of the war" made it possible for the 
crusaders for peace to make the t r ansition to crusaders for 
"a war to end war" 1- -once again there was a psychological 
consistency in the religious component of the public mood 
throughout a reversal of the actual policy orientation . 
Fensterwald and others have tended to ignore this prep-
aration of American moral fervor in the years prior to 1917 
and to regard Wilson as essentially the manipulator of the 
religious response after war was declared by putting the war 
on an "altruistic" basis . "The crusading aspect of the war 
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effort was superimposed only after our entry into the conflict . 
The slogans were not enunciated or made popular prior to the 
declaration of war . 112 Such a judgment underestimates the de-
gree of initiative assumed by many religious leaders in pro-
voking militant sentiments after 1914 and, more especially , in 
the two months between early February and early April in 1917 . 
On the Monday after the United States broke diplomatic rela-
tions with Germany in February , American newspapers reported 
a large number of Sunday sermons advocating intervention . 
Wilson himself, still not decided upon a declaration of war3 , 
l . Sweet , p . 400. 
2 . Fensterwald , p. 121 . 
3 . That Wilson's decision only came after the accommodation of 
a profound internal conflict within his own mind is sug-
gested below on p . 289 . 
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declared: "I think our clergy have all gone crazy."l While 
Wils on's own reluctance was eventually converted to enthusiasm, 
that enthusiasm was as much, if not more , a product of moral-
ized public opinion as its producer . Perhaps the most accu-
rate description of the pre-war weeks of 1917 is to character-
ize it as a period of "the milling process" in which both Hil-
son and the general public were increasingly subject to the 
pull of moralistic appeals which, in the end, they could not 
withstand. 
The churches finally pitched into the war effort with 
the conspicuous enthusiasm of a crusade. Frank Mason North, 
president of the Federal Council of Churches, proclaimed: "The 
war for righteousness will be won! Let the Church do her 
part . " Protestant leaders turned their churches into "little 
more than government agencies carrying out the will of the 
state . " They recruited soldiers, sold Liberty bonds, saved 
food, and urged the raising of production quotas. Sermons 
were preached "from outlines sent them by government propagan-
da agencies," especially for the playing up of "atrocities" 
by Germans and in exposing 11 plots" and "spies." The clergy 
agitated for the curtailment of civil liberties and Wilson's 
attorney-general, A. Mitchell Palmer, accommodated them. The 
I .W.W., German-Americans, conscientious objectors, and pacifists 
were all "lumped together for widespread ministerial denunciation 
1. Hill and Lund, pp. 7-8. 
and condemnation."l In this mood, Zion's Herald--later to 
manifest a passion for peace--announced with a mixture of 
protest and pun: "God's employment of War as a means of dis-
pensing with useless and harmful material is too conspicuous 
a feature of Scripture to allow standing room to Quakers and 
men with a quaking disposition . 112 
It is important to record, in this connection, that the 
final triumph of Protestantism's own greatest political cru-
sade, Prohibition, came during World War I . Many clergy 
made this connection prominent in their own preaching: Pro-
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hibition was associated with patriotism. The chief opposition 
to Prohibition in the Protestant stronghold of the Midwest 
came from Germans already "suspect of an un-American attitude 
to the war in Europe . " German-American brewers thus became 
the objects of an amalgamated moral and patriotic movement. 
Brogan's observation of this movement is that "what had been 
a defence of an economic interest and a way of social life 
became a defence of a particular foreign policy for the United 
States . 11 3 A Protestant writer in 1917 united these concerns 
by declaring: "The world will be a more fit place to live in 
when autocracy, war and drink are all buried in the same 
grave ."4 
1 . Sweet, pp . 400- 02 . 
2 . Quoted in 1£1£., pp . 402- 3 . 
3 . Politics in America, p . 178 . 
4 . William E. Johnson, The Federal Government and the Liquor 
Traffic , 2nd ed. {WestervilleA Ohio: American Issue PUblish-
ing Company, 1917}, p . 316 . ~uoted in Brogan, p . 177. 
175 
The combination of a Protestant President uniquely sensi-
tive to the moral dimensions of national leadership and a 
Protestant public which had already unleashed a succession of 
moral crusades gave to the First World War that paradoxical 
quality at the core of the Puritan ethos: an intensely na-
tionalistic internationalism. The war was conducted 
on a basis that was bound to give the maximum 
scope to the hysterias and frenzies associated 
with the fury of battle . Precisely because it 
was conducted as a war 'for righteousness', a 
war 'for the destruction of the wicked', that 
whole conflict was turned into one that could 
admit of no compromise . Precisely because of 
the myth of 'the war to end all war', we made 
it more true than it had been for centuries 
that war breeds war, provokes revolution, gen-
erates new causes of conflict, deepens resent-
ments, and produces those reversions which we 
call modern barbarism. The decision to fight 
such an unlimited war, for the vindication of 
morality as such, amounted to a decision to give 
war a greatly enhanced role in history , but it 
did not alter the dreadful rharacter of the role 
which warfare always plays . 
The moral quality of participation in an international con-
flict not only affects that conflict but future conflicts as 
well. It also preconditions the response of a public to the 
qualities of its efforts for peace following violent conflict. 
After World War I, the principal effect of the "high-minded 
sentiments was to build up American hopes and expectations to 
a height from which the descent was dizzying ."2 Because of 
the conspicuous role of the churches in that Crusade , they 
1. Butterfield, Christianity, Diplomacy , and 1·/ar, p . 17 . 
2. Fensterwald, p. 121 . 
experienced a "descent from the heights" in the post-war 
period . While some religious leaders sought to rally a new 
crusade for peace, the churches were being weakened through 
membership losses and a general revulsion to religion. Many 
churches experienced a "severe decline in prestige and popu-
lar appeal because of their war record. The accusation that 
they had abandoned their pacific mission, blessed the arms 
of all belligerents and exhorted their respective uniformed 
flocks to exterminate one another as a sacred, religious 
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duty carried the more conviction as indeed far too many church-
men of all denominations had surrendered to the war psychosis . "l 
In 1919 and 1920, many who had been zealous internation-
alists prior to the War would not support the League of Na-
tions or gave it only half-hearted support . 2 Just before his 
death in 1924, Wilson recognized the force of this public re-
action to crusading internationalism, implying that American 
failure to join the League was more than a failure of opposi-
tion political leaders such as Lodge: 
It was right that the United States did not join 
the League of Nations •••• I've been thinking 
about this for a long time . If we had joined the 
League when I asked for it, it would have been 
a great personal victory. But it would not have 
worked , because deep down in their hearts th~ 
American people didn't really believe in it.J 
1 . Baron, p . 251 . 
2 . Fensterwald , p . 121 . 
3. Quoted by Wilson 's daughter, Mrs . Eleanor ilson McAdoo 
and cited in Charles A. Beard, American Foreign Policy in 
the Making (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947), pp . 18-9 . 
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Bailey proposes a "political law of gravitation" according to 
which the reaction to intense moral fervor may be described : 
"the higher the idealism the greater the subsequent disil-
lusionment . There is a corollary law: a nation is able to 
key itself up to a high pitch for only a relatively short 
time, and then reaction sets in . "1 
In time , the disillusionment following World War I, while 
it dampened the ardor with which peace movements resumed their 
work, gave a new power to pacifism and made for qualitative 
differences in the response of the churches to World War II. 
During World War II, on the whole , churches held aloof from 
the excesses of frenzy . "Although the provocation was much 
greater and everyone realized that the very foundations of 
Western civilization were under attack , religious leaders 
largely succeeded in holding fast to the fundamentals of their 
2 faiths in the midst of the war hysteria . " There was more of 
an attitude of resignation , both in the churches and in the 
general public, to the actuality of aggressive assault and 
less disposition to whip up "hysterical hate for the Huns." 
Ther e was a more prevalent concern for civil liberties and 
for the treatment of conscientious objectors.3 Lasswell 
1 . Bailey, The Man in the Street, p. 188. 
2. Baron, p. 252. 
3. Mac Dougall, p . 527 . 
describes World War II, as waged by the American public, as 
"a struggle to stop a sadistic gang of thugs, but it was done 
without enthusiasm, without an overwhelming sense of mission. 
Somehow the whole business seemed a side issue in a world 
where there are major issues."l 
These descriptions of the quality of moral response to 
1J'lorld \'lar II suggest somewhat opposite types of analysis. 
It has been argued that increasing moral sensitivity among 
church leaders, including those who had attended the Oxford 
Conference of 1937 and had been most exposed to the interna-
tional contact s of the ecumenical movement, was responsible 
for the differences between 1917 and 1941.2 Lasswell empha-
sizes an apparently contradictory quality of public opinion: 
that it had been drained of its capacity for moral revulsion 
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and had become much more callous to the brutalities of inter-
national violence in a total war which justified the atomic 
attacks upon Hiroshima and Nagasaki . "The absence of moral 
revulsion is one of the dominant characteristics of our day."3 
Braden testifies to the international consequences of what he 
regards as the dulling of moral sensitivity among church lead-
ers during World War II to the point of justifying the weapons 
of mass destruction. Hiroshima was 11 a great shock to the 
people of India," but 
1. Harold D. Lasswell, "World Organization and Society," in 
Lerner and Lasswell, p. 111. 
2. The wartime ac t ivity of the ecumenical movement is discussed 
in Chapter VIII, Section 3. 
3. Lasswell, •tworld Organization and Society, 11 p. 111. 
' 
even more shocking was the rationalization of its 
use by the Bishops and religious leaders of the 
West--not all of them , of course, for there were 
exceptions •••• It seemed the ultimate in the 
repudiation of the principles of the Christian 
faith and did irreparable harm to that faith in 
India . It appeared to millions, particularly of 
the followers of Gandhi , as something monstrous in 
the extreme . l 
The people of India asked themselves : "If Christianity can 
justify this , what may it not justify?"2 
If Americans tended to justify the atomic bomb as saving 
lives and shortening the war , they had earlier expressed a-
cute horror at German use of V- 1 and V- 2 rockets . 3 This sug-
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gests that nmoralism" was far from absent during World War II, 
as the drive for "unconditional surrendern also indicates . 
The qualities of sentimental enthusiasm and uncritical patriot -
ism were expressed by some religious leaders as well as polit-
ical leaders . A popular song early in the war was "Praise the 
Lord and Pass the Ammunition . " President Roosevelt invoked 
the sanctions of Almighty God at each crucial stage of milit-
ary action and led the nation in prayers for victory . The 
myth of the national mission was given expression in Roose-
velt ' s Fourth Inaugural Address , January 20, 1945: 
The Almighty God has blessed our land in many ways . 
He has given our people stout hearts and strong 
1 . Charles Samuel Braden , War , Communism, and World Re ligions 
(New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1953) , p . 129 . 
2 • Ibid • , p • 2 54. 
3 . Hill , International Relations , p . 482 . 
arms with which to strike mighty blows for freedom 
and truth. He has given to our country a faith 
which has become the hope of all peoples in our 
anguished world.l 
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For most Americans, reli gion was profoundly identified with 
the punishment of Axis a ggression and the vindication of demo-
cratic government . That there was less moral fervor in the 
public and more discriminating judgment by some religious lead-
ers cannot efface the fact of the general support of the 
churches for the war . The retreat from pacifism and the sane-
tioning of war in 1940 and 1941 manifested the pervasive in-
volvement of American religion in the society of which it is 
a part and the identification of religious leaders with the 
mission of America, in the circumstances of both peace and 
war . 
iii. Ideological Polarization in the Cold War 
The ideological character of twentieth century conflict 
is demonstrated not only in vio l ent warfare but also in con-
tinuing hostility among nations threatened with the possibility 
of violent conflict . After a brief lapse to ttnormalcy" in 
1945-47, mass opinion in the United States retrieved much of 
the moral zeal for intervention with which it greeted the 
First World War. If the American public , in an isolationist 
mood, had been slow to r espond to the ideological challenge of 
1. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, My Friends: Twenty-eight History 
Makinr Speeches, edited by Edward H. Kavinoky and Julian 
ParkBuffalo: Foster and Stewart Publishing Corp., 1945), 
p. 151. 
' \ 
Nazism and Fascism in the 1930's and had condu ct ed World 
War II with somewhat ambiguous sentiments, it reverted to 
a crusading ardor when the Communist chal l enge became more 
acute in the late 1940's . In this renewed ideological in-
tensity, the Puritan ethos was stimulated to a new zest for 
action . If the Democratic Party and Woodrow Wilson had pro-
vided the political vehicle for the earlier crusade, the 
Republican Party and John Foster Dulles provided much of the 
moral indignation which fuelled the American response to the 
Cold War . 
Charles A. Eaton, former Baptist clergyman who had re-
sponded with enthusiasm to the crusade of 1917, and chairman 
of the House Committee on Foreign Aff airs in the Republican 
Eightieth Congress, declared in 1947: 
Americans are such good people that they are slow 
to recognize wickedness •••• Compromise with 
Russia seems impossible •• • • Th ey have no morals 
and no religion •••• Russians are Slavs, which 
means captives or slaves •••• But we still have 
the atomic bomb •••• Once kicked out of decent 
society, Russia must either seek to re gain good 
standing or be di s ciplined by the military action 
of the union of decent nations . l 
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Cardinal Spellman , one of many Catholic leaders who have com-
bined an assertive nationalism with moral fervor in the con-
flict with Communism, preached in New York's St . Patrick's 
Cathedral on February 6, 1949 , on the subject, "Rebellion to 
1 . ''Let's Have a Showdown with Russia,n American Magazine, 
144 (August, 1947 ), p . 21 . 
Tyrants is Obedience to God . " In that sermon, he called for 
a "crusade" against the Communist "crucifixion of humanity" 
and "the followers of Beelzebub, the world's most fiendish , 
ghoulish men of slaughter . "1 Increasingly, the "demonology" 
of Communism played upon both Catholic and Protestant fears . 
By 1950, "fear of the demon Communism" made Senator Joseph 
McCarthy "the most sought-after of all speakers . "2 
Dulles , before he became Secretary of State , perceived 
the excesses to which ideological polarization against Com-
munism might go and the temptations which it might offer to 
the West: 
It would be easy to arouse the so-called 'free 
socie·ties' of the Western 1 Christian 1 ci vilisa-
tion to initiate a great crusade, a holy war. 
Their programme could be expressed in many fine-
sounding slogans, such as the 'smashing of athe-
istic despotism' and the 'removal of the last 
remaining obstacle to indispensable world govern-
ment . ' Such a programme would evoke great en-
thusiasm and many fine sacrificial qualities. 
3 Many would gladly fight and die for such ends . 
The prospect of a prolonged antagonism between the American 
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coalition and the Soviet coalition kept public opinion in the 
United States from reverting to the type of isolationism of 
the inter-war period . Because the American people had re-
sponded to Communism as the greatest ideological threat to 
1 . Quoted in Ibid ., p . 286 . 
2. William Lee IVIiller , "A Theologically Biased View of Prot-
estant Politics," Religion in Life, 21 (Winter 1951-52), 
pp . 62-3. 
3. "The Christian Citizen in a Changing World," p . 112. 
~3 
I 
their "national religion'' in all of their history, it was 
Schuman's judgment in 1952 that "another and more probable 
course is the final unleashing by America, impatient of end-
less irritation and sacrifice, of a Holy War or Crusade to 
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destroy the barbarian empire in a frenzy of heroic ~essianism 
and establish by conquest an American world government . "1 
The possibility of such a response suggests that the 
psychological qualities underlying this renewal of moral f er-
vor reflected more complex developments than the transfer of 
enthusiastic optimism which marked American entrance into 
World War I . Years of war, depression, and war again--an 
almost uninterrupted preoccupation with national crisis--
had intervened . The Communist challenge , more than any of 
these , seemed to threaten national survival both physically 
and morally . Notwithstanding Stouffer's studies in 1954 
which indicated a primary orientation of the American public 
to family concerns and material values and only a secondary 
orientation to international affairs and the Communist threat, 
the identification of religious values with the Communist 
threat was significant . 2 Inasmuch as Stouffer was not able 
to compare 1954 with previous periods in American diplomatic 
history, it is not possible to use his data for the making of 
valid relative judgments about the intensity of mass moods . 
1 . Schuman , pp . 226- 7. 
2. See p . 84 above . 
While the hierarchy of values in the live s of interviewees 
may not have accorded the Communist threat a controlling 
status, it does not follow that the psychological substratum 
of values--not as open to public opinion studies--was not 
profoundly sensitive to that threat and potentially capable 
of "a frenzy of heroic Messianism." Schuman's description 
of "the American mood of the 1950's, and the public policies 
in which it found expression," is that they were 
less the result of any 'conspiracy' than the prod-
uct of an elemental and widespread irrationality, 
born of deep psychic insecurities. These forces, 
which have destroyed many past civilizations, are 
not explicable in terms of any simple dishonesty, 
insincerity, or villainy any more than are the 
barbarian invasions, the Jehad of Islam, the Cru-
sades, the wars of religion, or the Communist 
program of world religion. The fact remains that 
all such operations set in motion forces and 
pressures that tend to become uncontrollable, ir-
reversible, and irresistible--often eventuating 
in irreparable disaster.l 
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It is possible that the very preoccupation with family security 
noted by Stouffer was more functionally related to these 
forces and pressures than he indicated, even though it was 
not made articulate in terms of international problems . 
Quincy Wright , summarizing clinical studies of emotional bar-
riers to loyalty, reports: "When a person is in a state of 
anxiety, as the world is now, it grows increasingly difficult 
for him to develop loyalties or identifications ••• far 
beyond the usual security-giving things of everyday life. 
1. Schuman, p. 248. 
The anxious person is unlikely to identify himself with man-
kind or world symbols . "1 
The ideological polarization which developed between 
"the Christian West" and "the atheistic Communists" in the 
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years 1945-60 is not adequately to be understood as a conflict 
between two systems which have nothing in common . 2 The ele -
ments of common heritage have , in fact , intensified the con-
flict at many points . As Niebuhr and others have suggested, 
the danger of the Communist threat is not that the Soviets 
are godless but that they , too, have a god (the historical 
dialectic) "who , or which , sanctifies their aspiration and 
their power as identical with the ultimate purposes of life . n3 
It is precisely the religious zeal of the Communists which 
poses their most formidable challenge to 11 the national reli -
gion" of Americans . The Communists have themselves cl...Umed 
to be the "true champions 11 of the values which have been 
nurtured by Christian democratic society: freedom, justice, 
humanity . "Marxism is not an infidel creed denying the valid-
ity of the Judea-Christian-Western ethic . I t is a heresy 
1 . The World Community (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1948 ) , p . 236 . 
2 . The development of an international ethos in which Ameri -
cans and Russians, beneath the ideological struggle, have 
been acquiring a fund of common values is discussed below, 
pp . 380- 3 . 
3 . Niebuhr, The Irony of American History, p . 173 . 
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claiming new insights into its fulfillment . 111 If the Puri-
tan ethos has contributed a Messianic nationalism-interna-
tionalism to the American character, it confronts the same 
qualities in its most conspicuous antagonist . Communism is 
a compound of "Messianism and a lust for power . The lVlessian-
ism is a corrupt expression of man's search for the ultimate 
within the vicissitudes and hazards of time . "2 
The ideological intensity of the American- Russian con-
flict was personally dramatized in the pol icies and the lan-
guage of John Foster Dulles after 1952 . In the Republican 
platform of that year , he had called for a new policy of 
"liberation" to 
mark the end of the negative, futile, and immoral 
policy of 'containment ' which abandons countless 
human beings to a despotism and Godless terr orism 
which in turn enables the rulers to forge the cap-
tives into a weapon for our destruction •••• The 
policies we espouse will revive t he contagious, 
liberating influences which are inherent in freedom . 
They will i nevitably set up strains and stresses 
within the captive world which will make the rul ers 
i mpotent to continue in their monstrous ways and 
mark the beginning of their end . Our nation will 
again become the dynamic , moral, and spiritual 
force which was the despair of despots and the hope 
of the oppressed . 3 
The author of the "containment" policy, George Kennan , had 
been generally regarded as the nation's foremost Russian 
1 . Morray , p . 67 . 
2 . Niebuhr , The Irony of American History, p . 85 . 
3 . Quoted by Beal , p. 313 . 
187 
expert when Dulles became Secretary of State.1 In early 1953, 
Kennan, a Foreign Service career officer, . was in Washington 
awaiting reassignment after having been recalled from his 
ambassadorship to Moscow at Russian insistence. Dulles, by 
not arranging for Kennan's reassignment, secured his auto-
matic retirement. In this connection, it is important to re-
call that Kennan had also by 1953 become the most persistent 
professional critic of the influences of "moralism" upon 
American diplomacy; that he was temperamentally at odds with 
the Puritan zeal which Dulles so clearly manifested; that 
Dulles regarded Kennan as a political liability to the new 
administration; and that, more recently, Kennan has articulated 
a proposal for a policy of "disengagement" of American and 
Soviet spheres of influence, the polar opposite of Dullesian 
11 liberation. 112 
The Calvinist zest for action with which Dulles and other 
policy-makers have prosecuted the ideological struggle against 
the Communists is partly a cause and partly a consequence of 
the zest of the Communists themselves. Butterfield makes the 
parallel explicit: nif Communism is revolutionary, it hardly 
1. The policy of "containment" was first disclosed by Kennan 
in the heralded "Mr. X" article, "Sources of Soviet Con-
duct," Foreign Affairs, 25 (July, 1947), pp. 566- 82. 
2. The circumstances of Kennan's "retirement" are discussed 
in Beal , pp. 144-5. The proposal for "disengagement" was 
advanced in Kennan 's Rei th Lectures, published as Russia 
the Atom, and the West (New York: Harper and Brothers ___ , 
1958). President Kennedy restored Kennan to active s~r­
vice as Ambassador to Yugoslavia in February , 1961. In 
Senate hearings on the appointment, Kennan reported that 
advances in military technology had rendered a policy of 
"disengagement" obsolete. 
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exceeds sixteenth-century Calvinism in its energy as a mili-
tant, missionary, expanding creed. As the headquarters of 
international revolution, the Geneva of Calvin presents im-
portant features which make it a remarkable anticipation of 
modern times. 111 
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This parallel intensity of the ideological conflict during 
the 1950's has been observed with an acute sense of danger by 
Butterfield and others . One aspect of that danger is seen as 
the inability to analyze Communism itself with rational clar-
ity . It was this same quality of intensity which had pro-
duced the Wars of Religion: "It cannot be questioned that a 
danger comraon to the sixteenth and twentieth centuries is the 
fallacy of myth-making--englobing the enemy system in fog 
and legend, and turning it into a spectral giant, instead of 
analyzing it into its parts. 112 
A second danger is that the negative intensity of the 
conflict tends to drain the American ideology of its own posi-
tive content by justifying the broadest possible variety of 
participation. There is a disposition to enlist every non-
Communist nation, whatever its ideology, in the struggle of 
the so-called nFree World" against "atheistic Communism . " 
The myth that unites the collaborators is sub-
stantially the same as that in whose name the late 
Caesars of the Triplice sought to conquer the 
1 . Christianity, Diplomacy, and lfar, p. 104. 
2. Ibid., p. 106. 
world : anti-Communism. • • • The myth of the Pax 
Americana has no positive content . Its negativism 
rallies to its support all who feel threatened by 
Communism or by other movements challenging the 
established order: liberals, conservatives, and 
reactionaries; democrats, clericalists , and feudal -
ists; capitalists, colonialists, and potentially 
everyone who enjoys freedom and anyone who enjoys 
privilege and power . l 
Implicit in this negativism is the unwit~ing provision to the 
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Communist nations of their most formidable strategic advantage 
in the ideological conflict : the moral initiative . 11 The 
chief danger of a policy which makes Communism the primary 
enemy is the fact that one is easily seduced into thinking that 
it is sufficient to hold the status quo against revolution or 
social change , and against the missionary zeal of i mpatient 
reformers . 112 It is John Bennett ' s thesis tha t the rise and 
expansion of Communism is largely due to "the failure of Chris-
t i an s to be true to the revolutionary i mplications of their own 
faith . 11 3 The American people , with a heritage of a revolution-
ary faith and a revolutionary political s ystem, become vulner-
able to the zeal of their crusade against Communism to the 
extent that that crusade jettisons the genius of both their 
religion and their politics . "We are doing what the Russians 
want us to do when we make our diplomacy ideological; for where 
the appeal is to mass opinion the defenders of the status quo 
1 . Schuman, pp . 221- 2 . 
2 . Butterfield , International Conflict , p . 37 . 
3. Christianity and Communism (New York: Association Press , 
1949) , p . 9 . 
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are under a handicap . "l The Russian charge s of "imperialism" 
in the alliance patterns of the United States put her "in the 
happy position that the democracies once held, for the path 
of virtue happens to coincide with that of her own self-inter-
est . 112 
Yet another consequence of the intensity of the crusade 
against Communism is to distract attention from domestic prob-
lems which have international ramifications and from the 
sources of strength in the American character which can be 
employed to meet those problems. The uncritical identification 
of some religious leaders with the crusade provides powerful 
sanctions for policies which reflect "the common disposition 
of men and states alike ••• to identify the difficulties 
and dangers that beset them with external evils . "3 Louis 
Halle , writing as more of a "realist" than an "idealist," 
proposes a renewal of the positive vitality of the American 
ideology: 
If our own civilization remained in full posses-
sion of the vision on which it depends the ideol -
ogical challenge of communism would be quixotic . 
It could not endanger us any more than termites 
can endanger living wood . The danger to our 
civilization today comes from within, from the 
weakening of its vision, and the challenge of 
1. Butterfield, Christianity, Diplomacy, and War, p . 123. 
2. Butterfield, Internat ional Conflict , p . 30. 
3. Louis J . Halle, Civilization and Foreign Poli~y (New York : 
Harper and Brothers , 19;5), p . 1~-
.. 
world communism, although so conspicuous, is 
an incident that has significance in proportion 
to the weakness that it confronts.l 
The ultimate threats of the ideological conflict are 
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t hose which the foreign policy consensus has recognized: the 
triumph of Communism and the annihilation of the United States 
through nuclear violence. That violent conflict might leave 
some survivors is not regarded by Butterfield as an encourag-
ing prospect, for 
if we are to judge by the two world wars of the 
twentieth century, a crusade against communism would 
be the surest way of establishing that very s ystem 
over vast new areas of the world. It is not, then, 
a 1war for righteousness' against communism ••• 
that the present situation can ever call for; and 
we must feel half- afraid lest our American associ-
ates shou~d be unimaginative in their self-right-
eousness. 
These critics of the ideological intensity and the re-
ligious zeal of the American crusade against Communism pose 
an unprecedented problem for United States foreign policy: 
how to revitalize a sense of national purpose at the same 
time that new restraints upon moral fervor are to be developed. 
In the years of America's most massive power , to which it has 
risen through the energies of a Puritan ethos, it finds it-
self confronted by the external threat of a rival which has 
developed a Puritanical zeal and moral fervor of its own. 
11 By making consistent use of methods that were developed in 
1. Ibid., p. 168. 
2. Butterfield, Christianity , Diplomacy , and War, p. 122. 
the West--by turning the weapons of democracy a gainst democ-
racy itself--the Communists have brought to a climax the use 
of moral indi gnation as a weapon of power politics ."1 In 
these same years , the ne gative qualities of the conflict con-
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fronted the United States with an internal threat more serious 
than Communist subversion: the danger of ideological exhaustion. 
As Butterfield sees it, 
the greatest menace to our civilization today 
is the conflict between giant organized systems 
of self-righteousness--each system only too de-
lighted to find that the other is wicked-- each 
onl y too glad that the sins give it the pretext 
for still deeper hatred and animosity. The 
eff ect of the whole situation is barbarizing , 
since both sides take the wickedness of the other 
as the pretext for insults, atrocities , and 
loathing ; and each side feels that its own severi-
ties are not vicious at all, but simply ~unitive 
acts and laudable measures of judgement. 
3. Intranational Conflict 
Generalizations about religious sanctions upon foreign 
policy must be qua lified by data which demonstrate the differ-
ential influences of the various religious groups within the 
nation. The organized efforts of those groups , political 
party loyalties, and the propaganda of interreligious conflict 
all manifest the significance of these differences. 
i. Justification of conflicting patriotisms 
Among the non-doctrinal factors accounting for religious 
differences in the United States are the national origins of 
1. Butterfield , International Conflict, pp. 23-4. 
2. Christianity, Diplomacy, and War, p . 43. 
~ 
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the denominations and the dispersion of those denominations 
in various nations. H. Richard Niebuhr's study of these 
factors emphasizes both the special influences of the nation-
al churches which emerged from the Reformation and those 
churches of later development which were more peculiarly 
shaped by the circumstances of American sectionalism and the 
frontier. Of the former, Niebuhr observed: "The churches 
became nations at prayer, but even in prayer Christians found 
it difficult to transcend the limitations of national con-
sciousness."1 For many Americans, national loyalty has not 
been unambiguous: it has been subject to continuing conflict 
wi th the lingering patriotism of the lands of origin . Churches 
have frequently brought influences to bear upon American for-
eign policy which have provided conflicting sanctions for alter-
native patriotic sentiments . Differences among the Protestant 
denominations and among Protestant, Catholic , and Jewish groups 
are partly to be explained in these terms . A quotation attrib-
uted to Dean William R. Inge sugges ts the way in which reli-
gious conflict may be a mask for nationalistic conflict: "It 
is impossible to converse long with a Catholic without being 
conscious of an insurmountable barrier; and if we consider 
what this barrier is, we find that we cannot confidently ap-
peal to those instincts and moral traditions which are the 
common heritage of all English people . "2 
1 . The Social Sources of Denominationalism (New York : Henry 
Holt and Company, 1929), p . 133 . 
2 . Baron , p. 269. 
1'1. 
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Notwithstanding the moral fervor which the churches 
finally carried into World War I , they were significantly di -
vided in their sentiments in the period between 1914 and 1917 . 
Denominations with British origins moved toward favoring u.s . 
entrance into the war before 1917 . On the other hand , groups 
with German origins such as the Lutherans showed marked German 
sympathies . Catholics , under their predominantly Irish hier-
archy , were not anxious to support Britain . One of the results 
of the actual declaration of war was to bring from many German-
Americans and Irish- Americans a conspicuous patriotism which 
may apparently be explained as a defensive compensation for 
the extra suspicion with which they were regarded by other 
Ameri cans . 
Catholic priests and editors supported Irish freedom 
with incomparable fervor in the United States until that cause 
was won in 1921 . Where Catholic nationalism ended and Catho-
lie conviction began is impossible to determine with accuracy . 
Opposition to England had been registered by Catholics in 
1897 during the Senate debate over the Anglo - American treaty 
of arbitration of that year , and the treaty was defeated . 
"Home Rule for Ireland" was repeatedly promised by Democratic 
platforms in the early twentieth century . Resolutions sup-
porting Irish independence were annually introduced by Catho-
lics in Congress . The United States Senate , on March 11 , 1920 , 
finally ratified the Treaty of Versailles only after agreement 
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was reached that Irish freedom must be supported and Ireland's 
admission to the League of Nations guaranteed--even if the 
United States itself should not be prepared to join the 
League!l Thus Catholicism provided a powerful sanction for 
Irish nationalism at home and abroad . 
During the 1930's, American Jews were predominantly in-
ternationalist while Prote stants and Catholics, for somewhat 
different reasons, tended toward isolationism. Jews had sup-
ported the League of Nations because the League had seemed to 
promise security and the possibility of a Jewish homeland. 
While some Jews were pacifists , there was inc r easing interven-
tionist sentiment after the rise of Nazism and support for 
"anyone who would oppose Hitlerism. 11 2 Protes tantism was more 
widely influenced by pacifist and isolationist sentiment which 
did not weaken significantly until the Japanese assault upon 
China, which aroused sympathies associated with the mission-
ary movement. Reinhold Niebuhr, through his i nfluential peri-
odical Christianity and Crisis, swayed some Protestant leaders 
in the direction of intervention . By 1940, denominational 
statements became increasingly ambiguous in their support of 
11peace. 11 However, the widely read liberal pacifist Christian 
Century supported Wendell Willkie, prompted by opposition to 
Roosevelt's foreign policy and still hoping for intervention. 
1. Anson Phelps Stokes, Church and State in the United States 
(3 vols., New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), II, 414-
21. 
2. Fensterwald, p. 136. 
The effect of Pearl Harbor was to crystallize moral indigna-
tion and sweep even The Christian Century into the support 
of the war. 
The response of Catholics to the events of the thirties 
was subject to severe contradictions and strains. To some 
extent, this reflected the dilemmas of the Vatican in trying 
to maintain a position of non-antagonism with regard to Fas-
cism and Nazism. Also involved was the crusade of the Vati-
can against world Communism, a consequence of which was that 
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American Catholics were clearly more anti-Communist than anti-
Nazi, and therefore tended to be identified with isolationism 
through 1940 . Moreover, there had been sympathy with Franco 
in the Spanish War and adamant opposition to American aid to 
the Republican government in Spain . But the negotiations of 
the Vatican and Catholic interests abroad were strongly rein-
forced by the national origins of American Catholics who were 
ttviolently opposedn to American sanctions against Italy when 
Ethiopia was invaded in 1935. unespite a few dissident voices, 
the Catholic church in America as a who l e was doggedly anti-
interventionist in the period 1939-41 [ and] in the front ranks 
of the 1 isolationists.•"l The Hitler-Stalin pact somewhat 
simplified the problem of Catholic opinion for a few months, 
and the wide publicity given to Nazi persecution of Pol ish 
priests stimulated impulses toward intervention. Pressing 
1. Ibid. 
against such impulses were not only identification with 
Catholic Italy, Hitler 's ally, but the closest of ties to 
Catholic Ireland, which continued to call forth anti-British 
sentiment. These counter-tendencies were bolstered signifi-
cantly, leading to a resurgence of isolationism, when Italy 
actually entered the war and when the Soviet Union suddenly 
became the ally of Britain. Finally, however , it was the 
continuing church-state controversy in Germany and Hitler 's 
unwillingness to negotiate with the Vatican that began to 
crystallize Catholic opposition to Germany . While only some 
of the most liberal Catholics deserted isolationism before 
1941, Pearl Harbor evoked from the hierarchy a 11 just war" 
proclamation and Catholicism rallied to a full support of 
American policy. 1 
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At the end of the war , Protestant and Jewish enthusiasm 
for the United Nations and concomitant hopes for continuing 
Soviet - American cooperation were challenged by Catholic re-
action to the Crimean Charter signed at Yalta . The most bit-
ter denunciation was expressed by Catholic groups of Polish 
origin. The Yalta Conference was criticized for its decision 
with regard to the Curzon Line which returned pre-1919 Russians 
to the Soviet Union, thereby lopping off about one-third of 
pre-1939 Poland . Congressmen O'Konski (Wis.) and Lesinski 
{Mich.) assailed "the crime of Crimea" as "a stab in the back," 
1. Yinger, Religion in the Struggle for Power, pp . 189-97. 
a "second Munich111--and such phrases were to become common 
currency in subsequent foreign policy debates, notably in 
the speeches of Senator Joseph McCarthy , who won a wide fol-
lowing among Catholics of Polish origin in Wisconsin and 
other states . With the rise of McCarthyism, many Protestant 
and Jewish leaders who gave strong support to such groups as 
the American Civil Liberties Union and were critical of the 
loyalty-security policie s of the government found themselves 
arrayed against militant spokesmen for the Catholic Church. 
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The attitudes of American Catholicism during the Spanish 
Civil War and in reaction to Yalta , the Korean Nar, and pro -
posed negotiations with or visits by Communist leaders have 
been both stimulated and reinforced by . the all-out campaign 
of the Vatican against Communism . It is Lubell's observation 
that events abroad 
have operated to quicken the militancy of Catholic 
leaders . The fact that Soviet Russia has become 
the world's number one menace is unquestionably 
a powerful spiritual asset to the Church . The 
Church hierarchy has clearly interpreted the pres -
ent .world crisis as a challenge to reaffirm the 
all - pervasive character of the moral doctrines of 
the Church and to establish Catholicism as the ir-
reconcilable 'we or they' antagonist of 'atheistic 
communism'--a militancy which has disturbed many 
non- Catholic religious leaders.2 
l . Thomas A. Bailey, A Di lomatic Histor of the American 
People (New York : Apple ton-Century- Crofts, Inc ., 19 0 
p . 818 . 
2 . Samuel Lubell , The Future of American Politics (Garden 
City , N.Y. : Doubleday and Company, 1956) , p . 238. 
Lubell's analyses of American political behavior are notable 
for their attention to the qualifying impact of religious 
199 
and ethnic factors upon economic and other more commonly per-
ceived determinants. With regard to Catholic-Protestant re-
lations in American politics, he indicates that Catholic in-
tensity in the ideological struggle since 1945 is a function 
of ove~compensation for inferior social and economic status 
associated with late immigration. The anti-Communist issue 
"is almost the first political cause which has given Catholics 
generally the chance to feel more American than other Ameri-
cans."1 In this over-compensation, Catholic leadership has 
seized much of the initiative in the ideological conflict 
between the Uni ted States and the Soviet Union and has become, 
in effect, more Puritanical in zeal and moralism than Prot -
estant leadership. Helping to fuel this conspicuous patriot-
ism, however, is the continuing identification of millions of 
American Catholics with other countries which have come under 
Communist control. 
Not only have Protestant relationships with Catholics 
in foreign policy matters been affected by conflicting patri-
otism; Protestant-Jewish relationships since 1945 have been 
similarly affected . The partition of Palestine and the recog-
nition of Israel were developments profoundly influencing, 
and influenced by, both religious and political sympathies. 
1. Samuel Lubell, Revolt of the Moderates (New York: Harper 
and Brothers , 1956), p. 82. 
The American Jewish community itself has been divided with 
regard to the Zionist movement and the creation of a modern 
Israel. Reformed Judaism was long opposed to Zionism and 
the American Council for Judaism was organized in protest 
against the movement. Nazi persecution, including the ex-
termination of more than 5,000 , 000 Jews, aroused more sup-
port for Zionism, as well as the sympathies of Protestants 
and Catholics. Underlying the latter, however, was the un-
willingness of American opinion to consent to the admission 
of large numbers of Jewish refugees to the United States 
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during and after the War , even on a temporary basis; it was 
argued that they would "aggravate problems of unemployment, 
housing, and public support . Let Canada or Australia or 
South America shoulder the burden . 111 Canada, Australia, and 
South America were just as unwilling to provide for the re-
settlement of Jews as was the United States. The combined 
effect of persecution and rejection was to solidify Jewish 
support for Zionism at the end of World War II. In November, 
1945, the Roper Poll reported that 80 .1% of American Jews 
favored Zionism; only 10 . 5% were opposed . 2 
The 1948 election directed the attention of political 
leaders to the power of religion at the voting-booths when it 
1 . Bailey, The Man in the Street, pp. 192-3, discusses what 
he calls the American trait of "wavering between a humani-
tarian impulse to be helpful and a hardheaded instinct to 
count the cost." This trait of dualism has been conspicuous 
in both religious and political discussion of motives for 
foreign aid. 
2. Baron, p . 239. 
is identified with foreign policy matters . Bailey's charac-
terization of the competition for Jewish support prior to 
that election is that 
if the Arabs had the oil, which was far away, 
the American Jews had the vote , which was near 
at hand, and the latter might, especially in 
New York , turn the forthcoming election against 
Harry s . Truman . With an obvious play for votes , 
but much to the annoyance of the British, both 
President Truman and his prospective opponent , 
Governor Thomas E . Dewey of New York, urged 
Britain in 1946 to admit a minimum of 100,000 
Jews to Palestine . l 
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Although partition was opposed by experts in the State Depart-
ment , Truman, with what was criticized as "more regard for 
Jewish votes than for American strategic interests, used the 
enormous influence of the United States to force partition 
through the United Nations." Continued Arab opposition to 
partition led Truman to propose a temporary trusteeship for 
Palestine, which proposal was promptly greeted as an effort 
"to sacrifice Jews on the altar of oil-imperialism." When 
the Jews proceeded to proclaim the new state of Israel, 
Truman hastily extended recognition and a nation was born 
"under circumstances as fantastic as the Arabian nights, which 
seemed destined to take the place of Ireland as the leading 
object of American hyphenate concern. 112 And so religion once 
again provided a formidable sanction of nationalism which had 
important consequences for policy decisions . 
l. Bailey , A Diplomatic Hist ory, p . 874 . 
2 • . Ibid • , p • 8 7 5 • 
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Bailey's judgment as to the motives of Truman and Dewey 
must be tempered with the recognition that opinion studies at 
the time indicated a strong disposition to favor partition 
and to admit large numbers of Jews to Palestine--which was 
coupled with heavy opposition to sending American troops t o 
the defense of Jews abroad , or t o admitting Jews in large 
number to the United States . l It would be a serious distor-
tion of the pattern of pressure to claim that only Jews were 
agitating for the support of Zionism . Protestant churches , 
moved by appeals for "brotherhood" with Jews , were active in 
championing the cause . There was also a pmverful emotional 
identification with the Holy Land for both Protestants and 
Catholics . Several organizations , of which the American 
Christian Palestine Committee was most conspicuous , lobbied 
for a Jewish commonwealth . The Committee had 20 , 000 members 
by 1948 , its leaders including Senators Brewster and Mead , 
Dean Howard M. LeSourd, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Helen Gahagan 
Douglas . 2 Thus , while Truman may have been tempted by the 
prospect of Jewish votes (his policies actually lost Jewish 
support in the 1948 election) , he could maneuver with the 
general support of organized religion and other interests . 
1 . Ibid . , 874n . 
Had religion differed more sharply on the issue, his conduct 
might have altered accordingly. 1 
203 
These instances of decision-making which bring to a focus 
the sanctions of religion for conflicting national identifica-
tions within the American public demonstrate two themes of re-
ligious influence upon foreign policy: (1) religion's involve-
ment in national and other social forces may so divide and 
scatter its influence that no group is able to realize its 
policy goals ; but (2) under given circumstances, especially 
when religious loyalties are directly involved and are gen-
erally undivided among themselves, religion may provide the 
most significant influence in the making of major decisions. 
ii. Religious Affiliation and party affiliation 
In some countries, the political power of organized reli-
gion is directly expressed through parties affiliated with 
religious groups . This is conspicuously the case in the 
1. President Truman's mixed emotions over this affair are re-
vealed in his memoirs : 11The Jewish pressure on the White 
House did not diminish in the days following the partition 
vote in the U.N. Individuals and groups asked me , usually 
in rather quarrelsome and emotional ways, to stop the Arabs , 
to keep the British from supporting the Arabs, to furnish 
American soldiers, to do this, that, and the other. I 
think I can say that I kept my faith in the rightness of 
my policy in spite of some of the Jews. When I say 'the 
Jews} I mean, of course, the extreme Zionists . I know that 
most Americans of Jewish faith, while they hoped for the 
restoration of a Jewish homeland, are and always have been 
Americans first and foremost ." Memoirs by Harry s. Truman 
(2 vols., Garden City , N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., Inc ., 1956), 
II, 160. 
q. 
Catholic and Protestant parties of western Europe and in 
some of the most intensely nationalist parties in Asia. In 
the United States, however, there is no party organized 
around a particular denomination. Adherents of all faiths 
are distributed in both major parties. It is Bone 's judg-
ment that 11 any attempt on the part of a church to organize 
a party on a local or national scale would meet with general 
public disapprov~l. 111 Moreover, such disapproval tends to 
greet informal attempts to identify a religious group , or 
religion generally , with one party . Reinhold Niebuhr and 
a committee of one hundred clergymen charged the Republicans 
in 1956 with attempting to claim the identification of reli-
gion with its campaign for President Eisenhower . In 1960, 
the Catholic affiliation of Senator John F . Kennedy brought 
statements from leaders of all faiths that religion should 
not be the criterion for partisan voting. 
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These efforts to separate religious and political affili-
ation in the United States raise t he empirical question as to 
whether religion is actually an irrelevant factor in party 
differences, particularly insofar as those differences bear 
upon foreign policy. Recent studies by Samuel Lubell , 
Lawrence Fuchs , George Horsley Smith, and George Gallup sug-
gest that this is definitely not the case . In fact, it ap-
pears that political choice is more directly responsive to 
1 . Hugh A. Bone, American Politics and the Party S~stem, 2nd 
edition (New York·. McGraw- H1"ll Book Company 19 3) 284 , , p. • 
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religious factors in foreign policy issues than in any other 
set of secular issues. 
In domestic matters, particularly those involving social 
and economic policy, it has been impressively demonstrated 
that political differences among the denominations primarily 
reflect socio-economic stratification. The differences are 
real enough statistically: Congregationalists, Presbyterians, 
and Ep iscopalians are significantly correlated with conserva-
tism and the Republican Party, while Baptists, Catholics, and 
Jews tend toward liberalism and the Democratic Party . But 
the Allinsmiths , analyzing election returns for 1948, have 
shown how consistently these differences are related to the 
status-structure of American society. Methodists and Luther-
ans, largely middle class denominations halfway up the status-
ladder, are also midway between conservatism and liberalism, 
which reflect respective tendencies toward high and low 
status. 1 The conclusion of this analysis is that marked polit-
ical differences between religious groups are not primarily 
due to reli gious affiliation as such. Religious affiliation 
is "a latent cross-pressure'' exerting only minor influence 
nationally--yet remaining a factor of potential significance, 
especially for Roman Catholics . The Allinsmith 's analysis 
has to reckon with the fact that Jews are a conspicuous 
1 . Wesley Allinsmith and Beverly Allinsmith , "Religious Affili -
ation and Politico- Ec onomic Attitude: A Study of Eight 
Major u.s . Rel i gious Groups , " Public Opinion Quarterly, 12 
(Fall 1948), p . 386. 
exception to this rule, exhibiting little correlation between 
status and their consistent liberalism. "For Jewish people 
the cross - pressure of identification with other Jewish peo-
ple seems to outweigh economic interest . For Christian 
groups such a powerful cross - pressure appears to be lacking 
and economic interest is the basis for common viewpoints . 111 
For purposes of the dissertation , however , it is impor-
tant to note that the Allinsmiths 1 study was bas ed upon at -
titudes and voting with regard to domestic social and econom-
ic issues . The impact of religious differences in foreign 
policy matters must also be investigated . George Horsley 
Smith has made a fundamental distinction between "economic 
liberalism" and "non- economic liberalism, " the latter dealing 
with such "interclass values" as civil liberties and interna-
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tionalism . In his studies of foreign policy attitudes in 1948, 
Smith found no positive correlation between these two forms of 
liberalism among religious groups . In fact , there was a marked 
tendency for high- status religious groups , in spite of their 
e conomic conservatism, to be more internationalist than other 
groups . Congregationalists , Episcopalians , and Presbyterians 
were most internationalist among Protestants , followed by 
Methodists and Lutherans , and, finally , by Baptists . 2 An 
earlier study of American opinion toward the Soviet Union 
l . Ibid., p . 388 . 
2 . "Liberalism and Level of Information," Journal of Educational 
Psychology, 39 (February 1948), p . 65. 
reported that Catholics were most anti-Russian , Protestants 
modera t ely anti - Russian , and Jews most pro- Russian . l 
The Allinsmiths 1 qualification concerning Catholics and 
their exception concerning Jews are both significant . 
Lubell's analyses have given them greater force by stressing 
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differential sensitivity to f oreign policy issues among Cath-
olics and Jews , on the basis of presidential elections in 1936 
and after . In fact, Lubell downgrades the importance of 
sectional and economic factors in his assessment of isolation-
ism, maintaining that religious or ethnic factors have been 
more basic in many instances . Before 1936 , there had actually 
been a high correlation between Progressives and isolationists, 
which fact is often obscured by the later identification of 
internationalism under Roosevelt with the domestic New Deal . 
The effect of Father Coughlin's Union Party in 1936, with 
William ("Liberty Bell") Lemke as its presidential candidate , 
was to split the leftist - isolationist alliance in the iidwest . 
Lemke polled his heaviest support in the strong Catholic wards 
of Boston, Cincinnati , Dubuque , and St . Paul . Thus scattered 
across sectional boundaries and drawn "primarily from Irish 
and German Catholics , Lemke's following represented the most 
belligerently isolationist voters in the country . 112 
1 . "Attitudes toward Soviet Russia: II . Beliefs , Values , and 
Other Characteristics of Pro - Russian and Anti-Russian 
Groups , " The Journal of Social Psychology , 23 (February 
1946) , p . 32 . 
2 . Lubell , The Future of American Politics , p . 152 . 
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The contrast between Catholic and Jewish response to 
some foreign policy issues, measured by their voting behavior, 
is a sharp one: 
The pattern of attraction and counterattraction 
is unmistakable. As the Coughlinites forsook the 
Democratic party in 1936, the Jews came in. As 
Wallace pulled an appreciable portion of the Jews 
out of the Democratic party [1948], the Coughlin-
ites and Christian Fronters returned to the Demo-
cratic fold. Truman's heaviest gains came in the 
wards where Lemke polled his highest vote.l 
Still, as Lubell acknowledges, a majority of both Catholics 
and Jews voted Democratic in all four elections from 1936 to 
1948. The shifting votes represent only marginal segments 
of Catholicism and Judaism, but they do indicate the contra-
dictory forces tugg ing upon the two groups . These returns 
do not establish religion as the single determinant of voting 
behavior: they do indicate that the combination of religious 
affiliation and national origin is more influential than 
sectional or economic determinants for some voters in some 
elections. One of the apparent functions of some religious 
groups is to serve as a center of loyalty in which American 
patriotism is conditioned by other patriotisms . 
1. Ibid., p . 226. A more recent study of voting behavior con-
cludes with this summary and prediction: "Experience warrants 
the prophecy that ethnic attitudes toward ••• foreign pol-
icy will be affected by the legacy of the past as it is 
shaped by the present and that the voting returns will con-
tinue to reflect ethnic influences. As the different eth-
nic groups ascend the social and economic ladder, these 
cultural influences assume a different guise, but they per-
sist as shapers of the voting habits of the American 
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While some Irish and German Catholics may have been the 
most susceptible of all Americans to isolationism, there are 
more prevalent counter-tendencies among Catholics generally--
at least , in more recent years--within the Democratic farty . 
A University of Michigan study of the 1952 election found 
that Catholic Democrats supported policies of international 
commitment in larger proportions than did Protestant Demo-
crats . This was not , however , the case with Catholic Repub-
licans. On the issues of foreign policy, religious affili-
ation "appears to have some reinforcing influence on the atti -
tudes of Catholics who voted for the Democratic party, but 
no modifying influence on the attitudes of Catholics who voted 
for the Republican party . '11 
Consistent liberalism, internationalism, and Democratic 
party support have characterized Jewish voters since 1936- -
a pattern which has cut across all lines of status and class . 
Fuchs accounts for this by emphasizing the history of Jews as 
a people without a country: in the twentieth century alone , 
the Dreyfus affair, the pogroms of Eastern Europe, and the 
Nazi persecutions have dramatized this predicament . The 
people . The proposition that the ethnic factor is second 
only to the economic factor in influencing an American ' s 
vote is unlikely to be overthrown i n the near future . " 
Hoses Rischin , ' Our Own Kind ': Votin b Race Creed or 
National Origin Santa Barbara , Cal . : Center for the Study 
of Democratic Institutions , 1960), pp . 37 - 8 . 
1 . Daniel Katz et al . (eds . ), Public Opinion and Propaganda 
(New York: The Dryden Press , 1954), p . 6o6 . 
) 
Jewish response has been to support a strong u.s. foreign 
policy, including the Marshall Plan, Point Four, the United 
Nations with its genocide convention and international bill 
of rights. 1 The emotional attachment of Jews to Roosevelt 
had been particularly revealed in the overwhelming endorse-
ment they gave him in the elections of 1940 and 1944. After 
Roosevelt died, many Jews experienced a political alienation, 
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as the 1948 election returns disclosed. This was the election 
which suddenly found Jews a people with a country and without 
a party! While a majority remained Democra tic and voted for 
Truman, there was a large protest vote for Wallace, prompted 
by Truman's unpopular proposal for a United Nations trustee-
ship over Palestine. Many also turned to Dewey, while yet 
others refused to vote. Lubell tells of a l a rge Jewish fam-
ily in Brooklyn which had voted solidly for F.D.R. in 1940 
(except for one member opposed to a third term "on principle"}, 
but which tallied this way in 1948: Truman (11), Wallace (8}, 
Norman Thomas (1), stayed home (1) . "I r egistered," the last-
mentioned expla ined , "and must have changed my mind half a 
dozen times, but just finally gave up . 112 
In 1952, as both Catholics and Protestant were responsive 
to the Eisenhower "crusade" and to Dulles' anti-Communist for-
eign policy plank, Jews found new reasons for resuming their 
1. Lawrence H. Fuchs, The Political Behavior of American Jews 
(Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1956), p. 172. 
2. Lubell, The Future of American Politics, p. 220. 
211 
strong a ttachment to the Democratic Party . Adlai Stevenson ' s 
defense of civil liberties and his articulate internationalism 
won him 77% of the Jewish vote . During the Eisenhower presi -
dency , an administration closely identified in the vast major-
ity of Protestant minds with the popular religious revival , 
Jewish leaders ·v.rere sharply critical of Republican foreign 
policy . They complained that the administration was willing 
to ship arms to "feudal Arab leaders" but not to Israel, and 
that protests by Senator Ives and New York's Attorney-General 
Jacob Javits (now Senator) , were rebuffed by the State Depart -
ment . More than twenty Zionist rallies were held in October, 
1954, protesting American policy prior to the Congressional 
elections . At a mass "non- partisan" meeting in New York , 
speakers attacked Republican leaders , especially Vice-President 
Nixon, who was alleged to have charged that Zionists had mis -
represented administration Middle East policy . l After return-
ing another 75% support to Stevenson in 1956, Jews expressed 
particular resentment of Secretary Dulles' hmdling of the 
Suez crisis . At the height of Middle East tensions in early 
1957 , Dulles, "obviously concerned over American Zionist 
pressure on the American government , found it necessary to 
invite a group of prominent Jewish leaders of non- Zionist or -
ganizations to ask their help to influence Israel to withdraw 
from Egyptian territory . n2 Dulles' own punitive attitude 
1. Fuchs , p. 117 . 
2 . George L. Anderson , Issues and Conflicts: Studies in 
Twentieth Century American Diplomacy (Lawrence, Kansas: 
On1vers1ty of' Kansas, I959) , p . I9I . 
toward Israel, England , and France confronted in Israel and 
in Jewish-Americans a hostility which combined the fervor of 
religious conflict and national pride . During the 1950's, 
it was apparent that there was an intense identification of 
Protestant moralism wi t h President Eisenhower and Secretary 
of State Dulles and, accordingly, with the Republican Party. 
At the same time, there was a major shift of Catholic loy-
alties from the Democratic to the Republican Party and a 
reverse moMement of Jews back to the Democrat ic ranks . 
The 1960 campaign was dominated by two issues which 
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brought religion and foreign policy together in unprecedented 
combinations of loyalty and conflict: the religious affili-
ation of Senator Kennedy and the preoccupation with American 
prestige in the world . Vice - President Nixon succeeded in 
holding 62% of the Protestant vote (Eisenhower had received 
63% of Protestant votes in both 1952 and 1956) . Kennedy 's 
election, howe ver, was largely attributable to the return of 
Catholic voters to the Democratic Par t y , the disaffection of 
Jews with Nixon and a resulting 81% support for Kennedy , and 
an even higher ratio of support from Negroes . 1 While many 
Protestant voters in the Border States and the Midwest were 
persuaded not to vote for a Catholic candidate, Southern 
Protestants unexpectedly renewed their traditional Democrati c 
1 . George Gallup , "Protestants Voted GOP 62 per cent to 38 
in Election," The Washington Post , December 7, 1960, p . 11 . 
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l oyalties after wide supp or t for Eisenhower in 1952 and 1956 . 
The foreign policy debates provided the unusual spectacle of 
a Catholic candidate preaching the doctrine of the mission 
of America with Puritan zeal ("We must get America moving 
again ! ") , while the Protestant candidate was unavoidably in 
a defensive position which became incr easingly difficult to 
maintain . l Protestant leaders confronted a new administration 
with which , paradoxically , they would have unprecedented diffi -
cul t y in identifying symbolically but wnich promised foreign 
policies more in keeping with their own pronouncements than 
those of the Protestant opposition . 2 
1 . That an Irish Catholic should manifest Protestant traits 
of political behavior may not be difficu lt to explain if 
Roland Bainton is correct in observing that the Irish are 
not "Catholic by nature . They would have made marvelous 
Protestants ; for three centuries they have been protesting 
Catholics . " See 1111-lission in Latin America: I , 11 The 
Christian Century , 78 (January 11 , 1961) , p . 42 .~etho­
dist Senator Karl JVlundt was among those Republicans who 
felt that the Nixon campaign had been waged with "faint 
hearts . " While acknowled#ing that Kennedy had made effec -
tive use of the "prestige issue , Mundt added : "What a 
chance that was for us to talk about Yalta and Potsdam 
and other secret agreements made b~ Democrats ••• but 
we didn ' t do it and we didn ' t win . 1 The "timid" Repub -
lican campaign of 1960 was not fought with "the same evan-
#elistic fervor" which the Party had previously shown . 
1 Says GOP Faint Hearted , 11 The ~ofashington Post , January 11 , 
1961 , p . D- 1 . 
2 . One Prote s tant writer hopefull y regarded Inauguration Day 
1961 as an occasion to "serve symbolically as marking the 
end of Protestantism as a national religion and its advent 
as the distinctive faith of a creative minority . " The 
severing of this cord between Protestant piety and politics 
would involve "a revitalizing realignment of Protestant 
energies . " Martin E . arty , "Protestantism Enters Third 
Phase," The Christian Century , 78 (January 18 , 1961) , pp . 72- 4 . 
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Both the constituency of Congress and legislative voting 
behavior in recent y ears tend to confirm the patterns of rela-
tionship between religious and political affiliation a s they 
have been described above . Congregation alists , Presbyterians , 
Ep iscopalians , and Unitarians h ave had about twice the ir share 
of representation . Me thodists, Lutherans, and Baptists have 
been represented in approximate proportion to their member-
ship . Catholics have been only about one - half to one-third 
represented , Jews one - third to one - sixth . 1 In the 85th Con-
gress , Democrats had a 49 - 47 majority in the Senate, the mar-
gin provided by an 8 - 3 division of Catholic Senators over 
a g ainst a 40- 42 division of Protestants . There were two Jews , 
one in each party . Among Protestants , Methodists led with 18 , 
ll of whom were Republicans ; 6 of the 7 Democrats were from 
Southern states . The sectional differen ces reflect t h e status 
of Prote s tan tism. In the Northeast , 12 of 14 Protest ant 
Senators were Republican ; in the Midwest, 16 of 18 were Repub -
lican; in the South, all 24 were Democra ts. 2 While the 
The logi c of this argument suggest s that only with the 
acceptance of the conditions of confli c t given by a 
pluralistic society in which a non- Protestant may become 
President are the resources inherent in Protestantism 
challeng ed to maximum fulfillment . 
1 . Donald R. Matthews , The Social Background of Political 
Decision- Makers (Garden City , N. Y.: Doubleda y and Company , 
Inc ., 1954) , p . 26 . 
2 . Alan Geyer , Com arative Studies in Reli ious and Poli t ical 
Affiliation in the th Congress Boston: Unpublished 
paper, March , 1957) , p . 2 . 
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Democrats held a 232-201 maj ority in the House of Represent-
atives, they did so by virtue of an 8-0 distribution of Jews 
and a 52-21 distribution of Catholics over a gainst a 156-164 
margin of Republican Protestants. There were more flethodist s 
alone in the House than there were Catholics (as was the case 
in the Senate): 85, of whom 46 were Democrats, all but 10 of 
the latter from the South . In the Northeast , 51 of 57 Protes-
tant Representatives were Republican; in the I idwest, 69 of 
83: in the South, 98 of 106 Protestants were Democrats . 1 
There were more equal distributions in Border states and in 
the Far West for both the Senate and the House. 
The significance of the religious affiliations of Sena-
tors and Representatives is more than statistical as far as 
Protestant influence in foreign policy matters is concerned. 
The preponderance of conservative and nationalist Congressmen 
among Republicans in the Northeast and Midwest and Democrats 
in the South contrasts sharply with the liberal and interna-
tionalist pronouncements of Protestant denominations and the 
National Council of Churches . Ernest Best reports an inter-
view with a Representative in which Best was speaking on be-
half of Protestant support for World Refugee Year: "I was 
silenced by the representative's claim that the g reatest op-
position to increased overseas aid and to i n creased immigra-
tion comes from those areas of the country where Protestant 
1. Ibid., p. 5. 
churches are strongest."l Protestant lobbyists typically 
find more support for their pronouncements from Catholics 
and Jews in Congress than from fellow-Protestants. Jewish 
Senators {Lehman, Neuberger, Javits) and Representatives 
have been conspicuously liberal and internationalist. With 
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some exceptions, Catholics in Congress have been more liberal 
and internationalist than Catholic voters generally. The 
limitations of such generalizations are indicated by a study 
of the 8lst Congress in which it was determined that Method-
ists in the House actually had a higher degree of "voting 
cohesion" than did Catholics . 2 
While there are no apparent denominational blocs on 
Capitol Hill and religious affiliation is an inconspicuous 
factor in most legislative votes, the patterns of affilia-
tion condition the quality of access which Protestant church 
leaders have in the legislative process. They cannot expect 
religious rapport with Catholics and Jews and they often can-
not find political rapport with many Protestants. Moreover, 
these patterns are not easily subject to change. In a survey 
of the 418 changes which occurred in the House of Representa-
tives between January, 1935, and November, 1943, it was found 
that 193 of these involved changes in party, but that only 81 
involved changes in affiliation among major religious groups. 
1 . Ernest E. Best, "Facing Other Faiths," The Christian Cen-
tury, 78 (January 11, 1961), p. 39 . 
2. Matthews, p. 40. 
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In 295 of 376 Congressional contests, Protestants succeeded 
Protestants, Catholics succeeded Catholics , and Jews succeeded 
Jews. Thus, in practically 4 out of 5 changes, a Congressman 
was replaced by a person of the same religious group while , 
in contrast, in only slightly more than half of the changes 
was he replaced by a person of the same political party . The 
statistical evidence is, therefore, that "a candidate's reli-
gious background is more important to the success of his 
1 
election than the party he represents . " The results of this 
study are discouraging, h owever, only to those Protestant 
leaders who wish for greater Catholic and Jewish representa-
tion in Congress as a means of advancing the status of Prot-
estant pronouncements ! 
iii . The propaganda of prejudice 
While religious bigotry is scrupulously avoided by Ameri -
can political parties officially, there have been political 
campai gns in which the propaganda of prejudice , related to 
foreign policy matters , has been emp loyed. Because of a 
fancied "quasi-alliance" between Roosevelt and the Vatican 
after the President's appointment of Ivryron Taylor as his per-
sonal representative in 1939, the Herald of the Epiphany 
vigorously opposed F . D. R . in 1940 . In the same year , a Phila-
delphia billboard read: 
1. ·Madgj:l .rvr • • McKinney , "Religion and Elections," Public Opinion 
Quarterly , 8 (Spring, 1944), pp . 110-14 . 
SAVE YOUR CHURCH 
DICTATORS HATE RELIGION 
VOTE STRAIGHT REPUBLICAN 
Vigilante bulletins p l eaded: "Vote Republican 
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. . . and save 
the U. S. from absorption into the Jewish Empire . "l Both Eisen-
hewer and Stevenson were subjected to disgruntled right - wing 
isolationism and anti - Semitism in 19)2 . While such propaganda 
has had little impact in national elections , it may have been 
sufficiently effective to guarantee the defeat of several 
Senatorial candidates sinc e World War II . 2 The presidential 
campaign of 1960 wi t nessed a flood of anti - Catholic literature . 
However , Senator Kennedy 's open discussion of the church-state 
problem, Vice - President Nixon ' s repudiation of religion as an 
issue , and the Republican fear that exploitation of the reli -
gious issue might backfire in arousing solidified Catholic 
support for Kennedy prevented such literature from having the 
impact which many had expec t ed in advanc e . 
1. Bone, pp . 480- 1 . 
2 . Several such campaigns in 1950 are discussed in Forster 
and Epstein, pp . 238-48 . 
CHAPTER VI 
RELIGION AS A SOURCE OF CONFLICT 
1 . The Type 
The fourth function of r eligion in world politics is to 
serve as a source of conflict with the political community . 
The religious community recognizes the inevitability of 
conflict between itself and other communities . It cannot 
consent to the claims of any other community to absolute loy-
alty because it reserves that loyalty for an Ultirnate Being . 
Resistance to the illegitimate claims of the political com-
munity is obedience to the Absolute . The ultimacy of reli -
gi ous loyalty involves it in an i n evitable conflict with po-
litical loyalty . 
While the Old Testament generally reveals an identity of 
the religious community with the political community under the 
Covenant, there are anticipations of the conflict which was 
to become established with the formation of the community of 
the New Covenant . Faithful religion may be politically re -
jected . The Psalmist cried: 11 The kings of the earth set them-
selves , and the rulers take counsel together, against the Lord , 
and against his anointed , say ing , ' Let us burst their bonds 
asunder , and cast their cords from us. 1 nl The unhappy calling 
l . Ps . 2 : 2 - 3. 
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of Jeremiah , deeply loyal and patriotic as he was , set 
him in conflict with the decision- makers of his time . Jesus 
can only promise an enduring conflict between his disciples 
and the decision- makers: "For my sake you will be dragged 
before princes and kings , to bear witness before them and 
the gentiles . "l 
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The radical significance of the symbol of the cross can 
only be apprehended in its full Scriptural setting . Although 
it may fly with the Christian flag which is unfurled next 
t o a national flag and may bless the hosts of war , it is the 
eternal symbol of conflict between religious loyalty and polit-
ical power . The crucifixion must be seen as a political event 
before its religious meaning is fully disclosed . Cullmann 
suggests that the cross is properly to be acknowledged a Roman 
symbol before it became a Christian symbol . "In the cross of 
Christ the relationship between ' Christ and Caesar' stands at 
once in the beginning and at the center of the Christian faith . 
As a corollary, the problem , ' Church and State , ' is posed for 
the Church at all times , forever ."2 The "chronological dual -
i sm" implicit in the New Covenan t does not simply confer "pro-
visional" status upon the pol i s un t il the coming of the 
politeuma : it rejec ts the illegitimate and excessive claims of 
the polis . 
1 . Mt . 10 : 18 
2 . Cullman , p . 6 . 
\ 
The New Testament doctrine of the state is not simply 
a matter of obedience to Caesar. The state inevitably 
manifests a certain Satanic power , which the writer of Reve -
lation characterizes as a great "beast" rising up out of the 
sea. The qualities of the beast most obviously to be con-
demned are its claim to be worshipped and its specialty of 
waging war. 1 
The koinonia, the community of the New Covenant, will 
thus maintain its integrity and its loyalty only if it is 
faithful to its "alien" obligations within the state. This 
does not mean that the religious community will isolate 
itself from the political community; it will still seek to 
transform national life through the divine power within it. 
However, the radical loyalty of the koinonia will seem to 
give it a 11 foreignn status within every secular community. 
The very call of the koinonia to all men to join its fellow-
ship in the Body of Christ will dramatize this status, as 
Bonhoeffer wrote : 
This testimony of the Church is foreign to the 
world ; the Church herself, in bearing this testi-
mony, finds herself to be foreign to the world. 
Yet even this is always only an ever-renewed con-
sequence of that fellowship with the world which 
is given in the Body of Christ. The Church is 
divided from the world solely by the fact that 
1 . Rev . 13. 
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she affirms in faith the reality of God's accep-
tance of man, a leality which is the property of 
the whole world . 
The church thus has both a radically "foreignn character and 
a radical "worldliness . " It can never become completely 
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"domesticated" within any one nation . The church, at the very 
source of its being, recognizes that its fellowship is for 
the world . It is inherently a missionary community which 
will be the source of conflict within political communities, 
as well as reconciliation among political communities . It 
is transnational or supranational . It will seek to identify 
itself with every national community, but it will not allow 
any national community to take its support of the status quo 
for granted . 
The "foreign" character of the religious community will 
create special problems for foreign policy . Prevailing poli-
cies may be subject to criticism because the religious com-
munity asserts the claims of foreign political communities 
as well as its own . Decision- makers themselves, if they 
belong to the religious community, will be subject to inter-
nal conflicts . The status and influence of the professional 
missionaries abr oad will make demands upon both public opinion 
and foreign po l icy . The very claims of a universal reli gion 
to international status will cause conflict and generate 
1 . Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics . Edited by Eberh ard Bethge 
and translated by Neville Horton Smith (New York: The 
Macmillan Company , 1955) , p . 72. 
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hostility within every nation where other universal religion s 
claim their adherents . 
To the degree that Christian leadership recognizes the 
sources of conflict within the very nature of the community 
of the New Covenant, it will seek to make t hat conflict an 
expression of its own reconciling creativity and not an 
alienating rejection of the legitimacy of the political com-
munity . The Christian ethic must express both the ties which 
bind the person to the political community and the principles 
of the individual's transcendence of the political community . 
The latter principles are not abstract and individualistic: 
they express the ties which bind the person to another com-
munity in which the concrete meaning of his corporate obli-
gations is continually to be revealed to him . That other 
community is the fellowship of faith and action g athered in 
the koinonia , It is the community of the crucifixion in 
which love is commanded and practiced and which recognizes 
its inevitable conflict with all political loyalties. 
2 . International Conflict 
The national origins of some religious groups and the 
domestication of denominational organization and opinion must 
be balanced by a recognition of the international character of 
universalist religions. There is no simple identity of reli-
gious group membership and national citizenship for modern 
nations . Religious and political boundaries , while coinciding 
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at many points, also diverge and intersect . Where these boun-
daries are not identical, conflicting loyalties are inevitable . 
There is massive evidence that such conflicts between reli-
gious and political loyalty have exerted significant influences 
upon American foreign policy . 
i . Missions and Foreign Nationalism 
If the immigration of millions of people to America from 
other nations has resulted in a domestic religious pattern 
which continues to reflect diverse national origins , the 
missionary movement has carried thousands of Americans to 
other nations in which they have experienced religious and 
political conflict . Both the domestic and f oreign distribu-
tions of reli g ious g roups have helped to shape American poli-
cy decisions . Tocqueville perceived that mis s ionar ies in 
Western territories of the United States were political as 
well as religious creatures in their enthusiastic frontier 
nationalism: "If you converse with t hese missionaries of 
Christian civilization, you will be s urprised to hear them 
speak so often of the g oods of this world, and to meet a 
politician where you expected to find a prie st."1 While some 
missionaries have sought to deny this connection between reli-
gious and political influences which is inherent i n t h e mis-
sionary vocation, historians and po l itical scientists have 
1. Tocqueville, II, 317 . 
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repeatedly called attention to it . Perhaps no other aspect 
of religion's involvement in social and political institutions 
has provoked greater controversy among the various students of 
religion . If there have been bitter critics, especially among 
non- Christian nationalists in mission countries, cultural 
anthropologists , and diplomatic historians, there have also 
been articulate defenders among both religious and secular 
leaders, in the United States and abroad . A preliminary sug-
gestion as to the connection between missionary and political 
influence is afforded by Kalijarvi: 
One reason why the West attained world political 
supremacy may be found in the restless, dynamic 
character of the Christian religion as it strugg led 
for survival in ancient Rome, as it established 
its supremacy throughout Europe , as it fought for 
the recovery of the Holy Land during the Crusades, 
as it spread its missionaries everywhere . The 
Christian missionaries in the New World , Africa , 
Oceania, and the Far East have at once been agents 
of the church t h ey represented and also powerful 
advance re~resentatives of t h e states from which 
they came . 
Church-state doctrines which ignore these supranational con-
nections cannot fully apprehend the "restless, dynamic char-
acter11 of Christianity at its ultimate and universalist 
sources . Van Dusen observes that 11 an undeniable adjunct of 
Christian extension in each of its four most creative periods 
has been political conquest or penetration--what is today 
designated by the ill-odored word 'imperialism . ' ••• Almost 
always political penetration has in some measure prepared 
1 . Thorsten V. Kalijarvi et al ., Modern World Politics (2nd ed . , 
New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company , 1950), p . 37 . 
a setting for the Church ' s evangelistic work . 111 Christian 
expansion has also been intimately related to exploration 
and discovery and to the penetration of commerce and trade . 
In many cases , the order of penetration has been reversed: 
Christian missionaries were often the first representatives 
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of western nations to come into contact with primitive or 
non- Christian peoples, and later to be regarded as "represen-
tatives of western enterprise" and "western government . "2 
This mutual interpenetration of religious and political 
influences became greatly intensified in those very years in 
which the Uni ted States was emerging as a world power and 
shaping its modern foreign policies . Dwight L . Moody ' s re -
vivals in the 1890 ' s were essentially mission- oriented, and 
l aunched the Student Volunt eers for Foreign Missions with 
their ambitious slogan , "The Evangelization of the 1!1Torld in 
this Generation . " In no previous or subsequent period of 
American history did "young people fling themselves so reck-
lessly into the Christian crusade as after 1890 . "3 Varg 
interprets the missionary movement at the turn of the cen-
tury as "the religious counterpart of the new political forces 
that were stirring men's souls . " John R. Mott , Robert E . Speer, 
l . Henry P . Van Dusen , World Christianit : Yesterda 
Tomorrow (New York : Abingdon- Cokesbury Press, 19 
pp . 57- 8 . 
2 . I b id., pp . 59 - 60 . 
3 • V ar g , p • 3 • 
' 
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and Sherwood Eddy were "contemporaries of the businessman 
with an eye to foreign markets and of the new statesman with 
an irrepressible urge to cast the weight of American influence 
onto the scales of international power politics."1 The peri -
od 1890-1917 was marked by the highest degree of missionary 
fervor: 
Granted that a Christian sense of oughtness in-
spired the missionary, it is also true that the 
missionary movement and imperialism were wheels 
driven by the same explosive energy generated 
by a sense of superiority, moral duty, and the 
ego satisfaction to be gained in developing the 
underdeveloped areas of the world in the image 
of one's own society. The difference lay not so 
much in the nature of the generating force which 
gave the i mpetus to the two movements but rather 
in their aims. American imperialism aimed at a 
goal circumscribed by a nationalistic faith in 
American institutions; the missionary movement 
in general accepted these goals but also, at its 
best, transcended them and envisioned a world 
brotherhood where human value ~ would take preced-
ence over national loyalties. 
Thus did the missionary movement and modern foreign policy 
provide alternative outlets for the "zest for action" and 
the ''nationalism-internationalism" which have been the special 
properties of the Puritan ethos in America; thus did they pro-
ject that ethos into the international arena. Woodrow Wilson 
and John Foster Dulles , directly and personally responsive to 
the revitalized missionary movement, were not without reason 
characterized as "missionary internationalists." Each was 
1. Ibid., p. 56. 
2. Ibi~., pp. 81-82. 
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profoundly influenced by the most distinctive religious and 
political energies of his time ; each brought those energies 
to decisive focus in the conduct of American foreign policy . 
Among the more particular patterns of missionary influ-
ence upon foreign policy are : (1) the direct participation 
of mi ssionaries in the work of the diplomatic corps; (2) the 
securing of special treaties and other agreements protecting 
the status of missionaries ; (3) the stimulation of national-
ism in mission countries , both positively in the encourage -
ment of nationalist aspirations and negatively in the crystal-
lization of mass hostility; (4) the sympathies and hostilities 
generated by missionary education in American public opinion; 
and (5) the direct pressure of missionary lobbies upon na-
tional decision- makers responsible for foreign policy . 
During the nineteenth century , missionaries performed 
important official and unofficial services for the American 
government in various countries . Among these were : Peter 
Parker (1804- 88), medical missionary who served as legation 
secretary and then commissioner in Peking in the 1850's; 
Samuel Wells Williams (1812- 84) , head of the Mission Press 
in Canton who assisted Admiral Perry as an interpreter in 
Japan and served as legation secretary in both China and Ja-
• 
pan ; William A. • Martin (1826 - 1916) , President and Professor 
of International Law at Tung Wen College in Peking, first 
president of the Imperial University of China, and interpreter 
for the American legation in Peking ; Arthur H. Smith (1845-1932), 
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ninfluential" in determining China policy; Horace N. Allen 
(1853-1932}, first Protestant missionary to Korea , who helped 
to establish the Korean legation in Washington and served as 
u.s. minister-resident in Seoul; and James L. Barton (1855- 1936) , 
foreign secretary of the Mission Board in Turkey and "highly 
influential" in the conduct of United States policy in the 
Near East . l While it is difficult to measure just how 11 influ-
ential" these missionaries may have been in determining Ameri-
can policy, it can be recognized that they were positively 
related to diplomatic functions by performing routine services 
while providing some counsel in major matters of national in-
terest . What is perhaps of greater significance is that such 
activity tended to identify them with the interests of the 
American government in their mission work and in the thinking 
of the peoples to whom they were missionaries . Trade and ac-
cess by missionaries were the two principal objectives of 
nineteenth century diplomacy in the Far East . Neumann claims 
that the second of these objectives provided the characteris-
tic shape of American diplomacy: "American policy was differ-
ent from European because it was a missionary policy . " In 
1852, Congressman Chandler described that policy as "but an 
example of popular virtue, republican simplicity, and world-
teaching example . 112 
1 . Stokes, II , 429 . Stokes says of Allen: "Some of his pro-
motion plans and his relation to court intrigues were open 
to criticism, but his devotion to what he conceived to be 
the best interests of Korea was unquestioned . 11 
2 . William L. Neumann, "Determinism, Destiny, and lViyth in the 
American Image of China," in Anderson , p . 19. 
Missions have been related to foreign policy not only 
through personal services but also as the special objects 
of treaties of protection nego tiated by the American govern-
ment (frequently in concert with other Western powers) with 
Asian and African nations . Cus hiqg 1 s treaty of 1844 with 
China , which secured commercial privileges , extraterritori -
ality, and promises of protection for Christ ian missions, was 
negotiated with the assistance of Pe ter Parker and Samuel 
Wells Williams. According t o Baile y , the consequences of 
this a greement were these: 
Missionaries from the United States, assured 
of a footh old under the Cushing tre a ty, came 
to China in increasing numbers, and extended 
their acti vities in t o the interior . These 
earnest soul savers , though a source of dis-
turbance to the Chinese , we r e of some assist -
ance in facilitating the work of diplomacy, 
and of great service in awakening Ameri can 
interest in the Celestial Empire . Throughout 
the forty years after 1847 books written by 
missionaries, though reflecting a Christian 
bias , were the most reliable sources of infor-
mation about the Far East generally circulated 
in the United States . l 
While this account is useful in p o inting to the importance 
of the Cushing and subsequent treaties in p rotecting missions 
and in stimulating resentment abroad, it is also i l luminating 
as a typical expression of the skepticism of diplomatic his-
torians concerning reli g ion-- to which American students of 
forei gn policy have be en exposed for a g eneration . 
1 . Bailey, A Diplomatic History , pp . 326-7 . 
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That Bailey ' s reaction t o the Cushing treaty and the 
role of mi s sionaries therein is not simply one of bias can 
be demonstrated in the subsequent behavior and language of 
Parker and Williams . The former , addressing American mer-
chants in Canton in 1856 , declared that he shared their im-
patience at the slowness of the Chinese to adopt Western ways: 
nMy course with this government will be friendly , but firm. 
The time for nonsense is past , and trifling will be endured 
no longer . " Parker proposed the increase of American naval 
forces and the seizing of Formosa as a means of "bringing 
China to her senses . 111 Recalled by President Buchanan in 
1857 , Parker was replaced by Williams who was assigned to 
participate in renegotiation of treaty provisions in 1858 . 
Williams shared Parker ' s impatience : "We shall get nothing 
important out of the Chinese unless we stand in a menacing 
attitude before them . They would grant nothing unless fear 
stimulated t heir sense of justice , for they are among the most 
craven of people , cruel and selfish as he a thenism can make men, 
so we must be backed by f orce if we wish them to listen to 
reason . 112 Chester Bowles has observed that many contemporary 
Chinese associate Christianity with t h is past period of humil -
iating subservience to Western military power: 
1 . Varg , p . 9. 
2 . Frederick Wells Williams , The Life and Letters of Samuel 
Wells Williams , LL . D. (New York: G. P . Putnam's Sons , 
1889) , p . 268. Quoted in Varg , p . 11 . 
In the eyes of a majority of Chinese these mission-
ary privileges , extor t ed by alien military and 
e c onomic power fr om a helpless government , repre -
sented an affront to themselves and their own age -
old culture . When the privileges were extended to 
provide special protection for Chinese Christian 
converts , often releasing them from Chinese govern-
mental and fruaily authority , the smoldering opposi -
tion grew . Thus t he missionaries , the vast major-
ity of whom were motivated by the best Christian 
tradition of sacrifice and idealism, gradually came 
to conduct their work under an increasing burden of 
mistrust . l 
Missionary activity was the source of both legal and social 
conflict . :fvlany Chinese who had been accused of crime became 
professing Christians , thereby hoping to gain sanctuary at 
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mission stations by clai ming that they were being punished for 
religious beliefs . Because innocent converts had frequently 
been subjected to petty persecution , the claims of the gui lty 
gained plausibility with missionaries who "did not protect 
criminals knowingly, but it was not always p oss ible fo r them 
to know all of the facts and c onsequently they sometimes were 
duped into intervening in behalf of the guilty . 112 Some 
Inissionaries aroused Chinese bitterness because they evidenced 
race prejudice, while others , for the most opposite reason, 
provoked the hostility of mandarins by their special attention 
to the lower classes . To the mandarins , it became clear that 
"the missionary was privately , and sometimes publicly , 
1 . The New Dimensions of Peace (New York: Harper and Brothers, 
19 55 ) ' p • 8 3 • 
2 . Varg , p . 33 . 
') 
critical and that he was helping to undermine the confi-
dence of his converts in the political status quo." 1 
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The "missionary foreign policy" of the nineteenth cen-
tury thus helped to store up profound resentments within the 
soul of China--resentments which were not perceived by an 
American public generally unaware that the nation had a for-
eign policy. As the l890 1 s awakened that public to interna-
tional consciousness, there was a burst of world-saving en-
thusiasm . Meeting the new wave of American missionaries in 
China and other countries was an explosion of anti-Western 
conflict. Violence occurred in May , 1891, when .the American 
Methodist Girls 1 School at Nanking was destroyed by a mob . 
Charles Denby , the United States Minister in Peking , demanded 
punishment and the Chinese government responded by arresting 
mob leaders and decapitating two of them . After the slaying 
of eleven missionaries (including one American) in the vil-
lage of Huashan in August, 1895, American denominational 
leaders called for ''justice"; this time , twenty-six Chinese 
were beheaded by their government.2 
In March of 1900, as Secretary of State Hay was trium-
phantly announcing in Washingt on that the Open Door policy 
had become "final and definitive," an aggressively antiforeign 
l. Ibid., p. 32. 
2. Ibid ., pp. 38-9 . 
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group of Chinese revolutionists called 11 Boxers 11 launched a 
campaign of violence to expel "foreign devils . " The Boxer 
Rebellion in North China and IVJ:anchuria killed 136 Protestant 
missionaries , 44 Catholics , and 53 children: "heads severed 
by broadswords, burning of men, women , and children, and every 
fiendish device was employed . 111 Western legations in Peking 
were besieged under a reign of terror which lasted for nine 
weeks . Finally , the rebellion was crushed when an interna-
tional expedition including American troops and commanded by 
a German general marched t o Peking , sacked the capital, and 
exacted an indemnity of $330 , 000 , 000 , which far exceeded the 
damages caused by the rebellion . 2 
The Boxer Rebellion shocked the sensibilities of both 
diplomats and missionaries . While American consuls and other 
officials had previously been irritated by missionary behavior, 
they had been unwilling to jeopardize their careers by public 
criticism in a generation of missionary fervor . Privately , 
they had also expressed amusement at missionaries and had 
shared a fund of missionary jokes with the Chinese themselves . 
There had been resentment among diplomats when missionaries 
helped to block the appointment of W. W. Rockhill as Minister 
to China in 1897 . When Theodore Roosevelt succeeded in 
winning approval for the appointment of Rockhill eight years 
1 . Ibid ., p . 47 . 
2 . Bowles , The New Dimensions of Peace , p . 83 . 
later, it was upon the latter's promise to do his "best to 
defend missionary interests ." l A growing uneasiness among 
missionary leaders over treaty provisions and the use of 
force to back them followed the violence in which they were 
caught at the end of the century . With missionary support, 
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a new treaty was negotiated with China in 1903 which retained 
extraterritoriality but provided in Article XIV that Chinese 
Christians would be subject to the duties of citizenship and 
the jurisdiction of the courts. They were, however, to be 
guaranteed religious freedom by the Chinese government . 2 
After 1900, the missionaries were less successful as a 
pressure group aeeking directly to influence the Department 
of State . However , their influence continued in the larger 
context of the general approach of United States policy toward 
China. The fact that nineteenth century missionaries on fur-
lough and in publica tions had tended to emphasize the abnormal 
and unusual aspects of Chinese life in order to win sympathet-
ic support for their work left a deposit of "poor heathen 
Chinese" sentimentality in American opinion. Preoccupation 
wi th alleged low and corrupt morals among Chinese, an argu-
ment earnestly advanced as evidence of their need for salva-
tion (and, therefore, of the need of mission stations for 
more generous financial backing), did not always do justice 
1. Varg, pp . 134-5 . 
2 . Ibid., p . 125 . 
to the understanding of China which many American mission-
aries had , in fact, acquired . Such propaganda, however, in-
evitably made its way back to China and was the source of 
compounded resentmen t there . 1 In the twentieth century , 
American policy tended, according to Varg, to treat China 
as "a moral problem, a country to be encouraged to adopt 
Christian values, technology , popular education, and consti -
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tutionalism. It is not necessary to question the desirability 
for China of these institutions , but it is worthwhile to note 
that China's highly decent ralized and semifeudal society was 
far removed from such Western patterns . "2 Woodrow Wilson 
brought all of these values to a focus in his foreign poli -
cies: moral concern and a passion to export Christian stand-
ards, technology, education, and constitutionalism. His sensi-
tivity to missionary influence was evident in his invitation 
to John R . Mott to accept appointment as United States Ambas -
sador to China . Hott decl ined on the ground that he was "en-
gaged in a more important mission to the non- Christian peo -
ples of the world . "3 
The coupling of Christianity with Western imperialism, 
a tendency which became more pronounced than ever in the 
1 . Ibid . , p . 120 . 
2 . Ibid., p . 324 . 
3. William Warren Sweet , The Stor of Reli ion in America 
(New York : Harper and Brothers Publishers, 19 0) , p . 342 . 
1920's, was not g ener ally understood by American Christians . 
Some Protestant leaders did become aware, h owever, of both 
the Western biases of some missionaries and the nationalistic 
response to them in mission countries. Methodist Bishop 
Francis J . McConnell wrote in 1920 that 
as a matter of almost obvious historic truth im-
perialism in the church is very apt to follow i m-
perialism in commercial or political development . 
This is all the more probable because the tendency 
is so unconscious on the part of ecclesiastical 
leaders . Many of the most devoted churchmen may 
not be able to detect this parallelism between 
the national and the ecclesiastical movement 
even after it has been pointed out.l 
But if Protestant America was slow to de tect this connection 
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and its international i mplications , a Communist g overnment not 
yet t hree years in power in Russia canceled its "unequal 
treaties" with China in 1920 . The Soviet Union was ale rt to 
the deeper meaning of the revolution in China and was able to 
free itself from the c harge of imperialism while shifting the 
onus of that word to the capitalist nations of the West. "The 
liberal missionaries of the West, who favored t reaty revision , 
were never able to throw off this yoke, for Western govern-
ments prized the commerce of China and knew that t h is commerce 
would suffer if the tre a ties were not continued . 11 2 
Chinese intellectuals g ave a new quality of leadershi p to 
the anti - Western a g itation in the l920 1 s. Missionary 
l . Francis J . McConnell, Public Opinion and Th eology (New York: 
The Abingdon Press , 1920), p . 24. 
2 . Varg , p . 322. 
institutions provided symbols which fuelled nationalist 
propaganda . The Christian chapels, schools , and hospitals, 
managed by foreigners and patterned after forei gn institu-
tions, continued to fly foreign flags . In response to the 
zeal of a meeting of the World Student Christian Federation 
in Peking in 1922 and to a publication by the China Continu-
ing Committee of a book bearing the militant title , The 
Christian Occupation of China l, students organized the Anti-
Christian Alliance . 1 As the Communist movement spread in 
North China, missionaries were exposed to new dangers . In 
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Communist territory , a number of missionaries were driven out; 
some were killed; mission property was destroyed . There were 
increasing attacks by bandits which neither Communist author-
ity nor We stern power was willing to prevent by force . West-
ern g overnments generally became reluctant to consider mili -
tary action as a means of defending Christians in China; the 
effec t of this reluctance was to increase the insecurity of 
missionaries and to encourage the anti-Christian movement to 
still further violence .2 Paralleling the weakening of govern-
ment resolution was the fact that home support for missions 
experienced a sudden decline, both in financial backing and 
in general enthusiasm-- a decline which was to continue until 
World War II . 3 These were the years of post - war 
1 . Ibid ., p . 181 
2. Kenneth Scott Latourette, A History of the Expansion of 
Christianity (7 vols ., New York : Harper and brothers 
Pubilshers, 1945), VII , pp . 365- 6 . 
3. Sweet , p . 4 15 . 
disillusionment when it appeared that the Protestant "zest 
for action" had become a thing of the past . 
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Responsive to substantial religious sentiment for treaty 
revision which had built up during the 1920's, Secretary of 
State Kellogg announced that he was prepared to engage in 
negotiations with China. However , a change of administration 
in 1929 and the Japanese invasion of Manchuria on September 18, 
1931, were complicating developments which appeared to pre -
clude further progress in the matter . It was not until 1943, 
with Chinese-American cooperation at a premium in wartime 
alliance, that the United States finally surrendered extra-
territoriality--just 100 years after the original Cushing 
treaty . 1 
The heroism of many American missionaries who remained 
in China after the Japanese invasion-- some to be martyred for 
their identification with the Chinese cause--won a new respect 
for Christianity among its critics, both Western and Chinese . 2 
However , the immediate post -war period found missionaries seri-
ously divided in their political sentiments . Varg notes four 
varieties of opinion: (1) a militantly pro-Chiang group who 
regarded all criticism as "Communist propaganda"; (2) a mod-
erately pro -Chiang group disposed toward mild criticism; (3) 
a large group "disgusted with the ineptness and corruption of 
1 . Varg , p . 203. 
2. Van Dusen , pp . 113-4. 
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the Kuomintang 11 ; and (4) the "social gospel wing" hoping for 
the triumph of the Communist Revolution and regarding the 
Kuomintang as "hopelessly reactionary and corrupt." Most 
missionaries appeared to belong to the second and third groups . 1 
Whatever the illusions of the "social gospel wing," it had been 
they who had 
tried desperately to make Christianity relevant 
to the problems of hunger, disease, floods, famine, 
illiteracy, and the deplorable working conditions 
of factory labor. The grea t majority of mission-
aries did not go along; they side-stepped political 
and economic issues and sought to convince the 
Chinese that their problems were spiritual. Neither 
group of missionaries had any significant success.2 
In the early months of the Communist reg ime after the spring 
of 1948, the restraint of Communist leaders and the discipline 
of their troops seemed to promise an open future for Christian 
missions. The Party indicated that it would guarantee reli-
gious freedom and went so far as to express regret that many 
missionaries had been evacuated. There was some liberal en-
thusiasm for the social and economic programs of the new re-
gime . As Communist and Western definitions of "religious 
freedom" began to clash and popular resentment was inflamed 
by both anti-religious propaganda and the charge of abandon-
ment a gainst those Christians who "deserted the Revolution," 
persecution spread. At first , Party leaders expla ined 
1 . Varg, pp . 292-3. 
2. Ibid., p . 320. 
persecution as 11 the mistakes of local officials," then more 
frankly stated that churches must no longer be dominated by 
foreign contro1. 1 
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It would be misleading to imply that Christian missions 
have borne only a negative relationship to nationalism abroad.2 
As Latourette, the missionary historian, has written, the mis-
sionary enterprise "became the vehicle of many of the humani-
tarian movements which had their inception in the Occident--
education, greater privilege for women, hospitals, famine 
prevention and relief, sanitation, and many others--and but 
for the missionary movement the impact of the Occident upon 
the non-Occidental world would have been primarily for the 
purpose of exploiting other peoples for the benefit of the 
white man."3 The World Missionary Conference at Edinburgh in 
1910 reaffirmed a principle long honored by missions in theory 
but violated in the inevitable energies released by an inter-
national movement: "Missionaries should have nothing to do 
1. Ibid., p. 303. 
2. The manner in which missions have combined positive and 
negative sources of nationalism parallels the problem of 
colonial administration politically. The "painful dilemma" 
of colonialism is that it "sows the seeds of its own de-
struction." If colonial rulers placate natives by pro-
viding forms of political participation and higher stan-
dards of living, they become trapped in preparing the 
colony positively for nationalism. If, on the other hand, 
colonial rulers suppress the growing political and econ-
omic aspirations of natives, they provide the symbols of 
revolt against their rule. See Organski, pp. 236-45. 
3. Quoted in Stuntz, p. 79. 
with political agitation. This is outside their sphere, and 
engaging in it can only harm their work. 111 However, the fi-
nal report of the Edinburgh Conference revealed intense con-
cern ov e r the dilemmas of missionaries who were almost un-
avoidably finding themselves champions of the social and po-
litical aspirations of the people with whom they worked. 
Many offered their services to the g overnments of mission 
countries as advisers in matters of educati on, health , a gri-
culture, handicraft industries, literacy, finance. Frank W. 
Price, dean of the Theological Seminary at the University of 
Nanking , gave leadership to a broad program of rural recon-
struction, based upon a demonstration center and a related 
extension service.2 While mission activity was finally 
abandoned in China, many of these practical projects of mis-
sions were expanded in other countries. h ission leaders con-
tinue to maintain informal but regular and significant re-
lationships with key persons in government. After Wendell 
Willkie 1 s celebrated "one world'' jaunt, he reported (in words 
perhaps colored by his native enthusiasm and by the circum-
stances of his trip): 
I asked people in every land whether they were not 
res entful that these foreigners should invade their 
country. The answer was universal enthusiasm for 
what American missionaries have done and for the 
1. "Missions and Governments," Report of Commission VII 
(Edinburgh: World Missionary Conference, 1910), p. 95. 
2. Varg, p. 234. 
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lives they lead •••• Their kindness is pro-
verbial , They have brought with them a high 
standard of health , of cleanliness and medical 
care ••• a new sense of self - respect and well-
being .••• Everywhele they have stimulated a 
desire for education . 
The practical influence of Christian missions has been 
inseparable from the profound ideological impact of the mis-
sionary movement as the carrier of radically different reli -
gious ideas and the political values of Western democracy . 
This impact has been an unin t entional one for many mission-
aries . Bowles records that , although they "promised not to 
engage in politics , their gospel of equality under God had 
profound political implications. 112 In nation after nation , 
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the Christian missionary has "stimulated the desire for free-
dom [and) has prepared a native leadership saturated with ideas 
of freedom and equality . "3 This ideological ferment generated 
by international Christianity has not been confined to its 
converts, nor have all of those converted remained within the 
fold . Many of the Christian- educated idealists who wanted to 
build the "New China" after 1925 joined the Communists (some 
trying to retain their Christianity for a while) and later 
became prominent officials in the Mao government . 4 At the 
1 . One World (New York : S imon and S c huster, Inc ., 1943) , 
p . 117 . 
2. Chester Bowles , Ambassador ' s Report (New York: Harper and 
Brothers , 1954) , p . 57 . 
3. Stuntz , p . 30 . 
4 . Bowles, The New Dimensions of Peace , p . 117 . 
244 
same time, the fact that such Asian nationalists as Methodists 
Chiang Kai-Shek and Syngman Rhee have been more readily identi-
fied with American policy and sentiment, while it may have en-
hanced their status among their supporters, has tended to 
separate them from other Asian peoples who regard this reli-
gious identification as just another manifestation of Western 
imperialism. 
Indian leaders have frequently testified to the revolu-
tionary impact of Christianity . ~Then British administrators 
banned printing presses in an eff ort to halt nationalist prop-
aganda, missionaries proceeded to develop many Indian lan-
guages into written form and eventually set up their own 
presses . The levelling influence of Christian teaching and 
practice stimulated the aspirations of lower castes while , in 
the same paradoxical manner as in China, provoking a national-
ist resentment from the defenders of the caste system. Gandhi's 
nonviolent approach to Indian independence was attributed by 
him to Tolstoy and the New Testament as well as to the tradi-
tions of nonviolence in Hinduism. Gandhi maintained intimate 
friendships with some missionary leaders. 
But nationalists in India have discriminated between 
what they would accept and what they would reject from Chris -
tianity . The conversion methods of some Christian groups 
have greatly stimulated nationalism--negatively . Gandhi 
shared this reaction . 1 Philanthropic activities themselves 
l . See especially Clifford Manshardt (ed .), The Mahatma and 
the Missionar~ (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co ., Inc ., 1949) . 
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were not criticized so much as were the alleged abuses of 
them to induce baptism, church membership, and abolition of 
the castes . In the thirties , Hindu nationalism succeeded 
in securing discrimination against Indian Christians at some 
levels of government , even though such Christians usually 
shared the same aspirations for independence . Nissionaries , 
as non- Indians , could not dire c tly interfere in politics 
without a hostile reaction--but their very non- participation 
was subject to the charge of cowardice or sympathy with 
British imperialism, thereby alienating some Indian Chris-
tians from missionaries . In time , Christian leaders were 
drawn more and more into the independence movement: they felt 
obliged to "prove" themselves as persons who ttbelonged 11 to 
the scheme of Indian nationalism, even at the risk of antag-
onizing non- Christians still further . l In India , as in China , 
some of the most zealous Christians moved into the Communist 
camp , particularly those "who had actually experienced frus -
tration at being held back on social issues by Church lead-
ers . "2 
After independence was achieved , missions were subject 
to new strains which had not officially been imposed upon 
them during the years of British control . ~ihile India was 
established as a secular state , anti - Christian sentiment 
l . Braden , p . 176 . 
2 . Ibid ., p . 181 . 
remains strong in many government leaders and missions have 
been subjected to official investigation and continuing 
criticism. The report of a six- member committee appointed 
by the government in 1956 asserted: 
Evangelization in India appears to be a part of 
the uniform world policy to revive Christendom 
for reestablishing Western supremacy and is not 
prompted by spiritual motives . The objective is 
apparently to creat e Christian minority pockets 
wi t h a view to disrupting the solidarity of the 
non- Christian societies , and the mass conversion 
of a considerable section of Adivasis [aborigines] 
with the ulterior motive is fraught with danger 
to the security of the state •••• The manner 
in which the missionary movement goes on in cer-
tain places is clearly intended to serve some 
political purpose in the cold war • • •• The best 
course for t h e Indian churches to follow is to 
establish a united independent Christian Church 
in India without being dependent on foreign sup-
port . l 
This pattern of involvement in both the offi cial chan-
nels of diplomacy and in the dynamics of modern nationalism 
has also been conspicuous in the relations hips of missions 
to American foreign policy in the l"l iddle East . A recent 
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essay by De Novo , reviewing the history of United States poli-
cy in that area, observes that in t he late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, the 11best customers of t h e Ameri-
can diplomats for many decades were the missionaries opera-
ting in the area . n The activity of Christianity had been of 
"the greatest extent and consequence" for national policy, 
although it had received only "skimpy treatment from scholars." 
l . Quoted in Hill and Lund , pp . 141- 2 . 
Edward Mead Earle could say in 1929 that "the defense, sup-
port, and protection of mi ssions has been the most pressing 
problem of American diplomacy in the Near East ."1 Hos tili-
ty to missions intensified in the Ottoman Empire in the late 
1800's and was manifested in such official obstacles as: 
interference with the distribution of religious literature; 
interception of missionary mail; refusal to issue building 
permits for mission schools and churches; the denial of cus-
toms immunity for mission supplies as had been guaranteed by 
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treaty; and delays in the prosecution of criminal acts a gainst 
missionaries and their pers onal property . These forms of 
resistance called repeatedly for diplomatic intercessions by 
the United States government . Such intercessions became a 
further stimulus to Middle Eastern hostility. Apparently , 
this response was , in some cases, deliberately contrived by 
nationalist extremists themselves who attacked missionary 
property for the purpose of bringing about foreign interven-
tion. In the long run, the most far-reaching effect of Chris-
tian missionaries is to be found in the "side effects of 
their activities." Although they were not politically minded, 
they were politically influential . "If the missions were 
seed beds of revolution, it was quite unintentional in the 
opinion of most writers . 112 
1. John A. De Novo, "American Relations with the J.Vdddle East: 
Some Unfinished Business ," in Anderson , p . 67 . 
2. Ibi~ ., p . 68. 
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In 1885, the United States participated in the Confer-
ence of Berlin on African deve l opment which dealt especially 
with trade, but also provided for the protection of all reli-
gious institutions and "Christian missionaries, scientists , 
and explorers . " The Berlin Act was revised in 1919 at 
St . Germain- en-Laye where the United States joined with Great 
Britain , France, Belgium, Italy , Portugal , and Japan to 
strengthen these guarantees , subject to "the maintenance of 
public security and order" and the necessity for "enforcement 
of the constitutional law . "1 These revisions reportedly have 
provided legal justification for discrimination between Cath-
olics and Protestants in countries under Portuguese adminis -
tration . 
In a discussion of the relationship between religious 
conflict and political conflict , Coleman characterizes Chris -
tian missions in Africa as a 11 source of alternative values" 
providing "unintended consequences" for the patterns of na-
tional loyalty and action . n uch of Africa has been con-
ver t ed to Christianity from t r ibal religions, and it is an 
established fact that those areas where the conversion has 
been greatest have showed t he greatest nationalism . 11 While 
some church leaders attempt to limit responsibility for this 
reaction to fundamentalism , even the Anglican and Catholic 
1 . Stokes , II , 429- 30 . 
churches seem to have furnished the source of nationalism 
in Uganda and other countries . l 
The problems of identification , both with African na-
tionalism and withWestern militarism, were marked by acute 
personal conflicts for missionaries as the Congo attai ned its 
independence from Belgium in 1960 . At Coquilhatville, when 
United S t ates Army planes landed , mobs of Congolese believed 
that the pilots had come to liberate them from the hated Bel-
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gian paratroopers . Lining the roadside , they smiled and waved , 
chanting in unison "Vive les Americains ! 11 The pilots waved 
and smiled back . "They would never know the depth of dis -
appointment that followed when the Congolese learned why 
they had really come 11 : to evacuate American missionaries . 
ttBut you came to help us," Congolese protested to a mission-
ary . "We have to go , 11 was the reply . nour ambassador in 
Leopoldville says so . " "Please , tell him to let you stay . 
Without you Americans we are lost . 11 2 After Belgian evacu-
ation from Matadi , fighter planes had returned in a 11 sneak 
attack , bombing and strafing the city at random . " Enraged 
Congolese attacked the American Baptist mission , subduing 
its men and raping two women . It was then that United States 
Ambassador Clare Timberlake ordered all American missionaries 
1 . James s . Coleman , "Social Cleavage and Religious Conflict , " 
The Journal of Social Issues, 12 (1956), p . 52 . 
2 . Lloyd M. Garrison , "The New Heart of Darkness , " The Reporter , 
23 (September 1, 1960) , p . 16 - 17 . 
to leave the Congo . But these atrocities were greatly exag-
gerated in Western papers at the time: savage as they were , 
there were not as many as the reports indicated. 1 
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Missionary activity in the Western Hemisphere has not es-
caped involvement in conflict . Bemis, perhaps the most wide-
ly read of American diplomatic historians concerned with Latin 
America , has said of United States policy in that area: 
From the beginning it has had an ideological and 
missionary background , originally derived from 
Protestant Christianity , now resting also on the 
gospel of progress •••• It has received a mis-
sionary impulse to save peoples not only from 
political tyranny , but also from political in-
stability , from ignorance , from disease, from 
poverty •••• In the past missionary endeavor 
has not served to curb imperialism or political 
intervention; on the contrary . 2 
The Good Neighbor Policy is regarded by Bemis as an expression 
of the spirit of Protestant missions . 
Few chapters in American diplomatic history have been 
more controversial than the annexation of Hawaii . Without at-
tempting to settle the controversy , two contrasting accounts 
may be cited . Bailey's version is that ''sons of missionaries" 
helped constitute a small group of PJUericans who, in the late 
nineteenth century, had come to control two thirds of the real 
estate of the Hawiian Islands . This group organized the 
1. Ibid ., p . 18 . 
2 . Samuel Flagg Bemis , The Latin American Polic of the United 
States: An Historical Interpretation New York: Harcourt, 
Brace and Company, 1943), pp. 390-1 . 
revolution that deposed Queen Liliuokalani and pushed the 
project of annexation. When President Cleveland attempted 
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to make amends to the Queen, the "storm of criticism in Ameri -
ca redoubled its fury, greatly augmented by the church-mis -
sionary element . " Cleveland finally unloaded the problem on 
Congress , where it rested until the McKinley administration . 1 
Stokes, by contrast , records the willingness of many mis -
sionaries to renounce their American citizenship, enabling 
them to participate with undivided loyalty as subjects of the 
Hawaiian kingdom, serving that government and laying the foun-
dations for the racial harmony for which Hawaii is famous . 
While several of those who agitated for annexation may have 
been sons or grandsons of missionaries , Stokes maintains that 
no missionaries themselves were involved . He not e s that Mark 
Twain , of all people , praised missions for providing education 
and the i mpetus to freedom and equality for Hawaiians, and 
concluded by saying that "the benefit conferred upon this peo -
ple by the missionaries is s o prominent, so palpable , and so 
unquestionable, that the frankest compliment I can pay them, 
and the best , is simply to point to the condition of the 
Sandwich Islanders of Captain Cook ' s time , and their condition 
1 . Bailey , A Diplomatic His t ory, pp . 469- 73 . In the circum-
stances of the Spanish- American War , Hawaii ' s value as a 
naval installation crystallized public sentiment for 
annexation . McKinley succeeded in winning Congressional 
ratification for his treaty of annexation by joint reso-
lution of Congress, a device circumventing the require -
ment of a two - thirds vote in the Senate . 
today . Their work speaks for itself . " Stokes' own con-
clusion is that criticism of Hawaiian missions is due to 'mis -
understandings . 111 
What is common to these two accounts is the recognition 
that missionaries exercised a signi icant political influence 
in a problem of United States foreign policy, whatever quali-
tative differences the accounts may provide. With the annex-
ation of Hawaii and the subsequent grant of statehood, the 
islands moved out of the "foreign" category. 
In sum, it may be said that Protestant missions in Asia , 
Africa , and Latin America in the late nineteenth century and 
in the twentieth century were identified with the activities 
of the United States diplomatic corps and with the treaties 
which a number of nations came to associate with Western im-
perialism. 1'1ore positively, Protestant missions, through the 
ideological impact of their teachings and institutions, pro -
vided a major cause of the revolutionary ferment which Amer-
can foreign policy has confronted since World War II . 
ii . Religious Liberty Abroad 
While there are issues of religious liberty involved in 
the United States government's protection of missionaries , 
there are other issues more directly concerning traditional 
l . Stokes , II , 427-8 . The quotation from Twain appeared in 
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a paper by former Territorial Governor Walter F . Frear (1863-
1948) entitled "Anti-Missionary Criticism" and read before 
the Honolulu Social Science Committee in 1935. 
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guarantees of religious freedom which have required the atten-
tion of diplomats and which, on oc casion , have aroused public 
opinion. These matters include: (1) treaties guaranteeing 
religious freedom of American citizens in other nations; (2) 
attempts to defend the religious freedom of foreign citizens 
in their own countries; (3) the religious affiliation of dip-
lomats insofar as it may become a criterion of selection or 
assignment; and (4) the issue of diplomatic relations with 
the Vatican. 
Beginning in 1782, the United States established a pat-
tern of treaties with foreign governments to protect, among 
other things, the religious liberty of American nationals 
abroad. In that year , a treaty was negotiated with the Neth-
erlands which provided mutual guarantees of freedom of con-
science and of worship for the citizens of both countries. 
That this and subsequent treaties of "amity and commerce" 
with other Europ e an powers during the 1780 's should have been 
negotiated before the framing of the American Constitution and 
the ratification of the Bill of Rights suggests an historic 
connection between religion and diplomacy which both clergy 
and diplomats may be slow to recognize. Similar guarantees 
were written into treaties with Latin American countries as 
they achieved independence after 1824. In an agreement of a 
somewhat different and more specific nature , United States -
Russian negotiations over the cession of Alaska in 1867 pro -
vided that the American government would allow Orthodox churches 
built by the Russian government to remain the property of the 
Alaskan congregations . 1 
254 
Diplomatic action under such treaties has been called for 
on numerous occasions . In the 1850 ' s , there was a series of 
modifications in the Swiss Treaty which , at the insistence of 
t he Senate , extended more fully all guarantees to non- Chris -
tians (Jews in particular) . The public opinion arouEed in 
Switzerland over this matter seems to have played an important 
part in obtaining religious liberty through the adoption of 
a new Swiss constitution in 1874. 2 These negotiations with 
Switzerland were anticipations of the twentieth century , in 
which the Department of State has most frequently been obliged 
to speak for the rights of American Jews abroad . An example 
is provided by a series of Department protests in the early 
1900 ' s against refusal of the Russian government to honor 
passports issued to American Jews . The Russian action accom-
panied a period of pogroms which , whatever their official 
sanctions , indicated unwillingness or inability to protect 
religious liberty . Both Democratic and Republican platforms 
in 1908 promised to work for the lifting of travel restrictions , 
and William Howard Taft protested against them in his speech 
of acceptance of the Republican nomination . Finally, in 1911 , 
1 . Stokes , I , 475- 6 . 
2 . Ibid ., II , 4 39. 
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Congress by joint resolution ter minated its Treaty of 1832 
with Russia . 1 
On occasion , the United States g overnment has sought to 
defend the religious liberty of foreign citizens in their own 
couhtries . Because , in such an instance, there is no legal 
authority for American intervention , efforts are limited to 
"moral persuasion . " The first diplomatic action on behalf 
of Jews occurred in 1840 when Se c retary of State John Forsyth 
directe d a consul to protest the persecution of Jews in Tur -
key . 2 In 1902 the State Department, heeding "the cry of 
Jewish citizens in the Uni t ed States , protested against Ru-
manian persecution of Jews , although the matter was so large -
ly a domestic one as to make American intervention question-
able . But the protest seems to have helped the Republicans 
in the election of 1902 . " 3 With the rise of Adolf Hitler to 
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power in Germany in 1933 , an unprecedented period of Jewish 
persecution was reflected in growing indignation in the United 
States and insistence that t he State Department intervene . 
While the success of Hitler ' s negotiations at hunich added 
increasing disquiet , general horror spread through the United 
States when unprecedentedly severe attacks upon German Jews 
1 . Cyrus Adler and Aaron M. Margalith , With Firmness in the 
Ri ht: American Di lomatic Action Affectina Jews , 1840-
19 NevJ York : The Amer i can Jewish Committee , 1946) , 
pp . 276 - 85 . 
2 . Ibid ., p . 3 . 
3. Bailey , A Diplomatic History , p . 560n . 
occurred on November 10 , 1938-- 11 Black Thursday . " Homes and 
businesses were looted after thousands had been arrested and 
shipped to concentration camps ; hundreds of Jews died by 
torture or by suicide ; more than 600 s ynagogues were burned . 1 
Protestant and Catholic organizat ions joined in expressions 
of outrage and sympathy . On November 15 , President Roosevelt 
recalled the American ambassador , Hugh R . Wilson , from Berlin 
with this public statement: 
The news of the past few days from Germany has 
deeply shocked public opinion in the United States . 
Such news from any part of the world would inevi -
tably produce a similar profound reac tion among 
American people in every part of the nati on . I 
myself could s c arcely believe that such thin gs 
could occur in a twentieth century civilization . 
With a vi ew to gaining a first - hand picture of the 
situation in Germany I asked the Secretary of State 
t o order our Ambassador in B~rlin to return at once 
f or report and consultation . 
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At the San Francisco Conference of 1945, Dr . 0 . Frederick 
Nolde , representing the Federal Council of Churches , the Ameri-
can Jewish Committee , and other groups , presented a petition 
to Secretary of State Stettinius asking for postwar guarantees 
of human rights in the United Nations Charter . The support 
of the American delegation for the petition assured the acqui -
escence of the other delegations and the Charter was adopted 
with numerous references to human rights . 3 Article 1 , 
1 . Adler and Margalith , p . 380 . 
2 . The New York Times, November 16 , 1938 , p . 1 . Quoted in 
Adler and Margalith, p . 381 . 
3 . Adler and Margalith, pp . 451 - 2. 
Section 3 called for international cooperation "in promoting 
and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction as to race , sex , lan-
guage or religion . " Thus was American religious influence 
given access to international negotiations in seeking to pro-
tect religious liberty . The postwar years witnessed repeated 
expressions of official and religious indignation over the 
treatment a c corded Catholic leader s in Communist countries , 
Jews in Arab countries , and Protestants in Colombia and other 
Latin countries . 
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The religious affiliation of American diplomatic officials 
or members of their families has occasioned special attention 
more than once . President Cleveland appointed Anthony M. 
Keiley of Virginia to the post of Minister of Austria- Hungary 
in 1885. The latter government declared the appointment "un-
acceptable" because Keiley ' s wife was Jewish . Secretary of 
State Thomas Bayard protested the attitude of Austria- Hungary 
on the basis of the u.s . Constitution's requirement in Article 
VI , Section 3, that 11 no religious test shall ever be required 
as a qualification to any office or public trust under the 
United States." Cleveland took the extraordinary step of dis -
cussing the matter at some length in his annual message to 
Congress on December 8, 1885. His remarks on that occasion 
provided a "classic statement" frequently quoted in dis-
cussions of religious liberty . l Keiley eventually resigned . 
At times, religious groups have been critical of the 
State Department for alleged discrimination in the selection 
or assignment of diplomatic personnel, as well as in the ad-
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ministration of such routine services as the issuance of pass -
ports . It was reported in the late thirties that the Depart -
ment had adopted a policy of using only Roman Catholics as 
cultural attaches or consular officials in Latin American 
countries . As the hierarchies in those countries have stepped 
up their campaign against Protestant missions , there have been 
repeated claims by Protestants that they have had difficulty 
2 in securing passports . Both Christian and Jewish leaders 
have criticized American "understandings" with Saudi Arabia 
which provide that no Jewish personnel will be employed in 
official relationships with that country. 
Periodically, the issue of diplomatic representation to 
the Vatican has been aired by American opinion . V>lhile the 
first of a numb er of consuls to the papacy was appointed in 
1797, the declared opposition of such Protestants as James 
Madison to full political recognition of the Pope was the 
position which generally prevailed until 1848. In that year , 
after many Americans had responded favorably to the reform 
1. Stokes, I , 879- 82 . 
2 . Nichols , p . 263 . 
l 
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policies of Pius IX, President Polk appointed the U.S. lega-
tion secretary in Paris , Jacob 1 . Martin , as charge d'affaires 
at Rome --though not without heated debate in the Senate . 
Various ministers followed Martin to that post until 1867, 
when restrictions on Protestant worship within Rome city lim-
its aroused Protestant opinion and led to the closing of the 
mission . 
The issue did not create a public clamor again until late 
1939, when President Roosevelt sent holiday greetings to Pius 
XII, George Buttrick (then president of the Federal Council 
of Churches), and Cyrus Adler (prominent Jewish educator) , 
proposing discussions of "our parallel endeavors for peace 
and the alleviation of suffering . " Non-Catholics were not 
disturbed until it was learned that the President had decided 
to send Myron c. Taylor as his "personal representative" to 
the Pope . To many , this seemed like formal diplomatic pro-
cedure, and the general reaction elicited from the White House 
the explanation that Taylor 's appointment was only "temporary," 
that he would serve without salary and would not be formally 
accredited by the State Department . For a time, the Federal 
Council reluctantly accepted the appointment on t ha t basis, 
although many Protestant leaders continued to spe ak and write 
in opposition to it . The Christian Century editorially re-
garded the whole affair 
not as a peace move but as a political move . 
Roman Catholics will be greatly pleased and 
can be counted on to remember it at the polls. 
Protestants and Jews are expected to be diverted 
by the sop in the invitations to Dr. Buttrick and 
Dr. Adler, and to forget it long before November . 
In that expectation w! predict that the President 
will be disappointed . 
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Just how many Protestants and Jews "remembered" in the elec-
tion of 1940 is problematical in view of Roosevelt's generally 
strong support for a third term, whi ch the Century opposed . 
However, pressure was again put upon the White House when 
President Truman declined to recall Taylor at the end of the 
war . When the "personal representative" finally retired in 
1950, Truman appointed General Mark Clark to succeed him. 
There was sufficiently effective protest by Protestants and 
Jews for Truman's position to become untenable, and Clark 
stepped aside . No subsequent appointment has been made. 
iii . Religious interests abroad 
American diplomacy has occasionally confronted religious 
conflict in cases where identification of Americans with reli-
gious interests in other countries has been primary, while 
national origin, missions, or religious liberty has been only 
a secondary concern, at best . Two such instances have been 
"the Mexican situation" and the Spanish Civil War. 
When recognition was extended to the Carranza government 
of Mexico on the eve of World War I, there were scattered 
pressures on President Wilson from various directions . 
1 . "American Envoy to the Vatican," The Christian Century, 
57 (January 3, 1940), pp. 3-4. 
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Catholics complained that the disestablishment of their 
church by the new government was injurious to their religion 
and that American recognition seemed to sanction that action . 
At the same time , Wilson was accused of pro-Catholicism by 
outspoken Protestants , particularly because h is private secre-
tary , Joseph P . Tumulty , happened to be Catholic . Some im-
agined that Tumulty was a "spy" for the hierarchy and that 
the Pope was about "to take control of the government in 
Washington . " These conflicting pressures effectively neutral -
ized each other and enabled Wilson to maintain recognition . l 
Later , Presidents Coolidge ( in 1926) and Roosevelt (in 1934) 
were urged by Catholic leaders to intervene in Mexico . A 
diplomatic break was sought , the Mexican consulate was pi ck -
eted , and there were Catholic boycotts of Mexican goods . But 
American policy was not to be reversed in the years of the 
"Good Neighbor . " 2 
The Spanish Civil War produced international religious 
identifications in Americans which were not explainable as 
sanctions for diverse national origins . According to Lubell, 
Catholic- Protestant polarization over that conflict remains 
(as of 1956) 11 one of the more important political dividers in 
the country . Both Catholics and non- Catholics still are 
fighting to vindicate the positions they took in that 
1 . Edmund A. lVJ:oore , A Catholic Runs for President (New York : 
The Ronald Press Company , 1956), pp . 16-17 . 
2. Nichols , pp . 258 - 9 . 
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struggle . " American Catholics generally supported Franco , 
who had the unqualified backing of the Vatican , although some 
liberal Catholics exhibited their unhappiness with that po-
sition . While Catholic groups lobbied for the recognition of 
Franco , there was pronounced sympathy for the Republican g overn-
ment in liberal Protestant circles . American policy remained 
equivocal . When the United States blockade a gainst supp lies 
to Spain app eared on the verge of being lifted (wh ich would 
have permitted strengthening of the Republican position), 
President Roosevelt at length declined to do so, allegedly 
because of pressure invoked during the visit of uhigh church 
dignitaries" (Catholic) to him concerning the matter . 2 
The patterns of religious conflict abroad may thus pro-
ject back upon the American public and stalemate American 
policy- - or they may so diffuse public response that policy-
makers can maneuver without effectively crystallized opposition. 
In the dynamics of religious influence, the most opposite ef-
fects may once more be discerned . 
3 . Intranational Conflict 
The "Mexican situation" and the Spanish Civil War demon-
strate the pivotal relationship which may develop between 
international conflict and intra- national conflict on certain 
foreign policy questions of interest to relig ion. Religion is 
l . Lubell, The Future of American Politics, p . 238 . 
2 . Nichols , pp . 261 - 2 . 
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not simply a cohesive force in the modern nation-state, 
nor is it only a source of conflict among nation-states. It 
is a source of conflict within nations and, as the final chap-
ter will demonstrate, a source of cohesion among nation- states . 
The same capacity of universal religions to generate conflict 
through foreign missions must be acknowledged in the dynamic 
in~act of religious power domestically . Among the modes of 
domestic conflict produced by religion within the body poli -
tic are: (1) religious conflict; (2) conflict between reli -
gion and political power; and (3) conflict for decision-
makers between the claims of religion and the claims of poli -
tics. 
i . Religious conflict and the body politic 
When religious differences are projected into the polit -
ical arena , political conflicts are created . The very capac-
ity of religion to bring unique forms of power to bear upon 
other institutions equips all s eparate religious groups with 
a tendency to preserve or protect their own power positions . 1 
Religious conflict is a source of political conflict. While 
political loyalties reveal the differential distribution of 
religious affiliations according to national origins , section-
al and class status and other non- doctrinal factors , these 
same factors are heightened in their institutional manifesta-
tions among the denominations . That is , religious conflict 
1 . Mack and Snyder , p . 215 . 
\ 
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cannot simply be reduced to other forms of conflict: it is a 
consequence of the variety of centers of religious loyalty 
which, whatever their origins, reveal the influence of doc-
trines and of traditional group identifications. In turn, 
these competing centers of religious loyalty condition the 
participation of citizens in the political system and bring 
organized efforts to bear upon it . There is a reciprocal in-
fluence between religious and political conflict: neither is 
wholly a function of the other . 
Religious conflicts relevant to the study of United 
States foreign policy may be classified according to whether 
they are formal or informal . Formal conflicts are those which 
bring to a focus the differences among denominations within 
Protestantism and between Protestantism and Catholicism or 
Judaism. Informal conflicts are those which cannot be thus 
identified with official religious groupings but which occur 
within and cut across them. Among such conflicts are two 
which have been previously identified: (a) a vertical conflict: 
the "opinion gap" between pronouncements and constituent senti-
ment; and (b) a horizontal conflict: such fundamental theolog-
ical and ethical controversies as those between pacifists and 
nonpacifists . 
Presidents and other national leaders since Abraham Lin-
coln have had occasion to discover the force of his complaint 
during the Civil War that he had been "approached with the 
most opposite opinions and advice, and that by religious men, 
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who are equally certain that they represent the Divine will." 1 
The political responses to religious conflict include resent-
ment, the stalemate of policy, and, if the conflict is dif-
fuse and unorganized, the possibility of policy maneuver in 
which religion is reduced to irrelevance. During the late 
1930's, the conduct of American foreign policy was stalemated, 
owing in large measure to lack of religious consensus within 
the nation. Pacifism was still a doml nant force in Prates-
tantism. Jews were increasingly demanding intervention 
against Germany. Both Catholic and Protestant sentiments 
were pulled and hauled by the Spanish Civil War , the policies 
of Germany, Italy, Japan, the Soviet Union , China, and England, 
and by all of the emotions associated with those nations. 
Underlying all of these was the historical preference for iso-
lationism. 
In the United States, policy-making becomes especially 
difficult, if not impossible, when confronted 
by Catholic suspicion on one side, by Protestant 
suspicion on the other. A policy which, whatever 
its motives, may end in the destruction of the 
possibility of Catholic life in Poland, for in-
stance, or the physical destruction of Rome , will 
be seen very differently by those who care for 
Catholicism and for Rome and by those who don't. 
The American Catholic • • • tends to make the 
attitude of a foreign government toward the 
1. Luke Ebersole, Church Lobbying in the Nation's Capital 
(New York: The Macmillan Company , 1951}, p. 8. 
The occasion was a visit to the White House by a com-
mittee of denominational leaders from Chicago, September 
13, 1862, to urge the immediate issuance of an emancipa-
tion proclamation. 
Catholic church a touchstone of its decency, 
as Jews do the treatment of Jews.l 
Walter Van Kirk once wrote of the "inferiority-complex" of 
organized Protestantism compared with the confidence of 
Catholicism in international affairs. One result of such 
a "complex" is the tendency on the part of many Protestants 
to exaggerate the amount of Catholic "interference" in for-
eign policy. "It is probably much nearer the truth to say 
that the weight of Roman Catholic opinion in the field of 
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political and social action is derived from the mass solidar-
ity of this church, the alertness of its hierarchy , the ef-
ficiency of its organizational structure, the skill with which 
it implements its techniques of public information, and the 
known fidelity of Catholics to their heritage of religious 
obedience." 2 While the terms "mass solidarity" and "reli-
gious obedience" need to be qualified by the "opinion gap" 
which is evident even among Catholics, the Protestant re-
sponse to such qualities often intensifies religious conflict 
and weakens religious influence upon policy . Protestantism's 
own internal divisions also provoke impatience and disillu-
sionment from the press in its efforts to report all of the 
varied public activities of Protestants , compared with its 
gratitude for the ease afforded by the efficiency of Catho-
lie press relations. But this very reaction from the press 
1. Brogan, The American Character, p . 107. 
2. Walter Van Kirk , A Christian Global Strate~y (Chicago: 
Willett , Clark and Company, 1945), pp. 95- • 
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tends to be perceived by Prot e stants as "Catholic control of 
the press" and not as a consequence of Protestant inefficien-
cy . While there may have been occasions in which direct pres -
sure of the American hierarchy has been successful in influ-
encing the press (the reporting of the Spanish Civil War is 
often cited), the fact of Protestant fragmentation is more 
consistent and conspicuous . Pro testants have regaro~d the 
National Catholic Welfare Conference , the American bishops 
organized for public policy , with "a mixture of fear and envy, 
and their reaction has naturally been to strengthen their own 
inter-denominational body , the National Council of Churches . " 1 
The pronouncements of Protestant and Catholic bodies 
have brought them into their most intense conflict over the 
issue of assistance to the Republican government of Spain 
and that of diplomatic relations with the Vatican . The lat-
ter issue , in Pfeffer's judgment, unites American Protestant -
ism more than any other political issue except Federal aid to 
parochial schools . 2 
To the extent that the solidarity of Protestant leaders 
on policy issues is a negative response to Catholic solidarity 
and an intensification of religious conflict, it tends to 
serve as a distraction from those problems of internal conflict 
1 . Leo Pfeffer , "Isrues that Divide , 11 The Journal of Social 
Issues , 12 (1956) , p . 24 . 
2 . Ibid ., p . 37 . Protestant - Catholic conflict in Washington on 
11 the church- state battlefront" is the primary theme of Paul 
Blanshard , God and Man in Washington (Boston : Beacon Press 
1960) . -- ' 
1 {) 
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within Protestantism such as the "opinion gap" and the basic 
theological - ethical issues of war and peace . These unresolved 
conflicts add more competing c l aims to the interdenominational 
rivalries to which policy- makers are subjected by religion . 
ii. Pressure Groups and Policy- Makers 
The fact that religious groups seek to bring direct 
and indirect pressure to bear upon policy- making is not recog-
nized by many members of those groups . There is a low degree 
of public awareness of the activities of denominational and 
ecumenical lobbies . Bone ' s study of American politics points 
to the relative "invisibility'' of religious pressure groups : 
The separation of church and state and the popular 
assumption that politics and religion should not 
mix have obscured the fact from many Americans that 
there is a formidable ' church lobby' both in Wash-
ington and in the states . In 1930 very few reli -
gious groups had an office in the nation's capital . 
Nowadays nearly every majol denomination has a 
Washington representative . 
One of the reasons for this invisibility is that some of the 
largest denominations do not acknowledge to themselves that 
they are "pressure groups" or "lobbies . 11 l'lethodist agencies, 
recognized by policy-makers as exercising the formidable 
public influences appropriate to the nation's largest single 
denomination, have declined to register as lobbies, insisting 
1 . Hugh A. Bone, American Politics and the }art~ System (2nd 
ed., New York : McGraw-Hill Book Company , 195 ), pp . 182-3 . 
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that their work is "educational . " By contrast, some smaller 
groups frankly and openly acknowledge that their purpose is 
lobbying and register in compliance with the Federal Registra-
tion of Lobbying Act . Among such overt lobbies is the Friends 
Committee on National Legislation, whose statement of general 
purpose is an indication of a direct approach in bringing 
religious influence to bear upon decision-making, particularly 
with regard to foreign p olicy: 
The general purpose of the Friends Committee on 
National Legislation is to assist members of the 
Religious Society of Fr iends and like-minded 
citizens to contribute effectively in the process 
of shaping important decisions by Congress and 
other agencies of the Federal Government on causes 
that Friends have at heart . Friends are concerned 
today, as they have been in the past, that govern-
ments shall act wisely and justly in furtherance 
of the well-being of people, toward the creation 
of a true 1-wrld community, and for the elimination 
of the institution of war and militarism.l 
The small circle of Friends and other pacifists is not visible 
to most American Protestants on foreign policy issues except 
as pacifist demonstrations win press headlines . 
Another reason for the invisibility of Protestant pres -
sure groups --and perhaps the most important--is the marginal 
status of both pronouncements on foreign policy and the denom-
inational representatives who bring them to the attention of 
policy- makers . It is h ere that the "opinion gap" is perceived 
1. "Statement on Legislative Policy , the Friends Committee 
on National Legislation , for 1949 , " quoted in Ebersole , 
p. 26. 
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by political leaders even though religious leaders may pretend 
to speak for their constituencies. Public officials tend to 
be most responsive to the pressures of those groups which can 
command powerful rewards and punishments through their consti-
tuents: solidarity of opinion and support or opposition at the 
polls. When politicians suspect that Protestant pronounce-
ments are not even communicated to local parishioners, they 
are able to discount those pronouncements. 
They are wise enough to know that a pronouncement 
by a Baptist convention will not be the opinion 
of all Baptists, that a statement by the National 
Council of Churches will not represent the think-
ing of all American Protestants, and that a posi-
tion taken by the Commission of the Churches on 
International Affairs of the World Council will 
not have the considered support of world Protes-
tantism. This by no means implies that public 
officials are indifferent to church opinion; it 
suggests rather that they take the opinions for 
what they are--those of a few leaders of better 
than average standing. 
The threat to policy-makers which a religious pressure group 
justifies to itself is that group's claim to universal values 
by which the acts of government are to be judged. Religious 
loyalties transcend national loyalties and create tensions 
with political loyalties. For Christians, as Morray suggests, 
there is a continuing "crisis of patriotism'' or a "schizo-
phrenia of loyalties."2 In a sense, the very power of Protes-
tantism to influence foreign policy is dependent upon its 
1. Hill and Lund, p. 54. 
2. Morray, p. xv. 
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capacity to generate conflict. Unless it is able to establish 
and maintain loyalties which can provide sanctions against 
political organization and action, Protestantism is reduced 
to the function of blessing whatever the nation-state chooses 
to do. Yinger makes the category of conflict explicit in his 
discussion of the relationship between universalist religions 
and politics: 
A universalist religion, consistently carried 
through, must conflict at various points with 
the political activity of a society, with its 
concern for only a segment of mankind and its 
ultimate appeal to force •••• Unless the 
religious system around which the institutions 
have been built is completely destroyed, an 
implicit conflict will remain. Despite the 
enormous pressures toward the nationalization 
of religion in the modern ·~orld, it seems highly 
unlikely ••• that the universalist element in 
the world religions will ever be lost, however 
much those religions may change in theology, 
ritual, or organization.l 
The 11 supranationality" of the Church as the Una Sancta 
has been a prominent theme in ecumenical thought and action 
since the Stockholm Conference of the Universal Christian 
Council for Life and Work in 1925. This concept of "supra-
nationality" was given more concrete meaning at the Oxford 
Conference on Church, Community, ru1d State in 1937 which af-
firmed that, in the event of war, 11pre-eminently the Church 
must manifestly be the Church, still united as the one Body 
of Christ."2 
1. Religion, Society, and the Individual, p. 238. 
2. The continuing solidarity of "the Oxford spirit" during 
World War II and after is discu:3sed below, Chapter VIII, 
section 2:iii. 
While pressure groups representing the denominations 
and the ecumenical movement bring the function of conflict 
to a focus in Washington and at the United Nations , they 
must be seen in relationship to th•:? efforts of religious 
leadership to influence mass opinion. Some individuals are 
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able to influence decision-making .significantly on behalf 
of their religious constituencies , but they are most able to 
do so when they can demonstrate ma.ss support. The leaders 
of the Ant i-Saloon League could e~Jloy pressure with con-
fidence as a 11politico-ecclesiastieal machine" because, as 
one of them more recently remember13d with nostalgia, "In 
the old days we said to congressmen , ' Come ,' and they came; 
we said 1Go, 1 and they went." A f:Lxed platform, the central 
control of funds, and the dependab:Lli ty of voting support 
gave to the Prohibition movement a political power in which 
the efficiency of religious influence was uniquely developed. 1 
The repeal of Prohibition and the r1emories of both religious 
and political leaders have invoked inhibitions against the 
establishment of such a religio-po:_i tical movement on other 
issues. Since 1920, Protes tant groups have typically planned 
short-term "crusades" to influence mass opinion, notably on 
foreign policy issues. 
1. Ebersole , p. 22. This study of church lobbying by Eber-
sole discusses the types and tec·.hniques of Protestant 
groups in Washington a decade ago. 
In 1924, Protestant missionary leaders launched a cam-
paign against the "militarism" of the treaties which had 
guaranteed mission protection in China and other countries. 
Eighteen missionary societies and a majority of Protestant 
denominations agitated f or treaty revision . The campaign 
caught the "old China hands" in the State Department unpre-
pared politically. It now seemed to these career men with 
long memories that the inconsistency of Protestant fervor 
273 
had come full-cycle: in former years, when on occasion they 
had not rigidly enforced the treaties, they had been subjected 
to outraged condemnation by missionary interests . While some 
Protestant leaders expressed "repentance" for the actions of 
previous generations , the zeal of the new campaign against 
11militarismn provoked an understandable resentment and skep-
ticism. Arrayed against the forces of religion were those 
business interests which would be most threatened by the 
loss of extraterritoriality. The latter prevailed until the 
one effort for renegotiation was halted by the Japanese attack 
on Manchuria . 1 
The ~llanchurian Incident was the signal for a new campaign 
by Protestant leaders against the 11militarism" and "atrocities" 
of the Japanese who were contrasted with the "peace-loving" 
Chinese during the 1930's . In 1937, the renewal of aggression 
against China provoked more organized mi ssionary publicity 
1. Varg, pp. 194-203 . 
against Japan . John Leighton Stuart reports a 1937 con-
versation in China with Walter Judd, then a medical mission-
ary, who had witnessed Japanese conquest in the Shansi re-
gion and was particularly disturbed by the fact of Japanese 
dependence on America for the basic materials of war . Judd 
told Stuart that 
he must tell the American people of the iniquitous 
traffic which made us participants in these depra-
dations . It meant leaving China for as long as 
the Japanese remained in power, resigning with no 
resources of his own fr om his Mission Board, start-
ing on a crusade with no slightest assurance that 
the American public would care to listen to him or 
that even his minimum travel expenses could be pro-
vided . He had had some success in public speaking 
as a student, and that along with his burning con-
viction of having a burden on his soul of which he 
must deliver himself were his only assets •••• 
As he r elated to me instances of Japanese cruelty 
and described the consequences to China if this 
were allowed to go unchec ked , he became passionate -
ly excited . When he asked for my advice I could 
only urge him not to waste his energies on persons 
like me but to expend his fiery eloquence on the 
people at home . This he accomplished with marvel -
ous success, and it opened the way for his continu-
ing u a efulness to China as a distinguished member 
of Congress . Fortunate ly for all concerned , a 
committee had already )b een formed for the very pur-
pose he had in mind , and they were on the lookout 
for speakers when he arrived . l 
The committee which had been organized was the China Infor -
mation Service, established in Nanking in 1938 by Frank Price 
but with headquarters in Washington which provided a bulletin 
York: Random House, 19 
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and speakers ' bureau . 1 Protestant leaders also urged their 
members not to buy anything "made in Japan . " Latourette has 
written of this campaign that 11 it was churches through their 
missionary education who had done most to familiarize Ameri -
cans with the Far East and to create sympathy for China , the 
sufferer from the Japanese advance . Many Christians , by 
opposing the sale of scrap iron to Japan in an effort at 
' non- participation in Japanese aggression , ' contributed to 
the mounting feeling against the Japanese programme and so 
to the outbreak of war between Japan and the United States . "2 
Anxi ous to off set t he passion of their protests were mission-
aries in Japan who felt that the pic ture of China was one -
sided and who were uneasy over the hostility to the United 
States which was building up in Japan . 3 The "marvelous suc -
cess" of Judd and others was evident in a poll conducted by 
the American Institute of Public Op inion in February of 1940 , 
nea rly two years before Pearl Harbor : 7 out of 10 favored 
prohibition of shipment of military supp lies and materials 
to Japan , and 37 out of 38 expressed sympathy with China in 
the Chinese - Japanese conflict . 4 
1 . Varg , p . 260 . 
2 . Latourette , VII , 149 . 
3 . Varg , p . 263 . 
4 . Ibid., p . 272 . See also J . W. I111asland, "Missionary Influ-
ence upon American Far Eastern Policy , " Pacific Hi storical 
Review , X (1941) , pp . 279 - 96 . 
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If pre - 1941 opinion concerning China was primarily the 
product of missionary education , an observation of George 
Kennan is an indication of the critical reaction of some of 
the diplomatic historians : 
Unquestionably , our relation to the peoples of 
the Far East had been colored by a certain sen-
timentality toward the Chinese--a sentimentality 
as dis respectful to them and as unhelpful t o the 
long- term interests of our relations as the 
feelings of blind petulance into which it now 
has a tendency to turn . In general , we expect 
too much from our Asian friends in the way of 
intimacy and mutual liking . There is something 
patronizing in this attitude of ours . l 
The charge of "sentimentality" is frequently heard in the 
p olemics of foreign policy debate and is not subject to pre -
cise usage . If there is any validity to Kennan 's use of it 
here , it suggests that t here are likely to be differential 
and conflicting consequences for American public opinion 
when Protestant churches use the channels of missionary edu-
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cation to campaign for the interests of particular countries . 
From Kennan 's perspective , the quality of "blind petu-
lance" in present American attitudes toward China is a ref-
erence to the continuing moral and political repudiation of 
the Communist regime . From the perspective of some Protestant 
missi onaries , however , that repudiation is the refusal to 
abandon identification with the Chinese people who , they be-
lieve , do not sincerely support the Mao governraent . Many of 
those who did most to arouse American opinion a gainst Japan 
1 . Kennan, American Diplomacy, p. 55 . 
1 
in the 1930's have sustained another campaign since 1945 in 
defense of the Chiang government against the Communists . In 
late 1945, Walter Judd revisited China as a Congres sman and, 
according to Varg , as "Chiang's chief defender in the United 
States . n There were also , however , Protestant missionaries 
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in China who were sharply critical of Chiang, including the 
North China I"liss ion of the American Board who reported that 
they were "appalled by the gross corruption of the Kuomin-
tang . " During Judd's visit, however, they complained that 
they were unable to make their report to him because he was 
"tense and emotional" and 11 did all the talking . " 1 Judd re-
turned to the United States and, as Stuart wrote, was of "con-
tinuing usefulness to China" in Congress . Judd in the House 
and William Knowland in the Senate provided moral support for 
the "China lobby'' and helped to guarantee the persistent re-
fusal of the American government to recognize Communist China 
in the 1950's . Along with Secretary Dulles , they sustained 
the identification of rotestants with Methodists Chiang and 
Rhee . 
Stuart was the last American ambassador to China (1946-
1952) before the triumph of the Communists . The son of Pres -
byterian missionaries , he had been a teacher of New Testament 
and a missionary educator in China himself . His memoirs pro-
vide an interesting a ccount of the role of missions in relation 
l . Varg, p . 294 . 
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to the formation and execution of American policy . While he 
reports that he had many friends among both Comm.unist and 
Kuomintang leaders before assuming the ambassadorship in 1946, 
his service as an American diplomat found him subject t o the 
frustrations and resentments of both . Stuart repeatedly 
acknowledges the corruption and disorganization which had 
prevailed under the Kuomintang , but the introduction to his 
book by Hu Shih (Chinese ambassador to Washington 1938-42) 
t e stifies to the persistent alliance between Chiang Nation-
alists and some American Protestants on foreign policy is -
sues . After comparing Dean Acheson's Letter of Transmissal 
of the China "White Paper" with Matthew 27 : 24 which narrates 
Pilate ' s washing of hands , Hu Shih wrote : 11 Because of the 
betrayal of China at Yalta , because of its withholding of 
effective aid to China at crucial times, and, above all , be -
cause of its great power and undisputed world leadership , the 
United States was not 'innocent of the blood' of fallen 
China . 111 
The heavy emotional investment of American Protestants 
in the missionary movement in China continues to be manifested 
in such a way that no particular country presents a policy 
problem which divides Protestant leaders more sharply . Some 
1 . Stuart , p . xx . Acheson ' s Letter had concluded that "the 
ominous result of the civil war in China was beyond the 
control of the government of the United States . Nothing 
that this country did or could have done within the 
reasonable limits of its capabilities could have changed 
that result; nothing that was left undone by this country 
contributed to it . " 
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returned missionaries most impressed by China ' s difficulties 
under Chiang have been disposed to favor the recognition of 
Communist China and they have been supported by pronouncements 
of the National Council of Churches and several denominations 
seeking at least the reconsideration of American Far East pol-
icy . Such statements have been quickly repudiated by other 
Protestant leaders and by Congressmen. A vigorous protest 
against the identification of Protestantism with Nationalist 
China and the use of Protestant journalism to maintain it was 
made by Miller in 1951! Protestants , he complained, had been 
long ecstatic over Generalissimo Chiang Kai - Shek . 
There was no evaluation or even presentation of 
the politics of his regime , of his sources of 
support , of his program f or China , of his atti -
tude toward opposition groups and civil liber-
ties . There was simply a steady stream of praise , 
rising sometimes to the level of a litany , for 
the Generalissimo and his w}fe . Why? Because 
they are 'good ~ethodists . 1 
The "narrow house - organ approach" to national policy 
reflects the attitude of too many sectors of 
Protestantism. They are not interested in gen-
eral political policy , they are interested in 
their own institutional program . They are not 
interested in what happens to the world, but in 
what happens to the church . 2 
Not all Protestant campaigns for the arousing of mass 
opinion in foreign policy matters have been directly related 
to foreign missions . Others include : the crusade of the peace 
l . Hiller , ''A 'I1heologically Biased View , " p . 53 . 
2 • Ibid • , p • 54 . 
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movements for arbitration treaties prior to World War I; the 
organized support for the disarmament conferences of the 
inter-war years ; the program of the Federal Council of 
Churches' Commission on a Just and Durable Peace, under John 
Foster Dulles, to win popular support for the United Nations 
during World War II; the campaigns against Universal Military 
Training in the late 1940's; and repeated attempts to increase 
foreign economic and technical assistance and aid to refugees . 
In all of these efforts , Protestant groups have been joined 
by some Catholic and Jewish leaders and organizations. 
Defenders of these crusades do not find it difficult , in 
most cases, to prove their effectiveness . While their enthu-
siasm may lead them to exaggerate the power of religious in-
fluence upon public opinion and policy, they are , paradoxi-
cally , able to find testimony to that influence from its most 
severe critics . The "realists" have characteristically eK-
pressed a deep-seated antipathy to all crusades, even to the 
point of launching a "crusade a gainst all crusades . '' ith 
Fensterwald , they observe that there are "certain buil t-in 
features about crusades in general" whi ch have the effect of 
terminating their own effectiveness after a short time . "Cru-
sades work emotions up to a level far above that which can be 
permanently maintained . 111 But if crusades often are inherently 
1. Fensterwald , p . 121 . 
incapable of fulfilling their own objectives, they may have 
other consequences for policy-makers whose "gravest general 
problem," according to Almond, is t hat of ''the instability 
of mass moods, the cyclical fluctuations which stand in the 
way of political stability . 111 Protestant elites during the 
twentieth century have repeatedly given their constituencies 
the cues for those mass responses which have made responsible 
and consistent policy difficult and, at times, i mpossible . 
As "professional emotionalists," Protestant leaders have 
plunged into foreign policy discussion with a fervor not to 
be expended upon most other issues . The very nature of mod-
ern foreign policy , especially in a nation where popular con-
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trols are fundamental, encourages the enthusiastic participa-
tion of certain types of persons , according to c. B. Marshall : 
The sweep of its problems gives foreign policy 
a special attraction for those ••• born with 
a passion to reform the world . Foreign policy 
app eals to those inspired by identification 
with large and high-sounding public causes. Its 
complexities and subtleties are rich wit~ oppor-
tunity for generalizers and obfuscators . 
From the perspective of policy- makers, more important than the 
simple fact of participation by religious leaders is the ~ual ­
ity of that participation and, above all , whether it is sus -
tained or erratic participation . Statesmen have come to feel 
themselves "beholden to short-term trends of public opinion 
1 . Almond, p . 239 . 
2 . Charles Burton Marshall , The Limits of Foreign Policy 
(New York! Henry Holt and Company, 1954), p . 12. 
in the country and (to] what we might call the erratic and 
subjective nature of public reaction to foreign - policy 
questions . "1 While Protestant leaders cannot be blamed en-
tirely for the shape of public opinion-- in certain respects , 
they appear to have little control - -it can be asked whether 
their preferred technique of the "crusade" makes for a ra-
282 
tional and responsible public or whether it simply intensifies 
the problems of the policy- makers . 
The fact that policy- makers and diplomatic historians 
express a large measure of cynicism concerning religious 
pressure groups may not always reflect the objective circum-
stances in particular policy matters . To some extent, the 
most responsible and intelligent religious action i n the po-
litical arena will generate conflict . When that action does 
not support the positions for which public officials are 
seeking to win approval, religious leaders are exposed to the 
hazards which are confronted by all political groups: "loss 
of influence when wrong , demoralization when defeated, and 
the enmity of others . "2 Thes e hazards beget new and more sub-
tle dangers: the temptations to martyrdom and self-righteous-
ness which serve inevitably to alienate relig ious leaders from 
public officials and competing pressure groups . 
l . Kennan , American Diplomacy , p . 92 . 
2 . Hill and Lund, p . 77 . 
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iii . Intrapersonal Conflicts for Policy- Makers 
The relationships between religious leaders and policy-
makers are not simply characterized by conflict . There are 
some functions, in addition to the furnishing of sanctions 
for national policy, f or which policy-makers are more or less 
dependent upon private elites . One of those functions is 
that of being responsible spokesmen for the legitimate in -
terests which elites represent . When religious leaders call 
such matters to the attention of public officials, they may 
be received with appreciation for assisting government in 
its necessary tasks . ~men a representative of the National 
Council of Churches appeared before the Senate Foreign Re-
lations Committee in 1956 to point out that a draft Treaty 
of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation with Haiti had 
omitted the customary provision for the guarantee of reli -
gious liberty, it was obvious that the Committee was "grate-
ful for this reminder . " 1 
The fact that there can be an identity of religious in-
terest and the national interest at any point at all makes 
it possible for religious persons to serve in official posi-
tions related to foreign policy . Notwithstanding the widely 
prevailing skepticism concerning the historical qualities of 
religious influence upon foreign policy, the vast majority 
of American policy- makers are themselves at least nominally 
1 . Ibid ., p . 53 . 
\ 
affiliated with religious groups . In fact, the very in-
tensity of much of the criticism for which the "realists" 
have become spokesmen is a product of this affiliation ; in 
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the prophetic tradition , the mGst severe judgments are re -
served for religion itself . For the religious person employed 
by the political system, the tensions between the rival pres -
sures of church and government are experienced with special 
force . When religious leaders do not perceive these tensions 
within the experienc e of policy- makers and simply invoke the 
moral judgments of their denominations or their own opinions 
upon the heads of policy- makers , they incur the special risks 
of alienation within their own constituencies . "The clergy , 
as much as any sector of the American public , need to be 
warned against underestimating the immensity of the problems 
faced by the government in making foreign policy and against 
the temptation to offer ready , often ill - considered , solutions. 11 1 
Internal conflicts for policy-makers who are church mem-
bers are not simply those of conflicting roles , however . They 
are produced by the very nature of the process of decision-
making in which values must be related to concrete proposals 
for official action . It is precisely at this point that the 
"realists" have concentrated their discussion of the relation 
between the ultimate claims of Christian ethics and the 
1 . Ibid . , p . 45 . 
relative claims of foreign policy . While the dissertation 
seeks to advance a more comprehensive theoretical framework 
within which this relationship must be understood--and which 
will lend itself more adequately to the perception of this 
relationship empirically-- it must be acknowledged that the 
"realists" have most effec t ively dramatized this problem of 
internal conflict inherent in decision- making . Niebuhr, Mor -
genthau, Lippmann , Kennan , Halle , Marshall, Bennett, Butter-
field, and others have continuously portrayed the dilemmas of 
decision- making in all their tension, ambiguity, paradox, and 
compromise . 
In 1943 , Lippmann wrote that 11 i n foreign relations, as 
in all other relations, a policy has been formed only when 
commitments and power have been brought into balance . 111 
Decision- makers must not become so preoccupied with the ends 
of policy that they neglect the means necessary to the imple-
mentation of policy . Marshall's version in 1954 was that 
the goal aspect · of foreign policy is essential . 
It is also easy . It is the easiest part of the 
business . The difficult p~t comes not in 
figuring out what one would do if one could do 
everything one may wish to do . It comes in 
deciding what to do in the circumstances of 
being able to do only part of what one may wish 
to do . That is the task of handling dilemmas 
and of rationing means . Here the making of for -
eign policy reaches the vital level . Here suc-
cessis courted . Here failure is risked . 2 
1 . Lippmann, u.s . Foreign Policy, p . 7. 
2 . Marshall, pp. 30- l o 
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Similarly , Halle explained in 1955 that "the difficulty is 
not in choosing ends but in finding means. The problem of 
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choosing ends, in fact, arises largely out of the limitation 
of means; for a balance must be struck between the specific, 
practical ends a nation pursues and the means it has avail -
able for their pursuit . " 1 Perhaps the most systematic state-
ment of the internal conflicts built into the problems con-
fronting policy-makers is that provided by John Bennett's 
discussion of ttthe distance between Christian ethics and so-
cial policy . " In addition to the experience of jealousy and 
hostility among decision- makers , Bennett lists: (1) the 
history of accumulated disorders , prejudices, vested interests, 
and vicious circles of fear , hate , and vindictiveness which 
sets the stage for all present decisions ; (2) the fact that 
public decisions involve pluralistic communities in which 
only a minority may be Christians; (3) the impersonal relation-
ships characteristic of large - scale problems ; (4) conflicting 
group interests which intensify "moral blindness"; (5) the 
tendency to cloak self- interest with idealism; and (6) the 
dilution of p ersonal responsibility among decision-makers . 
Beyond all these are such "morally neutral" factors as techni -
cal issues, the need for prediction, and the problem of choice 
among competing values . 2 
1 . Halle , Civiliz~tion and Foreign Policy , p . 66 . 
2 . John C. Bennett, Christian Ethics and Social Policy (New 
York : Charles Scribner's Sons, 1946) , Chapter I I . 
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The religiously sensitive person cannot help experi -
encing these conflicts in acute form: his a bsolute religious 
loyalty must find expression in the relativities of political 
choice , but his sense of vocation is a response to the near -
absolute claims of the nation- state upon him . These conflicts 
a re not simply intellectual : they touch the deepest springs 
of personal sentiment . It is in the individual that conflicts 
of religious and political loyalties become most sharply fo -
cused . Decision-makers whose religious comn1itments are funda -
mental in their lives continue to bear those conflicts only 
at great physical and p s ychological cost . They may respond 
to intra- personal conflict by repressing it , compartmentalizing 
their loyalties , rationalizing their accommodation , projecting 
the tension upon others --or by deepening their religious in-
sight into the meaning of the conflict , releasing the ten sion 
in ever- renewed dedication to their calling , absorbing the 
hostility of others without returning it , sharing the meaning 
of their religious loyalty with others . The Christian in 
politics, wrote Jerry Voorhis , ''will constantly be confronted 
with the problem of half a loaf or none , and he will spend 
many a wakeful night wondering whether it is more nearly right 
to vote for the half loaf than to stand on principle and run 
the risk of getting none of it . "l Democratic government , even 
1. H. Jerry Voorhis , The Christian in Politics (New York : 
Association Press , 1951) , pp . 26- 7. 
at its very best , is "a process of compromise and reconcili -
ation of the various opinions of many different people . And 
therefore the difficult and usually unsatisfying task of the 
individual representative is to work unceasingly and wisely 
for the absolute right in which he believes but to make his 
choices and decisions from day to day not between white and 
black but between light and dar k shades of gray . "l 
Those entrusted with primary responsibilities as deci -
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sion- makers in fo r eign policy bear potentially the most severe 
internal conflicts with which modern men can be burdened . It 
is in their decisions that the ultimately religious problems 
of death , frustration , and hostility must be confronted more 
directly and more constantly than in the making of any other 
kind of decisions . It has been argued that the American 
President , with his final responsibility for foreign policy, 
should not be a "strong Christian" because of the polariza-
tion between religious and politi cal loyalties in the demands 
of political leadership : that the "strong Presidents" have 
invariably been "weak Christians . "2 It is only when one 
capitulates to the most narrow , ·moral is tic caricature of a 
Christian that this argument is acceptable to the faithful 
Christian . "Realists , " observi ng that 11 idealiststt have often 
relaxed the tension between ends and means in favor of the 
1 . Ibid ., p . 96 . 
2 . Warren B. Martin , "Weak Christian : Strong President , " 
The Christian Century , 77 (August 17, 1960), pp . 946-7 . 
ends, have just as often relaxed that tension in favor of 
the means . Whatever the external reli g ious qualities of 
an American Pres ident and others c ha rged with the direction 
of foreign policy , their most difficult t a sks require an 
ability to sustain the p rofoundest internal conflicts and to 
use them constructively . 
Wo odrow Wilson did not respond to international vio-
lence with the unambiguous enthusiasm of a "simple idealist . " 
Both the fidelity and the excesses of h is Puritan conscience 
were revealed in the decision to enter World War I and in 
his personal campaign for the League of Nations . With re -
gard to the former, Frank I . Cobb of the New York World pro-
vided the following account of a visit with Wilson in early 
April , 1917 : 
I'd never seen him so worn down . He looked as 
if he hadn 't slept , and he said he hadn't . He 
said he was probably going before Congress the 
next day to a sk a declaration of war , an d he 'd 
never been so uncertain about anything in hi s 
life as about that decision . For nights, he 
said, he'd been lying awake going over the whole 
situation •••• 'I think I know wha t war means ,' 
he said , and he added that if there were any 
possibility of avoiding war he wanted to try it . 
' vihat else can I do?' he asked, 'Is there any-
thing else I can do? ' l 
1 . The account by Cobb and others wh ich describe what Wilson 
himself called "the extraordinary isolation i mpo sed upon 
the Fresident 111 a re reported in 1\forg enthau , "Alone with 
Hi mself and History , " p . 25 . 
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CHAPTER VII 
RELIGION AS A SANCTUARY FRON CONFLICT 
1 . The Type 
The fifth function of reli gion in world politics is 
t o serve as a sanc tuary from pol itical conflict . 
The religious community recognizes the fact tha t all po-
litical conflict is personal as wel l as social - -that individ-
uals as well as col lectivities are inescapably involved in 
conflict . It cannot consent to absolute and total conflict 
among secular communities nor to the relinquishment of its 
ministry to persons participating in conflict . The ultimacy 
of religious loyalty requires a capacity to transcend polit-
ical conflicts for the sake of personal values . 
The Psalmist not only looked to God to favor him in a 
c ontest with his enemies: he sang of the Lord as his shepherd 
and believed that in all the days of his life and in the val-
ley of death he would be blessed with the goodness and the 
mercy of the Lord ' s house . 1 He looked to the Lord ' s protec -
tion in times of trouble and to the time when violence would 
cease : 
He who dwells in the shelter of the Most Hi gh , 
Who abides in the shadow of the Almi ghty , 
will say to the Lord, ' My refuge and my fortress; 
my God , in whom I trust .' ••• 
1 . Ps . 23 . 
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You will not fear the terror of the night, 
nor the arrow that flies by day •••• 
For he will give his angels charge of you 
to guard you in all your ways.l 
Isaiah proclaimed God's protection of at least a remnant of 
the people of the Covenant and the gathering of all peoples 
in peace upon his mountain: "They shall not hurt nor destroy 
in all my holy mountain: for the earth shall be full of the 
knowledge of the Lord, as the waters cover the sea."2 
The community of the New Covenant is promised a relief 
from travail and tension: 
Come to me, all who labor and are heavy-laden, 
and I will give you rest. Take my yoke upon 
you, and learn from me; for I am gentle and 
lowly in heart, and you will find rest for 
your souls. For my yoke is easy, and my bur-
den is light.3 
Paul's missionary message to the brethren at the church of 
Rome was a plea for "living sacrifice" as a ministry in con-
flict: 
If possible, so far as it depends upon you, 
live peaceably with all. Beloved, never avenge 
yourselves •••• No, 'if your enemy is hungry, 
feed him; if he is thirsty, give him drink •••• 
Do not be pvercome by evil, but overcome evil 
with good.Lj. 
Where Christianity recognizes the fact of conflict, it 
also establishes claims which transcend conflict. Divine 
worship in its fullness of personal sacrifice requires that 
1. Ps. 91:1-2, 5, 11. 
2. Is. 11:9. 
3. Mt. 11:28-30. 
4. Rom. 12:18-21. 
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persons make no pretense to ultimate judgment concerning 
parties in conflict; that Christians are enjoined against 
unrestricted and absolute conflict with other persons; that 
participants in conflict , whether deemed 11 friends" or "ene -
mies , " are worthy of both a physical and a spiritual ministry 
from members of the k oinonia , the loving community . 
The religious community ministers to the personal as -
pects of conflict by supporting individuals in the face of 
the demoralizing propensities of the conflict , which include 
the incur ring of guilt , the incidence of tragedy , the ravages 
of pain and suffering , and the confusion provoked by con-
flicting loyalties . The political community itself cannot 
adequately minister to these ultimately personal problems 
occasioned by its involvement in conflict , but it cannot 
maximize its effectiveness in conflict without at least per-
mitting the religious community to minister to them . Even 
the state which is normally hostile to religion will tend 
to recognize its inability to perform these functions by 
itself . The religious community , by definition , exists to 
deal with these ultimate problems and ceases to be religious 
to the extent that it fails to minister to them . At the 
very same time, it cannot escape the fact that its very min-
istry in these respects during conflict facilitates the po-
litical prosecution of the conflict and , to that extent , in-
volves religion as a party to the conflict . Both the 
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11worldliness 11 and the nforeignn qualities of the :koinonia- -
its power of identification with the political community and 
its power of transcendence of the political comraunity--will 
thus be manifested in its function as sanctuar y . John 
Bennett has described the fellowship of the church in terms 
of the combination of "peril and hope" for which it exists : 
"Always the church should be the teacher and inspirer of its 
members as they act in the world, and , when necessary, it 
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should be for them a home , where in perplexity or under pres -
sure from hostile forces they may find both light and healing . " 1 
The transcendence of religious loyalty and the preoc -
cupation of the religious community with its ministry to per-
sonal problems provide it with a certain orientation away 
from the purely political and military activities of the state . 
As the function of sanctuary tends to become more exclusively 
identified with the absolute demands of religious loyalty, 
various forms of rejection of political and military claims 
will be asserted by members of the religious community . 
Some will seek to limit the circumstances within which in-
ternational war is justifiable or to limit the weapons to 
be employed in the conduct of war . Some Christims will al -
low themselves only to perform such personal ministries as 
a military chaplaincy, the collection and d i stribution of re -
lief supplies , assistance to refugees, and medical service . 
1 . John C. Bennett , The Christian as Citizen (New York: 
Association Press , 1955) , p . 91 . 
Some will seek to substitute the ethics of the koinonia for 
the policy criteria of the polis , which universally have in-
eluded force and coercion . They will attempt to return the 
cross from its religious to its political symbolism- -not as 
the symbol of imperial persecution or conquest--but as the 
symbol of national self- sacrifice and non- resistance . Some 
will reject service to the state in any form , whether it be 
military service, the chaplaincy , the payment of t axes , or 
serving in public office , because they cannot assent to the 
inevitable assistance which these responsibilities render 
to the prosecution of conflict . Some will tend to reject 
both the political arena within the state and the interna-
tional arena as being illegitimate spheres of activity for 
religious persons --or they will seek to keep the conflicts 
of those arenas from being recognized within the sanctuary . 
They will quote Edmund Burke: 
Politics and the pulpit are terms that have 
little agreement . No sound ought to be heard 
in the church but the healing voice of Chris-
tian charity •••. Surely the church is a 
place where one day ' s truce ought to be allowed 
to the dissensions and animosities of mankind . l 
When this orientation of the sanctuary moves toward the 
reje c tion of the loyalty- claims of the political community 
and of the claims of the political community to legitimate 
1 . Reflections on the Revolution in France , quoted in The 
Oxford Dictionar of Q,uotations , Second Edition (London : 
Oxford University Press , 19 , p . 102 . 
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conflict with other political communities , this very re -
jection becomes itself the source of further conflict be -
tween church and state . This rejection will be countered 
by the reassertion of the force and legitimacy of the claims 
of the s t ate . 
2 . Ministry in Conflict 
i . Shelter for the Soul 
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The costs of international violence are ultimately per-
sonal . While the consequences of war may be measured in terms 
of property losses , changed boundaries , and altered govern-
ments , all of these acquire meaning only in relation t o the 
experiences of persons : victory and defeat , pain and death , 
loneliness , family disruption, moral confusion, mental ill -
ness , mobility , hunger , disillusionment , hate , fear, heroism , 
cowardice, guilt . The destruction of personal values which 
American Protestants exp erienced in World War I led to re -
peated interwar judgments that war was evil in its very na-
ture . But this did not preclude identification with the 
belligerents in World War II and a continuing ministry to 
persons caught up in that conflict . "Since war was sin , the 
Church as Church could not support it , but it would extend 
its ministry equally to those who felt they must support the 
war effort and to those who felt that cons c ientiously they 
could have no part in it . "l 
1 . Braden , p . 252 . 
War brings the ultimate loyalties of religion and the 
ultimate extremes of human conflict together in the most 
fundamental way . Whatever the ethical stance with regard to 
the issues of violent conflict or the legitimacy of partici -
pation therein, the church finds its own most distinctive 
functions projected into the very circumstances of violence . 
Protestants may reject war as an instrument of national poli -
cy, but the actual event of war calls for a peculiarly active 
ministry which transcends the issues of national policy in 
responding to personal need . Millions of Americans, indif-
ferent to religious obligations in peacetime but exposed to 
the strains and stresses of war , turn to the guidance , the 
security, and the consolation afforded by churches . Worship 
and prayer do not become less evident in war, but more so; 
pastoral counseling is not less demanding in war- - it is never 
subject to greater demand or greater need . 
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Towering above other personal experiences in war is the 
fact of death . Individuals become oriented to the fact of 
death in various ways : they confront it or fe a r it in their 
own persons; they suffer the fact and the fear of death for 
those whom they know and love; they witness death on the 
battlefield and in the bombed city; they become themselves the 
instruments of death and respond through repression, guilt , 
callousness , breakdown . Whatever the orientation to this 
ulti~ate experience, relig ion provides a sanctuary within 
which persons become more or less a ccommodated to death . 
Normal traditions of religious status within the nation give 
way to this profoundly personal predicament, whether in the 
relaxing of church- state barriers in the United States or in 
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the relenting of official hostility to religion in the Soviet 
Union . During World War II , 405 , 399 Americans lost their 
lives in military service; 670 , 846 survived wounds . 1 Millions 
of fam~lies were thus directly affected by death and by dis-
ability . Russian casualties exceeded those of every other 
nation: 7 , 500 , 000 died in action and civilian deaths were even 
more numerous . 2 After the German invasion of Russia on June 
22 , 1941 , Soviet policy t oward the Orthodox Church underwent 
a radical change . As military and civilian suffering in-
creased , the Church was allowed unprecedented freedom . It 
was the official recognitionof the problem of morale which in-
duced the change . The Church responded with expressions of 
national loyalty and wholehearted support for the war . 3 The 
Rus sian experience , while outside the framework of American 
institutions , demonstrates the inability of even the most 
politicized nations to rely solely upon political institutions 
for the solving of ultimately religious problems--especially 
during the most violent excesses of international conflict . 
1 . The World Almanac and Book of Facts: 1960 (New York: New 
York World - Telegram and Sun , 1960) , p . 741 . 
2 . Ibid ., p . 742 . 
3. Braden , pp . 259 - 60 . 
The memory of war and the threat of future war are not 
without consequences for religion. Since 1945, Americans 
have turned increasingly to religion: more than 109,500,000 
were reported affiliated with churches or synagogues in 
1959 . 1 Whatever the qualitative characteristics of this re -
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ligious revival, the quantitative evidence testifies to the 
continuing crisis through which people have been living . "Is 
it not significant that this revival of religi ous interest 
has come at a time when Americans feel helpless in the in-
security of the cold war and in the recurring danger of a 
2 hot war?" The answer implied in such a question is not that 
church membership is solely a response to world events but 
that its rate of increase or decrease may be conditioned by 
the degree of sensitivity to international conflict. 
ii . Refuge for the Body 
Whatever the sanctions of American Frotestantism in sup-
port of, or opposition to, a policy of war, churches have re-
sponded to violent conflict with a ministry of works as well 
as faith . Moreover , after both world wars of the twentieth 
century, they supporte d an official policy of relief and re-
habilitation with conspicuous concern . Notwithstanding the 
lack of American willingness to engag e in a large-scale re-
settlement program for Jewish refugees in World War II, 
1. The World Almanac, p . 711. 
2. Hill and Lund, p . 4. 
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churches worked with the government at home and abroad on 
refugee problems . Early in the war, a number of religious 
organizations helped in the reception of refugees: the Ameri-
can Committee for Christian Refugees, the Na tional Refugee 
Service, the National Catholic Refugee Service. The American 
Friends Service Committee fed needy children in Europe, 
operated ten ambulances in West China, established rehabili-
tation centers in various countries, and provided community 
services in Japanese-American relocation cruaps. 1 After the 
war, churches fostered the development of CARE, established 
11Food-for-Peace 11 programs and Church Wor ld Service, and sup -
ported the Foster Parents' Plan and other international 
arrangements for ministering to war orphans . Through the 
International Mi ssionary Council and the World Council of 
Churches' Department (now Division) of Inter-Church Aid and 
Service to Refugees, Protestants have contributed food, 
clothing , medical service, case work, legal advice, and group 
work programs to refugees, with particular concern for Arab 
refugees displaced by the Arab- Israeli conflict.2 The Ameri -
can Christian Palestine Committee, primarily sympathetic with 
Israel in the 1940's, broadened its interests to an 
1 . Clifton E . Olmstead, History of Religion in the United 
States (Englewood Cliffs, N. J .: Prentice-Hall, Inc ., 1960), 
pp . 569-70. 
2 . See Re ort from Beirut: A Re ort of a Conference on Arab 
Refugee Problems Geneva, Switzerland~ World Council of 
Churches, l9Sl} and Second Report from Beirut (1956) . 
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identification with the general problems of the Near Eas t, 
including that of the Arab refu gees . After the Hungarian 
revolution, religious comraittees worked with the United States 
and Austrian governments to plan for the resettlement of refu-
gees from the uprising . The National Council of Churches and 
member denominations endorsed President Eisenhower's procla-
mation of American support for World Refugee Year in 1959-60 
and gave wide publicity to refugee problems . 
The churches' own programs of relief and rehabilitation 
are related to foreign policy in a number of ways: (a) they 
bring religious leaders into working contact with government 
officials; (b) they provide a supplement to official programs 
in supporting national policy goals ; (c) they facilitate a two-
way process of understanding between American church ruembers 
and foreign nationals; (d) they assist t he government in fo-
cusing public attention upon matters of concern to policy-
makers . To the extent that the consequences of past wars be-
come the causes of potential wars, the mitigating of those 
consequences helps to lessen the probabilities of future war . 
On the other hand , such programs burden the churches with new 
interests in the world which may distract attention from , or 
may be the source of conflict with, the official i mplementa-
tion of foreign policy . 
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iii . Ministry to the Military 
In the wars of the twentieth century, churches have ex-
tended their personal ministry to the nation's armed forces 
through chaplaincies , religious literature, and other services . 
A Joint Commission on Army and Navy Chaplains operated during 
World War I to provide and supervise a government quota of 
one chaplain for each 1200 men . Working with the Commission 
were agencies of the major denominations , typically called 
National ar Councils , which not only recruited chaplains but 
made Bibles , religious books , and tracts available to service 
men . In addition , more than 11 , 000 Y. M. C. A. workers were 
active in providing canteen services , literature , and preaching 
. . l 
mlSSlOnS . 
In the fall of 1940 , the government announced that it 
was reinstating the World War I l/1200 quota for chaplains . 
Dur i ng the second war , particular attention was paid to the 
c ounseling responsibilities of chaplains in training schools 
established with interdenominational staffs . Each chaplain 
was trained to minister t o service men of all religious faiths . 
Protestant leaders reported effective co- operation with the 
Chief of Chaplains , Catholic Most Reverend William R. Arnold . 
Yet another evidence of the government's desire to avoid inter-
faith conflict was the Congressional appropriation in 1941 of 
$ 12 , 816 , 880 for the building of 604 chapels in Army posts and 
l . Olmstead , pp . 512 - 3 . 
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camps -- chapels designed with reversible altars usable by all 
three major faiths . In all , more than 8000 chaplains served . l 
The tragic symbol of interfaith cooperation was provided early 
in t h e war when a troop transport , the s .s . Dorchester , was 
torpedoed by a German submarine in the North Atlantic . Giving 
up their own life jackets and linking their arms in prayer as 
the ship made its final plunge were: George L . Fox , a Metho-
dist minister; Clark V. Poling , Dutch Reformed minister , John 
P . Washington, Roman Catholic· priest ; and Alexander Goode, a 
Jewish rabbi . All four were posthumously awarded the Distin-
guished Service Cross . 2 
The various forms of the churches ' ministry in conflict , 
while they may afford opportunities for cooperation with the 
government and for interfai t h cooperation , are all potential 
sources of conflict as well . Religious liberty during war, 
whether in the United States or in the Soviet Union , is bought 
at the price of general support for the war . Relief and re -
habilitation programs can intensify religious differences and 
limit the eff ectiveness of official programs, as did the con-
flicting faith group committees working under quota systems 
1 . Sweet , pp . 434-5. 
2 . Daniel L . Marsh , The Charm of the Cha;el (Boston: The 
Boston University Press , 1950) , p . 13 , tells the story 
of the four chaplains and presents portions of the Distin-
guished Service Cross citation in describing the memorial 
window consecrated for them in Marsh Chapel at Boston Uni -
versity , of which Fox was a graduate . 
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at the time of the Hungarian Revolution in the fall of 1956. 
The attempt to combine ecclesiastical and military professions 
in the chaplaincy is subject to role conflicts in which each 
profession claims the primary loyalty. While chaplains tend 
to urge the advantages of religious training in making "good 
soldiers," they are reluctant to acknowledge that religion can 
be "used" f or such a purpose . Recognizing that religion helps 
to sustain military morale , they are incl~ned to emphasize 
that function as a by-product of their ministry . But the 
evidence of conflicting loyalties is demonstrated in the mech-
anisms of compartmentalization and rationalization through 
which chaplains adjust to that conflict. 1 The church's own 
most unique ministries during war , proceeding from a concern 
to transcend conflict for the sake of personal values, in-
evitably relate those ministries dynamically to the conflict. 
It is the perception of this irreducible relationship which 
persuades some ministers to reject the chaplainc y and other 
programs which app ear to assist the government in the prosecu-
tion of the military effort . That such rejection itself is 
accompanied by further conflict suggests that there is no 
simple way to become detached from religious and political 
conflict in American society while a person retains both his 
religious credentials and h is national citizenship . 
l. Waldo W. Burchard, "Role Conflicts of JV!ilitary Chaplains ," 
American Sociological Review, 19 (October, 1954), pp. 528-35. 
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3. Rejecti on of Conflict 
There are various forms of rejection of confl ict which 
affect foreign policy and world politics . Religious influence 
may provide an orientation away from the conflict in each of 
these forms : by rejecting personal and national violence, by 
seeking to protect the nation through withdrawal from inter-
national commitments, and by rejecting the participation of 
the individual or of the religious community in the political 
arena . 
i . Pacifism: Rejection of Violence 
Following the War of 1812, the first of many peace socie -
ties was organized in the United States . In the late 1800 's 
and early 1900's, these societies responded to the more gen-
erally awakened international enth usiasm with a spurt of rapid 
growth , coming to represent the prevailing mood of the churches 
and of an apparent majority of Americans generally . It seemed 
to many peace leaders such as David Starr Jordan that only 
peace was compatible with "The Ivli ssion of America . " If the 
members of the societies did not uniformly articulate an ex-
plicit pacifism, there was a prevalent assumption that inter-
national violence wa s a thing of the past . The mental habits 
of peace leaders had been formed during three-quarters of a 
century of illusory isolation from the Monroe Doctrine to the 
Spanish-American War . Professions of guilt and shame after 
1900 and the nation's most obvious period of "imperialism" 
spurred the societies to new zeal in the early twentieth 
century. Most rejected the premises of "power politics" 
and expressed an aversion to armaments . On Peace Sunday in 
1909 , 50,000 sermons on peace were preached in American 
churches . With the financial backing of Andrew Carnegie , 
the movement seemed to reach its fulfillment in 1912 : Wood-
row Wils on was elected President and pacifist William Jen-
nings Bryan was appointed Secretary of State . 1 
In the conversion of American moral enthusiasm from 
peace to war in 1917, committed pacifists suddenly found 
themselves a persecuted minority. Protestant leaders were 
typically less willing than the War Department to seek the 
protection of conscientious objectors under law . Chaplains 
and Y. M. C. A. workers seemed especially determined to repudi-
ate any fellow churchmen who remained opposed to the war . 
The American Unitarian Association refused funds to churches 
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whose minis ters remained pacifis t. Methodist Bishop T . s . 
Henders on of Detroit made a pledge to "regenerate or elimi -
nate" any antiwar pastors in his area . While perhaps as many 
as several hundred ministers retained various shades of paci-
fist conviction, those who were outspoken lost many members 
fr om their churches . Only the Fe llowship of Reconciliation 
and the People 's Council conspicuously continued to oppose the 
war , attempting to protect c.o. 's and to secure a definition 
1 . Yinger , Religion in the Struggle for Power, pp . 178 - 9 . 
of war aims --but even they lost some of their most prominent 
leaders . Many were sent to Federal prisons for their paci -
fist objections . 
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After the Armistice and the post - ltJar disillusionment , 
there was a restoration of pacifism in Protestantism . Hundreds 
of ministers renounced their 1917 positions and returned t o 
the peace movement . All major denominations passed resolutions 
opposed to war . By 1934, perhaps the high- water mark of paci -
fist power in American histor y , a survey of Protestant and 
Jewish clergy disclosed that 62% would not sanction or parti -
cipat e i n war and 67% believed that the churches should refuse 
to sanction or support any war . Peace organ izations flourished 
again . They exerted heavy pressures in supp ort of disarmament 
conferences and urged the establishment of a Peace Department 
in the Federal government . 1 
It must be remarked , however , that pacifism ' s definition 
is variable , depending upon circumstances and upon individual 
interpretations . Strangely enough , it is only within the 
setting of social conflict that the dynamic properties of paci -
fism may be apprai sed . There are social and psychological 
factors shaping the size and strength of pacifism , i n cluding 
compulsions and aversions with regard to force generally . 
Kennan lifts up these characteristics as being fundamental in 
the history of kaerican public opinion as it has influenced 
1 . Ibid., pp . 187 - 9. 
foreign policy: 
Force , like peace , is not an abstraction; it 
cannot be understood or dealt with as a concept 
outside of the given framework of purpose and 
method . If this were better understood, there 
could be neither the sweeping moral rejection of 
international violence which bedevils so many 
Americans in times of peace nor the helpless 
abandonment to its compulsions and its inner 
momentum which characterizes so many of us in 
times of war . l 
The drives which carry moralis tic fervor can lend a psycho-
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logical consistency to a pacifist crusade and a military cru-
sade . Those who stand athwart either crusade at its high tide 
may be subject to sweeping personal rejection . In wartime, 
the pressures for conformity in loyal support of the war are 
so great that only a few seem willing to pay the social price 
and the personal costs of being categorized as pacifist . In 
peacetime, on the other hand , objection to war can be "almost 
a hobby or fad, and can even win a degree of popularity . "2 
Between the two world wars, pacifism's circle se emed to ex-
pand so wide as to include isolation ists and intolerant 
fringe groups . Most persons more strictly defined as paci -
fist after 1918 were ardently internationalist (although some 
did refuse support to Wils on's campaign for the League of Na -
tions because of his compromises at Versailles and the Cove-
nant's provisions for collective security) . It was, 
l . American Diplomacy, p . 88 . 
2. Franc is J . McConnell , The Christian Ideal and So cial Con-
trol (Chicago: University of Chicago Press , 1932), p . 127 . 
therefore, ironic that they should appear to come to be 
allied with pro- Nazi , anti-Semitic groups in pressing for 
nonintervention in the late thirties. Pacifism continued 
to have these associations in the public mind after 1941--
a major factor operating to limit the strength of pacifism 
in subsequent years . By pacif ism's refusal to sanction war, 
it was placed in the position of appearing to provide a reli -
gious sanction for isolationism (such sanctions were , in 
fact, being provided by other Protestant l eaders who were 
not articulate pacifist) and for groups which clearly repre-
sented the interests of the wartime enemies of the United 
States . The general support of the war effort after Pearl 
Harbor , while less enthusiastic than in 1917, demonstrates 
the minority status to which pacifism has been consigned in 
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the almost unrelieved international conflicts of the two sub-
sequent decades: 
Once again the churches exhibited how thoroughly 
intertwined with the rest of society they are . 
The dilemma that they face is made manifest by 
the inevitable retreat of the great majority from 
a position of pacifism. Once more they have had 
to accommodate to an 'inevitable, 1 even though it 
may be far removed from their ethic. Even were 
their loyalties entirely religious, many though t 
that to stand aloof from the conflict was not to 
stop it , but only to lose much of the influence 
for good that the churches might have had in the 
midst of it . l 
Some pacifists •..rould be disposed to question Yinger 's use of 
the word "inevitable" by reference to the changing character 
1 . Yinger , Religion in the Struggle for Power , p . 207 . 
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of modern war and the patterns of pacifist activity during 
World War II . Traditional pacifist sects , not without some 
dissension, generally refused to go along with the war . Pac i-
fists in the maj or denominations remained stronger than they 
had in 1917-18, and many sought to serve as actively as pos-
sible in working to reduce hate and atrocity stories, de-
fending civil liberties and improving race relations, and 
developing attention to war aims and pos twar planning . There 
was also more tolerance of con~cientious objectors by the 
Federal law and by public opinion: this time the churches 
worked with the National Service Board for Rel i gious Objectors 
in maintaining Civilian Public Service Camps . Protestantism 
more openly accepted its pacifist-nonpacifist differences; 
both groups worked together in the interests of a "just and 
durable peace . " Thus, pacifists were less extreme in their 
withdrawal from the conflict, and nonpacifists tended to be 
more restrained in their military fervor . 
The atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki complicated 
the ethical discussion of violence after World War II and the 
development of hydrogen bombs and long-range missiles raised 
still other issues . By the late 1950's, the "limited war" 
strategists and the Na tional Committee f or a Sane Nuclear Poli-
cy rallied many Protestants to new alternative positions , both 
short of the extremes of pacifism and unrestricted militarism . 
Accordingly, by 1960 five groups could be identified within 
Protestantism along a continuum between pacifism and 
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militarism: (l) 11 absolute pacifists" opposed to force as 
an instrument of f oreign policy or international organization; 
(2) "police-force pacifists" willing to support force under 
international controls through the United Nations; (3) "nu-
clear pacifists" opposed to nuclear weapons testing and stock-
piling but willing to support the use of conventional weapons ; 
(4) "limited war theorists" who would retain nuclear weapons 
as a deterrent but would not base military policy upon them 
because of the more prevalent threat of "brushfire wars" 
calling for conventional weapons -- or who would support the 
use of nuclear weapons primarily for "tactical" and not "stra-
tegic" purposes; and ( 5) "nuclear militarists" who would sup -
port nuclear weapons as the basic arms policy of the United 
States , some tending to suggest that they be used for "pre-
ventive war" or fo r a "forestalling blow . " In general , the 
"realists" have sanctioned the limited war theorists . 
While the fact may not be consciously recognized by some 
pacifists, their earnestness in rejecting violence is inevi-
tably a source of conflict in public opinion and foreign poli-
cy . Others recognize the nature of that conflict and seek to 
make it constructive by proposing positive alternatives and 
not permitting themselves to become personally alienated from 
nonpacifists and policy- makers . The attempt to practice an 
identification with parties in conflict, while rejecting the 
violent aspects of conflict, has occasionally provided Ameri -
can pacifists with unique opportunities for resolving con-
flict.1 
ii . Isolationism: Rejection of Foreign Policy 
Before 1898, the term "isolationist" was not so much an 
appropriate label for particular groups in the American pub-
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lie as a characterization of Americans generally . It is only 
with the development of a foreign policy after 1898 that 
"isolationism" came to be identified with movements of polit-
ical conviction in a differentiated public . This did not mean 
that the label was an acceptable or discriminating principle 
to all of those who were covered by it--in fact, in the inter-
war period , it covered a variety of convictions not held in 
common by particular groups . Not only were pacifists called 
isolationist: so were ardent nationalists and enthusiastic 
internationalists . nstrange bedfellows" as these clearly 
different groups became in interwar politics , they did form an 
unintended coalition, the effect of which was to delay mili-
tary resistance to aggression for the decade between 1931 and 
1941. Almond suggests the ttreligious" qualities of such a 
coalition: 
One may arrive at an isolationist position along 
more than one avenue. The nationalist rejects the 
limitations on power and discretion which alliances 
with foreign powers or participation in interna-
tional organization implies . The utopian 
l. See pp. 419-20 below for a discussion of pacifist "diplomacy." 
internationalist rejec t s the partialism of secu-
rity diplomacy and the sordidness of political 
and economic means . He worships in the pure 
church of humanity redeemed . In effect , but not 
in intent , he often finds himself lodge d in1 the same isolationist pew with the nationalist . 
Thatecclesiastical imagery should apply to nationalists as 
well as to internationalists in indicating the paradoxical 
combinations of "isolationism" was evident in the language 
of many religious and political leaders after 1918 . Senator 
~illiam Borah opposed Ameri c an entrance into the League of 
Nations because he feared the "contamination" of pure de -
mocracy through official contacts with the i mperialistic na-
tions of Europe . He preached that the "mission of America" 
was to demonstrate democracy to the world; democracy was more 
than a form of government : "It is a moral entity , a spiritual 
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force as well . And these are things which live only and alone 
in the atmosphere of liberty . "2 
The "outlawing" of war through the Kellogg- Briand Pact 
of 1928 was a notable instance of pacifist- nationalist - inter-
nationalist collaboration in support of a policy regarded by 
its critics as "isolationist" because it lacked effective im-
plementation . The United States did not thereby join the 
League of Nations nor did it assume any new obligations with-
in an alliance pattern . Brogan notes a parallel optimism 
1 . Almond , pp . 170- 1 . 
2 . Foster Rhea Dulles , p . 120 . 
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be t ween the Kellogg Pact and the Volstead Act (Prohibition): 
In that optimism there wa s a strong element of 
the old- time religion , of belief in the old 
evangelical mass conversion . Hundreds of thou-
sands had renounced the world, the flesh, and 
the devil in Kentucky or i n the 'burned- over ' 
district of New York State; why should not the 
nations renounce mutual murder? And this con-
version involved no serious mental stock-taking , 
involved no more than a firm resolu tion that the 
United States would not attack any nation and a 
belief that no nation would attack any other- -
especially the United States .l 
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Hill and Lund characterize the Kellogg Pact as a "church ven-
ture" which beg an in 1923 and which was principally sustained 
by the Federal Council of Churches and The Christian Century . 
That this characterization , made in criticism, has some validi-
ty is indicated by the positive claim of Charles Clayton 
Morrison ' s Century editorial of January 24, 1929: "It was the 
readers of the Christian Century who made the outlawry of war 
a reality . "2 Two years earlier , Morrison had published The 
Outlawry of War which had concluded with fervent support for 
Sena tor Borah ' s resolution to accept Briand ' s p roposal for a 
bilateral treaty : 
Thus cleared of ulterior intentions , this pro -
posal of M. Briand is pregnant with significance 
not only for France and America but for the peace 
of the world . If a simple , unencumbered treaty 
such as I have above suggested can be success-
ful ly negotiated by these two gre a t and influ-
ential powers, the logic of such an accomplish-
ment , tog ether with a prudent regard for its 
correct interpretation by world opinion , commits 
1 . Brogan , The American Character , p . 53 . 
2 . Hill and Lund, pp . 11-12 . 
both nations to go furt h er •••• But this 
means, on the part of the United States, nothing 
less than the adoption of the Borah re s olution 
for t h e outlawry of war as the p eace po l icy of 
this nation .••. With both France and the 
United Stat e s thus committed to the universal 
outlawry of war as their avowed policy for world 
peace, their i n vitation to other nations to join 1 them in realizing the g oal would be irresistible . 
In subsequent years, both diplomats and historians came to 
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express intense scorn for the Kellogg Pact a nd its mora l con-
sequences . In Foster Rhea Dulles' estima tion, it h ad become 
"almost universally agreed that the Kellogg-Briand Treaty had 
exercised a harmful rather than a helpful influence on the 
cause of world p e a ce . The outlawry of war s e rved to satisfy 
the conscience of the American people without r e quiring of 
them any positive action, and also cre ated an il l usion of 
safety which seemed to obviate the need for any more direct 
participation in world affairs . "2 The church es had generated 
a moral fervor which became a substitute for forei gn policy 
and a distracting influence from the responsibi l ities of 
policy-makers. That the campai gn for peace by treaty had, 
in some Prot e stant leaders, been prompted by a profound pas-
sion for p eace is unquestionable--the consequences were t hat 
Protestantism h ad bolstered isolationism. 
The Kellogg-Briand Treaty was repeatedly app ealed to 
by both government and relig ious leaders in the 1930's. When 
1. Charles Clayton J:vlorrison, The Outlawr - of 1.-'lar: A Construc-
tive Policy for World Peace Chicago: Willett, Clark and 
Colby, 1927), pp. 299 -300. 
2. Foster Rhea Dulles, p . 160 . 
the Japanese attacked 1'-'lanchuria in 1931, Secretary of State 
Henry L . Stimson protested on "moral grounds" under the 
Treaty . In time , Stimson came to favor active cooperation 
with the League of Nations and the imposition of economic 
sanctions against Japan . He was, however , opposed by Presi -
dent Hoover who insisted that the Treaty was not a military 
alliance but was enforceable solely by 11 the moral reproba-
tion of the world ."1 In this internal conflict within the 
administration , many Protes tant leaders swung to the support 
of the Stimson Doctrine as their identification with missions 
in North China and Manchuria asserted itself . Hoover , in 
addition to appealing to the "moraln arguments which the 
churches themselves had previously advanced, replied that he 
did not wish to aid the build- up of the military clique in 
Japan through external pressure . 2 
A Senate committee headed by Gerald P . Nye reported in 
late 1934 that United States and foreign munitions makers had 
been "linked together to increase the sale of their products 
by bribery , lobbying , and other methods . 11 Some Protestants 
responded to the 11 revelations 11 of the Nye Committee with a 
moral indignation which tended to reduce the causes of war to 
one: profiteering by munitions - makers . The Federal Council 
and The Christian Century gave vociferous support to the 
1 . Ibid ., p . 163 . 
2. Hill and Lund , p . 13. 
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Senate hearings. 1 One of the immediate consequences of the 
hearings was an effort to rally American opinion behind the 
Neutrality legislation introduced in 1935. A pronouncement 
of the Federal Council declared that "the United States 
should withhold aid from all belligerents in any conflict 
that might arise . " The Christian Century insisted that any 
nation 11 has a right to stay neutral at whatever cost , and 
that no cost which protects peace is too high . 11 2 
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After the Neutrality Act was passed , military adventures 
multiplied in widely separated territories . Italy attacked 
Ethiopia in October, 1935; Germany sent troops into the de -
militarized Rhineland in March , 1936; Germany and Italy both 
came to t h e support of Franco in the Spanish Civil War; Japan 
attacked China in the swmner of 1937 . While some Pro testants 
were beginning to question the ne~rality policy, iso lation-
ists and pacifists became more zealous in its defense . The 
latter groups expressed great alarm after President Roosevelt's 
"quarantine speech" of October 5, 1937 , in which he referred 
to the "epidemic" of aggression in the world community . The 
Christian Century ' s reply to Roosevelt was notably hostile: 
11Eis attitude toward the neutrality law , his use of the ' quar -
antine ' metaphor , his inveterate navalism, his need of dis -
tracting attention from certain unhappy features of his 
1 . Ibid ., p . 14. 
2 . Ibid ., p . 16 . 
domestic policy and of rallying Congress to his support , 
his possible ambition to outdo the other Roosevelt with the 
latter ' s Treaty of Portsmouth , and the contingency of a 
possible third term ·ambition--these considerations work to -
gether in the public mind to cause and in considerable 
measure to justify much of the apprehension which exists . " 1 
Roosevelt himself later acknowledged that his speech had fal-
len ~'-upon deaf ears -- even hostile and resentful ears . 112 
While some writers are not careful to distinguish be -
tween pacifism as a religious commitment and isolationism as 
a political mood, it is evident that political considerations 
other than those deriving from an articulate pacifism shaped 
much of the interwar response of Protestantism to foreign 
policy . That some pacifists were moved by these considera -
tions should not obscure the qualitative differences in 
peacetime pacifism--differences which may be understood as 
parallels to the diff erences in qualitative response to war 
in the twentieth century . A national policy of isolation, 
par tly stimulated by Protestant moralism, was able to count 
on substantial and effective Protestant sanctions in the late 
1920 ' s and throughout the 1930 ' s . When that policy modified 
and moved toward intervention , some Protestants moved with 
it while others dr~~ed up a militant resistance which did 
not yield until Pearl Harbor. 
l . Editorial , The Christian Century , 14 (October 20 , 1937) , 
p . 1287 . Quoted in Foster Rhea Dulles , p . 180 . 
2 . Dulles, p . 180 . 
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iii . Privatization: Rejection of Politics 
The nationalist - universalist tension is not the only 
internal paradox in the American character: there is a par-
allel tension in the paradoxical orientation of the Puritan 
ethos toward p olitical power and the authority of the state . 
The Puritan ethos has not only stimulated American energies 
to zealous political action : it has equipped Americans with 
moralistic inhibitions which serve to reject political ac -
tion . The very zeal with which persons seek to reform po-
litical institutions may proceed from a certain dark view 
of those institutions as the collective embodiment of sinful 
hmnan nature . The Reformation reverted to an Augustinian 
ambivalence concerning power and the state . 1 While it im-
parted much of the dynamic energy of Western nationalism and 
shaped demo cratic revolutions in England and America, it also 
implanted an enduring anxiety with regard to the very polit-
ical forms which it had helped to create . If the dynamic 
qualities of Cruvinism have become diffused and somewhat 
dissipated in succeeding politic al generations in the United 
States , the anxieties have been heightened and manipulated by 
both religious and political leaders. 
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Tocqueville , notwithstanding his recognition of the power 
of religion as "a foremost political institution" in America , 
1. The exposition of dua listic themes in church -state doctrines 
is especially prominent in Nils Ehrenstr om, Christian Faith 
and the Modern State (Chicago: Willett, Clark and Company, 
1937 • 
observed the tendency of Protestant leaders to exalt them-
selves above political responsibilities . "And when I came 
to inquire into the prevailing spirit of the clergy, I found 
that most of its members seemed to retire of their own accord 
from the exercise of power, and that they made it the pride 
of their profession to abstain from politics . 111 The non-
participation of most Protestant leaders in "politics" (the 
very word is pejoratively employed in the popular vocabulary) 
has helped both to generate and to sustain the anti - politi-
cal traditions of lay Protestants . 2 
The Puritan ambivalence in American politics has driven 
Protestants into the political arena with a peculiar moral 
fervor; it has also withdrawn Protestants from that arena 
with a chronic moral disdain . The Puritan ' s zest for reform 
has been matched by his fear of contamination. When }rotes -
tants ob-serve uninhibited Catholic and Jewish participation 
in politics, there is the persistent temptation to explain 
that very participation as a threat to American institutions 
and to reinforce the fear of contamination . The necessities 
of the political process --controversy, conflict, compromise, 
consensus --are subjected to moral repudiation rather than 
1 . Tocqueville , I , 320 . 
2 . President Eisenhower's repeated moralistic repudiation of 
"politics" and "politicians" unquestionably was an im-
portant factor in the intensity of Protestant identifica-
tion with him personally . 
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moral enlightenment . This withdrawal inflates the individu-
alistic propensities inherent in Protestantism; that inflated 
individualism returns to the political process a preoccupa-
tion with personality at the expense of public p olicy. Ameri-
cans tend to "equate political virtue with what is tradition-
ally known as personal morality . " 1 The tendency to simplify 
the standards of public behavior according to rigid c odes of 
personal conduct not only obscures the internal conflicts to 
which poli cy-makers are exposed and precludes a respect for 
the professional skills which are required to manage those 
conflicts : it releases Americans to engage in the private 
"pursuit of happiness" with a minimal degree of public obliga-
tion . There is thus a "privatization" of concern in the Puri -
tan ethos as it has developed in its American setting . 11 This 
centering upon private success means that we do not have a 
very sturdy tradition of public responsibility (though it's 
often celebrated in a rather uninteresting way in high school 
civics classes and Fourth- of- July oratory) . The economic 
philosophy we inherited said that if every man pursued his 
own private financial advancement , the over - all problems of 
the public would take care of themselves (but they don't) . "2 
1 . William Muehl , Politics for Christians (New York: Associ -
ation Press, 1956) , p . 40 . 
2. William Lee Miller , The Protestant and Politics (Philadel-
phia : The Westminster Press , 1958), p . 18 . 
Even where the sense of social responsibility has been 
stimulated in Protestantism, there has been a t ypical re-
jection of the political dimensions of that responsibility . 
Of particular relevance to this study is the non- political 
approach of many Protestant leaders exhibiting the most pas -
sionate concern for peace . There has been a preoccupation 
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with international organiza tion and with the future possibili-
ties of international law and a corresponding neglect of the 
national policy- making complex in foreign policy: the Presi -
dent and Executive departments , Congress , political parties , 
and pressure groups . Of the rejection of political instru-
ments in the fervent quest for peace , Wriston has written: 
Diplomacy moves in the medium of politics; there 
is no other atmosphere available, and it is folly 
to seek one . Schemes for the elimination of po-
litical forces in diplomacy are simply efforts 
to evade the facts of life . It is absurd to 
find men arguing for such a utopian program while 
pretending to deal realisticall y with world prob-
lems . l 
There are yet deeper relationships between the "privati-
zation" of Protestants and their Furitan heritage . Fromm 
and others , following Weber , have emphasized the role of as -
c e tic Calvinism in generating the energies of modern capital-
ism and of political democracy . The price of these develop -
ments , howe ver, was the dissolution of the security and con-
c reteness of pre- Reformation communities and their displacement 
1 . Henry ~ . Wriston , Diplomacy in a Democracy (New York: 
Harper and Brothers , 1956), p . 106. 
by a radical individualism . Middle class enterprise and 
confidence have always rested upon a substratum of anxiety 
wi th regard both to the authority of a God who is absolutely 
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sovereign and to the authority of a state which is peculiarly 
evil . Insecurity has been intensified by an increasingly 
rationalized economic system in which the individual is re -
duced to the status of means . hodern man in the 1tTest is in 
a condition of estrangement or alienation--alienation from 
faith in ultimate values , from spontaneous activity with 
other selves , and , fundamentally , from his own self . Without 
a sense of self , he cannot bear the burdens of freedom which 
individualism has bestowed upon him and resorts to such mech-
anisms as (l) the creation of new idols of authority; (2) 
the resort to unrestrained destructiveness; and (3) automaton 
conformity . 1 
The predicament of alienation generates a "privatiza-
tion'' of character which adds psychological substance to the 
"privatization" of morality . At the very time that these pri -
vate tendencies have elaborated themselve s , there has been 
a radical 11 politicization 11 of the national and international 
community . The claims of the state and the clamor of the mass 
media invade the privacy to which the individual has so 
resolutely dedicated his energies . Riesman writes: 
1 . This paragraph is essentially a recapitulation of the his -
torical argumen t of Erich Fromm , Escape from Freedom 
(New York: Farrar and Rinehart , 1942) . 
\ 
This invasion destroys the older , easy transi -
tions from individual to local , local to na-
tional , and national to internati onal interests 
and plunges the individual directly into the 
complexities of world politics, without any 
clear - cut notion of where his interests lie . 
At the same time politics becomes more difficult 
to understand in a purely technical sense , partly 
because it invades previously semi - independent 
spheres like economics , partly because of the 
growing scope and interdependence of political 
decisions . For instance , in modern war people 
must understand that higher taxes are necessary , 
not to meet government expenditures or even to 
redistribute income , but because industrial and 
private consumers must be kept from spending too 
much and because the government n ee ds to buy 
g oods and services that would be scarce if people 
were left with money to buy them . The incompre -
hensibility of p olitics gains momentum not only 
from the increase in its objective complexity but 
from what is in some respects a drop in the gen-
eral level of skills releyant to understanding 
what goes on in politics . 
While "privatization" and 11 politicization 11 thus have been 
occurring simultaneously as rival tendenci es wi thin twentieth 
century American life , the quality of personal reaction to 
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the latter has largely been to reinforce the former . There is 
a "vicious circle'' in which public responsibility is continu-
ally undermined by the excesses of an anxious , moralistic , con-
forming "individualism'' (that individualism having largely 
lost the quality of autonomy) at the very time in whi ch pub -
lie responsibility of an unprecedented character is required 
for human survival . Religiousleaders and others can play 
1 . David Riesman , with Nathan Glazer and Reuel Denney, The 
Lonel Crowd ; A Stud of the Chan in American Character 
Abridged , Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Company , Inc ., 
1956) , p . 205 . 
upon the threat to survival in such a way as to weaken the 
capacity of persons to meet that threat resourcefully . As 
Miller puts the dilemma for Protestants, nThis is what has 
happened: a nation with a most unpolitical tradition has now 
become the nation that most urgently needs political under-
standing ."1 
Beyond the requirements of knowledge and understanding, 
however , there are irreducibly moral and spiritual dimensions 
of political responsibility . The degree of Protestant alien-
ation from the arena of politics mus t be measured in such 
qualities as apathy and indifference even where the resources 
of knowledge are available . The political alienation of many 
Americans is not 11 the classic , quiescent indifference of the 
tradition- directed . It is to a large degree the indifference 
of people who know enough about politics to reject it , enough 
about political information to refuse it , enough about their 
political responsibilities as citizens to evade them . "2 
Levin has described the aspects of political alienation 
in Ameri c an cities, noting that Protestants "have stronger 
feelings of political alienat ion" than Catholics : 
Political alienation is the feeling of an indi-
vidual that he is not a part of the political 
process. The politically alienated believe that 
their vote makes no difference . This belief 
1. Miller , The Protestant and Politics , p . 19 . 
2. Riesman, pp . 196-7. 
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arises from the feeling that political decisions 
are made by a group of poli tical insiders who 
are not responsive to the average citizens -- the 
political outsiders . Political alienation may 
be expressed in feelings of political powerless -
ness , meaninglessness , estrangement from political 
activity , and normlessness . l 
The tendency to withdraw from politics because "they" are 
making the decisions thus becomes the source of a new social 
conflict between the powerful and the powerless . The Prot -
estant withdrawal from politics must be seen in the broadest 
possible perspective . That middle class Protestants should 
experience such a high degree of political alienation is not 
simply a consequence of the psychological properties of 
Puritanism: their political orientation is conspicuously re-
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lated to the patterns of social mobility in America in the 
twentieth century . The mobility of Protestants is partly re -
sponsible for the lack of sustained identification with partie -
ular communities which is almost the first maxim of political 
success and the source of a high degree of political interest . 
More dramatically evident to political observers , however , is 
the fact that the movement of white , middle class Protestants 
up the status ladder has meant a mass movement from the cities 
to the suburbs . If Protestants still comprise a numerical 
majority in the United States, that statistical fact must be 
measured against two others: ( a ) America is an urban nation , 
1 . Murray B. Levin , The Alienated Voter: Politics in Boston 
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston , Inc ., 1960), 
pp . 61 - 2 . 
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and (b) urban centers are increasingly populated by non-
Protestant and non-white gr oups . In a sense, the Protestant 
withdrawal from politics is a function of the Protestant with-
drawal from the city . That withdrawal, often accompanied by 
feelings of guilt , is partially converted into a reinforce -
ment of the moralistic image of politics as "corrupt," 
"machine - ridden , " and "Catholic - controlled . " The defensive 
reaction of rural Frotestantism to the problems of an in-
creasingly urbanized nation combines with the alienation of 
suburban Protestants to prevent national action in many poli -
cy areas . 
The results of this intensified alienation from politics 
are manifo l d in their influences upon the nature of Frotestant 
participation in the nationJ$ foreign policy: (l) Protestants 
are further removed from the political instruments of policy-
making; (2) the escape from the invasion of racial and reli-
gious minorities removes Protestant leadership from the scene 
of those domestic conflicts most readily perceived abroad, 
while actually intensifying those conflicts at h ome; (3) the 
abandoning of urban centers weakens Frotestant identification 
with those domestic economic and welfare problems which are 
increasingly draining the vigor of the nation; (4) Protestants 
become more vulnerable to the artificial dichotomy between 
"domestic" and "international" issues, leaving them increasing-
ly with the paradoxical combination of a sentimental "interna-
tionalism" and a socioeconomic "conservatism"; (5) the retreat 
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from the city is a retreat from exposure to the cosmopolitan 
and international influences of the city; and (6) Protestant 
influence is increasingly removed from such national and inter-
national centers of foreign policy discussion as New York , 
Washington , Boston, Baltimore , and Chicago . 
The new minority status of Protestantism within the city 
is not only a cause of political alienation : it has resulted 
in the weakening of the quality of religious leadership . As 
threatened congregations become increasingly burdened with 
the problems of survival--declining membership , building main-
tenance, budget deficits --they are progressively less able to 
sustain the integrity of program which orients their members 
to a radical witness in the community and to the world . They 
are also less able to secure the level of professional leader-
ship required for a sophisticated, rounded ministry . Where 
well - trained, liberal , interna~ionalist Protestant ministers 
once served, many ill- trained, fundamentalist nationalists 
now serve . 
Nor is the new quality of Protestantism in the suburbs 
without consequences for world affairs: the reverse problems 
of those which have been left behind in the city preoccupy 
Protestant leadership- - increasing membership , building con-
struction and expansion, and fund - raising . These problems 
distract attention from the larger arenas of action and do not 
relieve the political alienation of Protestants . Moreover, 
the patterns of status and prestige subject suburban 
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Protestanti sm to a new privat i zation (not without "socia-
bility") of religious experienc e drained of its ethical vital -
ity . 
The responses to political alienation include rational 
activism, withdrawal , projection , and identification with 
charismatic leadership . The first of these suggests tha t 
feelings of alienation may be expressed in "political action 
based on a realistic evaluation of the political situation , 
t he objec t of whi ch is to promote a pol i tical structure con-
sonant with political values . " 1 The remaining three open up 
new t hreats to a free political system: a middle class response 
which is increas ingly negative , unstable , and unpredictable . 
In t he 1950 ' s , that respons e be c ame more and more evident as 
11mo d e ration" relaxed Protestant identification with particular 
parties and policies but intensified identification with such 
"non- p olitical" personalities as President Eisenhower . The 
President was the essential symbol of sentimental internation-
alism and socioeconomic c on s ervatism as these moods came to 
charac t erize suburban Protestants . 
In modern America , the response of middle - class Protes-
tantism is by nature a mass response which tends to dominate 
national policy . In Kornhauser ' s phrase , "the politics of 
mass society" is both cause and cons equence of political 
alienation . To the extent that Protestantism has become 
1 . Levin , p . 66 . 
morally and psychologically orient ed away from the political 
instruments of p olicy- making , it shares rtJi th "mass society" 
a situation in which the aggregate of individuals 
are related to one another onl y by way of their 
relation to a comraon authority , especially the 
state . That is , individuals are not directly r e -
l a ted to one another in a variety of independent 
groups . A p opulation in this condition is not 
insulated in any way from the ruling group, nor 
yet from elements within itself . l 
While middle class Protestants may belong to an i mpressive 
variety of "independent groups , " the lack of political be -
long ing makes them especially susceptible to manipulation 
by elites and to t he irrational and unrestrained excesses of 
whic h masses are capable . 
In a democratic society , the final defenses against the 
tyranny of mass action can only be built within the rational 
capacities of personal action . Protestant leaders have it 
within their power ei t her to help their followers fulfill 
those capacities or to help dissipate them in f urther with-
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drawal , projection , and uncritical following of popular person-
alities . For middle class suburban Protestants, the special 
pric e of relief from political alienation- -relief whi c h is 
consistent with the purposes of a free and responsible soci -
ety-- is identification with those conflicts which they have 
so thoroughly sought to escape : the problems of urban conflict , 
class conflict , r ac e confl ict , interfaith conf l ict , partisan 
1 . William Kornhauser , The Politics of Mas s Society (Glencoe , 
Illinois : The Free Press , 1959) , p . 32 . 
conflict . Each of these conflicts, in turn, holds a key to 
the ultima te p rob lem of international conflict . Political 
matur ity, ac cording to Levin , is 
the ability of an individual to handle feeling s 
of political a lien a tion t h rough rati onal r ather 
than r egressive mechanisms . To ach ieve t his, 
one must perceive the re a lities of the p olitical 
structure , h old political goals wh ich are po -
tentially operational, and attempt to develop 
institutions through wh ich t h ese goals may be 
realized . Political maturity , like p olitical 
alienation , refers to a quality of an indivi dual 
rather than a system . l 
The Puritan eth os has produced in t h e American peop le 
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a "privatization of morality" and a " p riva tization of charac-
ter" orienting them , to a certain extent , away from politics . 
At the s ame t i me , it has g enera ted a defensive reac tion in 
relig ious institu tions with regard to the surr ounding secular 
climate , including the p olitical climate . 2 It is i n this 
context tha t Hager has app ealed for a coherent sociology of 
conflict app ropriate to the study of American religious be -
havior . A major obstacle to this development is 11 the re -
luctance of religious and sectarian organizations to conduct 
objective investigation of the Ameri can reli gious scene . "3 
Such an approach would be concerned not only with the evolution 
1 . Levin , p . 74 . 
2 . Don J . Hager , nRelig ious Conflict , " The Journal of Social 
Issues , 12 (1956) , p . 6 . 
3 . Ibid ., p . 7 . 
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of historical relationships but also with the qualities of 
contemporary religious experience . Here a gain, the vital 
connections to be understood are those between the ultimate 
orientations of religious loyalty and the ultima te imperatives 
of political responsibility . The category of conflict helps 
to illumine the characteristics of religious experience in 
times of personal and political alienation . Do Protestant 
leaders reinforce that alienation with moral indignation? 
Do they relieve the burdens of alienation with an intensified 
privacy of religious preoccupation? Do they equip their fol -
l owers for radical participation in the decisions by which in-
security may be mitigated among groups and nations? Is there 
any positive recognition of the personal values which can 
only be achieved throug h social conflict? 
To the extent that Protestantism possesses a chronic 
aversion to controversy and conflict concerning politics, it 
functions as a distracting influence from the fact that con -
troversy and conflict are the preconditions of decision- making 
in foreign policy and all other areas of basic national poli -
cy . The very aversion to politics becomes an unintended source 
of new political conflict . And , ultima tely, it functions as 
a distracting influence from the most vital qualities of reli -
gious experience itself . It is only when the inherent 
sources of conflict in faithful Christianity are apprehended 
and appropriated that persons and communities may be genuinely 
transformed by the spiritual power of that faith . The p osi-
tive appreciation of the role of conflict is expressed by 
a Congregat ional pastor in Providence: 
Controversy in a church may be a sign that that 
church is on the frontier of real and urgent 
quests, beyond the periphery of the trite and 
over-simple where it come s face to face with 
the problems of human understanding and holds 
all slogans suspect . Controversy may be an in-
dication of a venture into the realm of the 
ambiguous where we may come also to a compre-
hension of God ' s venture into the same world in 
Jesus Christ . Controversy may indicate involve-
ment in irreconcilables where the only answer 
is self - sacrifice and the cross becomes more 
than a symbol . Controversy over vital issues 
may indicate alertness to real problems that 
defy solution , making necessary a su£plication 
for the guidanc e of the Holy Spirit . 
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In such a church, the "sanctuary" affords not only an orienta-
tion which transcends conflict but also an orientation which 
radically identifies with conflict to wrest from it the high -
est ethical and spiritual achievements of which men are 
capable. 
1. Lawrence L . Durgin , " Honest Talk in Churches," Social 
Action, 23 (March , 1957) , pp . 18- 19 . 
CHAPTER VIII 
RELIGION AS A RECONC ILER OF CONFLICT 
1. The type 
The sixth and final function of religion in world pol-
itics is to serve as a reconciler of political conflict . 
The religious community r ecognizes the fact t hat con-
flict is never total or absolute . There are always personal 
and social forces exerting a cohesive influence in the midst 
of conflict . By definition , the total absence of integrating 
forces would mean the ex tinction of all personal and social 
life . All political conflicts are qualified by forces making 
for common loyalties . Religion identifie s itself , not only 
with the separate communities engaged in confl ict and the in-
dividual members of those communitie s , but with those dynamic 
relationships among them which tend to resolve conflict . In 
this final identification it professes to recognize the power 
of the Ultimate Being who is the source of absolute loyalty . 
The Psalmist sang of God 's mercy and blessing to all 
peoples: 
that thy way may be known upon earth, 
thy saving power among all na t ions •••• 
Let the nations be glad and sing for joy , 
for thou dost judge the peoples with equity 
and guide the nations upon earth . l 
l . Ps . 67:2, 4. 
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Isaiah foretold the coming of a Prince of Peace whose univer -
sal government and peace would be unending . l 
Micah shared the same vision of reconciliation: 
It shall come to pass in the latter days 
that the mountain of the house of the Lord 
shall be established as the highest of the 
mountains , 
and shall be raised up above the hills; 
and peoples shall flow to it , 
and many nations shall come •••• 
and they shall beat their swords into plowshares , 
and their spears into pruning hooks; 
nation shall not lift up s word against nation , 
neither shall they learn war any more.2 
The community of the New Covenant placed the message 
of reconciliation at the radical center of its ministry . It 
was the peacemakers who should be called 11 sons of God . 11 3 The 
Son of God himself -- the Prince of Peace now come --is the new 
center of history and the promise of the politeuma: 
Therefore , if any one is in Christ , he is a new 
creation; the old has passed away, behold , the 
new has come . All this is from God, who through 
Christ reconciled us to himself and gave us the 
ministry of reconciliation; that is , God was in 
Christ reconciling the world to himself , not 
counting their trespasses against them, and en-
trusting to us the message of reconciliation . 
So we are ambassadprs for Christ , God making his 
appeal through us . 4 
The Christian community of love , the Roinonia, ex-
presses its ultimate loyalty to a Power whose very nature is 
1 . Is . 9 : 6- 7 
2 . Mic . 4:1- 3. 
3 . lVi t . 5: 9 . 
4. II Cor . 5:17- 20 . 
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to reunite those who have been separ~ted by conflict . Rec-
onciliation is the ultimate pm.Jer and promise at the heart of 
Christian faith . All of the inherent functions of the Chris -
tian religion in world politics are faithfully expressed only 
when they are directed toward the end of reconciliation . This 
does not rnean that a faithful political ethic is the only 
expression of ultimate loyalty but that such an ethic must be 
controlled by the "me ssage of reconciliation'' in which loyal 
Christians are "ambassadors for Christ" above all other loy-
alties . 
The categories of l oyalty and reconciliation ( types one 
and six in the dissertation) unite at the highest level of 
faith and ethics . The dialectical claims of the comraunity 
and the person (types t-;,v-o and five) to intrinsic status only 
can derive that status from Him who is the source of loyalty 
and who reconciles the separated . The claims of either the 
secular or the religious community to justifiable conflict 
(types three and four) can only be accorded an instrumental 
status , deriving from community and personal values and , 
ultimately , from loyalty and reconciliation . The practical 
expression of Christian loyalty in its fullness depends up on 
the degree to which it recognizes , performs , and balances all 
of the other functions inherent in its dialectical relation-
ship to the political community . 
If Christianity refuses to identify with the political 
comraunity in both loyalty and conflict, it cannot contribute 
to the resolution of conflict because its very refusal of 
such sanctions is t he source of an alienating conflict be-
tween itself and the political community . Peacemaking may be 
more than a political function - -but it is not nonpolitical or 
antipolitical . 
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If Christianity does not control its sanctions for polit-
ical claims and conflicts by a more ultimate loyalty which 
issues in the unceasing assertion of universal values, it no t 
only ceases to be Christianity by definition but provides a 
dysfunctional moral izing power which intensifies conflict and 
does little or nothing to relieve it . Christianity must be 
the source of a continuing creative confli ct between itself 
and the political community if it would exercise any capacities 
to resolve conflicts between political communities . It must 
balance a legitimizing of p olitical loyalty with an unyielding 
transcendent loyalty which contradicts the excessive claims of 
all political systems . 
To the extent that Christianity does not perform its 
ministries to persons caught up in the collective aspects of 
poli tical confli ct, it makes political direction of the con-
flict difficult, if not impossible , and forfei ts the opportu-
nity to project the resolving power of its universal values 
into the conflict at its most critical points . 
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Thus, the capacities of Christianity to contribute to 
the resolution of international conflict depend upon its 
fulfillment of a 11ministry of reconciliation" which is in-
herent in its own nature, but whose special properties can-
not be appraised in a single, simple category like "unity" or 
t1pe a ce . 11 The full mean ing of Christianity's function as a 
reconciler of international conflict only becomes apparent 
with an adequate inventory of the other functions which Chris -
tianity must necessarily perform in the political community . 
The capacities of the loyalty-system, represented by 
the single label 11 Christiani ty;' to contribute to the resolu-
tion of international conflict are diminished by : (a) dys-
functional aspects of conflicting loyalties within Christianity; 
and {b) dysfunctional aspects of the conflict of Christian with 
non-Christian reli g ious loyalties . Just wha t aspects of these 
conflicts are "dysfunctional" presents a question which p ro-
jects this study into the liveliest theological controversies 
of the present day . It is no problem, however, to document 
the prevailing hostilities within Christianity and between it 
and other world reli g ions . 
By its own inherent recognition- -dogmatically and func -
tionally- -Christianity knows that conflict will be a continuing 
dimension of human life . The forms of conflict suggeste d by 
this study and assumed to be the enduring phenomena in the 
h istoric relationship of relig ion and world politics include : 
1 . Conflict between political systems 
2 . Secular conflict within political systems 
3. Conflict between political and religious systems 
4. Conflict within religious systems 
5. Conflict between religious systems 
6 . Conflict within the individual between the claims of 
the political system and the claims of the religious 
system. 
The recognition of these conflic ts as continuous will direct 
constructive efforts at reconciliation through making them 
functional conflicts --by helping to institutionalize them- -
and not by abolishing them . 
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The ultimate meeting- ground of dogma and function is 
finally a matter of faith for the koinonia . Both the koinonia 
and the polis employ dogmas and claim power . Love has a final 
political wisdom in history because it is to be found both at 
the source and at the end of his tory . This does not insure 
its success for any generation- - the Cross is every generation's 
reminder of the tragic cost of temporary politi cal defeat--
but the koinonia and the polis will battle no longer in the 
politeuma which is the promise of the faith . Archbishop 
William Temple, in the unpromising year of 1940 for his native 
England and not long before his death, wrote of "the hope of 
a new world" in which the vindication of love 's political wis-
dom would be established: 
The Kingdom of God is the sovereignty of Love--
since God is love . That great proclamation 
brings comfort and courage to all whose hearts 
are attuned to it; for if God is Love , then 
Love is the ultimate power of the universe , and 
every purpose or policy prompted by love •••. 
will reach its fulfillment whatever the sacri -
fice that may first be required of it, because 
it is allied with supreme power . But the 
proclamation that God is Love is not only a 
source of consolation; it is also a principle 
of judgment; for every purpose or policy that 
is alien from love • • • is bound to end in 
disaster, because it is resisting the supreme 
power .l 
In Christianity's understanding of the relationship be-
tween ultimate and temporal power, the decisive battleground 
for the conflicting claims of the koinonia and the polis is 
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not collective or institutional: it is personal . The religious 
community and the political community are not inhabited by two 
different groups of people . It is to persons who dwell in 
both communities and are subject to the claims of each that 
the world's hopes for resolution of international conflict 
must look . The Christian contribution will be made by indi-
viduals more than by organizations: by individuals whose tran-
scendent loyalty compels them to identify profoundly with 
both their religious community and their national corrm1unity, 
in their conflict with and need for fellowship with other com-
munities; and yet whose ethic compels them to practice a crit-
ical participation in all communities and a personal ministry 
1 . The Hope of a New World (New York : The Macmillan Company, 
1940), p . 123 . 
to members of every community . These multiple claims will 
not be held by the understanding Christian to be final con-
tradictions or ultimate ambiguities . His ch oices will not 
always be simp le , whether he is a relig ious leader or a na -
tional decision- maker, but t h ere is no inherent necessity 
for him ever to make less than a faithful c hoice . In faith 
h e can fulfill all of the abstract claims in the concrete -
ness of his every decision as one whose will is to do God ' s 
will . 
Bonhoeffer ' s ethic is based upon a doctrine of four 
"divine man dat e s" which the Christian is commanded to obey : 
labor , marriage , government , and church . It is not the de -
sign of these man dates 
to divide man up , to te a r him asunder ; they 
are conc e rned with the who l e man before God , 
the Creator , Reconc iler , and Redeemer; 
reality , therefore , in all its multiplicity 
is ultimately one; it is one in the incarnate 
God Jesus Christ , and precisely this is the 
testimony which the Church must g i v e . The 
divine mandates in the world are not i n tended 
to consume man in endless conflicts ; on t h e 
contrary , they are directed toward the whole 
man , as he stands in reality b efore God . Man 
is not the pla ce at which the incompatibility 
of these divine mandates is to make i t self 
apparent ; on t h e contrary , man , with his con-
crete life and action , is the first and only 
centre at which there is achieve d the unity 
of what is ' in itself ,' that is to say , 
theoretically , incompatible . But this unity 
is achieved only when man allows himself to 
be confronted in Jesus Christ with the accom-
plished reality of the incarnation of God and 
of the reconciliation of the world with God in 
the crib , the cross and the resurr ection of 
Jesus Christ . In the form of a t h eory of 
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' estates ' the doc t rine of the divine mandates 
threatens to lead to a perilous disintegration 
of man and of reality; yet it is precisely 
this doctrine which serves to confront man with 
the one and entire reality which is manifested 
to us in Jesus Christ . Thus here again all the 
lines converge in the reality of the body of 1 Jesus Christ, in which God and man became one . 
From this perspective , the religious person ' s function as a 
reconciler of conflicts is precisely that of identifying 
with those conflicts and internalizing them creatively . 
Both his effectiveness and his faithfulness will require him 
to bear within himself , as did the Prince of P eace , the bur-
den of the battle and the cost of the conflict . 
2 . The Reconciliation of Politics 
The philosopher Erich Kahler said during World War II 
that "the central issue of our ·· time is whether we believe 
there is one human race with a corrunon destiny , or whether we 
believe only in a multiplicity of races and nations, warring 
against one another in a me aningless conflict . "2 The search 
for meaning in the midst of relentless international conflict 
has engaged both religious and political leaders throughout 
the twentieth century . Both theologies and political philos -
ophies have made this unending strife the point of departure 
for new systems and new policies . Both domine and diplomat 
1 . Ethics , p . 77 . 
2. Man the Measure: A New A 
Pantheon Books, 19 3 , p. 
to Histor (New York: 
• 
have been seeking out the threads of identification with 
those who have been arrayed against them in struggles of 
increasingly ultimate dimensions . 
For universalist religions, there is an irreducible 
imperative to identify not only with a transcendent God nor 
simp ly with a national community: there is a world community 
asserting its claims to human loyalty . That the institutions 
and the power arrangements appropriate to a full human com-
munity remain undeveloped is not a consideration which per-
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mi ts a universalist to suspend his most inclusive commitments: 
that hard fact, if anything, becomes the source of his deep-
est concern . He is obliged by the commands of his faith , 
the security of his own nation, and the suffering of human 
beings in every nation to devote his energies to the shaping 
of the instruments of world community. Someh ow, he must bring 
his piety and his patriotism into a triangular relationship 
with his universal loyalty. The "radical monotheism" of 
Richard Niebuhr sp e cifie s the requirements of that loyalty: 
Such universal loyalty cannot be loyalty to 
loyalty, as Royce would have it, but is loyalty 
to all existents as bound together by a loyalty 
that is not only resident in them but trans-
cends them. It is not only their loyalty to 
each other that makes them one realm of being, 
but t he loyalty that comes from beyond them, 
that originates and maintains them in their 
particularity and their unity. Henc e universal 
loyalty expresses itself as loyalty to each 
particular existent in the community of being 
and to the universal community •• . • In p oly-
theistic faith the neighbor is defined as the 
one who is near me in my interest group , when 
he is near me in that passing association . In 
henotheistic social faith my neighbor is my 
fellow in the closed society . Hence in both 
instances the counterpart of the law of neigh-
bor love is the requirement to hate the enemy . 
But in radical monotheism my neighbor is my 
companion in being; though he is my enemy in 
some less than universal context the require-
ment is to love him . l 
There is thus a fundamental r eality to the world community 
which derives from the source of its life, even though the 
empirical qualities of that community require it to be identi -
fied as a "community-in-process-of-becoming . " There is a 
tentative quality in the world community which is the reverse 
manifestation of the provisional nature of the national com-
munity . The n a tion- state is accorded only a p rovisional 
loyalty because its established institutions claim more than 
is t heir due . The society of nation-states is accorded a 
provisional loyalty because its institutions are so large ly 
unestablished and do not receive what is their due . 
i . Christendom and International Law 
Sir Henry Maine , the English jurist, decla red confident-
ly in 1887 that the Christian nations were 11 bound toge ther by 
the brighter light and the more defin i te sanction which Chris -
tianity has communicated to the ethical jurisprudence of the 
ancients and have established a l aw of na tions peculiar to 
themselves . They form toge ther a community united by reli g ion, 
1 . H. Richard Niebuhr, Radical Monotheism and We stern Culture, 
pp . 33-4. 
") 
morals , and humanity . tt 1 There were elements of both truth 
and error in Sir Henry ' s declaration . The truth was that 
there had been an identifiable reality called "Chr istendom" 
which had united Western nations into a degree of special 
community (although that degree was chronically and senti -
mentally overestimated by both churchmen and statesmen who 
conveniently for got the violence of "civil" wars within the 
Western community) . The error was in not perceiving the 
pressures of nationalism in non- Christian states which even 
then were preparing to pull Christendom apart from without 
in the twentieth century . 
The modern system of nation- states had its historical 
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roots in We stern Christian culture as it slowly struggled for 
the principles and the forms of unity between the fifth and 
the tenth centuries . At the summit of its matured powers in 
the late Middle Ages , the Catholic Church fashioned the classi -
cal instruments of Western diplomacy: international law , the 
practices of negoti a tion , the dispatching of envoys and am-
bassadors to councils and courts . 2 Even in its medieval 
splendor , h owever , there were limited boundaries to the com-
munity of nations : 
l . Quoted by Norman Bentwich , The Religious Foundations of 
Internationalism: A Study in International Relations 
through the Ages (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd ., 
1933) ' p . 152 . 
2 . Schuman , International Politics, pp . 50 - l . 
The universal church, chief heir of the pax Romana , 
insisted upon the universal corpus Christianum as 
embracing all mankind , including infidels. It 
nevertheless emphasized the unity of the Christian 
as against the Muslim and pagan worlds , and more 
specifically that of Latin Christianity as opp osed 
to Greek Orthodoxy . While thus nurturing at least 
the idea of Occidental solidarity, it also greatly 
contributed ••• to the formation of national 
cultures and even to the rise of national states . l 
Modern nationalism is customarily acknowle dged to have emerged 
at the beginning of the sixteenth century , coinciding with the 
Protestant Reformation. Martin Luther became the decisive 
figure in breaking the unity of ecclesiastical and political 
power and introducing the particularism and individualism 
which fuelled the nationalist revolutions of Western Europe . 
The American and French revolutions indicated the increasingly 
secular protests within Western culture, although they ap -
pealed to religious sanctions . To c queville observed in the 
1830 ' s that it was "the close connection of politics andre -
ligion" that was then hastening the declining power of the 
latter . "The unbelievers of Europe attack the Christians as 
their political opponents rather than as their religious ad-
versaries; they hate the Christian religion as the opinion of 
a party much more than as an error of belief; and they reject 
the clergy less because they are representatives of the clergy 
than because they are allies of government . 112 Although he 
1 . Baron, p . 15 . 
2 . Tocqueville, I , 325 . 
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was a Catholic, Tocqueville thoughtthat it was only in the 
United States , predominantly Protestant and with a pattern 
of church-state separa tion, that relig i ous institutions would 
remain secure . 11 '1h.en religion clings to t h e i n terests of the 
world, it b e comes almost as fragile a thing as the powers of 
earth . It is the only one of them all which c an hope for 
immortality; but if it be connected with their ephemeral 
power, it shares their fortunes and may fall with t h ose tran-
1 
sient passions which alone supported them. " Tocqueville 
foresaw what many twentieth century Christians have yet to 
see happening in the world around them: that Christian in-
fluence would not only decline in the West but that it would 
universally be on the defensive . His own insi ght into the 
political power of American Protestantism mi ght have led him 
to foresee that the formal separation of church and sta te 
woul d not insulate the Unit e d States from the problems of the 
minority status of modern Christianity . The very persistence 
of relig ious influence in American institutions, subject to 
fits of renewal , tends to conceal from American eyes what has 
been long accepted by many Christians in other nations . 
Butterfield thus discerns the relig ious and political conse-
quences of the decline of Christendom: 
If Western Europe has lost its global p redomi-
nance, the religion which insp ired so much of our 
culture has long been losing its dominion even 
1 . Ibid., I, 322. 
in the countries where once it reigned supreme . 
The Christian Church has been driven from that 
general presidency which it once enjoyed in 
European society as a whole - -driven from that 
majority position which once enabled it to gain 
so many monopolies and priorities and special 
advantages for itself . The time has come when 
Christianity •.. must compete on fairly equal 
terms with all other gospels , creeds and ideol -
ogies whi c h now do battle for the possession of 
the souls of men . Many Christians still ••• 
expect to have the dice loaded in their favor 
either by governments or by educational systems 1 or by the continuing power of social convention . 
Protestantism, having literally lost the "presidency" in 
the United States , is a "minority within a minority" on the 
world scene because of its smaller constituency than that of 
Catholi c ism . Denominations represented in the World Council 
of Churches constitute only 7% of the world's population . 
There is a marked tendency for American Protestants to pre -
tend to religious as well as p olitical sovereignty in the 
world . A symptom of this failing is the moralistic use of 
the very word "Christian" which may prove embarrasing on diplo -
mat i c occasions . During a United Nations discussion of the 
Arab - Israeli dispute , United States Delegate Warren Austin 
arose and urged the quarreling Moslem and Jewish delegates to 
settle their differences "in a spirit of Christian charity . " 
(This s olemn sugge stion was later stricken from the record , 
at Mr . Austin's request) . 2 
1 . Butterfield , International Conflict, p . 107 
2 . Interview with Waldo Chamberlin who was present on that 
occasion . 
International law still provides standards of conduct 
for the arena of world politics , but its identification with 
Western imperial conflicts and with Christian origins tends 
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to undermine its authority . It is not always enforceable 
even in the West where national sovereignty is given priority . 
This does not mean that nations casually violate or repudiate 
international law : there is a disposition to "try by inter-
pretation to prove that the law is on their side . 111 It is in 
this context that the zeal of such American statesmen as 
Wilson and Dulles to reimpose a "Christian" international law 
must be seen as an embarrassment to other nations better ad-
justed to the decline of Christendom and more frankly seeking 
to advance their own interests . The legal approach to peace , 
rooted in Western and Christian culture, has also been subject 
to rejection by such Eastern statesmen as Gandhi . 2 
These developments do not mean that the quest for inter-
national law has been abandoned . They do indicate that there 
is a crisis of international law in which the Christian and 
Western foundations have been loo sened . There is a disposi -
tion to relegate the "law of nature" with its distinctly moral 
attributes to the background and to emphasize the positive 
sources and practices of law . American attempts to reempha-
size the Christian and moral origins of international law , 
l . Hill , International Relations , p . 483 . 
2 . Northrop , p . 56 . 
whatever their intrinsic merit, must come to terms with the 
secularization of the field and the sentiments of non-Chris-
tians and non-Westerners.l 
ii. Sanctions for International Organization 
At the very time that the nations of Europe were accommo-
dating more openly to policies based upon "national interest," 
the moral fervor of Protestant America burst into the interna-
tional arena. After a century of preoccupation with the ex-
panding frontier, sectional crisis, industrialization, and 
religious revival, American energies were released from iso-
lationism for the task of Christianizing and democratizing re-
lationships among states. When resistance to this mission was 
encountered, it was taken as proof of the iniquity of "power 
politics" and a summons to even greater efforts to convert the 
world to an extension of the American-style "rule of law." 
The peace movements, financed by American industrialists, 
campaigned for treaties of arbitration. From 1900 to 1930, 97 
such agreements were negotiated, 90 of which were bilateral. 
1. The participation of the ecumenical movement in the recon-
struction of international law through the exposition of 
an "international ethos" is discussed below, pp. 377ff. 
This concept was developed by Max Huber in connection with 
the Oxford Conference of 1937. Dr. Huber, a former Presi-
dent of the Permanent Court of International Justice, de-
clared: 11 0nly Christians, as members of the Una Sancta, 
understand the deep foundations of a legal order which can 
extend beyond the limits of the national communities. 
Only on the basis of the Una Sancta can a supranational 
ethos be built up. Without such an ethos, all law, es-
pecially international law, which has behind it no power 
or compulsion or onlTt limited and insecure forces, remains 
a fragile structure. 1 Quoted in Rouse and Neill, p. 578. 
That these treaties with which religious expectations had 
been conspicuously identified did not provide security , 
either for America or for the world , is hardly necessary to 
report . Only t~ro of them were ever invoked; it can be said 
of t h e others t ha t they had "not the faintest effect on the 
development of the terrible wars and uphe avals by which the 
first half of this century was marked . 111 
The League of Na tions won , initially, a singularly 
earnest response from American Protestants . Every denomina-
tion except the Southern Baptists officially supported the 
League , and church members sent a "shower of telegrams" to 
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the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and to individual sen-
ators . Methodism ' s Council of Bishops declared that "the 
League of Nations is an advance toward t he period prophesied 
by the Hebrew prophet when men should not ' learn war any 
more . 1 11 The Executive Committee of the Federal Council of 
Churche s cabled VJ'i lson at Paris to announce that the League 
was "the political expression of the Kingdom of God on 
2 
earth . " Failure of the United States to join the League 
after having launched the crusade for it subjected the na-
tion to a charge of hypocrisy as strong as the judgment of 
iniquity upon the nations of Europe had been in the fi rst place . 
2 . Hill and Lund, p . 10 . 
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The memory of the disillusionment , indifference, and 
isolationism of the interwar years prompted the vigorous 
campaign of the Dulles Commission to win mass support for 
the United Nat ion . Dulles and other Pr·otestant leaders 
later came to regard that campaign as the turning point in 
persuading the Senate that the new international organizat ion 
would have popular approval . One such leader reported in 
1948 that 11 the influence of church- related groups in creating 
a public opinion favorable to the idea of the United Nations 
has been tremendous . Scores of notable church conferences, 
thous ands of study groups in churches all over our land have 
g iven millions of people a Christian pointof view on interna-
tional relations . " 1 The enthusiasm of that report is matched 
by the skepticism of Almond who acknowledges the element of 
truth in it : 11 '11he campaign for the United Nations has con-
tain ed religious overtones and has been led by the guardians 
of the community conscience -- teachers, clergy , and the various 
women ' s organizations . 112 His concern is that the quality of 
support for the United Nations may involve such "sanguine 
expectations" that the inevitable failures of the organiza-
tion may produce a reaction of disillusionment . 3 
l . Stuntz , pp . 20 - l . 
2. ~ond , p . 100 . 
. . .... . 
. ' 
3 . Ibid ., p . 100 . 
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The access which Protestant and other faith groups found 
in the American delegation at the San Francisco Conference 
enabled them to exert a special influence upon the shaping of 
the United Nations Charter . In addition to the emphasis upon 
human rights , Charter provisions for the eventual freedom of 
colonial peoples , the progressive development of international 
law , and an easier procedure for amending t he Charter were 
projects of interest to the churches . Protestant opposition 
to the veto power , however, did not prevail . 1 The missionary 
movement had provided American Protestants with strong identi-
fications with colonial peoples and their needs, with the 
result that both Uni ted States and United Na tions programs of 
economic and technica l assistance have received constant 
supp ort . Practical programs of Christian missions provided 
important precedents for official action . "In effect the 
churches have carried on a Point Four project of their own, 
bringing to Asians and Africans education , sanitation , medi -
cal assistance , skill ••• in crafts - - all lines of welfare 
toward which the imperialist governments of the West were f or 
years much too indifferent in colonial areas . 11 2 Hambidge 1 s 
history of the Food and Agricultural Organization records 
that religious bodies pioneered in technical cooperation and 
agricultural development and that Protestant - Catholic coopera-
tion had been noteworthy . Both the Vatican and the World 
1 . Hill and Lund, p . 23 . 
2 . Ibid., p . 140 . 
Council of Churches' Commission on International Affairs 
maintain consultative status with F . A. o . l 
The United Nations and its affiliated agencies are not 
the only forms of international organization which have de -
veloped since World War II . American policy was instrwaental 
in the creation of a variety of regional organizations, in-
eluding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Baghdad 
Pact , the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization , and the Organi -
zation of American States (Rio Pact) . There has been less 
Protestant enthusiasm f or and interest in these arrangements 
than have been accorded the United Nations . Originally , 
N. A. T . O. was opposed by both The Christian Century and the 
Federal Council of Churches . In time , however , both ecumeni-
cal and denominational support were offered to regional 
groupings on the assumption that they would remain defensive 
in character and subordinate to the U. N. Charter . Baron was 
among the first to counter religious indifference to region-
alism with the suggestion that it provided a new set of loy-
alties more readily attainable than universalism but less 
aggravated by the problems of reli gious and cultural identi -
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fication than nationalism. "Regionalism, though creating some 
new temporary difficulties , will, in fact, help remove the 
greates t obstacle of all , the churches' nationalist limita-
tions •••• National loyalties may soon be subordinated to 
1. Gove Hambidge , The Story of FAO (New York: D. Van Nostrand 
Company, Inc ., 1955) , pp . 89 - 93 . 
regional feelings of solidarity , just as clan and tribal loy-
al ties 11\Tere once synthesized in national patriotism. nl As 
the North Atlantic Community has held together since 1949, 
there has been a renewed tendency to speak of "Christendom" 
and "Western values . " For the concerned Christian, regional 
loyalty presents the same basic dilemmas as national loyalty , 
if in less intense form: how to make that loyalty meaningful 
··, 
in uniting lesser loyalties without undermining universal 
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loyalty and aggravating conflict with other regional loyalties . 
iii . Ecumenicity and International Ethos 
The Protestant movement for interdenominational co-opera-
tion was given formal status in the United States in 1908 
with the creation of the Federal Council of Churches, later 
(1950) reorganized into the National Council of the Churches 
of Christ in the United States of America. In 1948 , at Amster -
dam, the World Council of Churches was established, although 
it had been "in- process-of-formation" during the war years . 2 
vfuile most of the energies of American Protestants in inter-
war years had been channeled the 
Oxford Conference on Church, 
1 . Baron, p. 261 . 
2 . For a full history of the emergence of the modern ecumeni -
cal movement , see Ruth Rouse and Stephen Charles Neill 
(eds . ) , A History of the Ecumenical Movement, 1517- 1948 
{Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1954) . 
had helped to identify prominent Americans with the world-
wide ecumenical concern for international affairs: Henry 
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Smith Leiper , Henry Pitney VanDusen, John R . :rviott , Henry 
Sloan Coffin , John Mackay , John C. Bennett, John Foster Dulles . 
The Oxford Conference had also been marked by a serious effort 
to confront and transcend pacifist - nonpacifist differences . 
Conspicuous in the ecumenical experience during World War II 
was the degree to which this international and interdenomina-
tional identification was sustained . Sweden and Switzerland , 
both neutral "oases , " provided continuing communication cen-
ters for church l eaders on both sides of the conflict . Geneva, 
in particular , b e came the headquarters for the "Protestant 
underground , " linking the churches of Europe wi th those of the 
United States . 11 By a plan carefully worked out in anticipa-
tion of conflict months before war broke, a series of periodic 
visitations from belligerent enemy nations to neut ral centers , 
and by the Geneva staff to every area of Europe, maintained 
throughout the six years of struggle personal spiritual fel -
lowship and consultation . 111 Among the German visitors to 
Geneva was Dietrich Bonhoeffer , later hanged for his partici -
pation in the plot to assassinate Hitler . Thus did the ecu-
menical movement perform political as well as religious func -
tions which united leaders in a common concern to minister to 
personal need and to prepare for post - war responsibilities . 
l. Van Dusen , p . 142 . 
Geneva was a city in which servants of the phil -
anthropic societies, diplomats, resistance - leaders, 
refugees, and Church leaders of many nations met 
and helped each other to keep the lines of commu-
nication open . In some cases documents crossed 
the frontiers in diplomatic bags; in other cases 
through the courier-service which the illegal 
press of the resistance movements had established 
between the various countries . Much of the mate -
rial came in the form of tiny microfibns which 
might be hidden in a piece of shaving-s oap or a 
fountain pen . In this way information constantly 
streamed through the World Council office and was 
passed on to the Churches through the Ecumenical 
Press Service or in less official ways . l 
The support of resistance movements was an indication that 
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t he World Council was not simply transcending the conflict but 
identifying with it . For American leaders, the sharing of a 
common religious loyalty with leaders of other nations during 
the war was a factor mitigating the moralistic enthusiasm 
which had been more characteristic of World War I . 
Paralleling the development of supranational loyalties 
in the World Council had been an increasingly self-conscious 
and organized attempt of the International Hissionary Council 
to make constructive and practical contributions to world 
affairs . The mood of the ~adras Conference of that body in 
1938 , with China at war and other nations about to be plunged 
into violence, was expressed in its final ·report: "Implicit 
in the life and work of the Church , whether in peace or in 
war, is the courage to see and to accept the conse quences of 
1 . Rouse and Neill , p . 709 . 
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its witness in international relations , even unto dea th . "1 
During the war that did follow , the I . M. C. sustained a min-
• 
istry not unlike that of the World Council i n its transcendent 
qualities . German missions in such places as Sumatra were cut 
off from their home country but were supported by Dutch , 
Swedish , and others . When Germans were interned , Protestants 
from t hose other nations assumed the burdens of management . 
An ttorphaned Missions Fund" was established , to which Ameri -
cans made generous contributions . Through the nunderground , " 
mis s ion leaders in Germany were as sured that Christians from 
enemy nations were caring for their fields of work . At the 
first post - war meeting of the I . M. C. at Hermannsburg in 
November 1945, "there was understanding , a grateful renewal 
of acquaintance , and a determination to be gin building toge t h -
er again in love and mutual trust ."2 
The practical ministries of the war years were continued 
after 1945 in the World Com~cil of Churches ' Department of 
Interchurch Aid and Service to Refugees . There was , however , 
a pronounced determination in both the W. C. C. and the I . M. C. 
1 . The World Mission of the Church: Findings and Recommenda-
tions of the International Missionarl Council , Tambaram, 
Madras , India , December 12- 29 , 1938 New York: Interna-
tional Missionary Council , 1939) , p . 119 . 
2 . Kenneth Scott Latourette and William Richey Hogg , World 
Christian Communit in Action : The Story of World War II 
and Orphaned Missions New York: International Missionary 
Council , 1949) , p . 38 . 
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to project ecumenical concern into the shaping of future deci-
sions -- to go beyond the necessary but limited work of helping 
to provide relief afte r violent conflict by helping to prevent 
such conflict from occurring . This determination reflected , 
more particularly , the professional concern of John Foster 
Dulles and his experience in the Federal Council Cormnission 
on a Just and Durable Peace to make organized relig ion rele-
vant to the processes of decision-making in foreign pol icy 
and international organization . At a conference in Cambridge , 
England , in August 1946, the concerns of Dulles , the World 
Counc il, and the International Missionary Council were brought 
together in the creation of the Commission of the Churches on 
Internatiohal Affairs . The formation of the C. C. I . A. was 
based up on five assumptions: (1) technical skills are required 
if the churches are to exercise a responsible role in inter-
national relations; (2) a continuing day- to - day operation is 
necessary to supp lement the work of ecclesiastical bodies which 
meet only periodically ; (3) pronouncements are effe ctive only 
as they are brought to bear at the time and place of politi -
cal decisions; (4) specialized organization must be maintained 
for these functions; and (5) such organization must avoid com-
promising political entanglements . 1 
Wi th offices in New York , London , and Geneva , the 
C. C. I . A. recruited a members hip consisting of more than 40 
1 . Commission of the Churches on International Affairs 
(Pamphlet , New York: C. C. I . A., n . d .), pp . 5-6. 
con~issioners in nearly 30 countries, a majority of whom 
have been laymen : cabinet ministers, educators, historians . 
In addition to Dulles (who resigned when he became Secretary 
of State), prominent lay members have included Frank Graham, 
Francis B. Sayre, R . A. Butler , Arnold Toynbee, Sir Kenneth 
Grubb, Werner Kagi , and Charles Malik . The C. C. I.A . is 
affiliated with national commissions and other groups in 
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more than 70 countries . It has consultative status with the 
United Nations through the Economic and Social Council and 
with UNESCO, FAO , and ILO . As a "N . G. O." (non-governmental 
organization) it has regularly been in attendance at U. N. 
meetings, as well as meetings of foreign ministers, the 
Korean truce negotiations, and at other trouble spots . Major 
concerns of the Commission have been in five policy areas: 
(1) peace and security; (2) human rights and religious liber-
ty; (3) trusteeships and non-self- governing territories; (4) 
economic and social development and expanded technical assist-
ance; and (5) refugees and migration . The C. C.I.A . claiills 
distinctive contributions to the final draft of the article 
on religious liberty in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and to the proposal for peace observation conm1issions 
embodied in the "uniting f or peace resolution" passed by the 
General Assembly in 195o . l 
1 • Ibid . , p • 19 • 
Such recognizable contributions of the C. C. I . A . are 
limited in number and scope . Because of the very nature of 
its work , the Commission has not been afforded wide publici -
ty . At the U. N. and in various national capitals , it carries 
on behind- the - scenes conversations with diplomats and other 
government officials . Although strictly limited in size of 
staff and available funds , the C. C. I . A. can call upon its 
commissioners and other church members in virtually every 
country except the Soviet Union to provide information as 
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well as to comraunicate the position of the churches to govern-
men t s . At times , it seeks the adoption of particular poli -
cies; at other times , it asks for reconsidera tion of decisions 
already made . The effort is always to transcend political 
differences and to provide a mi nistry of reconciliation . 
Some C. C. I . A.-diplomatic relationships have been specifical-
ly relig ious when common faiths made possible religious 
counsel or the sharing of prayer and worship . If it cannot 
be said that the C. C. I . A. often has a decisive influence upon 
national policies , it can be said that such a disinterested 
agency which is continually in touch with decision- makers all 
ove r the world can provide unique assistance in shaping the 
many details of policy implementation and in improving the 
quality of the networks of personal rela tionships which often 
determine the success or failure of diplomac y . Of these 
limited forms of influence , Henry Smith Leiper has said : 
Aware that it was breaking new ground , beset by 
many potential dangers , the C. C. I . A. has moved 
forward cautiously , concerned to build soundly 
rather than to expand too rapidly . This has 
meant that many legitimate areas of Commission 
activity have been excluded or only gradually 
undertaken, to avoid slip- shod work or undue 
straining of resources . The result is that 
the C. C. I . A. has gained a reputation for thor-
oughness in those governmental circles familiar 
with its work , and a heartening confidence among 
ecumenical leaders . l 
Offsetting the claim of disinterestedness , however, has 
been the recognition by C. C. I . A. leaders and others that this 
unique "witness in the world of nations" cannot escape being 
the source of conflict as well as reconciliation . The para-
mount role of Dulles in the early years and the predominance 
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of an Anglo - Saxon staff (including Director 0 . Frederick Nolde 
and Executive Secretary Richard M. Fagley, both Americans) 
have troubled both the staff itself and church leaders from 
other countries . 2 The Commission Chairman, Sir Kenneth Grubb , 
observed in 1956 that a special difficulty affecting the 
C. C. I . A. and ecumenical action generally is 
the strength of American Protestant Christianity . 
American ecclesiastical influence does bring with 
it certain powerful bargaining advantages, but it 
is not with these that I am concerned here . I 
find , however , that I always have to ask myself 
whether in accepting advice that purports to re -
flect a r e asonably comprehensive approach to an 
international problem, I am, in fact, accepting 
l. 11A Witness in the Jorld of Nations," (Typewritten manu-
script , C. C. I . A. files , January, 1956), p . 5. 
2 . Interview with Richard M. Fagley , March 10 , 1957 . 
advice which is primarily, if unconsciously, 
in the interests of the United States . The 
same temptation to confuse an ecclesiastical, 
or even an ecumenical , motive with a national 
one arises with most of us in all nations, but 
it is particularly dangerous in the cases of 
the United States and the American Churches , 
because of the enormous power of the former and 
the considerable influence of the latter . It is 
not a question of where the money for the ecu-
menical movement comes from, or whether undue 
influence is attached to it when it arrives; it 
is not even necessary to raise this unworthy 
query . It simply is that in the presence of 
considerable influence in church, state, or in-
ternational relations , the existence of undeni -
able centres of power is something that cannot 
be ignored . The influence of the United States 
and of the American Churches se ts the nature 
and shapes the rules of international ecumenical 
discussion . l 
A related problem is the pair of assumptions with regard to 
pacifis t-nonpacifist differences . The World Council of 
Churches and the International Missionary Council embrace 
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both pacifists and nonpacifists and , accordingly, the C.C.I.A. 
is obliged to be responsive to bo t h groups . In its daily 
work, however, the Commission's Director reports that the 
C. C. I . A. is compelled to proceed upon such nonr acifist as -
sumptions as "negotiation from strength" and the insistence 
upon "multilateral disarmament ." These assumptions and the 
charge of identification with American interests both were 
brought to sharp focus in 1950 when the Central Committee of 
the w. c . c ., meeting in Toronto, adopted a statement endorsing 
1 . Kenneth G. Grubb , nchristian Approach to International Af-
fairs: A Criticism," The Ecumenical Review, 8 (July 1956) , 
p . 396 . This entire issue of the Review was prepared as 
an evaluation of ecumenical action in international affairs 
and celebrated the tenth anniversary of the C. C. I . A. 
United Nations action in Korea . The statement, prepared by 
I1ethodist Bishop G. Bromley Oxnam and by Richard 1'1 . Fagley, 
was criticized by neutral and pacifist churchmen as well as 
by representatives of Communist nations. 1 In this case, the 
identification of ecumenical leadership with the United Na-
tions was transferred, said the critics, to support for Ameri-
can foreign policy inasmuch as Pres ident Truman's initiative 
in Korea had preceded sanction by the Security Council. 
Implicit in such political conflicts to which the work 
of the ecumenical rnovement is exposed are the fundamental 
ethical and theological cleavages within Christianity . If 
pacifists have criticized the C. C. I . A. for its pronouncements 
and assumptions, there have been criticisms from such "real-
ists" as Reinhold Niebuhr (a Commission member until 1953) and 
Ernest Lefever that C. C.I.A. work has proceeded under "illu-
sions" and lacks the "realistic approach of power politics . tt2 
It is the very concern of the Commission for daily relevance 
in t he influencing of specific decisions which has , curiously 
enough, raised the basic issues of ethical and theological 
discussion . An evaluation prepared for the Second Assembly of 
the World Council at Evanston in 1954 asked frankly whether 
a price has been paid in the breadth and depth 
of the Christian testimony in the world of nations . 
l . Interview with 0 . Frederick Nolde , May 14, 1957 . 
2 . Ibid . 
In attempting to deal with urgent and immediate 
international issues , there is always the danger 
that the longer - range and broader perspectives of 
the Christian witness may be obscured , that 
striving for partial objec tives may conceal the 
larger objectives •••• The difficulties of re -
taining a balance between Christian action for 
peace and j u stice and Christian judgment on the 
predicament of man and society have hardly been 
dealt with . 1 
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There have been open differences of opinion among C. C. I . A . 
personnel as to how and whether these internal conflicts 
should be faced and the fundamental issues raised . Director 
Nolde has been most conscious of the obligation to practice 
stewardship with the very limited material resources at his 
disposal . This obligation, combined with the relentlessly 
critical state of international tensions , has inclined him 
toward an immediate and concrete ministry with all the re-
sources and thoroughness the C. C. I . A . can conmand . It is 
this vi ewpoint which has generally set the pattern for the 
Commission 1 s labors . Executive Secretary Fagley has been more 
willing to risk a present lapse for t he sake of long- term 
considerations of an ultima tely theological nature . He keen-
ly feels the need to be able to answer the question , 11What is 
the unique approach of Christianity to international rela-
tions?112 Dr . Fagley wrote that a 11major weakness" of the 
C. C. I.A . 1 s first decade was "the insufficient attention 
l . Preparatory Study for the Second Assembly of the World 
Council of Churches IV : Christians in the Stru le for 
World Community Revised draft , mimeographed, New York: 
C. C. I . A., July, 1953) , p . 85 . 
2 . Interview with Richard M. Fagley , March 10, 1957 . 
given to the underlying theological presuppositions of ecu-
menical action in world affairs •••• The need for thorough 
study on the relation of the Chri stian faith to the principles 
of 't..rorld community is urgent . " 1 Theolog ical assumptions not 
only condition the policies to which pronouncements testify: 
they play back upon the strategy of religious action in world 
politics. The language of strategy was conspicuous in Dr . 
Fagley ' s remarks to the Commi ssion at its 1956 meeting in Ger-
many . He pleaded for more Hanticipatory action 11 : for less 
t•grappling for the hind- lock of events , and more opportunity 
for attention to seizing them by the forelock; less concentra-
tion on putting out fires , and more on fire-proofing the 
building ."2 
In the nforelock of events" are the original attitudes 
which shape national and international policy . The ability 
of an agency of limited resources such as the C. C. I . A . to 
influence mass opinion in the United States and other 
1 . Fagley, "Christian Witness in the World of Nations , " The 
Ecumenical Review , 8 (1956), p . 392 . The writer of the 
dissertation had orig inally proposed a study of the 
C. C. I . A. for the fulfillment of the requirements of the 
Ph . D. degree . Drs . Nolde and Fagley encouraged such a 
project and these interviews testify to their cooperation . 
However , their m-vn concern about the more fundamental 
problems of t h eory relevant to their responsibilities was 
persuasive in the selection of the comprehensive approach 
finally adopted in the dissertation . 
2 . Fagley , uRemarks on Future Tasks of C. C. I . A. n (Typewritten 
manuscript of remarks addressed to the meeting of the 
C. C. I . A. in Herrenalb , Germany , July 22- 25, 1956) , p . l . 
countries is not impressive. The Commission staff has recog-
nized this problem . It appealed for foundation assistance 
in establishing a broader program of public education but was 
turned down on "sectarian" grounds . Currently , there is a 
disposi tion to depend upon the separate national commissions 
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and denominational agencies · for basic education in internation-
aL affairs . It is in this elaborate pattern of communica-
tion--World Council , National Council, denomination, and con-
gregation--tha t the public identity of the C.C.I . A. tends to 
be lost . Dr . Nolde acknowledges the lack of local parish 
awareness of the work for which he is responsible: its double -
effect is that the Commission loses power and influence while 
gaining privacy and flexibility . Nolde avoids the word "lob-
bying" in connection with C.C . I.A. efforts; there is no 
threatening reference to a "constituency of 170,000,000 people 
all over the world"; the emphasis is upon "helping diplomats 
do a better job . 111 An external critic of this strategy re -
plies : 
The offsetting disadvantage of C.C . I . A. met h ods 
is t hat t he se few leaders will have too much 
control and their points of view will not ac-
curately reflect the opinions of the churches 
for whom they speak . • • • Few of the church 
members who sit in the pews on Sunday express 
views that travel on to the higher-ups , and 
few clergymen relay opinions to the higher 
1 . Interview with 0 . Frederick Nolde , May 14, 1957 . 
echelons . Indeed , most of these people do not 
even know of the system of the C. C. I . A. l 
In defense of the C. C. I . A. , it may be pointed out that the 
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staff is painfully aware of the limitations of its influence , 
that it is dependent upon the voluntary cooperation of the 
many constituent organizations related to it , and that it is 
not the only agency of Protestant and Orthodox churches bear -
ing the burdens of international responsibility . 
The "opinion gap 11 thus afflicts an ecumenical agency in 
an even more acute form than that of denominational agencies . 
Together , ecumenical and denominational organizations lack 
a sustained strategy for the shaping of responsible public 
opinion in matters of foreign policy . As the whole modern 
history of religious influenc e in international relations has 
demonstrated , the lack of such a strategy is a source of in-
stability and conflict which compounds the difficulties con-
fronted by the policy- makers of the nations . It is only in 
the broad sentiments of masses of peoples that universal loy-
alties can become decisive in policy- making; it is only when 
both the political community and the religious community 
have been successful in managing their own internal conflicts 
that there is a promise of the reconciliation of international 
conflict . Schuman confronts the political ethics of American 
Protestantism with this dual challenge: 
1 . Hill and Lund, pp . 37 - 8. 
The age-old quest of de c ent and reasoning men 
for an ethics broader than the in- group may 
usefully be regarded as a double problem: that 
of reducing within every community the volume 
of insecurities , tensions , and aggressions 
seeking destructive release , and of achieving 
a symbolism and value - system sufficiently uni -
versal to make possible universal fellowship 
through uniformity of emotional irlentifications . 
However variously expressed , this in truth has 
been the mission of all universalists , social 
reformers , prophets of righteousness , and 
preachers of God . l 
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The significance of such a statement , coming from a political 
scientist and not a theologian , should not be lost on reli -
gious leadership . There is no substitute for bringing the 
disciplines of ethics into the arenas of power where conflicts 
must be managed , whatever formal and institutional arrange -
ment s may be required and whatever dynamic reshaping of the 
traditional and essentially negative American doctrines of 
separation of church and state may be called for . The access 
which religious elites do have to the influencin6 of the 
ps ychological properties of persons and groups is not present -
ly serving as the channel for self- conscious and responsible 
public opinion leadership : it is the unwitting vehicle of 
intensification of most of the tensions and hostilities which 
religious elites share with their publics . While these qual -
ities characterize perhaps a majority of Protestant pastors 
and congregations , t hose who are preoccupied with internation-
al affairs responsibilities for denominations and the 
1 . Schuman , The Commonwealth of Man , p . 106 . 
ecumenical movement are oriented away from the whole problem 
of providing rational disciplines for their constituencies . 
It is precisely this problem of the irrational and irrespon-
sible public which "realists" recognize as the major threat 
to the free society in the twentieth century . In Lippmann ' s 
account of this phenomenon in which Protestantism has been 
an inescapable participant , 
there has developed in this century a functional 
derangement of the relationship between the mass 
of the people and the gove r nment . The people 
have acquired power which they are incapable of 
exercising , and the governments they elect have 
lost powers which they must recover if they are 
t o govern •••• When mass opinion dominates the 
government , there is a morbid derangement of the 
true functions of power . l 
That Lippmann happens to be a humanist should not obscure 
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the fact that he pleads for the recovery of a function which 
has traditionally been performed by religion: "A large plural 
society cannot be governed without recognizing that , trans -
cending its plural interests , there is a rational order with 
a superior conwon law . This common law is 1 natural 1 in the 
sense that it can be discovered by any rational mind, that it 
is not the willful and arbitrary positive command of the 
sovereign power . 11 2 It is thus not arbitrary leadership for 
which Lippmann is asking : it is the recovery of the 
1 . Walter Lippmann , Essays in the Public Philosophy (New York: 
The Ne1-1 American Libr ary, 1956), p . 19 . 
2. Ibid ., p . 83 . 
essential nature of leadership itself a s the responsible 
management of public affairs guided by ultimate and universal 
values . The external threats of universal cat a strophe have 
only served to dramatize the qualities of leaders hip required 
by a free society for its survival . Foreign policy is , 
a c cordingly , the supreme challenge to political leadership in 
the twentieth century because it demands the highest realiza-
tion of the internal values of a nation for an adequate re -
sponse to the circumstances of international conflict . It 
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is at this deepest level within the soul of particular nations 
that religious influence is most decisive for good or evil . 
Any Protestant strategy for international relations which does 
not take account of this national arena of action and the 
qualities required of it will tend , in the very nature of the 
contemporary international arena , to become either dysfunc -
tional or irrelevant . 
Protestant special ists in international affairs have 
become alienated from the problems of leadership in the ~­
tional arena . Th ey have joined an ''international elite," 
along with diplomats, educators , foundations , the press , and 
certain interest groups . It is not that they have ceased to 
be patriotic that is the problem-- they may, in fact, reveal 
nationalist bias unintentionally--it is that the very setting 
within which they work tends to be remote from the constitu-
encies which they are supposed to represent . Periodically, 
they are troubled by the realization of their degree of 
alienation . Typically, they are only too willing to speak 
to conference audiences--audiences which t hemselves tend 
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not to be representative . Often, it is one of these special-
ists who p leads for a broader strategy on the p~ t of ecu-
menical and denominational organization- - but he tends to 
lack the power to influence major strategy changes in the 
larger Protestant bureaucracies and his own limited resources 
do not equip him to deal effectively with the public . Those 
whose work keeps them largely within the United Nations arena 
share the degree of alienation of that arena its e lf from the 
serious foreign policy decisions of national g overnments . 
The parallels between ecumenical organization religiously 
and international organization politically are instructive . 
Both the World Council of Churches and the United Nations , 
while claiming to be inclusive and representative bodies, 
are staffed by personnel who are more or less marginal to 
their constituencies . Ecumenical pronouncements on interna-
tional affairs are manifestly in advance of public opinion 
at the parish level; United Nations proposals languish for 
lack of political support in member nations . Both the W. C. C. 
and the U. N. have only delegated , limited functions . Both 
agencies have only very limited resources with which to work : 
the U. N. budget is infinitesimal by comparison with national 
budgets and the w.c.c. budget does not compare with denomi -
national budgets . The conditions of effective leadership 
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are thus lacking in the very arenas within which that leader-
ship must be exercised . Brinton discribed the experiences 
and t he limitations of the new "international elite" as it 
emerged in the late 1940 ' s: 
a group of men and women skilled in the Hays of 
co-operation among varied peoples , trained and 
pract iced persons , an international elite not 
entirely divorced from national allegiance, but 
on the whole devo t ed to the task of getting in 
practice bey ond the sovereign nation- state •••• 
The proportion of preachers and teachers among 
them may still be a bit excessive . They probably 
fnrm too much of a coterie , if not a sect , who 
see too much of one another a t meetings , confer -
ences , congresses and other plares where the con-
verted preach to the converted . 
To the extent that these characteristics of the "international 
elite" apply to Protestant leadership in world affairs , they 
indicate the double- alienation of Protestants from the arenas 
of policy-making in fore i gn policy: the estrangement of 
leaders from their constituencies and the estrangement of 
their constituencies from the political instruments of policy-
making . 
Another problem of strategy for ecumenical Christianity 
is the distribution of Protes t an t and Orthodox churches 
around the world . That distribution is such that Christianity 
is weakest where international conflicts a re potentially mos t 
acute . Grubb notes the practical consequences of this problem 
for the crucial area of the Near and l'Iiddle Eas t: 
1 . Crane Brinton , From Han One: The Process of Political 
Inte ration--The Problem of World Government Cambridge: 
Harvard Univers ity ress , 19 , p . 112 . 
Everybody knows that when ancient and modern 
churches there are added together , the total 
Christian distribution is very small , and 
everyone knows the reason why . This enhances 
the significance of the ecumenical fellowship 
for the international order, but it is in itself 
a worrying weakness . So much so, that it is 
almost true to say that the best contribution 
the average Christian can make to Christian 
influence in world affairs is to increase the 
number and strength of the Church where it is 
weakest . Christian people t a lk about the World 
Church being the new fact of our time , and it 
is quite true that the Church is t h ere , but 
there is an aspect of this talk which is merely 
a whistling to k eep up one ' s courag e in t h e 
dark . l 
Implicit in Grubb ' s comment are two i mplications for Prates -
tant strategy : (l) negatively , the imperative of avoiding 
sentimental exaggeration of Protestant influence in t h e world 
and the adjustment required of minority status; and (2) posi-
tively , the imperative to a new quality of dynamism in the 
world mission of the Church which will identify with the most 
serious and threatening conf licts and dispatch only the most 
alert personnel to those various national arenas . 
There has been a profound wrestling with the meaning of 
such problems on the part of some missionary statesmen during 
the past decade . In particular, the demand for indig enous 
leadership in mission fields and the explosive nationalism 
which generates t ha t demand have raised critical issues for 
mission strategy . Kitagawa calls attention to the unwitting 
paralle l s between the bureaucratization of missionary 
1 . Grubb , p . 399 . 
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organization and the bureaucratization of c olonial administra-
tion . "The structure of the mi s sionary society that has come 
to be taken for granted by most Protestant churches today was 
the product of the colonial era . 11 The basic pattern of con-
trol has been exercised through foreign boards and societies . 
Missionary bureaucracy , like all forms of bureaucracy, tends 
to become an end in itself, generating drives toward con-
formity, sanctifying status syrabols , and develcping an in-
group defensiveness . 1 While pronouncements of the churches 
favor i ng indigenous leadership 11 in principle" and "in t i me" 
have been issued repeatedly , basic changes have yet to be 
made for most organizations . The structure itself tends to 
block change . 2 
It is not only the pattern of control that is at issue : 
it is also the ethical meaning of nationalism . Canon Warren 
has urged caution in using the term "supra- national" as 
a description of the Church , "lest in trying to be too heav-
enly- minded ~..J"e become of no e arthly relevance . 11 Noting with 
approval the call of the Willingen Conference of the Interna-
tional Missionary Council in 1952 for international , inter-
racial , and interdenominational mission teams, he nevertheless 
protests against an excessive tendency to "denationalize" a 
missionary . That tendency , he suggests , ignores the 
1 . Joseph M. Kitagawa , "Divided We Stand , " Religion in Life , 
27 (Summer , 1958) , p . 343 . 
2 . Ibi£. , p . 350 . 
inevitable conflict of national identifications which is 
produced by missionary endeavor and which can be a special 
ministry of reconciliation . 
To denati onalize a mi s sionary , which is what 
a good deal of current talk about identifica-
tion virtually invo lves , may be to reduce his 
ability to serve to the very minimum . At 
least a part of the ' foreigner ' s ' offering 
lies not in the fact that he is proclaiming 
eternal truths but that in himself and in his 
nationali ty he is a demons t ration that the 
Eternal can ente r history and transform it . 
The principle of the Incarnation demands an 
assessment of nationalism which is not yet 
being recognized by the missionary movement . 1 
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The truth in various forms of the classical Christian doctrine 
of the Covenant is that nationalism and universalism mus t not 
be r e garded as polar opposite s but that they stand in a re -
lation of mutual and positive fulfillment . If some American 
statesmen and those who followed them have revealed the ex-
cesses to which the Puritan version of the Covenant may lead , 
they have also revealed the positive energies which may be 
released in national and international action . Indeed , their 
most dysfunctional contributions to the problems of foreign 
policy must be s e en as proceeding from an inadequate under -
standing of the highest meanings of the Covenant doctrine --
not in its Puritan abe r rations but in its implicit founda -
tions in the Scriptures . Nationalism, according to Warren , 
must be understood as "the self - conscious assertion by a 
1 . M. A. C. Warren , "Nationalism as an International Asset," 
The International Review of Missions , 44 (1955) , pp . 389-
90 . 
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people of its own individuality in relation to other peoples . 
Internationalism, properly understood, is not the negation 
of nationalism but its fulfilment in the community of na-
tions."l The missionary , while he is exposed to nationalist 
conflicts in their most intense form, has a unique opportu-
nity for a ministry of reconciliation as a two-way ambas -
sador who retains, as profoundly as possible , his identifica-
tions with both the country of his origin and the country of 
his work . In Bennett ' s discussion·of ethics and foreign 
policy , this role of the missionary as a two-way runbassador 
is g iven a high valuation: 
The missionary movement is one of the most aston-
ishing examples of the capacity of Christians to 
identify themselves with people in other nations . 
Missionaries have been much criticized for bringing 
their national culture with them and for allowing 
t hemselves to be used as instruments of western 
imperialism. But after we have made full allowance 
for the truth in such criticisms , there has been 
a vast amount of real identification wi t h people 
of another nation in the service of Christ rather 
than of any western values or interests . Very 
often today the missionaries are so identified 
wi th the nations to which they go that they repre-
sent them to the nations from which they come . 
They become most effective defenders of the in-
terests and the aspirations of the peoples with 
whom they have identified. themselves against both 
the national selfishness and the moral pretensions 
of western peoples .2 
Both the opportunities and the excesses of missionary influ-
enc e upon foreign policy are implicit in that statement . 
1 . Ibid ., p . 387. 
2 . John c. Bennett , Christians and the State (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), pp . 187- 8. 
Notwithstanding the decline of the traditions of inter-
national law , the ecumenical movement since 1937 has carried 
on discussions seeking a more realistic reconstruction of 
international law as the framework for the adjustments of 
the conf licting claims of the nations . The Oxford Confer-
ence declared that all forms of law, national and interna-
tional, must be based on "a common ethos , that is, a common 
foundation of moral convictions . To the creation of such a 
common foundation in moral conviction the Church , as a supra-
national society with a profound sense of the historial real-
ities and of the 1rwrth of human personality, has a great con-
tribution to make . 111 No major effort at mass reconstruction 
of political values has been attempted but the C. C. I..A. has 
conducted a continuing study of the problem of an "inter-
national ethos . " Nine general principles for an 11 inter- na -
tional ethos" were tentatively advanced and accepted by the 
World Council of Churches at its Evanston Assembly in 1954: 
(l) All power carries responsibility and all 
nations are trustees of power which should 
be used for the common g ood . 
(2) All nations are subject to moral law , and 
should strive to abide by the accepted 
principles of international law to develop 
this law and to enforce it through common 
actions . 
1 . The Churches Survey Their Task : The Report of the Confer -
ence at Oxford , July 1937 , on Church , Community, and 
State (London: George Allen and Unwin , Ltd ., 1937), 
pp . 173-4 . 
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(3) All nations should honor their pledged 
word and international agreements into 
which they have entered . 
(4) No nation in an international dispute has 
the right to be sole judge in its own 
cause or to resort to war to advance its 
policies , but should seek to settle dis-
putes by direct negotiation or by submit -
ting them to conciliation, arbitration , 
or judicial settlement . 
(5) All nations have an obligation to insure 
universal security and to this end should 
support measures designed to deny victory 
to a declared aggressor . 
(6) All nations should recognize and safeguard 
the inherent dignity , 1r10rth and essential 
rights of the human person, without dis -
tinction as to race , sex, language or re -
ligion . 
(7) Each nation should recognize the rights of 
every other nation , which observes such 
standards , to live by and proclaim its own 
political and social beliefs , provided 
that it does not seek by coercion , threat , 
infiltration or deception to impose these 
on other nations . 
(8) All nations should recognize an obligation 
to share their scientific and technical 
skills with peoples in less developed re -
gions , and to help the victims of disaster 
in other lands . 
(9) All nations should strive to develop cor-
dial relations with their neighbors , en-
courage friendly cultural and commercial 
dealings , and join in creative interna-
tional efforts for human welfare . l 
The difficulty with such a formulation is that it cannot 
be publicized without generating reactions from those whose 
1 . Evanston S eaks: 
ivorld Council of 
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moral and legal traditions are alien to the assumptions un-
derlying this "international ethos . " Communist and Eastern 
nations, with whom the problems of international conflict 
are most acute , cannot without hypocrisy subscribe to this 
essentially Western list of principles . In fact, what pur-
ports to be an "international ethos" may be regarded as 
simply the imperialistic extension of the "Puritan ethos" 
which has shaped American foreign policy. The Wilsonian 
doctrine of collective security implicit in these princi -
ples is rejected, for opposite reasons, by both pacifists 
and "realists" in the United States . 1 Here, as has been 
demonstrated in the entire modern history of international 
law, there is no self- sufficient legal framework for the 
resolution of international conflict; any conceivable frame -
work will be the source of conflict itself and will not re-
ceive uniform support . This is not to suggest that an "in-
ternational ethos" approach is meaningless but rather that 
there is no simple way to lift it above national, cultural, 
and ideological differences . It is only when these differ-
ences confront each other in the arenas of discussion that 
organic reality may be given to universal principles . 
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1 . The pacifist objects to the use of military force to re -
sist aggression. The "realist" challenges the assumptions 
of collective s ecurity with regard to the definability of 
aggression and the interests and abilities of the various 
nations in joining to resist aggression . These assump-
tions are discussed in Organski, pp . 371-89 . 
International law is more the fruit than the 
source of community. An international ethos 
must emerge from all the groups which partici-
pate significantly in world society. No one 
nation, group of nations, economic society, or 
religious body can provide such an ethos for 
others. But all countries must enter into an 
encounter with all others and trust that in 
the free market of ideas the common values 
will in due course elicit a common consent.l 
In a de facto sense, an international ethos is coming 
into being. Since 1948, the ecumenical movement has sought 
to transcend the American-Russian conflict, not simply be-
cause of polarization between the two nations but also be-
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cause of largely unperceived similarities in the existential 
creation of values within them. 2 Lasswell has noted a "trend 
toward scientific and democratic homogeneity" obscured by ide-
ological differences.3 Toynbee sees "socialism" and "free en-
terprise" as a "Russo-Ame.rican goddess" wearing the same suit: 
And if you identify the goddess with her dress, 
the name that you give her will depend on which 
way out you make her wear her suit. In the eyes 
of any citizen of the Old World, this Russo-Ameri-
can suit of clothes might look peculiar because 
its material is economic stuff, and to dress 
1. Walter G. Muelder, Foundations of the Responsible Societ~ 
(New York and Nashville: The Abingdon Press, 1959), p. 2 6. 
2. The Amsterdam Assembly urged Christians to see the "hand of 
God in the revolt of multitudes against injustice that 
gives Communism much of its strength •••• Christians 
should realize that for many, especially young men and 
women, Communism seems to stand for a vision of human equal-
ity and universal brotherhood for which they were prepared 
by Christian influences •••• The Christian churches should 
reject the ideologies of both Communism and laissez-faire 
capitalism, and should seek to draw men away from the false 
assumption that these extremes are the only alternatives." 
Turnbull, pp. 131-3. 
3. Harold D. Lasswell, "World Organization and Society," in 
Lerner and Lasswell, p. 113. 
a goddess in that is something new in the 
history of religion . At some place and time, 
human beings have worshiped almost eve r y t h ing 
under the sun: animals, trees, crops, thunder-
bolts . But this is sure l y the first time in 
history that anyone has ever worshiped systems 
of economic production and distribution . l 
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The essential difference between the two systems -- and accord-
ing to Toynbee this is an "enormous" difference--is the degree 
of 11 spiri tual freedom'' in America . The common materialism 
of the Russian system and the American system raises , however , 
the serious question as to whether ecumenical Christianity 
should identify itself with any and all tendencies toward the 
universalization of values . 
Schematically , the elements of Russian and American sys -
tems tending to produce similar values most relevant to in-
ternational relations include the following : 
1 . Both systems in their modern forms were created out of 
violent revolution and retain a certain revolutionary 
fervor . 
2 . Both systems have become ideologically moralistic in 
the conduct of policy and the campaign for world opinion . 
3 . Both nations occupy large land masses not easily attacked 
or conquered and tending to perpetuate a cert a in degree 
of isolationism and suspicion . 
4. Both nations are led politically by Caucasians (although 
the Soviet Union , notwithstanding its sovereign ty over 
1 . Arnold J- . Toynbee , "Spiritual Freedom is t h e Great Dif -
ference , " The New York Times lliagazine , January 15, 1961 , 
p . 30 . 
the Caucasus , is pleased to maneuver the United States 
into a pattern of " East - We st" thinking , reinforcing 
Russian identification with non- Caucasian peoples) . 
5. Both nations include large non- Caucasian p op ulations who 
provide sources of both identification and conflict with 
other nations . 
6 . Both nations have been transformed from rural agrarian 
societies into industrialized and urbanized societies . 
7. Both economic systems have been driven by technological 
revolutions and gi ve high priority to scientific values . 
8 . Both political systems, professing a disdain for the state 
as such, have become increasingly centralized and bureau-
cratized. 
9 . Both nations , professing an abhorrence of peacetime armed 
forces , have become highly militarized . 
10. Both societies, professing an egalitarian ideology , have 
developed class structures which can only be rationalized 
with much difficulty . 
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11 . Both g overnments lack continuities with the stable diplo -
ma tic traditions of the nineteenth century and have a 
certain lack of sophistication and maturity in their diplo-
matic conduct . 
12 . Both political systems subject foreign policy to a high 
degree of party interference militating against the 
autonomy of professional diplomats . 
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The consequences of these similarities are not necessari -
ly hopeful for the resolution of the conflicts between the Uni -
ted States and the Soviet Union. The very fact of similarity 
can sometimes give a peculiar intensity to personal or social 
conflict . Moreover, such parallels tend to increase the ali -
enation of those neutral nations who do not share the same 
values and who feel threatened by both systems . Finally , the 
rationalizing functions performed by increasingly similar and 
competitive ideologies both reflect and hasten the exhaustion 
of the more authentic values within each system. The challenge 
to ecumenical political ethics is to avoid any simple or un-
critical identification with national ideologies and ye t retain 
a relevance within both national and international arenas . 
That relevance includes the provision of a creative ferment 
leading to a new integration of vital norms and values in po-
litical systems . 
3. The Reconciliation of Religion 
The nature of religious influence upon polit ical deci-
sions is not simply a function of external relationships between 
religious and political institutions: it depends , finally , on 
the nature of religious resources themselves . It is the con-
cluding argument of the disser tation that the capacity of reli -
gion to disc i pline its own internal conflicts and to wrest 
from them the creative energies which disciplined conflicts 
generate is the ultimate source of positive religious in-
fluence upon secular decision-making. 
i . World Religions and World Community. 
From the perspective of the political community, reli-
gious differences do not efface the meaning of the generic 
term "religion . " It is readily perceived that a variety of 
groups claiming ultimate sanctions and universal norms seek 
to influence political decisions . The ecumenical movement 
proceeds upon the premise that united action enhances Prot-
estant and Orthodox influence in world affairs . Protestant-
Catholic cooperation is less stabilized and is interrupted 
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by persisting clashes over church- state issues . Radically 
different issues of strategy , however , are raised by world 
religions outside the larger Christian community . Non- Chris -
tian religions of an increasingly missionary quality are dy-
namic participants in the same arenas of nationalist fervor 
and international action which engage Christian groups . In 
many countries, the encounter is direct and the conflict is 
serious . Hinduism, Islam, Buddhism, Confucianism, and tribal 
religions have all crossed political boundaries and become in-
ternational forces in the twentieth century . The practical 
question for Protestantism is : Should it consider non-Chris-
tian religions as significant actual or potential allies in 
the ministry of reconciliation--or should it simply regard them 
as threats to that ministry? The more fundamental theological 
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question is: Should Protestantism proclaim the message of 
reconciliation as one requiring conversion and rejection of 
previous religious identification--or should it regard other 
world religions as manifestations of the message of reconcili-
ation for their adherents? 
After World War I, the Church Peace Union, itself a 
Catholic-Protestant-Jewish organization in the United States, 
n?t only promoted a World Alliance for International Friend-
ship through the Churches, but also a World Conference for 
International Peace through Religion. Enthusiasts for the 
latter characterized it as "the most daring project in behalf 
of world peace yet promoted by any religious organization." 
It called for a conference of 1000 representing all religions 
"not to discuss or compare religions nor to form a league of 
faiths, least of all to find a common denominator of their 
beliefs 
• • • but to harness to the cause of international 
goodwill and peace the spiritual force of all their religious 
faiths." At the organizational meeting in Geneva in 1928, 
there were Christian, Jewish, Hindu, Confucian, Moslem, Bahai, 
Shintoist, Buddhist, Theosophist, Zoroastrian, and Ethical 
Culture delegates. The wars of the 1930's and 1940's kept 
the association from becoming a sustained movement.l 
The theological and ethical mood of Protestant and ecu-
menical thinkers since 1945 has tended to discourage the 
1. Stuntz, pp. 47-8. 
mobilization of world religions in a common peace movement. 
In late 1945, D. Luther Evans offered a proposal for "United 
Religions for the United Nations" with the conviction that 
"it is very doubtful if philosophies will ever come to fun-
damental agreement in theory until they cooperatively test 
the worth of their respective philosophies in the realm of 
joint social action."l There was a lack of substantial re-
sponse to the proposal. Protestant indifference to such 
schemes in recent years reflects a theological revival in 
which the uniqueness of the Christian message has been 
heightened, enthusiasm for peace movements discouraged, and 
the failures of "common denominator approaches" witnessed. 
Faith conflicts moved into the United Nations during 
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the discussions of the proposed Declaration of Human Rights 
in 1948. Article 18 of the Charter, in the preparation of 
which c.c.r.A. participation had been conspicuous, provided 
an essentially American Protestant definition of the fullness 
of religious freedom. Various amendments were proposed in 
the General Assembly. Delegate Pavlov of the Soviet Union 
moved the addition of the clause 11 in accordance with the laws 
of the country concerned and the requirements of public 
morality." Moslem Delegate Baroody of Saudi Arabia, after 
sharply criticizing missionaries as the "forerunners of 
1. "United Religions for United Nations," Journal of Liberal 
Religion, 7 (Winter, 1945-46), p. 213. 
political intervention , " asked for an amendmen t which would 
restrict the definition to "freedom of thought, conscience, 
and religion . " In final Assembly voting, both amendments 
were defeated 45- 4 with 4 abstentions . 1 
A new proposal for a synthesis of world religions 
was made by David Rhys Williams in 1951: a "Liberal Faith" 
along Unitarian and Universalist lin es . Williams ' method 
was a study in comparative religi ons to identify the "Golden 
Rule 11 and the "Immortal Hope 11 which nearly all were found to 
conta in . He had conducted the study "to understand more 
fully the ideals and motivations of the various peoples of 
this earth with whom we have to coopera te if we are going to 
live together in peace and harmony in the world . 112 Northrop 
presented a pointed challenge to American Protestantism in 
1952 with the prediction that victory in the global struggle 
between the United States and the Soviet Union would go to 
that ideology nwith the deepest and most sympathetic under-
standing of the mental ities of Islam and Asia . 11 3 
Ecumenical and mission leaders, acknowledging that their 
judgment is generally opposed to any league of faiths for 
peace or fo r any other purpose , have defended that position 
1. These Rights and Freedoms (New York: United Nations 
Depar-tment of Public Information, 1950), pp . 48-50 . 
2 . David Rhys Williams , World Religions and the Hope for 
Peace (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1951), p . 3. 
3 . Northrop , p . 69 . 
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doctrinally with the exclusive claim of God ' s "historic 
act of reconciliation in Jesus Christ . '' The "savior gods" 
of other religions are relegated to the status of "mytho-
logical figures, whereas Jesus Christ woo a historical fig-
ure •••• Once it is seen that the redemption of men in 
history must be a historical redemption , then the challenge 
to Christian exclusiveness can persist only as a challenge 
to Christian inclusiveness . 111 
A vigorous liberal dissent from this viewpoint is 
Ross ' s charge of "isolationism" and the "sharpening of the 
mood of competitiveness" in ecumenical theology . 
The interest in world community among the leaders 
in the ecumenical movement is in reality an in-
terest in world Christian community: community 
must be ' in Christian terms .' ••• Apparently 
there is to be no serious attempt to raise the 
searching question as to the capacity of any one 
r~ligious symbol to take on equal vitality for 
all the diverse peoples of the world with the 
rich cultural heritage peculiar to each . There 
is to be no sustained attempt to examine the as -
sumptions underlying the Christian missionary 
attitude •.•• At the moment the prevailing 
theological position in the ecumenical movement 
is built on the assumption that only in the 
history of Israel has there been a significant 
cumulative history of God ' s concern for man's 
welfare . 2 
l . Charles W. Forman, "The Challenge to Christian Exclusive-
ness,11 Religion in Life, 27 (Summer, 19.58) , p . 360 . 
2 . Floyd H. Ross, Addressed to Christians: Isolationism vs . 
orld Community (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950) , 
P:t: • 12- 13 . 
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And so there are conflicts within Protestantism over strategy 
concerning other world religions and there are the inevitable 
conflicts between missionaries and non-Christian religions in 
mission countries. The minority status of Protestantism is 
more than a statistical fact: it testifies to the enduring 
qualities of other faiths. Protestant leadership is not ob-
liged, however, to intensify interfaith conflict with defen-
siveness about the uniqueness of the message of reconcilia-
tion. It may be no less faithful to that message--and a more 
practical expression of its ministry--to act upon the belief 
that Christianity is most unique among the religions of the 
world when it is least disposed to clamor for that distinc-
tion. For missionary strategy, there is always the compel-
ling alternative of "evangelism of the deed 11 in which the 
Incarnation is witnessed as action in history and not simply 
proclaimed as a word about action. 
If Protestant leaders cannot accept syncretistic schemes 
with enthusiasm, they can identify themselves with persons in 
other religious communities whose ethical insight and prac-
tical talents assert claims for the status of allies in the 
quest for peace. The defensive stance of Christianity in 
much of the world, not only before the assaults of a mission-
ary Communism but also in the face of an unparalleled mis-
sionary vigor in the religions of Asia and Africa, is far too 
serious a predicament to be dismissed with disdain because of 
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dogmatic confidence. The refusal to engage in common work 
with non-Christian religious leaders because of doctrinal ex-
clusiveness has non-doctrinal consequences for international 
political relationships. If universalist religions cannot 
evolve patterns of co-existence, their insistence that polit-
ical systems do so loses much of its legitimacy and force. 
It bears repetition in this context that international strife 
has become peculiarly demonic in the twentieth century be-
cause of the quasi-religious and totalitarian qualities of 
competitive ideologies. It is no capitulation to syncretism 
to suggest that world religions have a common stake in human 
survival which offers the most radical imperative to some 
degree of reconciliation among them. 
American Protestantism, both its defenders and its 
critics seem to agree, is largely without disciplines for 
engaging Hinduism and Islam in either religious dialogue or 
humanitarian service. Whatever the formal differences among 
such religions may be, they are differences among persons 
equipped with a mutual universalism. As persons more than 
systems, these religious communities are not without common 
interests in the international political arena--interests 
which a preoccupation with doctrinal exclusiveness has long 
obscured. Among these common interests are the following: 
1. The integrity of religious loyalty over against the total 
claims of the nation-state and the tendency of political 
systems and movements to manipulate religious loyalty. 
2. The protection of human rights, including religious lib-
erty, through international sanctions. 
3. The capacity to challenge the sway of materialistic 
values in both capitalist and communist systems. 
4. The struggle for racial justice against the manipulation 
of religious doctrine to justify oppression. 
5. The ministry to physical suffering of persons caught up 
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in international tragedy or national disaster or privation. 
6. The sanctity of the family and the status of women. 
7. The religious foundations of education. 
8. The study of comparative religions. 
9. The provision of opportunities for personal service 
vitally related to international affairs. 
10. The religious interpretation of political vocations. 
While universalist religions do not give uniform attention to 
such concerns, obstacles to cooperation in projects relating 
to them are not primarily or necessarily doctrinal: they are 
cultural, psychological, national, and moral. Where the study 
of comparative religions is only doctrinal, it may be supple-
mented by empirical investigation of world religions and world 
politics. It can no longer be regarded as a fringe matter for 
study of the most fundamental human loyalties to be conducted. 
ii. The Institutionalization of Conflict 
Protestantism as the largest private constituency within 
the American public has unique opportunities and heavy obli-
gations in the processes by which that public shapes foreign 
392 
policy . Its points of access have typically been more nu-
merous than Protestants have themselves perceived . Their 
influence at those points of access has been erratic and 
undisciplined because they have not possessed either the 
ethical wholeness or the practical wisdom to understand their 
own influence . Fundamental to that lack of understanding has 
been an inability to come to realistic terms with the meaning 
of conflict . It is when that meaning is grasped that Prot -
estantism may be prepared to release its special ener gies 
under the sustained disciplines of new strategies in the 
public arena . Together , such strategies for the management 
of conflict require integrity of relationship between the 
inner life of the church and the outward witness of the church . 
There is no point in the church 's life that is entirely sep-
arable from the life of the world to which the church brings 
its mini stry of reconciliation . The strategies of conflict, 
taken collectively, may be termed the "institutionalization 
of conflict . " Implicit in that collective concept are such 
features as continuity of interaction; regularized procedures 
for handling changes in conditions , goals , and power ; and the 
steady and vital capacity to create new norms . The institu-
tionalization of conflict is not the process by which conflict 
is held at bay or repressed or compartmentalized: it is the 
process by which disciplines of action make conflict function -
al for the life of the church and the world . It is not the 
necessary opposite of cooperation: it is the precondition of 
any kind of cooperation which is vital . 
Ins titutionalization requires the combination of 
conflict and cooperation, since rules and pro-
cedures cannot function in the absence of volun-
tary obe dience or enforcement through sanctions . 
Even war , the ultimate in conflict, is coopera-
tive to the extent necessary to permit communi -
cation between enemies and administration of 
mutually advantageous rules . Thus the frequent 
ri g id dichotomy between harmony and opposition , 
coop eration and conflict , is very misleading . l 
The church requires strategies of orientation to conflict in 
three phases of action which connect the church with world 
politics: (a) a strategy of opinion; (b) a strategy of power; 
(c) a strategy of violence . 
The importance of a Protestant strategy of opinion has 
been demonstrated in the excesses to which an undiscip lined 
Puritan ethos has led the American public in the twentieth 
century . It has been the combination of professional leader-
ship unacquainted with the consequences of its own influence 
in an ideolog ical century and of mass opinion unp repared for 
the discriminating responses required of it in the same cen-
tury . The alternative policy orientations of American Prot -
estants-- iso l ationism, internationalism, pacifism, realism--
have all been joined by subterranean cur r ents in the Ameri-
can psyche making it possible for millions to be swept along 
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from one to t h e other, unaware of the p sycholog ical consistency 
1 . Mack and Snyder , p . 243 . 
of their apparently conflicting enthusiasms . Perhaps the 
deepest currents sweeping through the American psyche have 
been those of moral indignation . Preachers and policy-
makers have both depended too exclusively upon this vital 
drive in the Puritan ethos in their attempts to sway their 
audiences ; perhaps only a few have been aware of the degree 
to which they were manipulating explosive power . Moral in-
dignation , while a necessary element in a prophetic reli-
gion , is as irresponsible a form of power as any other un-
less it is (1) balanced by an appreciation of the compound 
of justice and injustice in all parties to most conflicts; 
(2) accompanied by an effort to consolidate the elements of 
mutuality which unite all parties in conflict; and (3) con-
trolled by an ultimate scheme of loyalties which is trained 
to temper, qualify , or reject the excessive claims of more 
relative loyalties . But these controls upon moral indigna-
tion are not made effective by any simple r ational applica-
tion . Their efficacy is only secured by the compelling 
qualities of a higher level of moral and sp iritual appeal 
than that which has customarily issued from political and re -
lig ious leadership in matters of foreign policy . Such an ap -
peal cannot i gnore the enduring vitality and the instability 
of personal and mass emot ions generated in international con-
flict and productive of hitherto untamed collective hostili-
ties . New and more constructive channels must be provided 
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for the expression of such emotions: work which identifies 
persons with the very causes of international conflict . 
National loyalties will not be dissolved by political 
or religious agencies , national or international . But the 
energies which they generate can be directed by imaginative 
statesmanship to the solution of other public problems of 
national and international scope . Many such problems remain 
unsolv ed because of what is apparently a dysfunctional dual -
ism in the American ideology: that ideology is capable of 
arousing an unusually high degree of collective sacrifice 
when the nation is at war , but it becomes so quickly trans -
muted into a rationalization for purely private pursuits when 
the nation is not at war . The neglected problems - -economic , 
educational , medical , racial , residential --of each non- war 
period , requiring the highest degree of creative nationalism 
for their solution but so inadequately attended to by the 
American nation in the twentieth cen t ury , become caught up in 
the chain of causes which bring a renewed intensity to inter-
national conflict . There is thus a vicious circle in public 
opinion , beyond the power of policy- makers to break , but to 
some extent alterable by more self- conscious and responsible 
opinion elites . While guarding against the possibility of 
over - estimation , it may be asked whether there are not with-
in the American character, so deeply rooted in religious nur -
ture and schooled to a respect for personal sanctity, 
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treasures of precisely those kinds of powe r which interna-
tional statesmanship will require for a long generation or 
more. The nation's ideology, unstable and vulnerable to both 
political and religious manipulation and formally threatened 
with e xhaustion, requires more authentic interpretation and 
more profound historical understanding if it is to become the 
vehicle of the nation's most creative contributions to the 
resolution of interna tional conflict . At the heart of such 
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an understanding is the apprehension of both the power and the 
risks in an essentially Furitan ethos which has alternately 
manifested and obscured the truths contained in the doctrine 
of the Covenant . That a nation can and must be the vehicle 
of universal purposes is a truth which skepticism and cynicism 
dare not destroy; that a nation tempted to attach universal 
sanctions to its own interests can be the source of ma ss 
hostility and international conflict is a truth which all of 
its leaders dare not forget . 
Protestant elites can react either with resentment or 
with intelligent planning to an increasing boldness upon the 
part of secular scholars and policy-makers in requesting that 
reli g ious influence become n1ore self- conscious and more de-
pendable in the public arena . That request has not ye t been 
heard by many in the churches who are in positions to bring 
resources to bear upon the problem of opinion leadership in 
professional training . This is more than a problem of formal 
theological orientation: it is a problem of making religious 
leaders perceptive and skillful participants in the process 
of opinion-formation . That process , it must be relentless-
ly repeated , is never very far from the deepest psychic re-
alities of the human spirit--whether the superficial mani -
festation of those realities is apathy or enthusiasm . Public 
opinion , both by design and by default, brings the dominant 
values of a free society to bear upon national policy . Re -
ligious leaders have always wanted to believe that they were 
the custodians of those values: they should find encourage-
ment in an age which they have been disposed to call 11 secu-
lar11 when secular leaders indicate that they are only too 
much aware of the continuing vitality of religious influence . 
That the resentment of religious influence should give oc-
casional bias to secular proposals for the reform of the ways 
of religious leadership is not a fact which religious leaders 
shoull seize upon and intensify . 
Perhaps the most notable secular plea for improving the 
qualitative participation of religious elites in public opin-
ion was voiced by Gabriel Almond more than a decade ago . 
Almond did not suggest a direct assault upon mass opinion 
through a quantitative program of public education: 
Far greater returns may be expected from efforts 
to broaden the curricula of teachers' colleges , 
theological seminaries, and schools of journalism 
to include sober studies of international econ-
omics and politics than from the more spectacular 
efforts of the 'forums of the air .' The problem 
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is to introduce information and critical in-
telligence into the stream of communication 
at key points in the political process and in 
channels which conform to the ' social terrain,' 
at points where trust and intimacy open the 
minds of men to new thoughts and recognitions . l 
A reoriented program of the Church Peace Union has , since 
1957 , provided a selective approach to religious leaders on 
an interfaith basis in which the dominant focus is "ethics 
and foreign policy . " In New York and various regional cen-
ters , a series of seminars has carried ethical conversation 
forward . These s eminars , in which the writer has been a 
grateful participant , have had an essentially theoretical 
orientation to a dialogue between policy professionals and 
religious professionals . The more practical aspects of 
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opinion leadership have not yet been systematically approached . 
Independent groups such as t he Church Peace Union have 
only a marginal relationship to the power structures of Ameri -
can Protestantism. Horeover , their programs are by nature 
post - professional . They do not claim to be , nor can they be , 
substitutes for the quality of religious training more organ-
ically related to the life of churches . Their interfaith 
boundaries, while providing an opportunity for reconciling 
opinion among Protestants , Catholics , and Jews, do not permit 
the most vital resources of each tradition to be fully ex-
posed--only the separate seminaries and denominational programs 
1 . Almond , p . 7. 
can perform that function . Almond's conclusions , after the 
most 11 realistic 11 analy sis of American public opinion , d irect 
attention to theolog ical education and teacher training : 
If we set as our standa rd of elite perf ormance in 
foreign policy the objectives of democratic disci-
pline, ideological consensus, and the development 
of a systematic and integrative menta lity, we are 
led inevitably to the two primary training elites --
the teachers and the clergy . These elites appear 
to fall s hort of fulfilling their tasks in a num-
ber of respects . Teachers and clergymen tend to 
be the bearers of moral and political idealism. 
They are sus ceptible to millennial h opes , and 
thereby lay the groundwork for cynical rejections 
and disillusionments among their c h arges . In this 
respect they contribute to American moral dualism; 
they are res p onsible in part for the persisten ce 
of instability in American opinion . They set up 
aspirations which cannot be fulfilled, and incul -
cate principles of conduct which cannot be effective . 
• • • There is no short cut to the improvement of the 
educational and reli g ious elites . ~mat mi ght be 
proposed are such changes in the training of teachers 
and clergy as will make it increasingly dif f icult for 
t h e practitioners of t h es e professions to evade po -
litical reality . Few clergymen and teachers , even 
in the purely formal sense study 'politics.' They 
are rarely called upon to confront the real problems 
of military and political security . An already 
strong p enchant for escapism, which often lies at 
the basis of their choice of these professions, is 
encouraged by curricula badly adapted to the broad 
character- molding and ideal - setting function thes e 
elites are called on to perform . l 
It may be doubted that a more forceful and penetrating invita-
tion to the influencing of policy decision s has ever been 
extended to theological education by a person professionally 
preoccupied with world politics . That the language of skep-
ticism is conspicuous should n~t be a reason for refusing the 
1. Ibid ., p . 234. 
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invitation . That certain policy assumptions are implicit 
in the invitation should provide no excuse for those of dif-
ferent policy assumptions to evade the problem of responsible 
opinion leadership . 
It is only within the integrity of the total ministry--
primarily as men are prepared for it by theological semina-
ries -- that the ethi cal and practical dimensions of opinion 
leadership may be brought together . Fortunately , many Prot-
estant seminaries are located in the nation ' s most lively 
and most influential centers of foreign policy study and 
discussion: New York , Boston-Cambridge , Washington , Chicago, 
and others . They have largely unexplored opportunities of 
an incomparable quality for a reconciliation of relevant 
disciplines . It is not just the mutual exposure of ethics 
and foreign policy which is required : it is the exposure of 
both of these to the more behavioral fields of public opinion 
and propaganda . Both the assumptions and the technical in-
sights of public opinion are more important to Protestant 
ethics than either opinion or ethics has recognized . The 
evangelical commission of "propagation of the faith" is more 
to be illumined by the study of "propaganda" than religious 
leaders care to acknowledge . The preaching , educational , 
and action ministries of the churches are subject to the same 
field of psychic forces which propagandists and advertisers 
seek to influence ~ It is not that Protestant preachers need 
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to be made more effective n1anipulators of public opinion : 
the need is precisely the opposite . Only by exploring the 
ways in whic h opinion may be manipulated and the unwitting 
conspiracy of religion in that manipulation may Christian 
ethics be effectively lifted above identification with the 
ideologies of party , class , and nation . It is the need to 
introduce the qualities of rational discipline through opinion 
elites which theological education must appreciate . Such 
tools of propaganda study as "thematic analysis" and the 
perception of the !!boomerang effect" are directly relevant 
to the communication of the Gospel . l Responsible cormnuni-
cation requires a knowledg e of the behavior of communication 
systems . The capacity to learn from the most secular disci -
plines is an openness to the range and the unity of truth 
which are the premises of a coherent faith and of scientific 
inquiry . Only if religious leadership acquires at least 
semi - professional understanding of the subtleties of publi c 
opinion will it be able to extend its ministry of reconcili -
ation constructively into the public arena . It is just that 
understanding which makes it possible for the most disinter-
ested and most transcendent qualities of religious influence 
to retain their integrity when they are projected into the 
middle of human conflicts . The role of a reconciling public 
ministry is indicated , in part , by Mack and Snyder : 
Normally , no matter h ow serious a confl ict exists 
between particular groups and individuals , there 
will always be disinterested or neutral , but none -
theless affected , outsiders (or, indire ctly , 
' third ' parties) . If conflict comple tely divides 
a local , national , or international community , 
which means in effect that there are no outsiders , 
solutions become very difficult indeed. This is 
partly because there are no available neutral con-
ciliators or mediators and partly because no one 
has a vested interest in the cessation of conflict . 
The pressure for liquidation or control of social 
conflict from disinterested but affected bystanders 
is one of the primary limits on its duration , ex-
tension , and intensity . l 
The very capacity of some religious persons to transcend con-
flicting opinion is the most relevant identification they can 
make with the conflict itself . This is not , however, a 
11 simple transcendence 11 :: it becomes meaningful only through 
empirical insight into the nature of the conflict . 
The meaning of conflict cannot be lea rned only through 
detachment: it must be lear ned through experience in the 
exercise of power . In a free society , all mature persons 
are n o t only entitled but obliged to participate in the exer-
cise of power . Indeed , it is the dynamic meaning of a free 
society that there is no arbitrary monopoly of power . The 
orientation of persons to the meaning of power is therefore 
the highest task given to political ethi c s . But the psychic 
properties of power clruaor for the recognition t hat the 
1 . Mack and Snyder , p . 226 . 
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de c isive experiences of p ersons in their orientation to the 
meaning of power occur in the very early years of life . No 
program of formal adult instruction in churches or other 
institutions can make up for the lack of sustained personal 
nurture in that meaning, primarily within the family arena . 
The qualities of experience in decision- making , attitudes 
toward authority and responsibility, habits of ·controversy 
and compromise, loyalty to and identification with larger 
interests--all of these aspects of the meaning of p ower are 
schooled in persons long before , if ever , t hey learn to per-
ceive that they a re being schooled. The family is a vital 
political institution not simply because it is a vehicle 
for the transfer of group membership and public i nformation: 
it is vital because it is the fir st power- system experienced 
by the members of society . 1 
Protestantism's 11 strategy of opinion," therefore, must 
do more than train elites for the management of adult senti -
ment : it must develop disciplines appropriate to its most 
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1 . The lasting qualities of these "pre - political" experiences 
are exposed in Lasswell ' s interpretation of the self -
respect required for political maturity and to counter 
political alienation . rvia turity involves a 11 degree of eman-
cipation from the immediate environment by 'internalizing ' 
and applying the patterns of the earlier environment •.•• 
Such a mature personality can consider the significance of 
any act of policy upon the fate of the world community •••• 
Pre - adult environments must be modified to permit the in-
corporation of symbols of humanity into the self , together 
with demands upon the self to live up to a working code in 
the control of destructive private impulses and in liquida-
ting the cultural patterns that provoke and incite destruc -
tiveness.11 "World Loyalty," in Wright, The World Commu-
nity, p . 217. 
natural group constituents , its member families . At this 
point , the question must be asked as to whether the "family 
life" planning of Protestant denominations has not tended to 
segregate family functions artificially from their decisive . 
influence upon society . The "togetherness" theme may be re-
garded as the last pale extension of a Puritan ethos which 
has generated personal and political alienation through its 
exalting of privatization . To the degree that ufamily life" 
programs simply confer moralistic sanctions upon white , 
middle class suburban familie s in their pursui t of happiness , 
they reinforce the escape of those families from the most 
crucial internal conflicts within the American nation . The 
choice in such program planning may be stated , perhaps with 
hyperbole , as the decision as to how the vacuum left in the 
wake of the long decline of productive and creative functions 
of the American fmaily shall be filled: with a combination 
of the somewhat artificial contrivances of family religious 
ritual and family recreation , or with the attempt to build 
vital new functions into f~~ilies which are identified with 
the world ' s conflicts . The redemptive involvement of the 
family arena in the world arena may be the cost of its and 
the world ' s survival . Dinner-table conversation is not un-
related to the prejudices and the animosities which divide 
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the whole human family . Authority in the family is not irrel-
evant to the pa t ter n of authority in the state . Family 
budget-planning is not separable from the hunger and 
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homelessness and illiteracy of millions who live far away 
but who are rising in revolution . There is an ethics of 
residence, seldom acknowledged , in which the basic decision 
as to where a family shall live and who shall and who shall 
not be its neighbors practically determlnes the relevance of 
the Second Commandment of Christ . The valuatlon given emo-
tionally in the family to such voc ations as "politicians" and 
11 preacherstt may determine how lives shall be spent . Atti -
tudes t oward income - tax returns and tickets for speeding have 
a way of conditioning sentiments toward g overnment . Such 
a list could be multiplied easily . Its only purpose is to 
demonstrate what middle class Pro testantism has generally 
failed to recognize : that there is an organic relationship 
between the family and socie t y -- indeed , among all human in-
stitutions--which must be apprehended as basic to Christian 
ethics , including political ethics and its application to 
international conflict . 
For the churches , there is thus a political wisdom in 
working with such natural grou ps as the family . Families 
may become strategic points of access for both long- range 
political nurture and for the more urgent and sacrificial 
tasks required of compassionate people in a world of hostili-
ties. If it is true that t he resolution of international con-
flict requires the resolution of conflicts intern~l to the 
life of a nation , it is just as true that the resolution of 
a nation's conflicts requires the resolution of the conflicts 
within each of its basic institutions . The family mirrors 
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all of the world 's problems . If it cannot solve those prob-
lems by its own action, it can lay the most fundamental founda-
tions, with religious guidance , for the distinctive require-
ments of political e thics . 
There is no escape from this indirect pattern of opinion 
strategy if polit ical ethics is to participate in sustained 
and responsible public disciplines . Crusades , lobbies, and 
sensation- seeking demonstrations tend to become dysfunctional 
detours around public disciplines , with the consequence that 
they aggravate the mutual estrangement of Protestantism and 
politica . Religious and political elites actually are exposed 
to many of the same dilemmas: each group brings to a focus 
many forces which are neither religious nor political in 
origin , but economic, social, psychological, cultural . What-
ever their need for separation in some matters, religious and 
political leaders have a common stake in problems which they 
can influence but cannot directly control--at least, not in 
a free society . They have a common responsibility in pre -
paring persons for a wide variety of tasks from citizenship 
to professional specialization . They are both obliged to 
inspire and motivate the most creative efforts of which human 
beings are capable if they and their institutions are to sur-
vive. In the very century in which specialization of work 
has fragmented other vocations, the preacher and the 
politician alike have been compelled to broaden and general -
ize their vocational competence . Both must reckon with the 
natural process of opinion- formation in secular interest 
groups . There is a statesmanship required of religion and 
a statesmanship required of politics . In fo reign policy , 
for both elites , there is a "domestic diplomacy" as well as 
an "international diplomacy . "l A generation ago , Henry 
Wallace explored these parallels between religious and po -
litical leadership , noting particularly the ethical hazards 
to which they are inevitably exposed : 
The problem of statesmans hip is to mold a policy 
leading toward a higher state for humanity , and 
to stick by that p olicy and make it seem desirable 
to the people in s p ite of short- time political 
pressure to the contrary . True statesmanship and 
true religion therefore have much in comraon . Both 
are beset by those who , professing to be able poli -
ticians and hard-headed men of affairs , are actually 
so exclusively interested in the events of the im-
mediate future or the Helfare of a small class that 
from the broader , long- time point of view they are 
thoroughly impractical . 2 
While the style of the "idealist" seems prominent in that 
·" 
statement , there is a fundamental "rea l i sm" in acknowledging 
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1 . The distinction betHeen "domestic" and "international" di-
plomacy brings to the surface the different styles by which 
1
'idealist" and 11 realist 11 statesmen have related t hemselves 
to the domestic arena . Wilson and Dulles courted and won 
the participation of mass publics but could not achieve 
some international objectives because they alienated p ro-
fessionals and elites . Acheson was preoccupied with p ro -
fessional participation; his international obj e ctives 
suffered the rejection of mass publics . Both styles of 
domestic diplomacy failed to achieve the sustained con-
fidence of pivotal opinion elites . 
2 . Henry Wallace , Statesmanship and Religion (New York: Round 
Table Press, Inc ., 1934), p . 115. 
the need to improve the quality of elite participation in 
policy discussion . Both political and religious professions 
are dependent upon the radical participation of lay groups 
and must work to lift the level of lay performance . Prot -
estantism has a vital doctrine of lay vocation which is 
dormant within present patterns of lay organization inside 
the church and only superficial in present application to 
the secular groups which tend to dominate policy decisions 
in the United States . 
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Thus , an adequate "str a t egy of opinion 11 inevitably 
becomes a 11 strategy of power . " There is no escape for Chris -
tian ethics or leadership from the realities of power . "The 
eternal problem of politics , national or international , do -
mestic or foreign, is not to do away with power but to tame 
it , to contro l it , to confine it within legitimate chan-
nels . "1 Protestantism has lacked an ethic and a strategy 
for the integration of these tasks . At times , it has been 
zealous in leg itimizing the status quo in power relations - -
or altering those relations according to current definitions 
of national interest . At other times , it has professed an 
aversion to power in all of its conspicuous forms . In these 
s hifting orientations to poVJer , Protestantism has demonstrated 
dynamically that its traditional doctr ines of church and state 
cannot discipline Protestant action responsibly . 
l . Halle , Civilization and Foreign Policy , p . 45 . 
The foundation principle of the Christian doctrine of 
the state , implicit in the New Testament but obscured by cen-
turies of static thinking upon that most intrinsic concern , 
is and can be none other than the most dynamic doctrine of 
the ministry of reconciliation . That doctrine, far from 
being irrelevant to the conflicts and tensions within the 
secular community , is the most politically relevant message 
to be addressed to them . In a sense , political ethics cannot 
begin for the Christian with the state : it must begin with 
the reality of persons - in-community who are related by a com-
bination of loyalty and conflict and who must use power for 
purposes which express Ultimate power and purpose . It is 
only in a secondary sense that a doctrine of the state emerges 
in the form of community instruments of power . Those instru-
ments are entitled to positive sanctions as the means by 
which the community symbolizes its unity and interdependence , 
brings its decisions to a focu s , and unites its energies for 
limited collective responsibilities , When community welfare 
is abused by private action , the state is entitled to ex-
ercise discipline . When community welfare is abused by pub -
lic action , the conscience of the community must be allowed 
to assert its sanctions against the state . The participation 
of religion belongs both to the process of comraunity decision-
making prior to action by the state and to the conscience of 
the community after action by the state . But relig ion in all 
its forms cannot participate radically in the life of the 
community if it is formally atta ched to the state , for t h en 
it will have imparted t h e status of transcendent authority 
to the instruments of p ower instead of to the per s ons and the 
corr~unity for whom t hose instruments exist . Th e ministry of 
reconciliation can only consent to the building up of the 
state up on the foundations of a radically personal and rad-
ically communitarian ethic . 
The ministry of reconciliation does not require official 
recognition in constitution or currency , alth oug h those who 
profess it will always work for political and economic forms 
which are most open to the possibilities of reconciliation . 
Such forms inherently require that a self - conscious system 
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of conflict be built into the management of the instruments 
of power . Conflict is , politically and economically as well 
as religiously , the prerequisite of reconcili a tion . If 
either the p olitical or the economic system f ails to insti -
tutionalize and rationalize forms for the exp ression of con-
flict , it is unnecess arily threatened with both tyranny and 
violence . A t h oroughgoing political ethic based up on t h e 
ministry of reconciliation will require more than the shaping 
of community decisions: it will require a continuing critical 
attention to the structures by which community d e cisions are 
made . In the field of foreign policy, if these decisions 
cannot always be made public , the ministry of reconciliation 
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insists that the claims of persons and communities shall be 
continuously represented in the structures by which the com-
munity instruments of power may be directed toward or against 
other persons and communities . 
The truth in the doctrine of separation of church and 
state, according to the ministry of reconciliation, is that 
both religious and political communities must be free to 
engage one another in a relationship of conflict . Whatever 
institutional separation is required for that possibility 
of conflict must be sanctioned by political ethics . There 
must also be a disentangling of symbolism if the loyalties 
which belong separately to the religious community and to 
the political community are not to merge t heir sentiments 
and preclude dynamically what their institutional separation 
seeks statically . The limitation in the doctrine of separa-
tion of church and state, according to the ministry of recon-
ciliation, is to ignore the fact that the boundaries of reli-
gious and political communities , if not identical, , intersect 
at every point in the lives of those communities . Dynamical-
ly, there is no way to prevent religious influence and polit-
ical influence from affecting each other . While the conflict 
between them must be maintained, that very conflict is a func-
tion of t heir relationship to each other . The reconciliation 
of that conflict, as that of all other conflicts requires at 
least a minimum of continuous consultation and regularized 
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procedures which bring the representatives of the religious 
and political communities together . Ironically, the pre-
vailing American interpretation of church-state relations 
permits a symbolic identification of religious and polit -
ical loyalties whi c h intensifies international conflict while 
repressing the inevitable domesti c conflicts between them 
and forbidding any serious attempt to reconcile them. 
The message of reconciliation in its political implica-
tions has a special relevance to the ecumenical concept of 
"the responsible societyn which emerged from the Amsterdam 
Assembly of the 1-Jorld Council of Churches in 1948 and which 
was defined as follows : "A responsible society is one where 
freedom is the freedom of men who acknowledge responsibility 
to justice and public order , and where t hose who hold polit -
ical authority or economic power are responsible for its 
exercise to God and the people whose welfare is affected by 
it."l The unfolding logic of t he message of reconciliation 
provides both shape and substance to such a definition . 
Among its truths which the dissertation has demonstrated are 
t hese : 
1. "Public order'' is not simply that to vJhich free men are 
res p onsible: free men share responsibility for public 
order . A disciplined public is beyond the capacity of 
1 . Amsterdam Assembly, The Church and the Di sorder of Society 
(New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1948), p . 200 . 
government officials to achieve by themselves: they must 
be sustained morally and practically by private groups . 
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2 . "Those who hold power't are not confined to secular leaders: 
religious leaders hold power peculiar to their profession 
and to their constituencies . To the norms which "the 
responsible society" prescribes for political and economic 
elites must be added norms of accountability for religious 
leaders themselves . 
3. The provisional and instrumental character of the state 
requires a recognition that all policies proposed for 
the state must be held provisionally and instrumentally . 
Religious leaders are obliged to avoid the conferring of 
ultimate sanctions upon the policies which t hey propose . 
4. 11 The responsible society't cannot prescribe norms for 
domestic social and economic policies without continuing 
reference to the fact of inte r national conflict and the 
need for international reconciliat i on . 
5. Both religious and political responsibilities require 
a sustained conflict between them if they are to be fully 
exercised . The ultimate logic of New Testament dogma is 
that of the secular state -- implicit in the Pauline cor-
respondence and in the Revelation of John but obscured 
by both Catholic and Calvinist teaching in later centuries . 
6 . 11 The responsible society" must not be taken as an abstrac -
tion to apply only to society en masse . A prerequisite of 
such a society is a pattern of multiple group loyalties 
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and conflicts within it and not absolutely dominated by it . 
Poli tical responsibility is more than a set of obligations 
to and for the state: it requires significant participation 
in private groups which influence the state . 
Protestantism's "stra tegy of power" in a responsible 
society must involve a radical participation in both the gen -
erating and the discipl ining of public energies . All of the 
inherent funct ions of the political arena must be illumi-
nated by the message of reconciliation and must be served 
with ar ticulated disc i plines of action . These functions in-
clude: (a) controversy over values; (b) conflict among groups ; 
(c) compromise in making decisions; and ( d) consensus sus-
t aining public policy . Th ere is nothing in the message of 
reconciliation which requires the moral rejection of any of 
these difficult public tasks; in fact, that message implicit -
ly provides ethical imperatives for the fulfillment of all 
these tasks . It is on l y the moralis tic corruption of that 
message --both the cause and consequence of the political 
alienation of .~erican Protestantism--which c an justify the 
escape from these responsibilities in a free society . 1l'hese 
are the disciplines which are required of political ethics 
and the Protestant "strategy of power . " They must be under-
stood by professional leaders first and then inte rpreted 
meaningfully in the training of lay members : controversy, 
conflict, compromise, consensus . No capitulation of ultimate 
religious loyalty is the necessary consequence of participa-
tion in these disciplines , although there are ethical and 
spiritual risks in each of them which must be resolutely 
guarded against . If American Protestantism has tended to 
idolize the state , it has tended to deny legitimacy to these 
political preconditions of the state . Only when Protestants 
become willing to bear the burdens of these di s ciplines will 
they be led out of their political alienation in their own 
11 land of the free and home of the brave . n 
There is no virtue of ethical insight or political 
participation or foreign policy which can provide absolute 
guarantees against the risks of violence . Neither the paci -
fist nor the nonpacifist is entitled to claim assurance that 
his action or his preferred policy can avoid injury or loss 
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of life, either for himself or for the entire human race . 
There is no Biblical promise that the earth is secure from 
universal catastrophe . Accordingly , political ethics is 
obliged to go beyond matters of opinion and power to a "strat-
egy of violence . " Such a term does not necessarily indicate 
the legitimacy of direct participation in violence, although 
some would have it so when confronted by dilemmas of "greater" 
and "lesser evils . " 1fuat that term does indicate is that 
when modern nations are preoccupied with preparation for vio-
lence, it is impossible for citizens to escape some degree 
of participation in it and for citizens in other nations to 
remain untouched by it . Regardless of the ethics of inten-
tional participation, there must be an ethics of response 
to the fact or the threat of violence . 
A Protestant ttstrategy of violence" must take account 
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of both the elements of consensus and the elements of conflict 
among pacifists and nonpacif i sts . While pacifists have gen-
erally been a minority movement within Protestantism, they 
have had two somewhat paradoxical influences upon ethical 
discussion : (a) they have imparted a moral orientation against 
war and military institutions which has spread far beyond their 
own limited numbers and made- it difficult to idcn tify 11 com-
mitted" pacifists; and (b) they have increasingly served to 
put the ethical burden of proof upon nonpacifists, particular -
ly with regard to the totalitarian character of modern war . 1 
Acknowledging the dangers of generalization, the typolo-
gy employed in this study may perhaps serve in analyzing 
dynamic tendencies of both pacifists and nonpacifists . 
Pacifism emphasizes ultimate loyalty , conflict with the state , 
sanctuary from partisan and international conflict , and 
a ministry of reconciliation . It tends to de-emphasize the 
legitimacy of political loyalties and the inevitability of 
political conflict and pacifism ' s own involvement therein , 
thereby alienating itself from the political system and 
1 . Bennett , Christians and the State , p . 165 . 
reducing its own capacity for reconciling conflicts . Non -
pacifism also claims ultimate loyalty but asserts emphatic 
sanctions for political loyalty and conflict . In the pre-
occupation with those sanctions, it tends to be oriented 
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away from the creative possibilities of conflict and the 
transcendence and reconciliation of conflict . Yet , between 
pacifists and nonpacifists , the whole range of the inherent 
functions of Protestantism in world politics is more or less 
encompassed . To the extent that Protestantism is capable of 
effecting an institutional reconciliation between its paci-
fists and nonpacifists, the dialectical energies inherent in 
both groups may be released to the more general task of 
reconciling international conflict . This is not to substitute 
a social scheme for an inherently e thical and theological con-
troversy , but it is to suggest that some shift of focus might 
mitigate the mutual aliena tion which has characterized the 
discussion of war and peace and maximize t he contributions 
of both groups . The elements of po tential consensus between 
pacifists and nonpacifists which have been emerging recently 
but which are yet to be perceived as such include t he foll ow-
ing items: 
1 . Resistance to ideological polarization in the Cold War 
and a corresponding concern for the hazards of national 
self - righteousness . 
2 . Rejection of various forms of neo - isolationism. 
3. Recognition of the social , economic, and ideological 
sources of Communist appeal . 
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4. Insistence that a military policy preoccupied with nuclear 
weapons and the threat of total war not only intensifies 
the threat of war but obscures the nature of most present 
and probable international conflicts . 
5. Awareness of the hazards of accidental war . 
6 . Attention to non- military factors- - political and psycho-
logical - -as preconditions of na t ional security and world 
community . 
7. Support for expanded economic and technical assistance . 
8 . Stress upon the bearing of such domestic problems as 
racial tensions and agricultural production upon national 
interests abroad . 
9 . Investigation of the nature of violence and the compulsions 
and aversions which attend violence in public opinion . 
10 . Acknowledgement that the elements of risk and sacrifice 
accompany any con ceivable foreign policy . 
Seifert has charged that both pacifists and nonpacifists 
have lacked a capacity for sustained attention to long-range 
problems in foreign policy : 
If we weighed distan t goals more heavily, we would 
insist that present choices include elements which 
might make even better choices possible in the 
future . Neithe r the pacifist nor the participant 
has dealt fully with the goal of peace until , in 
addition to nonparticipation or participation in 
present wars , he also invests energy in some move -
ment aimed at the fu ture elimination of war . His 
dimension of concern then includes a program de-
signed t o abolish for future generations the tragic 
decision to which he is now limited •••• It should 
prevent too hasty an acceptance of the compromise 
which fi rs t commended itself . l 
There is a radical imperative in the ministry of reconcilia-
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tion to prevent internationmviolence by sustained disciplines 
of personal and community involvement in the mitigation of 
suffering , injustice , hostility , fear . Until some more de -
finitive consensus among pacifists and nonpac ifists develops, 
the distinctive contributions of each to an overall Prot-
estant "strategy of violence" should be lifted up for ins pec-
tion . The Quaker International Service , a little-publicized 
operation with headquarters in Geneva , demonstrated between 
world wars the capacity of persons refusing to sanction vio-
lence to perform unique functions transcending international 
conflic t. The Service main t ained nEmbassies 11 and "Ambassadors" 
in such cities as Paris , Berlin , Vienna, and Rome . These 
centers provided opportuni ties for negotiation when regular 
political lines of communication broke down; they were widely 
trusted across national boundaries when suspicion hampered 
the work of other agencies . While the personnel at such 
"Embassies" were under no illusions about their ability to 
c ontro l political forces in Europe , they were able to provide 
vital services until full - scale war resumed . During the re -
viving Franco- German conflict , Quaker mediators in the Ruhr 
managed to secure the improvement of conditions under which 
1 . Seifert , p . 82 . 
political prisoners were being held; food was supp lied to 
families in Berlin; an exchange progrrua was arranged for the 
visits of German children to French families.; mutual respect 
for ~uaker integrity in the Sa~r helped to maintain order 
after the plebiscite in that province . In Poland , under 
Quaker "Ambassadors , " leaders of belligerent German and Po -
lish minorities met together for conferences and for study . 
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In Austria , negotiations were made for the disposition of about 
$ 240 , 000 in emergenc y relief , and similar arrangements were 
made in the Sudetenland while the German and Czech governments 
were a t odds . In Memel , Quaker diplomacy was able to modify 
the Li t huanian treatment of German prisoners . 1 
Perhaps the most distinc t ive ministry being performed by 
some nonpacifists is the r e f u sal to abandon identification 
with t hose persons whose vocations in the national government 
involve the making of military decisions and who may become 
involved in an official policy of violence . It is primarily 
through concerned nonpacifists that the humani t y of the mili -
tary i s remembered; the degree of ethical concern among mili -
tary leaders themselves appreciated ; the technical problems 
of military decision-making explored; the variety of policy 
alternatives among military thinkers understood . From the 
ranks of this ministry emerges a new kind of challenge to 
1 . Bertram Pickard , Pacifist Di lomac in Conflict Situations 
(Philadelphia: Pacifist Research Bureau , 19 3 • 
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pacifists and others for whom "militarism" is only an epi -
' 
thet: those who are most deeply concerned about war should 
be t h ose who have the fullest understanding of the problems 
of the military community . They have no eth ical justifica-
tion for allowing their personal aversion to a policy based 
upon the p remises of vio l ence to alienate them from the in-
ternal conflicts which must be personally sustained by 
thousands who , by choice , have just as much interest in 
a warless world and just as much desire for a private life 
and an alternat ive vocation . There is an experience of 
alienation for many persons in the military community which 
is the consequence of their separation from more natural 
comraunities , their irr.uaediate identification with instruments 
of death , and t heir ethical ambiguity which calls for a pos -
itive ministry of sensitive understanding and a negative re-
straint upon the amount of moral indignation unleashed 
against 11mili t a rism . 11 
iii . The Internalization of Conflict 
The ministry of reconciliation insists that t here is 
no ultimate status or concrete rea l ity to institutions as 
such . Beyond all strategies are the status and the reality 
of the person . While the individual canno t be absolutely 
separated from the source of h is b eing or the community of 
his interdependence , he has a life within himself . The vital-
ity and the pattern of t ha t inner life are uniquely h is own . 
It is in that private arena that the claims of his faith 
and the claims of his world me e t and mix . l 
The final logic of political ethics for the Christian 
is that his most perfect expression of transcendent loyalty 
is only to be found in that arena of conflict in which it is 
most difficult for him to express that loyalty . Only as he 
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subjects himself to the secular community in its law and force 
and controversy can he come to know the political meaning of 
the crucifixion which is prior to , but fulfilled in , the 
ultimate meaning of the crucifixion. Whether his status is 
lifted to that of an ''elite" o r is accorded little public 
recognition , he p articipates in a ministry of reconciliation 
in which his influence touches every other p erson in the world 
community . If he becomes a leader within the religious com-
munity , he must: 
1 . remain faithful to the radical source of his religious 
loyalty and facilitate cornnunication of the meaning of 
that loyalty within the religious community ; 
2 . Identify profoundly with the traditions of his own and 
other national heritag es and with the burdens of those 
who carry national heritage forward through their public 
vocations; 
l. James S . Coleman , "Social Cleavag e and Religious Conflict , " 
The Journal of Social Issues , 12 (1956) , p . 46 , observes 
that multiple identifications produce lines of cleavage with-
in the individual and "cross - pressures 11 which 8_re required 
for the holding of hostility to a minimura . Such lines of 
cleavage are defenses against "runaway" or 11 explosive" con-
flict . 
3 . not regard all political conflict as ''bad" and to be 
abolished but accept it as a vital necessity to be made 
constructive and not destructive; 
4. maintain a prophetic role of criticism within his nation-
al community , taking special care not to alienate himself 
unnecessarily in the process; 
5. provide a ministry to both the participants in and the 
victims of political and international conflict ; 
6. direct the attention of his constituents to forces making 
for the resolution of conflict and engage them in disci -
plines which vitally relate to those forces . 
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Beyond the patterns of his leadership , the Christian will 
need a "theology of conflict" which expresses both the radi-
cal apprehension of the most violent and destructive forces 
which can be released in human struggle and a radical appre -
hension of the most redeeming and creative forces which can 
only be released in hmnan struggle . While international con -
flict dramatizes the extremities of human action , it thereby 
reveals the bolder outlines of a theology of conflict . The 
prophetic tradi t ion in the Scriptures possessed such a theol -
ogy . What is tragically or triumphantly true in the life of 
nations is not less true in all human comraunities or in per-
sons who comprise them : there is an internal arena of struggle 
which participates in every external arena of struggle . 
"Idealists" have failed to recognize the inevitable and 
pervasive qualities of conflict . The most enthusiastic 
"idealists" of every generation are subject to disillusion-
ment when the demonic propensities of the conflicts t hey 
sought to avoid take their toll of life and virtue . 
"Realists , 11 who recognize conflict, are ahvays tempted 
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to interpret it by their own dogmas about the nature of man , 
the nature of history , the nature of evil--but their very 
dogmatic preoccupation is misplaced . Radical monotheism can-
not permit the erection of rigid dogmas concerning man , his -
tory , or evil because every such dogma becomes an idolatrous 
rival for the exclusive loyalty which belong s to God alone . 
These dogmas chronically blind the "realists" to the creative 
possibilities of man ' s moral response in history--possibili -
ties which the "idealists" feel but do not fully understand . 
The "realists" have brought a strange rev ersal to ethical dis -
cussion: they have allowed their own assumptions to check and 
compromise prema turely the fullness of the divine operation 
in history. 1ihile they have proclaimed the transcendence of 
God , they have not known how fully transcendent He is and 
how mysteriously His works are done . The 11 realists 11 are dog -
matic where they have no right to be and they are not dogmatic 
precisely where they must be . "Realists" have had in in-
tuitive wisdom which has revealed to them the demonic p ro-
pensities of conflict whi le "idealists" have had an intuitive 
wisdom which has revealed to them the creative energies of 
conflict. Together , they have formed a league to obscure the 
wholeness of the Christian ethic, including the Christian 
political ethic . 
Conflict--the actual and potential opposition of wills, 
human and divine -- is not simply the consequence of evil or 
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the ambivalence of man's nature or the intransigence of his -
tory . It is the divinely given precondition of all meaning-
ful human freedom and all meaningful human responsibility . 
More particularly , the "realists" have erred in their orienta-
tion to sin as a doctrine with which to interpret conflict . 
The initiative of interpretation must flow in the opposite di-
rection . From the full range of Scriptural testimony emerges 
the implicit understanding that it is conflict which helps 
to interpret the meaning of sin . Men are estranged from one 
another and from God, but not sLnply because of sin . Until 
the properties of conflict are themselves explored historical-
ly and empirically, the range of the meaning of human evil 
in all its variety cannot be fully apprehended . Even then, 
no "doctrine" of sin can be allowed to obscure the Power which 
is always working to overcome sin--often in the most unex-
pected ways --and which is always ready to reconcile men to 
one another and to Himself . It is not that a new doc trine of 
conflict can be erected by which all the "realists ' " favorite 
dogmas may be re-interpreted: there is no substitute for the 
long and difficult empirical investigation of all that con-
flict means to men and to history , Conflict, finally , has 
no ultimate status before the One God: it is only His 
arrangement for the bringing of all His cre a tures into the 
fullest possible fellowship with Himself . Man ' s separation 
from God and from his fellows is not an inherently evil fact : 
it is essential to his salvation as a free being . 1 
It is more than an accidental fact to be recorded that 
the 11 realists 11 have tended to ignore the inherent requirments 
of that single core of dogma at the very heart of t h e Chris -
tian message . Niebuhr and his followers have had very little 
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to say about the meaning of the Incarnation and the continuing 
meaning of the Church as the Boay of Christ . But it is only 
in relation to that dogmatic core that Christian ethics may 
be nourished and sustained for the disciplines of action in 
the 'iJOrld . The irony of the realists' own irony is that they 
have pretended to defend the fortress of Biblical faith while 
they have actually been defending themselves and allowing the 
fortress to collapse . 
Decision- making , for the Christian , has no inherent prop -
erties which dictate a less - than - faithful decision , whether 
in families or in foreign policies . That there are tensions 
to be borne is not the final word to be said . Political 
ethics, for the Christian, can have no other source than the 
ministry of reconciliation and all of the inherent requirements 
1 . Strangely enough, it is the heavily disguised moralism of 
the theological !!realists" themselves which has led them 
to interpret conflict and separation so ri gidly from a 
doctrine of sin--proving that those who had plumbed the 
depths of the Puritan ethos so critically were fi ghting 
an internal struggle in which t h e Puritan ethos shaped 
their own thought more than they knew . 
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of that ministry, according to which he must be an ambassador 
for Christ . 
As the individual Christian identifies himself with all 
human conflicts and internalizes them within his own being , 
he helps to resolve the tensions among international polit ica l 
and religious systems which have combined to assault men and 
women, young people and children , with hostility and guilt , 
pain and death , through long immemorial centuries --but which 
have become so demonic in these latest generations . This may 
be the new kind of Christian for whom the world is waiting: 
the person whose way of life is to take up all of the world's 
struggles within himself , and there , upon that inner battle -
ground, by a Power which is ready to use every struggle crea-
tively , to win the greatest of victories . But such a defi -
nition has , after all , a familiar ring: 11For in him all the 
fullness of God was pleased to dwell , and through him to rec -
oncile to himself all things , whether on earth or in he aven, 
making peace by the blood of his cross . " 1 
1. Col . 1:19- 20 . 
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ICA: International Cooperation A&ainistration 
BUR . EC . AFF .: Bureau of Economic Affairs 
BUR . I . O. AFF .: Bureau of International Organization 
Affairs 
AF: Bureau of African Affairs 
AM: Bureau of Inter - American Affairs 
E: Bureau of European Affairs 
FE: Bureau of Bar Eastern Affairs 
NE : Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs 
BUR . INT . & RES .: Bureau of Intelligence and Research 
BUR . PUB . AFF .: Bureau of Public Affairs 
BUR . ADMIN . : Bureau of Administration 
BUR . SEC . & CON . AFF .: Bureau of Security and Consular 
Affairs 
USDA: United States Disarmament Administration 
BUR . CONG . REL .: Bureau of Congressional Relations 
Other Bureaus, Agencies , and Officials 
USIA: United States Information Agency 
USIB : United States Intelligence Board 
CIA: Central Intelligence Agency 
SP . ASS 1 Ts.: Special Assistants to the President for 
National Security Affairs 
NSC PL . BD .: National Security Council Planning Board 
OCB : Operations Coordinating Board 
OCDM: Office of Civilian and Defense J:vlobi lization 
NASA : National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
AEC : Atomic Energy Commission 
FBI : Federal Bureau of Investigation 
I . & N.: Immigration and Naturalization Service 
JCS : Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Services 
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ABSTRACT 
Problem. It is the primary problem of the dissertation 
to develop a schematic and comprehensive approach to the em-
pirical study of the relationships between Protestantism and 
American foreign policy in the modern period, 1898-1960. 
There is a secondary and normative concern: to define these 
relationships in such a way as to guide the most fruitful 
further research and the most responsible reliiious action. 
After 1898, American forei gn policy increasingly came to 
require a 11 total diplomacy." At the same time, Protestantism 
was developing a 11 tot al relision. 11 This parall el expansion 
of national interests and religious interests to ultimate 
boun daries made the relationships between them complex beyond 
the ready apprehension of leaders and scholars in both poli-
tics and religion. Neither the ethicists nor the empirical 
students of religion have developed a theoretical structure 
adequate for the understanding of religious behavior in world 
politics. 
Method. The dissert a tion develops a typology which seeks 
to (a) extend the theoretical structure of the sociology of 
religion ao as to become more applicable to world politics; 
and (b) demonstrate the sources of insight available to church-
state theory and political ethics when they focus upon the 
dynamic relationships between reli gion and politics in their 
inevitably transnational aspects. 
The typology is constructed upon a triangular founda-
tion: a functional approach to reli gion, a dynamic and behav-
ioral theory of international conflict , and a model of deci-
sion-making in forei gn policy. The functional approach to 
reli gion permits the construction of an inventory of sixty 
simple statements which summarize previous research and which 
may be grouped for typological classification. Two radical 
categories of loyalty and conflict are apprehended as corre-
sponding to the cohesive and divisive properties of reli gion. 
The sustained methodological goal is to provide instruments 
for the sharpening of perception of reli gious influence upon 
foreign policy. 
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Conclusions. The six-fold typolo gy finally elaborated 
embraces the followini: (a) reli gion as a source of loyalty; 
(b) reli gion as a sanction for political loyalty; (c) reli-
gion as a sanction for political conflict; (d) reli gion as a 
source of political conf lict; (e) reli gion as a sanctuary from 
political conflict; and (f) reli gion as a reconciler of polit-
ical conflict. 
All of these types, inherent in the doctrine of the Cov-
enant, were mediated to Americans principally through the 
"Puritan ethos. 11 In the modern period, Woodrow ~ililson and 
\ 
John Foster Dulles most decisively recapitulated the Puritan 
ethos and its peculiar combination of nationalism and inter-
nationalism. In both war and peace, Protestant action has 
participated in the excesses of moral enthusiasm which have 
produced the most opposite effects upon foreign policy. The 
domestic ambivalence of the Puritan ethos has been witnessed 
in its polarities of political crusade and political aliena-
tion. 
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Ecumenical and missionary leaders have sought to identify 
Protestants with "supranational" loyalties. There is, however, 
a serious "opinion i ap 11 between Protestant pronouncements and 
the prevailing sentiments of lay members. New institutional 
strategies are required. Theological education must include 
responsible opinion leadership within its curriculum. Lay 
leadership requires a radical reorientation to the di ciplines 
appropriate to a more responsible public: controversy, con-
flict, compromise, consensus. 
The full meaning of 11 the message of reconciliation" is 
inseparable from a "theology of conflict" in which reli gious 
and political claims encounter one another as creatively as 
possible. The final logic of political ethics for the Chris-
tian is that his most perfect expression of transcendent loy-
alty is to subject himself to the secular community in its 
law and force and controversy; thus does he come to know the 
political meaning of the Crucifixion which is prior to, but 
fulfilled in, the ultimate meaning of the Crucifixion. It is 
only as the radically committed Christian internalizes the 
most acute stru6gles of his human world that he becomes an 
ambassador for Christ eniaged in the ministry of reconcilia-
tion. 
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